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Thesis abstract  
Scientists propose developing solar radiation management (SRM) geoengineering to offset 
rising global mean surface temperatures associated with anthropogenic climate change. The 
most prominent proposal is stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI). SAI involves creating aerosol 
particles in the stratosphere to reflect some incoming solar radiation and thereby reduce global 
temperature increase. SAI poses risks of transboundary harm and/or harm to the atmosphere, 
such as regional drought and further depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. It is therefore 
important that SAI is governed at an international level. However, presently there are no 
international agreements that specifically govern SAI, or SRM more generally.  
This thesis asks what role the ‘no-harm’ rule might play in the international governance of SAI. 
The no-harm rule is a longstanding principle of customary international law. It provides that 
states have an obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm and harm to the global 
commons. Legal scholarship has considered the potential of the no-harm rule as a basis of a 
claim for state responsibility should a state attempt SAI and cause significant transboundary 
harm. However, there has been no detailed consideration of the potential of the no-harm rule 
to respond prospectively to the risks of transboundary harm and/or harm to the atmosphere 
posed by SAI.  
This thesis examines the content of the no-harm rule and considers its likely influence on the 
behaviour of states in future attempts at SAI. Using doctrinal legal analysis, this thesis 
establishes that states have a duty to take positive action to prevent activities under their 
jurisdiction and control from causing significant transboundary harm and/or harm to the global 
commons.  This includes conducting an environmental impact assessment and notifying and 
consulting with potentially affected states. In the context of SAI, states may also be held strictly 
responsible should significant harm nevertheless result. However, the meaning of ‘significant’ 
harm is ambiguous, and it is unclear how this should be interpreted to determine when SAI will 
give rise to obligations under the no-harm rule. This thesis applies Brunnée and Toope’s theory 
of interactional international law to analyse the no-harm rule’s capacity to promote compliance 
through as sense of legal obligation and legitimacy. This capacity appears strongest regarding 
the prevention of transboundary harm and weakest for the prevention of harm to the global 
commons.  
Given the risks of harm to the atmosphere posed by SAI, it should be a priority for the 
international community to develop the no-harm rule for application to global commons areas. 
This thesis recommends developing a set of objective criteria to reduce doctrinal ambiguity for 
determining if a proposed activity poses a risk of significant harm to the global commons. It 
also recommends creating greater opportunities for mutual engagement between state and non-
state actors to enhance shared understandings and practices to strengthen the likelihood of 
compliance with the no-harm rule in this context. The results of this thesis provide a deeper 
understanding of the capacity of the no-harm rule to respond to the risks of SAI and how it 
might be developed to better contribute to international environmental governance.  
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Preface  
I first came across the issue of geoengineering in 2012, when I was looking for a thesis topic 
in international environmental law. Geoengineering was making headlines in the news. A 
controversial field experiment for stratospheric aerosol injection had been scheduled to take 
place in United Kingdom, but was cancelled largely due to patent conflicts. In that same year, 
an illegal ocean fertilization experiment was conducted off the coast of British Colombia, 
Canada. I was shocked by the sheer hubris of the idea that humans might deliberately 
manipulate the global climate, and by claims that the global community may not have a choice 
if it wishes to avoid severe climate change impacts. Moreover, I was deeply concerned by 
claims in popular media and academic literature that there were no rules of international law to 
prohibit geoengineering.   
I began this thesis with a broad focus on international law for the governance of 
geoengineering.  This led me to consider the no-harm rule. It quickly became apparent that 
there were no easy answers or explanations of the content of the no-harm rule, or the role it 
plays in contemporary international environmental governance. Geoengineering therefore 
provided a novel lens through which to reconsider the no-harm rule.  
The timing of this thesis has been fortuitous. Over the past four years, there has been a surge 
in interest in geoengineering and its potential to contribute to international efforts to combat 
climate change. There has also been a reawakening of interest in the no-harm rule in 
international law scholarship as a mechanism to enable international law to respond to complex 
threats of global environmental harm. It has been a wonderful experience to work on two 
cutting-edge topics.  
Throughout the course of my research, I have come to understand and appreciate that the future 
welfare of the global community may depend on some form of geoengineering going ahead to 
prevent excessive global temperature rise. But I firmly believe that international legal and 
governance mechanisms much first be in place to ensure that any attempts at geoengineering 
do not do more harm than good. I look forward to continuing to work towards the international 
governance of SRM.  
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1  Introduction 
Parts of this chapter are published in Kerryn Brent, Jeffrey McGee, and Jan McDonald, ‘The Governance of 
Geoengineering: An emerging Challenge for International and Domestic Legal Systems?’ (2015/2016) 
24(1) Journal of Law, Information and Science 1. Permission has been granted from the editor to reproduce 
sections of this article in this chapter (See appendix 1). 
 
The ‘no-harm’ rule1 is a longstanding principle of customary international law.2 The no-harm 
rule provides that states have a duty to prevent significant transboundary harm to the territory 
of other states, and harm to the global commons. 3  Since the no-harm rule was formally 
articulated in the Trail Smelter arbitration4, it has been restated in two influential international 
                                                 
1 Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility 
(Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), 137 & 145.   
2 Customary international law is unwritten international law that binds all states. Article 38 of The Statute of the 
International Court of Justice defines customary international law as ‘international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law’. Customary international law is formed by two elements. The first element is 
state practice; that is that states follow the custom. The second element is opinio juris sive necessitatis or a 
belief that the custom is law and must therefore be followed. For an explanation of customary international law 
see Donald K Anton, Penelope Mathew and Wayne Morgan, International Law- Cases and Materials (Oxford 
University Press, 2005 ) 202; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 
7th ed, 2008) 5-10. Alexandre  Kiss and Dinah  Shelton, International Environmental Law (Transnational 
Publishers, Inc. , 3rd ed, 2004), 175. Kiss and Shelton describe the role of customary rules in international 
environmental law as forming ‘a kind of common law of the environment.’  
3 See Trail Smelter Case (United States v Canada) (Awards) (1938 and1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1965 (‘Trail 
Smelter (Awards)’); Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN 
Doc.A/CONF/48/14/REV.1 (16 June 1972) (‘Stockholm Declaration’) principle 21; Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1(3-14 June 1992) (‘Rio 
Declaration’) principle 2; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 
226, 241-242 (‘Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion)’); Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of 
International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 195-196. According to Sands and 
Peel, there is no question since the Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) that states have a duty under 
customary international law to prevent harm to the territory of other states and the global commons.  The global 
commons are areas and resources that exist beyond the territorial jurisdiction of states and/or cannot be 
exclusively owned and controlled by states. The oldest global commons recognised by international law is the 
high seas. The global commons also include the deep seabed and outer space. See Kathy Leigh, 'Liability for 
Damage to the Global Commons' (1992) 14 Australian Year Book of International Law 129, 130 and Marvin S. 
Soroos, 'Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons' (1998) 40(2) Environment: Science and Policy for 
Sustainable Development 6, 6. This project recognises that Antarctica is technically not a global commons as it 
is still subject to state sovereignty claims. These claims have been ‘frozen’ by The Antarctic Treaty, opened for 
signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 72 (entered into force 23 June 1961) art IV. Antarctica is nonetheless 
commonly referred to as a global commons in international law literature and this project follows this trend. See 
Sands and Peel, above n 3, 579 nn 10.         
4 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1965. The Trail Smelter arbitration concerned a 
bilateral dispute between the United States and Canada. The Tribunal reached its decision by applying principles 
of international law and US domestic law. This is further discussed in chapter 4.2.   
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soft law’5 agreements: the 1972 Stockholm Declaration6 and the 1992 Rio Declaration7. The 
no-harm rule has also been incorporated into binding international agreements8, and it has been 
recognised by the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’).9 It is therefore well-recognised as a 
binding rule of customary international law.  
As a principle of customary international law, the no-harm rule has the potential to ‘fill the 
gaps’ between international environmental agreements. Many environmental issues of 
international concern, such as transboundary air pollution and ozone depletion, are now 
governed by specific international agreements. 10  However, the scope of international 
agreements to respond to global environmental issues is not comprehensive. For example, key 
international environmental agreements, such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’) and the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (‘LRTAP’) do not bind all states.11 Furthermore, new threats of environmental harm 
may arise that are not specifically addressed by existing international agreements. The no-harm 
rule is binding on all states, and provides states with general obligations and sets a general 
standard for states to prevent activities under their jurisdiction and control from causing 
significant harm to the environment of other states and to the areas beyond their jurisdiction 
                                                 
5 ‘Soft law’ agreements are non-binding agreements in international law. However, they may provide influential 
statements of existing customary law norms, and they can lead to the development of new customary norms. See 
Sands and Peel, above n 3, 108; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, 'Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment ' 
(1990-1992) 12 Michigan Journal of International Law 420, 422. Dupuy highlights that soft law has been 
important in the development of international environmental law, as many principles of international 
environmental law have evolved from soft-law agreements. 
6 Stockholm Declaration, principle 21. 
7 Rio Declaration, principle 2.  
8 See, eg, Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened 
for signature 29 December 1972, 1046 UNTS 138 (entered into force 30 August 1975) preamble (‘London 
Convention’); Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered 
into force 29 December 1993) art 3 (‘CBD’); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (Entered into force 21 March 1994) preamble (‘UNFCCC’); 
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 1979, 1302 UNTA 
217 (entered into force 16 March 1983) preamble (‘LRTAP’); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 293 (entered into force 22 September 1988) 
preamble (‘Ozone Convention’); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 
December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) art 192-194(2) (‘UNCLOS’). 
9 Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 241 – 242. This obligation was repeated by the ICJ 
in the Case Concerning the Gabçikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Merits) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 41 
(‘Gabçikovo-Nagymaros Project’).   
10 For example, the problem of transboundary air pollution is addressed under the LRTAP Convention. Depletion 
of the stratospheric ozone layer is addressed by the Ozone Convention and the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 1987, [1989] ATS 18 (entered into force 1 
January 1989) (‘Montreal Protocol’).   
11 There are only 168 parties to UNCLOS. Most notably, the United States is not a party. See United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (6 May 2017) United Nations Treaty Collection 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-
6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en#1>. LRTAP is a regional convention. Membership is confined to 
European states with the exception of the US and Canada. See 1.2.4 below.  
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and control. The no-harm rule can form the basis of claims for state responsibility and 
reparations for harm caused to other states. It also provides states with a duty of conduct or 
‘due diligence’ to take positive steps to prevent significant transboundary harm and harm to 
the global commons. This includes procedural obligations, such as the duty to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) and the duty to notify and consult with potentially 
affected states. The no-harm rule therefore has the potential to enable international law to 
respond to activities that pose risks of transboundary harm or harm to the global commons that 
are not otherwise governed by international agreements.  
One such future threat to the global environment is solar radiation management (SRM) 
geoengineering. Geoengineering is defined as ‘the deliberate large-scale intervention in the 
Earth’s climate system, in order to moderate global warming.’12  SRM refers to a suite of 
geoengineering technologies currently being considered as a potential response to 
anthropogenic climate change. SRM is being proposed as a means to cool the global 
temperature by limiting the amount of sunlight (i.e. energy) that enters the earth’s 
atmosphere.13 The most prominent proposed method of SRM, stratospheric aerosol injection 
(SAI), 14  poses a significant risk of transboundary environmental harm and harm to the 
atmosphere per se. Scientists predict that harmful side-effects could include widespread 
drought, ozone depletion, and an increase to the earth’s vulnerability to climate change.15 The 
proposed development of SRM also presents political and social risks. For example, there is 
concern that if SRM were to be successfully developed, it could detract from current efforts 
and weaken political resolve to mitigate climate change by reducing global greenhouse gas 
emissions.16   
Despite these risks, there are currently no international agreements that specifically govern 
SRM.17 There is also currently no prospect that a binding international agreement for SRM is 
                                                 
12 The Royal Society, 'Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty ' (The Royal Society 
2009) 1 (‘Royal Society Report’). This definition is widely used in geoengineering literature.  
13 See ibid; Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, 'Solar radiation management: the governance of 
research ' (Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, 2011) <http://www.srmgi.org/report/> (‘SRMGI 
Report’).  
14 This term is used in S Schäfer et al, The European Transdisciplinary Assessment of Climate Engineering 
(EuTRACE): Removing Greenhouse Gases from the Atmosphere and Reflecting Sunlight away from Earth 
(2015) <http://www.eutrace.org/> 41('EuTRACE Report'). These proposals are also commonly referred to as 
sulphate aerosol injection.  
15 See, eg, Alan Robock, '20 reasons why geoengineering may be a bad idea' (2008) 64(2) Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 14; EuTRACE Report, above n 14, 43-44; Royal Society Report, above n 12, 31.  
16 See, eg, EuTRACE Report, above n 14, 58-60.  
17 Efforts were made in the 1970’s to ban environmental modification techniques, which are analogous to 
geoengineering, under the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
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to be negotiated in the near future. This is alarming, given that there are proponents who 
advocate that SRM research should progress to field testing in the atmosphere in the near 
future.18 Furthermore, the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change has set an ambitious target 
of limiting global warming to ‘well below 2°C’ with the further intention of pursuing ‘efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C’.19 Leading climate change scientists and scholars 
have suggested that geoengineering might be necessary to achieve this target.20 In this sense, 
the Paris Agreement has amplified calls to develop geoengineering technology, without 
providing a framework for future governance. The international governance of SRM is 
therefore a pressing issue for international law and governance scholars, scientists and policy-
makers.21  
This project examines the potential for the no-harm rule to contribute to the international 
governance of SRM. In this project, the term ‘governance’ is used to mean the ‘process of 
steering or guiding societies towards collective outcomes that are socially desirable and away 
from those that are socially undesirable.’22 This project recognises that governance can be 
achieved by formal (such as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ international agreements) and informal (such as 
self-governance) mechanisms.  However, due to the nature of proposed SRM and its potential 
to have global impacts and side effects, formal governance mechanisms will be necessary at an 
international level.23   
                                                 
Modification Techniques, opened for signature 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151 (entered into force 5 
October 1978) art 2 (‘ENMOD’). For further discussion, see 1.2.1 below.  
18 Stefan Schafer et al, 'Field tests of solar climate engineering' (2013) 3(9) Nature Clim. Change 766. For 
examples of proposals to progress to field testing, see Douglas G. MacMynowski et al, 'Can we test 
geoengineering?' (2011) 4(12) Energy & Environmental Science 5044; Edward A Parson and David W Keith, 
'End the Deadlock on Governance of Geoengineering Research' (2013) 339(6125) Science 1278; David G Victor 
et al, 'The Truth About Geoengineering' (2013)  Foreign Affairs 1 
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/global-commons/2013-03-27/truth-about-geoengineering>; Jane C S 
Long, Frank Loy and M Granger Morgan, 'Start research on climate engineering ' (2015) 518(7537) Nature 29.  
19 Paris Agreement, opened for signature 12 December 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016) < 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php>. 
20 See eg Kevin Anderson, ‘Talks in the city of light generate more heat’ 582 (7583) Nature 437; John 
Shepherd, ‘What does the Paris Agreement mean for geoengineering?’ on The Royal Society (17 Feb 2016) 
<http://blogs.royalsociety.org/in-verba/2016/02/17/what-does-the-paris-agreement-mean-for-geoengineering/>; 
Joshua B Horton, David W Keith and Matthias Honegger ‘Implications of the Paris Agreement for Carbon 
Dioxide Removal and Solar Geoengineering’ Harvard Project on Climate Agreements (July 2016) 
<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/160700_horton-keith-honegger_vp2.pdf>;   
21 See Kerryn Brent, Jeffrey McGee and J McDonald, 'The Governance of Geoengineernig: An emerging 
Challenge for International and Domestic Legal Systems?' (2015-2016) 24(1) Journal of Law, Information and 
Science EAP 1. 
22 Oran R Young, Leslie A King, and Heike Schroeder (eds) Institutions and Environmental Change: Principal 
Findings, Applications and Research Frontiers (MIT Press, 2008) glossary.  
23 See Ian D  Lloyd and Michael Oppenheimer, 'On the design of an international governance framwork for 
geoengineering ' (2014) 14(2) Global Environmental Politics 45, 46.  
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There has been some consideration from international law scholars of the potential application 
of the no-harm rule to geoengineering. 24 Such consideration has typically focused on the 
potential of the no-harm rule to form the basis of a claim for state responsibility or liability for 
transboundary harm once it has been caused.25 There is little understanding of its capacity as a 
primary rule of international law26 to influence the behaviour and decision-making of states in 
order to prevent harm in the first place. Existing research on the no-harm rule and SRM is also 
limited, and stands against more widespread, general claims in geoengineering governance 
literature that international law does not govern geoengineering, as well as claims that current 
international law actually encourages the development of geoengineering. 27 For example, 
leading international governance scholar Scott Barrett has stated that ‘countries are more or 
less free to do what they want’ with regards to future attempts at geoengineering.28 Such claims 
are typically made with reference to existing treaty regimes and without detailed consideration 
of rules of customary international law and the role it plays in international environmental 
governance.29  
This project challenges such claims by providing a detailed analysis of the no-harm rule and 
enhances the understanding of legal and geoengineering scholars alike as to what role the no-
harm rule might play in governing the risks of SRM. The main focus is on the role and function 
of the no-harm rule as a primary rule of international law, and not merely a means for triggering 
‘secondary’ rules of state responsibility, or as a means to claim reparations for harm.30 This 
                                                 
24 See, eg, Barbara Saxler, Jule Siegfried and Alexander Proelss, 'International liability for transboundary 
damage arising from stratospheric aerosol injections' (2015) 7(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 112; David 
Reichwein et al, 'State Responsibility for Environmental Harm from Climate Engineering' (2015) 5(2-4) Climate 
law 142; Anna-Maria Hubert and David Reichwein, 'An Exploration of a Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Scientific Research involving Geoengineering: Introduction, Draft Articles and Commentaries' (IASS, Potsdam 
Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, University of Oxford, 2015), Draft Article 7.  
25 Saxler, Siegfried and Proelss, above n 24; Reichwein et al, above n 24.  
26 These are substantive rules of international law that require, permit or prohibit certain conduct on behalf of a 
state. See Alan E. Boyle, 'State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts 
Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?' (1990) 39(1) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 10. See also Chapter 2.3.  
27 For an example of this view expressed in popular media, see Michael Marshall, ‘Geoengineers are free to 
legally hack the climate’ New Scientist, (1 November 2013) 
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22029413-800-geoengineers-are-free-to-legally-hack-the-climate/>. 
In this article, geoengineering governance scholars Jess Reynolds and Scott Barrett suggest that international 
law does not restrain states from engaging in geoengineering. See also Jesse Reynolds, 'Climate Engineering 
Field Research: The Favorable Setting of International Environmental Law' (2014) 5 Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 417. 
28 Quoted in Marshall, above n 27.  
29 See Chapter 2.1.   
30 Boyle, above n 26, 10. This distinction is followed by the International Law Commission in the ‘Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) II(2) 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 31 (‘Draft Articles on State Responsibility’).  
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project therefore considers the content of the no-harm rule, as well as questions of compliance. 
As noted by Raustiala and Slaughter, ‘[l]aw and compliance are conceptually linked because 
law explicitly aims to produce compliance with its rules’.31 There are different understandings 
of compliance with international law. This research takes a causative approach to considering 
compliance with the no-harm rule.32 That is, it not only considers whether states are likely to 
meet their obligations under the no-harm rule, but the extent to which such behaviour is driven 
by the rule itself. This approach therefore overlaps with certain understandings of the 
effectiveness of legal rules, being ‘the degree to which a rule induces changes in behaviour that 
further the rule's goals’.33        
This project therefore aims to:  
(1) Analyse the content of the no-harm rule and how it would apply to SRM;  
(2) Assess whether states are likely to comply with the no-harm rule, as currently 
formulated, in developing and attempting SRM; and 
(3) Consider how the no-harm rule might be developed to better respond to the risks of 
SRM and prevent harm to the global environment.  
In resolving these issues, this work contributes to the existing scholarship on geoengineering 
by providing a detailed analysis of the potential of the no-harm rule to contribute to 
geoengineering governance. At the same time, it contributes to a deeper understanding of the 
no-harm rule by undertaking a comprehensive chronological analysis of the rule’s development 
through key legal sources, including recent interpretation by the ICJ in the 2015 case Certain 
Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & 
Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica).     
                                                 
31 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie  Slaughter, 'International Law, International Relations and Compliance ' in 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (Sage 
Publications, 2002) 538, 583.  
32 See David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy 
(Foundation Press, 4 ed, 2011) 362. Hunter, Salzman and Zaelke define compliance in the context of 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) as the measure of an MEA’s success at changing behaviour of 
key actors. 
33 See also Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 31, 589; Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A 
Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University Press, Inc., 2008) 22-23; Oran R Young and Marc A Levy, 'The 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes' in Oran R Young (ed), The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999) 1, 4-6. The approach in this project 
combines what Young describes as the ‘legal approach’ and the ‘political approach’ to effectiveness. The legal 
approach focuses on the degree to which obligations are met. The political approach focuses on how rule or 
regimes change behaviour. These approaches are distinct from the so-called ‘problem solving’ approach to 
effectiveness, which is whether or not rule or regimes alleviate a specific problem (at 4). As SRM has not yet 
been conducted, it is impossible to consider effectiveness from this perspective.   
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In order to achieve these aims, this project takes an interdisciplinary approach to analysing the 
no-harm rule. It integrates doctrinal legal analysis with Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope’s 
theory of interactional international law.34 Doctrinal legal analysis is used to trace the historical 
development the no-harm rule through authoritative international law sources to assess its 
purpose and content. This understanding of the no-harm rule is then applied to proposed SRM 
geoengineering to determine the extent to which the no-harm rule is likely to respond to the 
risks of these proposals. This project then analyses the no-harm rule against interactional law 
theory. Interactional law theory is a theory of legal obligation, being a sense of legal legitimacy 
and commitment or ‘fidelity’ to international law that promotes compliance.35 Brunnée and 
Toope understand laws to be legitimate when the internal features of a legal norm promote 
compliance with that rule as well as to the rule of law itself.36  This theory explains how legal 
norms can be made to promote a strong sense of legal legitimacy and legal obligation that, in 
turn, increases the likelihood of compliance. This is important in the international law system 
which lacks coercive enforcement mechanisms and mandatory means of dispute resolution 
characteristic of domestic legal systems. This research assesses the no-harm rule against 
interactional law theory to determine its capacity to promote a sense of legal obligation and, 
consequently, whether the rule is likely to promote compliance from states should they decide 
to attempt SRM in the future. The results of these two lines of inquiry are used to recommend 
how the no-harm rule might be further developed to better contribute to the governance of 
SRM.  
This research suggests that the capacity of the no-harm rule to respond to the risks of harm 
posed by SRM would differ depending on the nature of the risks. That is, whether they are risks 
of transboundary harm to the territory of another state or harm to the atmosphere per se. The 
findings in this project indicate that the no-harm rule is better placed to respond to risks of 
transboundary harm from SRM than risks of harm to the atmosphere per se. The content of the 
no-harm rule is more firmly established in the context of transboundary harm. Application of 
                                                 
34 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
35 Brunnée and Toope, 7.  
36 Ibid, 52-53. In some respects, this understanding of legitimacy reflects that of Thomas Franck. See Thomas M 
Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International Law System' (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law 705, 
713. However, Brunnée and Toope distinguish their theory from Franck’s, as they privilege the role of different 
internal features in building legitimacy. Brunnée and Toope’s understanding of legitimacy is also distinct from 
other theories of legitimacy in international law. See, eg, Daniel Bodansky, 'The Legitimacy of International 
Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?' (1999) 93(3) The American Journal of 
International Law 596; Mattias Kumm, 'The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis' (2004) 15(5) European Journal of International Law 907.  
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interactional law theory also suggests that the no-harm rule is more likely to generate a sense 
of legal obligation in this context. In comparison, it is less clear how the content of the no-harm 
rule should be interpreted to apply to risks of harm to the atmosphere. The no-harm rule is also 
less likely to promote a sense of legal obligation, thereby reducing the prospect of compliance 
in this context. Given the risks of harm that SRM poses to the atmosphere, this project 
recommends that future development of the no-harm rule should, as a priority, aim to bolster 
the rule’s capacity in this regard.  
Having summarised the key elements of this research, the remainder of this introduction 
proceeds in four sections. Section 1.1 introduces SRM geoengineering and highlights key 
environmental risks and governance challenges. Section 1.2 explains how existing international 
agreements do not adequately respond to the risks of SRM.  Section 1.3 provides an overview 
of the theoretical approach taken in this project and why this approach is important. Finally, 
section 1.4 outlines the chapters of this thesis.  
1.1 SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT GEOENGINEERING  
Solar radiation management (SRM) is a class of proposed geoengineering technologies. SRM 
seeks to reduce rising global temperatures associated with climate change by reflecting a 
portion of incoming solar radiation (i.e. sunlight) away from the Earth.37 The most discussed 
SRM proposal, stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), would mimic the cooling effect of a large 
volcanic eruption by creating a fine layer of particles in the stratosphere to reflect away a 
proportion of incoming solar radiation. Given the prominence of SAI, the analysis in this 
research is specifically directed at these proposals. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the analysis 
in this research may also be relevant to other proposed methods of geoengineering, including 
other SRM proposals and carbon dioxide removal proposals. This section provides a detailed 
overview of SAI proposals, with a view to highlighting the risks and uncertainties associated 
with them.  
1.2.1 What is SRM and why is it being proposed?  
The aim behind SAI (and SRM more generally) is to reduce global mean surface temperatures 
by altering the amount of energy that enters and leaves the Earth’s atmosphere. The Earth’s 
temperature (and hence climate) is determined by three elements: (1) incoming solar radiation 
energy from the sun; (2) the Earth’s ‘albedo’ or reflectivity; and (3) the ‘greenhouse’ effect 
                                                 
37 See Royal Society Report, above n 12, 23.   
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produced by greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere.38 Burch and Harris describe these 
elements as forming the Earth’s ‘energy budget’, as each element influences ‘how much energy 
enters and leaves the climate system.’39 To put it simply, incoming solar radiation enters the 
Earth’s atmosphere, where an amount is absorbed by the Earth’s surface and some emitted into 
the atmosphere as infrared radiation.40 Some of this infrared radiation escapes back out into 
space with the residual trapped in the atmosphere by GHGs.41 It is this ‘energy budget’ that 
has kept the Earth’s surface and atmospheric temperatures at levels that are consistent with 
human flourishing over the last several thousand years. Figure 1.1 below provides a simplified 
representation of the Earth’s energy budget.  
Figure 1.1 The Earth’s energy budget42 
 
                                                 
38 Sarah L Burch and Sara E  Harris, Understanding Climate Change: Science, Policy and Practice (University 
of Toronto Press, 2014) 51.  
39 Ibid, 51.  
40 Burch and Harris, above n 38, 53. Burch and Harris note that approximately 30% of incoming solar radiation 
is reflected by clouds, dust and aerosols in the atmosphere.  
41 Ibid, 54.  
42 In order to clearly visualise the purpose of SRM, this diagram, and the further two below, do not represent the 
amount of incoming solar radiation that is naturally reflected by clouds, dust and aerosols in the atmosphere. See 
note 39 above.  
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Human activities, such as the burning of fossil fuels, have over the last 200 years significantly 
increased the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere thereby trapping more 
outgoing infrared radiation and disturbing the Earth’s energy budget. The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report states that human activities have 
caused the Earth’s atmospheric concentration of GHGs (i.e. carbon dioxide, methane and 
nitrous oxide) to increase to their highest levels in 800,000 years.43 In the words of the IPCC, 
it is ‘extremely likely’ that the increased level of GHGs in the atmosphere is the dominant 
cause of climate change. 44  The increase in carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion is of particular concern to scientists. Approximately 80% of the total increase in 
GHG emissions from 1970-2010 came from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes.45 
In May 2013, the Mauna Loa observatory in Hawaii recorded atmospheric carbon dioxide 
levels over 400 ppm for the first time.46 The changes to the Earth’s energy budget due to 
increased levels of GHGs in the atmosphere is represented in figure 1.2 below.  
  
                                                 
43 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers' in Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 29 
<http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf> 4. According to this report, 
the atmospheric concentration of these GHGs in 2011 were as follows: carbon dioxide was 40% higher than pre-
industrial levels at 391 parts per million (ppm); methane was 150% higher than pre-industrial levels at 1803 
parts per billion (ppb); and nitrous oxide was 20% higher than pre-industrial levels at 324 ppb (at 11).  
44 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 'Summary for Policymakers' in Climate Change 2014: Synthesis 
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014) <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/> ('AR5 
Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers') 4.  
45 Ibid, 5. 
46 National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Carbon Dioxide at NOAA’s Mauna Loa 
Observatory reaches new milestone: Tops 400 ppm (10 May 2013) 
<http://research.noaa.gov/News/NewsArchive/LatestNews/TabId/684/ArtMID/1768/ArticleID/10061/Carbon-
Dioxide-at-NOAA%E2%80%99s-Mauna-Loa-Observatory-reaches-new-milestone-Tops-400-ppm.aspx>. 
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Figure 1.2 How increased levels of GHGs in the atmosphere has changed the Earth’s energy 
budget   
 
 
Scientists propose to develop geoengineering technology as a means of addressing this energy 
imbalance. One class of proposed methods is carbon dioxide removal (CDR). The aim of CDR 
is to address the increased atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases by removing carbon 
dioxide directly from the atmosphere (i.e. direct air capture) and storing it for a sufficiently 
long period to influence the global energy budget.47 Numerous techniques have been proposed 
to capture and store carbon dioxide in the land or in the oceans. Examples of proposed land-
based CDR techniques include: afforestation and reforestation; 48  bioenergy with carbon 
                                                 
47 See Royal Society Report, above n 12, 9.  
48 See National Research Council, Climate Intervention: Carbon Dioxide Removal and Reliable Sequestration 
(The National Academies Press, 2015) <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18805/climate-intervention-carbon-
dioxide-removal-and-reliable-sequestration> 39 (‘NRC CDR Report’). Afforestation and reforestation are 
proposals to restore deforested land in order to create a land-based carbon sink. According to the Royal Society 
Report, afforestation and reforestation are not traditionally identified as ‘geoengineering’. See Royal Society 
Report, above n 12, 10. 
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capture and storage;49 and direct air capture and sequestration.50 Examples of proposed ocean-
based CDR include: Ocean Iron Fertilization (OIF) and ocean upwelling/downwelling.51  
By contrast, SRM is intended to directly address the ‘effects’ of climate change, namely rising 
global mean surface temperatures.52 Scientists propose SRM to limit the amount of incoming 
solar radiation to compensate for the increased absorption of infrared radiation in the 
atmosphere.53 Instead of allowing more energy to escape the atmosphere, SRM would reduce 
the amount of energy entering in the first place. Figure 1.3 below represents how SRM would 
influence the Earth’s energy budget.  
Figure 1.3 How SRM would influence the Earth’s energy budget  
 
 
                                                 
49 See NRC CDR Report, above n 48, 63. According to the NRC CDR Report, biomass (i.e. vegetation) draws 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through photosynthesis. The concept behind this form of CDR is to use 
biomass to produce energy/electricity. The carbon dioxide released in this process would be captured at source 
to prevent it from entering the atmosphere.  
50 See ibid, 67. These are proposals to chemically ‘scrub’ (i.e. remove) carbon dioxide directly from ambient air 
and store it.  
51 See Royal Society Report, above n 12, 19 
52 Royal Society Report, above n 12, ix. 
53 Ibid, 23. 
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Proposed SRM technologies aim to reduce the amount of incoming solar radiation by 
enhancing the reflectivity (‘albedo’) of the earth.54 One proposed method of SRM is to increase 
the amount of solar radiation reflected away from the Earth by placing giant mirrors into outer 
space to orbit the earth at strategic locations.55 Another proposal is to increase the brightness 
of naturally-formed ocean clouds so that they reflect more sunlight.56 However, this research 
focuses on stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), as it is the most prominently discussed 
proposal. 
1.2.2 Stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI): A proposed method of SRM  
SAI is an SRM geoengineering proposal designed to mimic the climatic effects of large 
volcanic eruptions.57 Scientist propose creating a fine layer of a minute aerosol particles in the 
stratosphere. 58 The particles would be created in the stratosphere using modified weather 
balloons, jet aircraft or military artillery.59 Unlike the troposphere (the lowest layer of the 
atmosphere in which we experience weather) the stratosphere is relatively stable with little 
convection (upwards and downwards movement of air). 60 Scientists suggest that particles 
could therefore remain suspended in the stratosphere for 12 months or more.61  Once in the 
stratosphere, these particles would create a fine reflective layer intended to prevent a 
percentage of incoming solar radiation from reaching the Earth’s surface.62  
SAI is one of the most prominent geoengineering proposals due to its perceived affordability, 
short-term feasibility and likely effectiveness in reducing temperatures.63 According to the 
Royal Society Report, SAI is likely to be highly effective in reducing global temperatures and 
                                                 
54 Ibid.  
55 Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy (COSEPUP), Policy Implications of Greenhouse 
Warming: Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Basis, (National Academy Press, 1991) 448. 
56 See EuTRACE Report, above n 14, 44-46.  
57 Ibid, 22. See also Paul J Crutzen, 'Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to 
Resolve a Policy Dilemma?' (2006) 77(3-4) Climatic Change 211.  
58 Royal Society Report, above n 12, 29. According to this report, the most prominent proposal is to use sulphate 
aerosols. However, some scientists advocate using other substances, such as aluminia particles or diamond dust 
as they may have less undesirable side effects. See Andy Extance, ‘Climate scientists ponder spraying diamond 
dust in the sky to cool the planet’, Nature News 26 October 2015 <http://www.nature.com/news/climate-
scientists-ponder-spraying-diamond-dust-in-the-sky-to-cool-planet-1.18634>.   
59 See Royal Society Report, above n 12, 32. See also Alan Robock et al, 'Benefits, risks, and costs of 
stratospheric geoengineering' (2009) 36(19) Geophysical Research Letters L19703, 4-6.  
60 Burch and Harris, above n 38, 40-41.  
61 Royal Society Report, above n 12, 29. Particles in the troposphere would only stay suspended for a short 
period of time (days or weeks) before being rained out. See ibid, 40-41.  
62 See, e.g. Royal Society Report, above n 12, 29; National Research Council, Climate Intervention: Reflecting 
Sunlight to Cool the Earth (The National Academies Press, 2015) <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18988/climate-
intervention-reflecting-sunlight-to-cool-earth> ('NRC SRM Report') 66-67. The NRC report notes that aerosols 
naturally exist in the stratosphere and SAI would increase the amount of aerosols in the stratosphere.   
63 See EuTRACE Report, above n 14, 22. 
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could be feasibly developed in the near future.64 Scientists are yet to field test SAI in the 
stratosphere. Nevertheless, they are confident it will have a cooling effect from observing the 
climatic cooling effects produced by large volcanic eruptions, such as from the 1991 eruption 
of Mt Pinatubo in the Philippines.65 As prominent atmospheric chemist Crutzen notes in his 
seminal paper on SAI, the eruption of Mt Pinatubo in 1991 injected around 10 teregrams 
(approx. 10000 kilotons) of sulphur into the stratosphere that cooled the global mean surface 
temperatures by 0.5˚C within 12 months. 66  SAI is essentially intended to mimic this 
phenomenon.  
The promise that SAI could reduce global temperatures within 12 months of deployment makes 
it attractive as an ‘emergency response’ to climate change.67 For example, it has been suggested 
that SAI could be deployed to prevent abrupt and/or irreversible climate change impacts, such 
as the melting of tundra or ice caps. 68  More recently, scientists have begun to consider 
conducting SAI as a ‘complement’ to climate change mitigation strategies, rather than as an 
emergency substitute or alternative. 69  Keith and MacMartin propose that SRM could be 
conducted on a more moderate scale, alongside mitigation and carbon dioxide removal efforts, 
as a temporary means to limit the ‘rate and absolute magnitude’ of climate change.70 This 
proposal envisages SAI playing an important role in medium- to long-term global strategies to 
respond to climate change. 
The final perceived benefit of SAI is its apparent affordability. Generally speaking, SRM 
proposals appear to be relatively affordable compared to CDR proposals, such as ocean iron 
fertilization. 71  Robock et al suggest that the annual cost of deploying SAI would vary 
depending on the method by which it is delivered into the stratosphere. For example, they 
suggest that it may be significantly cheaper to deliver the sulphates into the stratosphere using 
modified aircraft compared to weather balloons or military artillery.72 Early estimates suggest 
that SAI could cost as little as US$1 billion per annum.73 The cost of SAI could also be 
                                                 
64 Royal Society Report, above n 12, 31.  
65 Crutzen, above n 57, 212. 
66 Ibid. 
67 The Royal Society Report, above n 12, 31.  
68 See Nils Markusson et al, '‘In case of emergency press here’: framing geoengineering as a response to 
dangerous climate change' (2014) 5(2) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 281, 282.  
69 David W. Keith and Douglas G. MacMartin, 'A temporary, moderate and responsive scenario for solar 
geoengineering' (2015) 5(3) Nature Climate Change 201.  
70 Ibid, 205-206.  
71 See NRC SRM Report, above n 62, 4 Table S.1. 
72 Robock et al, above n 58, 7.  
73 See Scott Barrett, 'The incredible economics of geoengineering' (2008) 39(1) Environmental and Resource 
Economics 45, 49. For a more recent summary of cost estimates see EuTRACE Report, above n 14, 42.  
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significantly less – up to 1000 times cheaper - than traditional climate change mitigation 
strategies.74  However, these perceived benefits of SAI must be weighed against the significant 
uncertainty and potential environmental and associated social risks inherent in these proposals.  
In scientific literature, the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” are often attributed different 
meanings. Gardiner provides a simple explanation of this use, stating that: ‘[i]n the technical 
sense, a risk involves a known, or reliably estimable, probability that a certain set of outcomes 
may occur, whereas an uncertainty arises when such probabilities are not available.’75 Both 
terms are commonly used in geoengineering literature, however the extent to which their use 
mirrors this understanding is unclear. The term ‘risk’ is typically used to refer to potential 
negative side effects of SAI that have been identified on the basis of climate modelling,76 or 
from observing the effects of large volcanic eruptions.77 The term ‘uncertainty’ is typically 
used to describe potential side effects that are not so readily identifiable. In other words, these 
terms appear to be used more on the basis of discernibility than relating to probability. This 
trend is unsurprising, given that scientists have limited capacity to quantify risks and magnitude 
of the potential side-effects of SAI at the present time.78 Generally speaking, the use of the 
terms ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ in this project mirrors this trend in geoengineering literature.  
Uncertainty and potential side effects of SAI 
There is significant scientific uncertainty as to how SAI will affect the global climate system 
and the precise nature and magnitude of side effects it could have at regional and global 
scales.79 It is thought that SAI will produce both ‘winners and losers’: some states and/or 
                                                 
74 Gordon MacKerron, ‘Costs and economics of geoengineering’ (2014) Climate Geoengineering Governance 
Working Paper Series: 013  <http://www.geoengineering-governance-
research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper13mackerroncostsandeconomicsofgeoengineering.pdf>, 11 
75 Stephen M Gardiner, 'Ethics and Global Climate Change ' in Stephen M Gardiner et al (eds), Climate Ethics- 
Essential Readings (Oxford University Press, 2010) 3 
76 See, eg, Alan Robock, 'Stratospheric Aerosol Geoengineering' in Roy  Harrison and Ron Hester (eds), 
Geoengineering of the Climate System (The Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014) 162, 164; J F Tjiputra, A Grini 
and H Lee, 'Impact of idealized future stratospheric aerosol injection on the large-scale ocean and land carbon 
cycles' (2016) 121(1) Journal of Geophysical Research: Biogeosciences 2; Victor Brovkin et al, 
'Geoengineering climate by stratospheric sulfur injections: Earth system vulnerability to technological failure' 
(2009) 92(3-4) Climatic Change 243.  
77 See, eg, Robock et al, above n 58, 2.  
78 See Joshua B Horton, Andrew Parker and David Keith, 'Liability for Solar Geoengineering: Historical 
Precedents, Contemporary Innovations, and Governance Possibilities ' (2015) 22 New York University 
Environmental Law Journal 225, 242. Horton, Parker and Keith state that the probability, magnitude, and 
location of potential harm from SAI is are likely to vary in ‘unpredictable ways’ depending on the way in which 
SAI would be conducted. This include the rate and size of SAI deployment, as well as where in the world it is 
being deployed. 
79 See, Royal Society Report, above n 12, 12, 31, 34. This report states that further research and development is 
needed to ‘assess uncertainties about effectiveness and undesired side effects’ of SRM.  
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regions may benefit whereas others may suffer detrimental side effects.80 For example, based 
on climate modelling and observations following large volcanic eruptions, some scientists 
suggest that SAI could alter regional precipitation and change the patterns of the Asian and 
African monsoons.81 Yang et al suggest that this could reduce the yield of certain crops in areas 
likely to be affected.82 The Royal Society Report further notes that the impacts of SAI could 
adversely affect regional food security.83 SAI could also delay the recovery of, or even further 
deplete, the stratospheric ozone layer.84 The changes to precipitation and sunlight (intensity 
and scattering of light) may affect ecosystems and biological processes such as 
photosynthesis.85 It could also increase surface acid deposition, in the form of acid rain.86 The 
final report produced by the European Transdiciplinary Assessment of Climate Engineering 
(‘EuTRACE Report’) and the 2015 report on SRM by the US National Academy of Sciences 
National Research Council (‘NRC SRM Report’) both recognise that SAI could have 
unforeseen side effects that may only be identified after the technology has been deployed.87 
The ‘termination problem’  
A further risk associated with SAI (and other SRM proposals more generally) is what some 
refer to as the ‘termination problem’. 88  As noted above, if particles were created in the 
stratosphere, they would not remain there indefinitely. If SAI were commenced then halted, 
the Earth’s reflectivity would decrease, allowing more solar radiation to enter the atmosphere. 
                                                 
80 See Scott Barrett et al, 'Climate engineering reconsidered' (2014) 4(7) Nature Clim. Change 527, 528 Figure 
1. 
81 See Robock, ‘Stratospheric Aerosol Geoengineering’, above n 76, 174-175; Royal Society Report, above n 12, 
31. See also NRC SRM report, above n 62, 84-85. But see Jesse L. Reynolds, Andy Parker and Peter Irvine, 
'Five solar geoengineering tropes that have outstayed their welcome' (2016 (forthcoming))  Earth's Future doi: 
eft2.2016EF000416 , 5-6. Reynolds et al suggest that the degree to which precipitation from monsoon patterns 
would be reduced would be a direct consequence of the scale and magnitude of SRM being conducted. They 
therefore claim that this is not an ‘inevitable result’ of SRM, so long as it was conducted on a modest scale.  
82 Huiyi Yang et al, 'Potential negative consequences of geoengineering on crop production: a study of Indian 
groundnut' (2016)  Geophysical Research Letters. Yang et al focus on the impact on groundnut yields in India. 
They state that this crop accounts for 3% of Indian agricultural output, and would be significantly affected by 
attempts at SAI.  
83 Royal Society Report, above n 12, 31.  
84 See, e.g., NRC SRM Report, above n 62, 86; P Heckendorn et al, 'The impact of geoengineering aerosols on 
stratospheric temperature and ozone' (2009) 4(4) Environmental Research Letters 045108; Robock, 
‘Stratospheric Aerosol Geoengineering’ above n 76, 167-168. 
85 NRC SRM Report, above n 62, 94. This report indicates that SAI could have negative and positive effects in 
this regard.  
86 Ibid, 94. However, it is thought that the contribution of SAI to acid rain/snow would be minimal compared to 
current industrial pollution. See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The 
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
<http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf> chapter 7, 634.  
87 EuTRACE Report, above n 14, 44; NRC SRM Report, above n 62, 95.  
88 Royal Society Report, above n 12, 24.  
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Scientists fear that if SAI is implemented but the atmospheric concentration of GHGs remains 
high, halting SAI could cause global temperature to increase rapidly, creating far more serious 
problems. 89  According to Ross and Matthews, if planetary-scale geoengineering (like the 
injection of sulphate aerosol particles) were suddenly stopped, the rate of subsequent warming 
could be so high that it could seriously impact on ecosystems and compromise their ability to 
naturally adapt to climate change.90 Therefore, while SAI might lower global temperatures and 
reduce some of the impacts associated with climate change, the termination problem means 
that deploying SAI could nevertheless introduce a new risk of triggering a rapid increase in 
global temperatures in its own right.91 
Sporadic or uncoordinated attempts at SAI may result in similar negative impacts, for example, 
if different states decided to deploy SAI at the same time without coordinating their efforts. 
Matthews and Caldiera suggest that poor international coordination over the future deployment 
of SAI could also trigger high rates of change in global temperatures: 
In the case of inconsistent or erratic deployment (either because of shifting public opinions or 
unilateral action by individual nations), there would be the potential for large and rapid 
temperature oscillations between cold and warm climate states.  It is also likely that such 
scenarios would lead to uneven spatial application of geoengineering...Temporally and spatially 
patchy attempts at geoengineering would pose significant challenges to adaptation by human 
societies and natural ecosystems.92 
Similar issues could arise if a large volcanic eruption were to occur while SAI is being 
conducted.93 As noted above, large volcanic eruptions can produce a similar cooling effect by 
injecting particles into the stratosphere. Laakso et al note that it is impossible to predict the 
timing of large volcanic eruptions, but they nevertheless occur frequently enough to make it 
possible that one might coincide with any future SRM activity.94  
                                                 
89 See Royal Society Report, above n 12, 24. See also Brovkin et al, above n 76, 243. But see Reynolds, Parker 
and Irvine, above n 81, 3. Reynolds et al suggest that termination shock could be avoided by conducting SRM to 
only produce a low degree of cooling, or by slowly ramping down the amount of radiative forcing over decades. 
90 Andrew Ross and H Damon Matthews, 'Climate engineering and the risk of rapid climate change' (2009) 4(4) 
Environmental Research Letters 045103 57, 4. 
91 J G Shepherd, 'Geoengineering the climate: an overview and update' (2012) 370(1974) Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 
4166, 4107.  
92 H Damon Matthews and Ken Caldeira, 'Transient climate–carbon simulations of planetary geoengineering' 
(2007) 104(24) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 9949, 9952.  
93 For a discussion of this possibility and modelling predictions, see A. Laakso et al, 'Radiative and climate 
impacts of a large volcanic eruption during stratospheric sulfur geoengineering' (2016) 16(1) Atmos. Chem. 
Phys. 305 
94 Ibid, 306. 
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High atmospheric concentration of CO2 
SAI (and SRM techniques more generally) would not do anything to reduce the level of CO2 
in the atmosphere. High levels of CO2 have environmental impacts other than enhancing the 
Earth’s greenhouse effect. Scientists are concerned that these additional impacts would persist 
if SAI were deployed and atmospheric CO2 levels remained high.95  
A primary concern is ocean acidification. The Earth’s oceans are a ‘carbon sink’, meaning that 
they naturally absorb CO2 from the atmosphere.96 Once absorbed, the CO2 reacts with water to 
form carbonic acid and other products, including hydrogen ions. 97  As Burch and Harris 
explain, the increase in hydrogen ions lowers the oceans’ pH, making the water more acidic.98 
Higher concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere means that more CO2 will dissolve in the 
oceans, increasing their acidity. 99  According to scientists, increased ocean acidity can 
significantly impact on ocean organisms and ecosystems. 100  Unless carbon emissions are 
reduced, the problem of ocean acidification would persist, regardless of any effects on global 
mean surface temperatures from SAI.101 Williamson and Turley further suggest that SRM 
techniques such as SAI might have ‘secondary effects’ on the ocean carbonate system. For 
example, changes to sunlight caused by SRM might affect the photosynthesis and production 
of vegetation and phytoplankton.102 They also state that changes to the ocean temperature from 
SRM/SAI could have impacts on the ocean as a carbon sink, however, the nature and severity 
of these potential impacts are not yet known.103  
Field testing and deployment 
The term ‘field testing’ refers to geoengineering experiments ‘conducted outside the lab and in 
the real world’.104 SAI has not yet been field tested in the stratosphere. In 2009, a team of 
                                                 
95 See, eg, Robock, ‘20 Reasons’, above n 15, 15.  
96 See Burch and Harris, above n 38, 224. See also Ocean Carbon Cycle, NOAA PMEL Carbon Program 
<http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/Ocean+Carbon+Uptake>.  
97 Phillip Williamson and Carol Turley, ‘Ocean acidification in a geoengineering context' (2012) 370(1974) 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering 
Sciences 4317, 4318. Burch and Harris, above n 38, 224; NOAA PMEL Carbon Program 
<http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/co2/story/Ocean+Carbon+Uptake>.  
98 Burch and Harris, above n 38, 224.  
99 Williamson and Turley, above n 97, 4318.  
100 Ibid, 4318. See also Burch and Harris, above n 38, 224.  
101 Robock, ‘20 Reasons’, above n 15, 15.  
102 Williamson and Turley, above n 97, 4328-4329. 
103 Ibid, 4238.  
104 SRMGI Report, above n, 48.  
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Russian scientists tested aerosols at ground level to study their reflective characteristics.105 
Research has otherwise been confined to laboratory testing and climate modelling.106 Some 
scientists argue that the utility of laboratory testing and climate modelling of SAI is limited and 
instead advocate field testing. Keith, Duren and MacMartin suggest that at some point in the 
future, field testing will be necessary to answer research questions that cannot be addressed by 
climate models.107 A small group of scientists further suggest that small-scale field tests (i.e. 
tests that will not have any measurable impact on the global climate) might help resolve 
significant uncertainties surrounding SAI, such as how aerosol particles would form and 
operate in the stratosphere108 and the impact they might have on stratospheric ozone.109 
Proposals to field test SAI – even on a small scale – are highly controversial and subject to 
much debate in geoengineering literature.110 There is concern that field testing might create a 
‘slippery slope’ that would eventually lead to full-scale deployment.111 In 2011, the Solar 
Radiation Management Governance Initiative (‘SRMGI’), which was convened by The Royal 
Society, The World Academy of Sciences and the Environmental Defence Fund, released a 
report examining the governance of SRM research. With regard to research in general, the 
report noted that:   
Research could create momentum for development of SRM technology, as well as a lobbying 
constituency of scientists, engineers, investors and government agencies with an interest in 
pursuing SRM, leading to its eventual deployment. This constituency could use its influence to 
override moral and other objections or to unduly influence public opinion…Allowing SRM 
research, and thereby making it the status quo, could also create an inertia opposing the 
cessation of research even if there is evidence of overwhelming negative impacts. 112 
                                                 
105 Yu A. Izrael et al, 'Field experiment on studying solar radiation passing through aerosol layers' (2009) 34(5) 
Russian Meteorology and Hydrology 265.  
106 A key example is the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (‘GeoMIP’). GeoMIP is an ongoing 
research initiative that uses climate models to investigate the impacts of solar geoengineering methods (SAI and 
cloud brightening) on climate patterns. See Ben Kravitz et al, 'An overview of the Geoengineering Model 
Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP)' (2013) 118(23) Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 13. 
107 David W. Keith, Riley Duren and Douglas G. MacMartin, ‘Field experiments on solar geoengineering: report 
of a workshop exploring a representative research portfolio’ (2014) 372 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A, 4-5. 
108 MacMynowski et al, above n 18, 5045. 
109 John A Dykema et al, 'Stratospheric controlled perturbation experiment: a small-scale experiment to improve 
understanding of the risks of solar geoengineering' (2014) 372(2031) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 1. 
110 See e.g., Alan Robock et al, 'A Test for Geoengineering?' (2010) 327(5965) Science 530; Mike Hulme, Can 
Science Fix Climate Change? (Polity Press, 2014)  60-68; 
111 SRMGI Report, above n 13, 21. 
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In other words, field testing could normalise SAI as a response to climate change. It might also 
create vested interests in continuing the development of SAI, leading to technological ‘lock 
in’.113 
A further concern is that it may be hard to distinguish between field testing and full-scale 
deployment. The SRMGI report distinguishes between small-scale field testing, medium and 
large-scale field testing and full-scale deployment.114 In this report, both medium and large-
scale field testing and deployment involve conducting geoengineering on a large enough scale 
so as to produce measurable and significant environmental impacts.115 The key difference 
between field testing and deployment is that deployment would seek to significantly affect the 
global climate for more than one year, and would be conducted with this purpose in mind, 
rather than merely for research.116 However, Robock et al suggest that at a practical level large-
scale field testing and deployment of SAI may be indistinguishable.117 They argue that SAI 
cannot be effectively field tested unless it is on a scale comparable to full-scale deployment.118 
This is because it may be difficult to distinguish the impacts of an SAI field test from the natural 
variations in atmosphere and global climate system.119 Robock et al therefore claim that in 
order for field tests to have measureable effects, they would need to be conducted on a 
sufficiently large scale and over a long period of time.120 By this reckoning, field tests could 
therefore give rise to the same risks and side-effects as full-scale deployment.  
Deployment in and changes to the global atmospheric commons  
In addition to the possibility of SAI having unintended, detrimental side-effects, it is important 
to highlight that large-scale field testing and full-scale deployment of SAI will inevitably have 
impacts on the atmosphere. SAI is intended to change the chemical composition of the 
atmosphere and influence the global climate.121 By its very nature, SAI would be conducted in 
and have impacts on the atmosphere as a global commons. This is not a ‘risk’ (i.e. a scientific 
probability) but a certainty, as it is the purpose and function of this proposed technology. This 
                                                 
113 Neil Craik, 'International Law and Geoengineering: Do Emerging Technologies Require Special Rules?' 
(2015) 5(2-4) Climate law 111, 119. SRMGI Report, above n 13, 21.   
114 SRMGI Report, above n 13, 47-52. 
115 Ibid. 
116 SRMGI Report, above n 13, 52.  
117 Robock et al, above n 110, 530.  
118 Ibid.  
119 Ibid, 531.  
120 Ibid.  
121 The precise legal status of the atmosphere is unsettled. However, given that the atmosphere and global 
climate system exist beyond the individual sovereign control of states, it can best be described as a global 
commons area. This argument is elaborated in chapter 7. See also Soroos, above n 3, 7-8.  
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characteristic of SAI – the certainty that it will influence the global climate regardless of the 
probability of the unintended side effects of SAI - is particularly important to keep in mind 
when considering international law and governance.  
1.2 THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF SRM  
The potential for SAI to have transboundary and global impacts gives rise to questions of 
international law and governance. The need for SRM/SAI to be governed at an international 
level has been long recognised in geoengineering literature.122 Concerns about the adequacy of 
existing international rules and regimes have arisen in parallel with these claims.  This section 
provides a brief overview of these concerns. It examines how key international environmental 
agreements, including those directed at atmospheric pollution and degradation, do not provide 
an adequate governance framework for SAI.  
1.2.1 The 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention) 
The most relevant international agreement to the proposed development of SAI is the 1976 
ENMOD Convention.123 This convention was negotiated to protect humanity from the dangers 
of using weather and environmental modification technologies as a weapon.124 Weather refers 
to the day-to-day changes in the atmosphere (i.e. wind, temperature and rain), whereas the 
climate is the long-term average of weather.125 Shortly after the end of the Second World War, 
scientists in the United States developed weather modification technologies that aimed to 
influence the weather at a local scale over a short period of time. Examples included: enhancing 
the amount of rain or snow produced by naturally formed clouds (‘cloud seeding’); 126 
                                                 
122 For early examples, see, eg, Daniel Bodansky, 'May we engineer the climate?' (1996) 33(3) Climatic Change 
309; Ralph J Cicerone, 'Geoengineering: encouraging research and overseeing implementation' (2006) 77(3) 
Climatic Change 221; John Virgoe, 'International governance of a possible geoengineering intervention to 
combat climate change' (2009) 95(1-2) Climatic Change 103.  
123 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, 
opened for signature 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 151 (entered into force 5 October 1978) (‘ENMOD’) 
124 See ibid, preamble. 
125 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Working Group 1: The Physical 
Science Basis, Frequently Asked Question 1.2 What is the Relationship between Climate Change and Weather? 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change <https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/faq-1-
2.html>.  
126 A recent example of cloud seeding to increase precipitation is in Kosciusko National Park, Australia, where 
hydroelectric company Snowy Hydro conducted ‘cloud seeding’ in an attempt to increase the amount of 
snowfall produced by clouds during the winter ski season. See Scott Hannaford, ‘Concerns persist over long-
term impact of cloud seeding in Kosciuszko’, Sydney Morning Herald (online) 27 March 2015 
<http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/concerns-persist-over-longterm-impact-of-cloud-seeding-in-
kosciuszko-20150327-13tj6c.html>.  
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dispersing cloud or fog;127 and reducing the severity of hurricanes by seeding the eye wall of 
the hurricane with silver iodide. 128  The United States’ interest in developing weather 
modification technologies included investigating its potential to be used as weapon during the 
Cold War. An infamous example of the military use of weather modification technology 
occurred during the Vietnam War, when the United States Air Force used cloud seeding 
technologies to cause flooding of the ‘Ho Chi Minh trail’ and thereby impede North 
Vietnamese troop movements.129 This event triggered international concern over the potential 
for weather modification to be used as a weapon of mass destruction, and gave rise to the 
negotiation of the ENMOD Convention to prohibit the weaponisation of weather modification 
technology.130    
The ENMOD Convention specifically addresses the use of weather and environmental 
modification techniques in a military context. Article I of the ENMOD Convention contains the 
purpose or object of the treaty and indicates that the parties to the ENMOD Convention are 
prohibited from engaging in environmental modification techniques for military or other 
hostile purposes. Environmental modification techniques are defined in Article II as ‘any 
technique for changing – through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes – the 
dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere 
and atmosphere, or of outer space.’ This definition of ‘environmental modification techniques’ 
is arguably wide enough to include weather modification attempts at a local scale, as well as 
                                                 
127 An example of weather modification (cloud seeding) for the purpose of dispersing clouds or fog was during 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics in China. See Clifford Coonan, ‘How Beijing used rockets to keep opening 
ceremony dry’, The Independent (online), 11 August 2008 <http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympics/how-
beijing-used-rockets-to-keep-opening-ceremony-dry-890294.html>.  
128 H E Willoughby et al, ‘Project Stormfury: A Scientific Chronicle 1962-1983’ (1985) 66(5) Bulletin 
American Meteorological Society 505, 505–6. From 1962 to 1983, the United States government funded project 
‘Stormfury’. One of the goals of project Stormfury was to develop the means to modify hurricanes in order to 
reduce their intensity (at 505).  
129 See Jack Anderson, ‘Air Force turns Rainmaker in Laos’, The Washington Post, (Washington DC), 18 March 
1971, F7. See also Louise A. Purrett, ‘Weather Modification as a Future Weapon’ (1972) 101(16) Science News 
254; James Rodger Fleming, 'The pathological history of weather and climate modification: Three cycles of 
promise and hype' (2006) 37(1) Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 3, 13. See also 
Chunglin Kwa, 'The Rise and Fall of Weather Modification: Changes in American Attitudes Toward 
Technology, Nature, and Science' in Clark A Miller and Paul N Edwards (eds), Changing the Atmosphere: 
Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (The MIT Press, 2001) 135, 157. According to Kwa, the 
United States Department of Defense spent USD$21.6 million on weather modification along the Ho Chi Minh 
trail.  
130 See United Nations, The United Nations and Disarmament 1970-1975, (United Nations Publication, 1976) 
191–9.  For contemporaneous discussion of the need for a treaty to regulate weather modification for military 
purposes, see J W Samuels, ‘International Control of Weather Modification Activities: Peril or Policy?’ in 
Ludwik A Teclaff and Albert E Utton (eds), International Environmental Law (Praeger Publishers, 1974) 199. 
See also Fleming, above n 129, 14. Fleming suggests that the negotiation of the ENMOD Convention was 
triggered by the United States’ use of cloud seeding along the Ho Chi Minh trail, which became public 
knowledge in 1971. 
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attempts to manipulate the atmosphere on a larger scale, such as SAI.131 However, the preamble 
to the ENMOD Convention clearly distinguishes the ‘hostile’ use of environmental 
modification techniques from non-military uses, recognising that: 
[T]he use of environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could improve the 
interrelationship of man and nature and contribute to the preservation and improvement of the 
environment for the benefit of present and future generations.  
The ENMOD Convention therefore does not prohibit the use of SAI if carried out for non-
hostile (i.e. ‘peaceful’) purposes.  
1.2.2 The climate change regime  
The governance of SAI is currently beyond the scope of the international climate change 
regime. The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and 
associated agreement, including the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2015 Paris Agreement, form 
a comprehensive regime for international climate change governance. The scope of this regime 
is currently limited to climate change mitigation, adaptation and procedural mechanisms, such 
as finance and reporting. General provisions under the UNFCCC may be indirectly relevant to 
future attempts at SAI, such as the obligation to protect the climate system and the 
precautionary principle under article 3.132 The recently concluded Paris Agreement contains an 
oblique reference to CDR geoengineering, acknowledging in article 4 a need to ‘achieve a 
balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse 
gases in the second half of this century’.133 However, there are no provisions within the Paris 
Agreement or the broader UNFCCC regime that would enable it to expressly govern SAI 
proposals.134 It certainly does not prohibit SAI, but nor does it provide clear guidance as to 
how environmental risks and uncertainties should be addressed.  
                                                 
131 See Ralph  Bodle, 'Geoengineering and International Law: The Seach for Common Legal Ground' (2010-
2011) 46 Tulsa Law Review 305, 312. 
132 See Albert C Lin, 'International Legal Regimes and Principles Relevant to Geoengineering' in Wil C G Burns 
and Andrew L Strauss (eds), Climate Change Geoengineering- Philosophical Perspectives, Legal Issues, and 
Governance Frameworks (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 182, 184. According to Lin, the extent to which 
geoengineering techniques would support obligation to protect the climate system under the UNFCCC is 
debateable, given the risk of adverse side effects.  
133 Paris Agreement, opened for signature 12 December 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016) < 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php>. 
134 See also Karen N Scott, 'International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the Geoengineering 
Challenge ' (2013) 34 Michigan Journal of International Law 309, 330-331. Scott also notes that, with the 
exception of afforestation and reforestation the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol do not explicitly address CDR 
geoengineering.  
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1.2.3 The ozone regime  
The potential for future attempts at SAI to further deplete the stratospheric ozone layer 
potentially brings it within the scope of the Ozone Regime. Under article 2 of the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Ozone Convention), states have a general 
obligation to ‘take appropriate measures…to protect human health and the environment against 
adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or are likely to 
modify the ozone layer.’135 The Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Protection 
of the Ozone Layer 136  (Montreal Protocol) establishes specific, binding legal obligations 
concerning the production and consumption of expressly listed ozone-depleting substances.137 
Both the Ozone Convention and Montreal Protocol have universal membership,138 giving these 
agreements the theoretical capacity to respond to the future SAI activities of any state. 
However, sulphate aerosols – the most popular proposed substance for SAI that has the 
potential to interact with ozone molecules – are not listed under the Montreal Protocol.139 Lin 
suggests that ‘given the potential for stratospheric aerosols to undermine the fundamental 
objective of the Protocol, the parties to the Protocol would likely take action to address 
geoengineering projects that involve the release of stratospheric aerosols.’140 Nevertheless, as 
it currently stands, it is unlikely that the Ozone Regime would respond to future attempts at 
SAI.  
1.2.4 The 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) 
The LRTAP Convention is a regional agreement aimed at limiting transboundary air 
pollution. 141  Under article 2, parties to the agreement are to ‘to protect man and his 
environment against air pollution and shall endeavour to limit and, as far as possible, gradually 
reduce and prevent air pollution including long-range transboundary air pollution.’ Air 
pollution is broadly defined under article 1 as:  
[T]he introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the air resulting 
in deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and 
                                                 
135 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 
293 (entered into force 22 September 1988) (‘Ozone Convention’).  
136 Montreal Protocol on substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 16 September 1987, 
[1989] ATS 18 (entered into force 1 January 1989). 
137 Sands and Peel, above n 3, 265.  
138 See Treaties and Decisions, Ozone Secretariat <http://ozone.unep.org/en/treaties-and-decisions>. 
139 Lin, above n 132, 196.  
140 Ibid.  
141 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 1979, 1302 
UNTA 217 (entered into force 16 March 1983) (‘LRTAP’). 
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ecosystems and material property and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate 
uses of the environment.  
The term ‘long-range transboundary air pollution’ refers to air pollution that crosses from the 
jurisdiction of one state into another ‘at such a distance that it is not generally possible to 
distinguish the contribution of individual emission sources or groups of sources.’142 These 
definitions are sufficiently broad enough to bring SAI within the general scope of the LRTAP 
Convention. Of further relevance to SAI are two additional protocols to the LRTAP Convention 
that expressly deal with sulphur emissions: the 1985 protocol on the Reduction of Sulphur 
Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent143 and the 1994 Oslo 
Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions.144 Parties to these additional protocols 
have obligations to limit their sulphur emissions, which could be potentially relevant should 
SAI be conducted using sulphate aerosols.145 
Nevertheless, there is a number of factors that limit the potential of the LRTAP Convention to 
contribute to the governance of SAI. The first issue is membership. The membership of the 
LRTAP Convention is regional – mostly European states with the exception of Canada and the 
United States. It therefore would not be able to respond to geoengineering activities that may 
be conducted by non-member states (i.e. states in South-East Asia, Oceania, Africa and South 
America).146 Furthermore, not all Parties to the Convention are party to the 1985 and 1994 
additional protocols. The United States – a state which has recently shown interest in the 
development of SRM/SAI147 - has not signed or ratified either protocol.148 Additionally, the 
quantity of sulphur emissions from future attempts at SAI may not be enough to trigger 
                                                 
142 LRTAP, art 1. 
143 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Rang Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur 
Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent, opened for signature 8 July 1985, 1480 
UNTS 215 (entered into force 2 September 1987).  
144 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Rang Transboundary Air Pollution on the Further Reduction of 
Sulphur Emissions, opened for signature 14 June 1994, 2030 UNTS 122 (entered into force 5 August 1998).  
145 For further discussion, see Lin, above n 132, 195.  
146 See also David A Wirth, 'Engineering the Climate: Geoengineering as a Challenge to International 
Governance' (2013) 40(2) Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 413, 436.  
147 In 2016, a spending bill was proposed in the US Senate to study the potential of SRM as a response to 
climate change. See Adrian Cho, ‘To fight global warming, Senate calls for study of making the Earth reflect 
more light’ Science (19 April 2016) <http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/04/fight-global-warming-senate-
calls-study-making-earth-reflect-more-light> 
148 See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Rang Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of 
Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent, United Nations Treaty Collection, < 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-1-b&chapter=27&clang=_en 
>; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Rang Transboundary Air Pollution on the Further Reduction of 
Sulphur Emissions, United Nations Treaty Collection, 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-1-
e&chapter=27&clang=_en>. 
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obligations under these protocols.149 The LRTAP Convention therefore has limited capacity to 
respond to future attempts at SAI.  
1.2.5 Other international agreements  
Efforts towards governing geoengineering technology have been made under some 
international agreements, but these do not adequately respond to the risks of SAI. Since 2008, 
there have been developments in other treaty regimes specifically directed at governing the 
CDR geoengineering technique of ocean fertilisation. These developments were largely 
triggered by private sector interest in developing ocean fertilisation technology so as to 
generate carbon credits for trading purposes.150 According to Ginzkey and Frost, proposed OIF 
activities by United States company Planktos Incorporated triggered the Contracting Parties to 
the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
(‘London Convention’) 151  and the 1996 Protocol (‘London Protocol’) 152  to consider the 
international regulation of ocean fertilisation geoengineering.153 In 2008154 and 2010155, the 
Contracting Parties to the London Convention and London Protocol passed non-binding 
resolutions that encouraged the development of an effective control and regulatory mechanism 
for ocean fertilization activities.156 In 2013, parties to the London Protocol adopted resolution 
LP.4(8) to amend the London Protocol to including legally binding provisions for the 
                                                 
149 Lin, above n 132, 195-196;  
150 A prominent example is United States based company Planktos Incorporated. See, Rachel Courtland, 
‘Planktos dead in the water’, Nature (online) 15 February 2008 
<http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080215/full/news.2008.604.html>.  
151 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for 
signature 29 December 1972, 1046 UNTS 138 (entered into force 30 August 1975). 
152 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, opened for signature 7 November 1996, [2006] ATS 11 (entered into force 24 March 2006). 
153 See Harald Ginzkey and Robyn Frost, 'Marine Geo-Engineering: Legally Binding Regulation under the 
London Protocol ' (2014) 8(2) Carbon and Climate Law Review 82, 83.   
154 Resolution LC-LP 1(2008) on the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, LC30/16 (adopted 31 October 2008) < 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=24337&filename=LC-LP1(30).pdf>. This Resolution 
recognised that ocean fertilization activities fall within the scope of the London Convention and Protocol (at 
[1]). Contracting Parties also agreed that ocean fertilization activities for purposes other than ‘legitimate 
scientific research’ should not be conducted, due to the limited understanding of these technologies (at [8]). See 
also ibid, 83. Ginzkey and Frost note that this resolution closely follows decision IX/16 under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993) 
(‘CBD’). 
155 Resolution LC-LP.2 (2010) on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean 
Fertilization, LC 32/15 (adopted 13 October 2010). Under this resolution, the Contracting Parties adopted a 
non-binding framework to evaluate whether a proposed ocean fertilization activity constitutes a ‘legitimate 
scientific activity’ (at 2 [1]). 
156 For an historical overview of the regulation of marine geoengineering under the London Convention and 
London Protocol see Ginzkey and Frost, above n 153. See also International Maritime Organization, Marine 
Geoengineering 
<http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/EmergingIssues/geoengineering/Pages/default.aspx>.  
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regulation of marine geoengineering activities.157 However, SAI is not within the scope of 
these amendments.  
In 2008158  and 2010,159 the issue of geoengineering was similarly considered by state parties 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 160  The 2010 Conference of the Parties 
decision X/33 is of most relevance to SAI.161 X/33 effectively called for a moratorium on all 
geoengineering activities (including SAI), until there is adequate scientific understanding and 
governance mechanisms in place. The only exception to this moratorium are: 
[S]mall scale scientific research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting in 
accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, and only if they are justified by the need to gather 
specific scientific data and are subject to a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts 
on the environment.162  
However, as noted by Scott, while this COP decision may be persuasive, it is non-binding.163 
This development therefore does not provide adequate governance for SAI.  
1.3 UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE NO-HARM RULE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH     
The above analysis demonstrates that existing international agreements would not adequately 
respond to future attempts at SAI. In recognition of this gap in international law, researchers 
have proposed the development of specific governance mechanisms to address the risks and 
governance challenges of geoengineering research and future deployment, including SAI.164 
These proposals range from the development of formal international institutions165 to self-
                                                 
157 Resolution LP.4(8): On the Amendment to the London Protocol to Regulate the Placement of Matter for 
Ocean Fertilization and other Marine Geoengineering Activities, LC 35/15 (adopted 18 October 2013). 
158 Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Ninth 
Meeting, IX/16 Biodiversity and climate change, C. Ocean Fertilization, 9th mtg , Agenda Item 4.5, 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/16 (9 October 2008) <https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-09/cop-09-dec-16-
en.pdf>. 
159 Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Tenth 
Meeting x/33, Biodiversity and Climate Change, 10th mtg, Agenda Item 5.6, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/33 (29 
October 2010) paragraph 8(w) (‘Decision X/33’). See also, Scott, above n 134, 332. Scott notes that this 
decision is sometimes referred to as a moratorium on geoengineering, however, this is incorrect because it is 
non-binding.  
160 CBD. 
161 Decision X/33. See also, Scott, above n 134, 332. Scott notes that this decision is sometimes referred to as a 
moratorium on geoengineering, however, this is incorrect because it is non-binding.  
162 Decision X/33. 
163 Scott, above n 134, 332.  
164 See, eg Anna-Maria Hubert, Tim Kruger and Steve Rayner, 'Geoengineering: Code of conduct for 
geoengineering' (2016) 537(7621) Nature 488; Hubert and Reichwein, above n 24.  
165 See Wirth, above n 146, 437.  
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imposed standards or moratoria to be voluntarily adopted by scientists. 166  While these 
proposals have contributed to growing discussions on geoengineering governance, they have 
not yet led to the negotiation of international governance mechanisms for SAI. Until such a 
development takes place, if international law is to play a role in governing SAI it must be 
through existing rules of customary international law. This raises the question: what role might 
the no-harm rule play in governing future attempts at SAI?  
Work on this project has coincided with a renewal of interest in international environmental 
law scholarship on the no-harm rule and its potential to respond to international environmental 
issues that are beyond the scope of existing treaty law. For example, in 2011, the President of 
the small Pacific Island developing state of Palau called for the International Court of Justice 
to provide an advisory opinion on the potential application of the no-harm rule to the issue of 
climate change damage.167 In 2013, the International Law Commission commenced a new 
project on international law for the protection of the atmosphere, which includes detailed 
consideration of the potential of the no-harm rule to respond to threats of harm to the 
atmosphere. 168  Renewed scholarly interest in the no-harm rule has also been fuelled by 
increased consideration of the no-harm rule by international courts and tribunals in recent 
disputes. Since 2010, the no-harm rule as a principle of customary international law has been 
considered in three disputes before the International Court of Justice.169 Two cases have also 
been brought before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Convention and the 
                                                 
166 See, Parson and Keith, above n 18. See also, Asilomar Scientific Organising Committee, ‘The Asilomar 
Conference Recommendations on Principles for Research into Climate Engineering Techniques’ (Conference 
Report, Asilomar Scientific Organising Committee, November 2010) 
<http://www.climate.org/PDF/AsilomarConferenceReport.pdf> (‘Asilomar Principles’); Steve Rayner et al, 
‘The Oxford Principles’ in The Regulation of Geoengineering, House of Commons, Science and Technology 
Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2009-2010 (2010) Ev42-Ev44 ('Oxford Principles'); ‘The Berlin 
Declaration’ Climate Engineering Conference 2014 <http://ce-conference.org/draft-statements>. The Berlin 
Declaration was put forward for consideration at the 2014 climate engineering conference in Berlin. It was 
dismissed by participants and eventually withdrawn by the proposers. For further analysis see Andy Parker, 
Reflecting on the “Berlin Declaration”, (16 July 2015) Forum for Climate Engineering Assessment 
<http://ceassessment.org/reflecting-on-the-berlin-declaration-andy-parker-with-oliver-morton-and-george-
collins/>. 
167 ‘H.E. Mr. Johnson Toribiong, President of Palau Statement Summary of the 22nd September 2011’, General 
Assembly of the United Nations, <https://gadebate.un.org/en/66/palau>; See also Stuart Beck and Elizabeth 
Burleson, 'Inside the System, Outside the Box: Palau’s Pursuit of Climate Justice and Security at the United 
Nations' (2014) 3(01) Transnational Environmental Law 17.  
168 See Shinya Murase, ‘Third report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, 
International Law Commission, 68th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/692 (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016), 6-
20. 
169 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay)(Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14; Aerial Herbicide 
Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) (Order of 13 September 2013) [2013] ICJ Rep 278; Certain Activities Carried 
Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along 
the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 
152, 16 December 2015).  
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Permanent Court of Arbitration that consider articles 192 and 194 under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’).170 These articles embed the no-harm rule 
within UNCLOS. Leading international environmental law scholar Jutta Brunnée has described 
this recent surge in disputes as a ‘renaissance’ of the no-harm rule.171  
This research contributes to this renaissance by considering the content of the no-harm rule in 
light of recent developments in international case law, but it also aims to extend the renaissance 
of the no-harm rule beyond legal doctrinal scholarship. Legal doctrinal scholarship provides an 
important understanding of the content of the no-harm rule and how it might be interpreted to 
apply to specific scenarios, such as future attempts at SAI. However, it leaves unanswered key 
questions regarding the wider role of the no-harm rule in international environmental 
governance. Reflecting on the meaning of governance outlined above, understanding the 
content of the no-harm rule is not the same as understanding its potential to steer or guide 
international society towards socially desirable outcomes. It does not explain why the no-harm 
rule is invoked in some international disputes, but not in others. It does not shed light on the 
capacity of the no-harm rule to influence the decision-making of key international actors. 
Finally, doctrinal legal analysis does not provide a framework for exploring how the no-harm 
rule might be developed to enhance its contribution to international environmental governance.  
Research on the no-harm rule from other disciplinary perspectives is therefore needed to 
address these questions and thereby realise the potential of the no-harm rule to govern future 
attempts at SAI. Answering these question will help to predict how the no-harm rule is likely 
to influence the decision-making of key actors (especially states) to prevent any future attempts 
at SAI from having significant detrimental side effects on the global environment. Different 
approaches are also needed to suggest how the no-harm rule be developed to better achieve this 
objective. This is where international relations theories on compliance with international law 
can make an important contribution. International relations theories can complement doctrinal 
analysis by explaining how and why the no-harm rule is likely to shape the behaviour of state 
and non-state actors when it comes to future attempts at SRM. They can also provide a fresh 
perspective on the capacity of the no-harm rule to contribute to broader issues in international 
environmental governance, such as the protection of the atmosphere.  
                                                 
170 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the 
Area (Advisory Opinion), [2011] ITLOS Reports 10; The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) 
(Awards) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 2013-19, 12 July 2016). 
171 Jutta Brunnée, 'The Sources of Interactional Environmental Law: Interactional Law ' in Samantha Besson and 
d'Aspremont (eds), Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law ((2017) Forthcoming) 1.  
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As a discipline, international relations is a broad church. There are numerous approaches within 
this discipline for considering the way in which norms (including legal rules) facilitate 
international governance and promote compliance by influencing the behaviour of state and/or 
non-state actors. International relations theories on compliance can be divided into two main 
categories. The first category are theories that follow the ‘logic of expected consequence’.172 
Theories in this category privilege the role of states in international governance. States are 
characterised as rational, self-interested and utilitarian actors that are driven by a desire to 
maximise future gains and/or minimise future losses. Simply speaking, in this view legal rules 
contribute to international governance by modifying a state’s expectations of future gains or 
losses. Such interests may include power, financial, or reputational interests.173 The second 
broad category of theories are those that follow the ‘logic of appropriateness.’ 174  These 
approaches are non-utilitarian. Logic of appropriateness theories generally consider the role of 
both state and non-state actors in international governance. They characterise actors as being 
motivated and shaped by norms themselves.175 Broadly speaking, these theories recognise that 
actors follow norms, including legal rules, because they perceive them to be acceptable, 
authoritative or legitimate.176 In other words, actors comply with international law because it 
is the ‘right thing to do’ and not because of utilitarian calculations.177  
This project uses Brunnée and Toope’s theory of interactional international law to assess the 
potential role of the no-harm rule to contribute to the international governance of SAI. 
Interactional law theory explains the operation of legal rules and the international law system 
through the logic of appropriateness. This approach is used in this project instead of ‘logic of 
consequence’ theories. A detailed explanation for selecting this theory is provided in chapter 
three. For the purpose of this introduction, it is sufficient to note that the inherent uncertainties 
involved in conducting SAI, such as the potential for unknown side-effects and the difficulty 
in predicting regional impacts, are likely to limit the capacity for utilitarian decision-making 
based on a cost-benefit analysis.178 Whether states are likely to comply with the no-harm rule 
                                                 
172 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders' (1998) 
52(4) International Organization 943, 949.  
173 See, eg, Jack J Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2007); Guzman, above n 31. This is discussed further in Chapter 3.  
174 March and Olsen, above n 172, 951.  
175 Ibid, 951.  
176 Young and Levy, above n 33, 23-34. 
177 Ibid, 24; March and Olsen, above n 172, 951.  
178 Oran R Young, 'Does fairness matter in international environmental governance? Creating an effective and 
equitable climate regime ' in Todd L Cherry, Jon Havi and David M McEvoy (eds), Towards a New Climate 
Agreement: Conflict, Resolution and Governance (Routledge 2014) 16, 18-19. 
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in the event of future attempts at SAI will therefore more likely be driven by the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’. Interactional law theory follows the logic of appropriateness. It draws on 
constructivist international relations theories and the procedural natural law theory of Lon L 
Fuller179 to explain the role and creation of ‘legal obligation’. This is a sense of legal legitimacy 
and fidelity to international law that exerts a ‘compliance pull’ on state and non-state actors.180     
Interactional law theory is a relatively new approach. Aside from Brunnée and Toope’s use of 
this theory, it has not been widely considered or applied by other law or international relations 
scholars.181 This project therefore provides an opportunity to consider the efficacy and function 
of this theory. In applying interactional law theory to the no-harm rule, this project also seeks 
to test the theory’s utility as an approach for assessing the role of customary legal norms in 
international environmental governance and how they might be developed to increase the 
likelihood of compliance. It is also hoped that the application of interactional law theory in this 
project will stimulate consideration of the role of the no-harm rule in international 
environmental governance beyond the field of legal doctrinal scholarship, encouraging 
international relations and governance scholars to turn their attention to the role of the no-harm 
rule and customary international law in international environmental governance.  
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This project is organised into ten chapters. Chapter two examines the current state of analysis 
of the no-harm rule in legal literature and in geoengineering literature more specifically. 
Chapter three establishes the research design of the project. It sets out specific research 
questions and explains how doctrinal legal analysis and interactional law theory are used to 
address those questions. Chapters four, five and six examine the content of the no-harm rule. 
As a principle of customary international law, the content of the no-harm rule has continued to 
evolve over time. These chapters therefore take an historic approach to establishing the content 
of the no-harm rule, analysing the development of the no-harm rule through key sources from 
the 1938/1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration to the present day. The understanding of the no-harm 
rule developed in these chapters is then applied to SAI proposals in chapter seven. As SAI 
                                                 
179 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law- Revised Edition (Yale University Press, 1969).  
180 Brunnée and Toope, above n 34, 113. 
181 The exception to this are several articles that discuss interactional international law theory published in a 
special edition of International Theory in 2011 (volume 3 issue 2). See Martti Koskenniemi, 'The mystery of 
legal obligation' (2011) 3(02) International Theory 319; Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 'What is the purpose of international 
law?' (2011) 3(2) International Theory 326; Christian Reus-Smit, 'Obligation through practice' (2011) 3(02) 
International Theory 339. 
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remains conceptual, having not yet been field tested in the atmosphere, Chapter seven uses a 
series of hypothetical scenarios to give weight to this analysis. Chapter eight applies 
interactional law theory to the no-harm rule to assess the likelihood that states will comply with 
it when it comes to future attempts at SAI. Chapter nine synthesises the findings from doctrinal 
legal analysis and the application of interactional law theory and reflects on the overall capacity 
of the no-harm rule to govern the risks of SAI. It recommends how the no-harm rule might be 
developed to strengthen its capacity to respond to risks of harm to the atmosphere posed by 
SAI. Chapter ten concludes this project and flags directions for future research.  
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2  The Current State of Analysis of the No-Harm Rule in 
Geoengineering Literature 
Parts of this chapter are published in Kerryn Brent, Jeffrey McGee, and Amy Maguire, ‘Does the ‘No-Harm’ Rule 
Have a Role in Preventing Transboundary Harm and Harm to the Global Atmospheric Commons from 
Geoengineering?’ (2015) 5(1) Climate law 35. Permission has been granted from the editor to reproduce sections 
of this article in this chapter (See appendix 2). 
 
Chapter one demonstrated that existing international agreements do not adequately respond to 
the potential risks of environmental harm posed by SAI. Until such time as an existing 
agreement is amended or a new agreement negotiated to specifically address SAI, the primary 
means through which international law can respond to these risks is through existing rules of 
customary international law. The no-harm rule appears promising in this regard. The potential 
for the impacts of SAI to transcend state borders and affect the territory of other states and the 
atmosphere per se may give rise to obligations under the no-harm rule.  
This chapter considers the extent to which existing scholarship has examined the potential of 
the no-harm rule to contribute to the governance of SAI. It highlights three different 
approaches. The first approach in geoengineering literature is an assumption that there are no 
binding rules of international law that exist or that apply to SAI that might limit the freedom 
of states to engage in SAI. The second approach is literature that recognises the potential 
relevance of the no-harm rule but downplays its potential to contribute to the international 
governance of SAI. This is typically because of a perceived lack of clarity regarding the content 
of the no-harm rule or concerns regarding the capacity for the no-harm rule to be enforced 
against states that do not comply. The third approach is literature that primarily considers the 
no-harm rule as the basis of a claim for state liability and compensation for harm after it has 
been caused – that is, as  a potential mechanism to hold states responsible under international 
law for transboundary harm that might result from future attempts at SAI.  
This survey of geoengineering literature highlights a common gap. These approaches suggest 
that there is limited understanding of the potential of the no-harm rule to contribute to the 
governance of SAI. Specifically, there is little understanding of how the no-harm rule might 
operate to influence the behaviour of states in order to prevent transboundary harm and harm 
to the global commons from occurring. Existing literature further highlights a need to clarify 
the content of the no-harm rule and how it might apply to SAI. It also calls into question long-
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standing assumptions in legal literature as to the relationship between the legally binding status 
and enforceability of ‘hard’ legal norms and compliance with them. Overall, the way in which 
SAI has been considered in geoengineering literature so far underscores the need to reconsider 
and better communicate the contemporary role of the no-harm rule in international 
environmental governance. 
This chapter examines each approach in geoengineering literature respectively in sections 2.1, 
2.2 and 2.3. Section 2.4 focuses on the gaps in these approaches and in our understanding of 
the role of the no-harm rule in international environmental governance.       
2.1 APPROACH NUMBER 1: INTERNATIONAL LAW DOES NOT PROHIBIT SAI  
The first approach in geoengineering literature is the broad assumption that international law 
would not prohibit or otherwise curtail future attempts at geoengineering. The previous chapter 
drew attention to a statement by Barrett, who said that ‘countries are more or less free to do 
what they want’ when it comes to future attempts at geoengineering.1 In a 2013 article in the 
leading journal Science, geoengineering proponents Parson and Keith claimed that 
geoengineering ‘falls under no international legal control’, including both small-scale field 
tests and full-scale deployment.2 These examples are broad and refer to both CDR and SRM 
geoengineering proposals. However, they give the impression that there are currently no 
mechanisms under international law that have the capacity to govern future attempts at SAI. It 
is true that international treaty law is unlikely to adequately respond to field testing or full-
scale deployment of SAI.3 However, these claims do not appear to take into account customary 
international law. In particular, the way in which the risks of transboundary harm and harm to 
the atmosphere posed by SAI are likely to give rise to obligations under the no-harm rule.  
The implication that there is no international law for the governance of SAI is reinforced by 
the inadequate treatment given to customary international law in early interdisciplinary reports 
on geoengineering governance. For example, in 2009, the Royal Society published the first 
comprehensive report on the science and governance of CDR and SRM geoengineering.4 This 
                                                 
1 As quoted in Michael Marshall, ‘Geoengineers are free to legally hack the climate’ New Scientist, (1 
November 2013) <https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22029413-800-geoengineers-are-free-to-legally-
hack-the-climate/>. 
2 Edward A Parson and David W Keith, 'End the Deadlock on Governance of Geoengineering Research' (2013) 
339(6125) Science 1278, 1278.  
3 See chapter 1.2.  
4 The Royal Society, 'Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty ' (The Royal Society 
2009)(‘Royal Society Report’). The Royal Society is a fellowship of the world’s most distinguished scientists 
based in the UK. In 2009 the Royal Society brought together experts from different fields, including climate and 
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report presents mixed messages concerning the capacity of international law to respond to 
geoengineering proposals. According to this report: 
At present international law provides a largely permissive framework for 
geoengineering activities under the jurisdiction and control of a particular state, so 
long as those activities are limited in their scope and effects to that state’s territory.5 
(emphasis added) 
The report then goes on to give a brief overview of the no-harm rule. 6  It mentions that 
geoengineering activities may give rise to the duty not to cause significant transboundary 
harm.7 However, it does not expressly identify this as a rule of customary international law, 
nor does it explain that as a principle of customary international law it is binding on all states. 
The 2011 report by the Solar Radiation Governance Initiative similarly flags the no-harm rule 
as a principle of customary international law, but does not explain what this term means.8  The 
target audience for these reports are interdisciplinary – many readers would be unfamiliar with 
the meaning of customary international law, or aware that it has equal status to binding treaty 
rules and applies to all states. The status of the no-harm rule as a binding principle of customary 
international law is significant because traditional doctrinal approaches to international law 
assume that the binding status of rules enhances the influence they have over states, and hence 
the likelihood of compliance.9 Greater explanation is needed to convey the status and operation 
of the no-harm rule as a principle of customary international law, especially to audiences that 
are predominantly without expertise in international law.  
The assumption that there are no rules of international law that govern SAI is further bolstered 
by some suggestions that existing rules of international law actively encourage the 
development of geoengineering technology. According to Reynolds, multilateral 
environmental agreements favour field testing of geoengineering, including SAI because the 
development of geoengineering is intended to address the risks of climate change damage.10 
Reynolds states that ‘commitments to protect the environment often imply that States should 
                                                 
environmental science, engineering and law to provide a comprehensive assessment of the most prominent SRM 
and CDR geoengineering proposals (at v). 
5 Royal Society Report, above n 4, 40.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Solar Radiation Governance Initiative, Solar radiation management: the governance of research (2011) 
<http://www.srmgi.org/report/> 31 ('SRMGI Report').   
9 Brian D  Lepard, Customary International Law- A New Theory with Practical Applications (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 99. See also Harold Hongju Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' (1997) 
106 Yale Law Journal 2599, 2608; Daniel Bodansky, 'The who, what, and wherefore of geoengineering 
governance' (2013) 121(3) Climatic Change 539, 542.  
10 Jesse Reynolds, 'Climate Engineering Field Research: The Favorable Setting of International Environmental 
Law' (2014) 5 Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 417, 419.  
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consider innovative actions such as climate engineering in order to do so.’ 11  Reynolds 
recognises that under the no-harm rule states may have a duty of due diligence to prevent 
significant transboundary harm from future geoengineering activities and a duty to cooperate 
with other potentially affected states to minimise risks of transboundary harm.12 However, he 
implies that there may be conflict in the application of this rule between the need to prevent 
harm from geoengineering versus the need to develop technology to prevent significant harm 
from climate change.13  
Reynolds is not alone in highlighting potential conflict between the duty to prevent harm from 
geoengineering and the duty to prevent harm from climate change.  Bodansky makes a similar 
comment with regards to the no-harm rule and geoengineering, noting that it is unclear how 
the no-harm rule would apply as ‘geoengineering is intended to prevent rather than cause 
environmental harm.’14 Scott also suggests that the risks of climate change may need to be 
taken into account when evaluating the risks of future attempts at geoengineering.15 These 
comments raise questions about the content of the no-harm rule and how it should be 
interpreted to apply to the risks posed by SAI. However, the proposition that geoengineering 
may be necessary to fulfil international obligations to prevent climate change damage 
reinforces broader claims that there is currently no international law to respond to the risks 
posed by SAI.  
2.2 APPROACH NUMBER 2: THE NO-HARM RULE IS UNCLEAR AND 
UNENFORCEABLE  
The second approach in geoengineering literature recognises the potential relevance of the no-
harm rule to geoengineering proposals, including SAI, but downplays its capacity to contribute 
to geoengineering governance. This characterisation of the no-harm rule is typically found in 
articles that conduct broad surveys of legal rules (treaty and customary) and non-binding 
principles (notably the precautionary principle) that may be relevant to geoengineering 
                                                 
11 Reynolds, above n 10, 430.  
12 Ibid, 476-477. A detailed explanation of the duty of due diligence under the no-harm rule, including the duty 
to consult and notify with potentially affected states is provided in chapter 6.  
13 Ibid, 477. 
14 Daniel Bodansky, 'Governing Climate Engineering: Scenarios for Analysis' (2011) 47(11) Harvard Project on 
Climate Agreements Discussion Paper 1, 15.  
15 Karen N Scott, 'International Law in the Anthropocene: Responding to the Geoengineering Challenge ' (2013) 
34 Michigan Journal of International Law 309, 335.  
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proposals.16 Such accounts of the no-harm rule tend to be brief (between several paragraphs 
and several pages), and consider the relevance of the no-harm rule in the context of 
geoengineering proposals more broadly, rather than just SAI. As such, they do not engage in a 
detailed analysis of content of the no-harm rule and its potential to respond to specific risks 
posed by SAI.   
The first reason why the capacity of the no-harm rule is downplayed by some scholars is that 
they perceive its content to be unclear. That is, the scope of the rule (i.e. what activites the no-
harm rule applies to) and/or the standard of care that states must meet to fulfil their obligations 
in accordance with it is not clear. For example, Bodansky suggest that the no-harm rule, like 
other general rules of international law, is unlikely to directly constrain any future attempts at 
geoengineering because its content is too vague.17 That is, it does not provide specific guidance 
to states as to how they should proceed with geoengineering.18 Bodansky19 and Lin20 further 
suggest that it is uncertain whether future attempts at geoengineering will meet the threshold 
of ‘significant’ harm, which is necessary to give rise to obligations under the no-harm rule.21 
Both authors suggest that the no-harm rule may provide a frame of reference from which states 
can debate geoengineering governance at best, but that it is unlikely to constrain any future 
attempts at geoengineering, including SAI, in the rule’s present form.22  
Claims that the content of the no-harm rule is too vague or uncertain to respond directly to the 
risks of SAI do not match with accounts of the no-harm rule in legal literature. There is a wealth 
of contemporary legal analysis that provides detailed interpretations of the content of the no-
harm rule and demonstrates that the content of the no-harm rule can be identified and 
interpreted with –sufficient clarity to apply it to specific environmental problems. This body 
of legal literature suggests that the potential of the no-harm rule to contribute to the governance 
of SAI should not be downplayed for reasons of clarity. For example, Lefeber provides a 
                                                 
16 See eg, Daniel Bodansky, 'May we engineer the climate?' (1996) 33(3) Climatic Change 309; Albert C Lin, 
'International Legal Regimes and Principles Relevant to Geoengineering' in Wil C G Burns and Andrew L 
Strauss (eds), Climate Change Geoengineering- Philosophical Perspectives, Legal Issues, and Governance 
Frameworks (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 182; Ralph  Bodle, 'Geoengineering and International Law: 
The Seach for Common Legal Ground' (2010-2011) 46 Tulsa Law Review 305.  
17 Bodansky, ‘May we engineer the climate?’, above n 16, 313; Bodansky, ‘The who, the what, and wherefore 
of geoengineering governance’, above n 9, 542.   
18 Bodansky, ‘May we engineer the climate?’, above n 16, 313; Bodansky, ‘The who, the what, and wherefore 
of geoengineering governance’, above n 9, 542.   
19 Bodansky, ‘May we engineer the climate?’, above n 16, 312.  
20 Lin, above n 16, 198. According to Lin, the applicability of the no-harm rule will likely ‘depend on the 
amount of harm resulting from a geoengineering project and the degree of care taken by the responsible state.’ 
21 This threshold is dicussed in chapter 7.3.3.  
22 Bodansky, ‘May we engineer the climate?’, above n 16, 313; Lin, above n 16, 199. 
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detailed analysis of the content of the duty to prevent transboundary harm to states with respect 
to the planning, operational and termination phases of activities,23 although the scope of his 
analysis is restricted to harm or ‘interference’ caused to the territory of states and not to the 
global commons. 24 Hanqin’s comprehensive study of transboundary harm in international 
lawaddresses the issue of harm to the global commons,25 and Verheyen analyses the no-harm 
rule in the context of climate change damage.26 In particular, Verheyen examines the issue of 
standard of care and how this might translate to real-life situations. 27  Finally, McIntyre 
analyses how the no-harm rule might apply in the context of the protection of shared 
international freshwater resources.28  
The capacity of the no-harm rule to respond to geoengineering is also downplayed due to 
concerns regarding enforcement. Bodle suggests that it is unlikely that the no-harm rule, as 
currently formulated, could be successfully enforced against states if they attempt 
geoengineering and cause environmental harm.29 Bodle argues that it may be difficult to prove 
that a ‘particular geoengineering activity caused particular harm to the environment of other 
states or of areas beyond national control.’30 He also suggests that, even if the no-harm rule 
could be successfully enforced, it would only provide a retrospective response to 
geoengineering.31 In other words, it cannot prevent states from causing transboundary harm or 
harm to the global commons. This approach primarily suggests that the no-harm rule will only 
make a valuable contribution to the governance of SAI if it can be enforced against states that 
cause transboundary harm. 
This emphasis on enforcement reflects broader assumptions concerning the relationship 
between enforcement/sanctions and international law. International law does not have the same 
mandatory dispute settlement or enforcement mechanisms as does domestic law.32 This does 
                                                 
23 René Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State Liability (Kluwer Law 
International, 1996) 35-46. 
24 Ibid, 10. This extends to indirect incidences of harm where direct harm to the global environment ‘manifests 
itself on the territory of another state’.  
25 Xue Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) Part III.  
26 Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility 
(Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), 145-186. 
27 Ibid, 169. 
28 Owen McIntyre, 'The Role of Customary Rules and Principles of International Environmental Law in the 
Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources' (2006) 46(1) Natural Resources Journal 157 
29 Bodle, above n 16, 306-308. 
30 Ibid 306. Bodle suggests reversing the burden of proof for the no-harm rule and geoengineering.  
31 Ibid 308. 
32 See Frederic L Kirgis, ‘Enforcing International Law’ (1996) 1(1) ASIL Insights 
<https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-international-law>. But see Madeleine K. Albright, 
'Enforcing International Law' (1995) 89 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International 
Law) 574. In the context of international peace and security, Albright suggests that the UN Security Council 
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not match with the positivist, ‘Austinian’ view that law functions through coercion and 
therefore must be supported by the threat of sanctions,33 but even in the absence of mandatory 
enforcement mechanism, states generally tend to obey international law.34 As famously stated 
by Henkin, ‘almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all 
of their obligations almost all of the time.’35 Accordingly, the potential of the no-harm rule to 
contribute to the governance of SAI should not be downplayed merely because it may be 
difficult to enforce the no-harm rule against non-complying states.  
2.3 APPROACH NUMBER THREE: THE NO-HARM RULE AS THE BASIS FOR STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARM  
Since 2015, several legal scholars have begun to consider the potential of the no-harm rule to 
form the basis of a claim for state responsibility for significant transboundary harm that might 
result from future attempts at SAI. 36  Under customary international law, states are 
internationally responsible for breaching ‘primary’ legal obligations.37 These are substantive 
rules of international law (i.e. that require, permit or prohibit certain conduct on behalf of 
states).38 Responsibility may give rise to so-called ‘secondary’ obligations, such as the duty to 
make reparations for harm caused.39 The International Law Commission has attempted to 
codify this area of international law in its 2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts.40 In this approach, legal scholars have focused on whether 
                                                 
possess strong enforcement mechanisms. However, it is the responsibility of individual states to implement 
enforcement mechanisms (at 576).  
33 Denise Meyerson, Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 2011), 14.  
34 Koh, above n 9, 2600. 
35 Louis  Henkin, How Nations Behave (Columbia University Press, 2nd ed, 1979) 47. 
36 David Reichwein et al, 'State Responsibility for Environmental Harm from Climate Engineering' (2015) 5(2-
4) Climate law 142; Barbara Saxler, Jule Siegfried and Alexander Proelss, 'International liability for 
transboundary damage arising from stratospheric aerosol injections' (2015) 7(1) Law, Innovation and 
Technology 112.  
37 See, eg, Chorzów Factory Case (Germany v. Poland) (Jurisdiction) (1927) P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9, 21; Corfu 
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 23; Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility with commentary Draft Article 1. The distinction between primary and secondary rules of 
international law is made by the ILC in its Draft Articles on State Responsibiltiy (at 31) This follows the 
distinction made by H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 2nd  ed, 1994) Part V. This project 
follows this distinction in the literature. However, it recognises that some legal scholar have argued that this 
distinction is confusing. See, eg, Ian Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at 
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1998) 5-6.    
38 Alan E. Boyle, 'State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not 
Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?' (1990) 39(1) The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1, 10.  
39 Ibid.  
40 ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) II(2) 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 31 (‘Draft Articles on State Responsibility’). ‘Attempted’ in the 
sense that the Draft Articles on State Responsibility have not been formally signed or ratified by states as an 
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SAI might breach the no-harm rule as a primary rule of international law and give rise to 
secondary obligations under the law of state responsibility.  
Reichwein et al engage in a detailed examination of the potential of the no-harm rule to hold 
states responsible for transboundary harm that might be caused by future attempts at SAI.41 As 
part of this examination they consider the content of the no-harm rule and what states must do 
to uphold their obligations under it. Reichwein et al suggest that the main obstacle to establish 
whether SAI would breach the no-harm rule and to recover compensation for associated 
damage would be the element of causation.42 That is, a causal link must be established between 
a specific SAI and harm (or risk of harm) caused.43 Saxler, Siegfried and Proelss also consider 
the no-harm rule as part of a broader analysis of existing international legal mechanisms that 
could be used hold states liable for environmental damage from SAI and provide the basis for 
compensation.44 For them, the biggest obstacle for holding states responsible and liable is 
establishing fault, not causation. In their view, it must be established that a state failed to act 
with due diligence in attempting SAI in order to trigger secondary rules of state responsibility.45  
Compared to the previous two approaches, Reichwein et al and Saxler, Siegfried and Proelss 
provide more nuanced analyses of the potential role of the no-harm rule in responding to the 
environmental risks of SAI. They also engage in detailed consideration of the applicable rules 
of state responsibility and how they might operate to provide compensation to states should 
SAI be attempted by another state and cause them harm. However, similarly to Bodle above, 
the primary focus of this research is the potential of the no-harm rule to respond to SAI 
retrospectively or ‘ex post’ – after harm has been caused. They do not provide a detailed 
analysis of how the no-harm rule might address the environmental risks of SAI in an 
anticipatory or pre-emptive way.  
A further issue with considering the no-harm rule only from the perspective of state 
responsibility is that it provides a limited perspective on the rule’s capacity respond to risks of 
harm to the atmosphere per se presented by SAI. The atmosphere is a fluid body of gases that 
                                                 
international agreement. Nonetheless, certain provisions have been widely accepted by states and international 
courts and tribunals as representing customary international law. See, eg Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case [47] [50] 
[79] [83].  
41 Reichwein et al, above n 36. 
42 Ibid, 180.  The difficulty in establishing causation between an activity and damage is a common issue when it 
comes to compensation for transboundary environmental harm. See, eg, Alexandre Kiss, 'Present Limits to the 
Enforcement of State Responsibility for Environmental Damage ' in Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi 
(eds), International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (Graham and Trotman, 1991 ) 5-6.  
43 Reichwein et al, above n 36, 157, 180 
44 Saxler, Siegfried and Proelss, above n 36, 113.  
45 Ibid, 123. 
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exists beyond the individual sovereign control of states.46 The legal status of the atmosphere 
and who has legal standing to enforce its protection is unclear.47 It is therefore also unsettled 
how the rules of state responsibility operate concerning harm to the atmosphere as opposed to 
harm to states.48 It has been suggested that states have an obligation erga omnes to protect the 
atmosphere which is owed to the international community as a whole.49  However, as noted by 
Reichwein et al, this is not fully settled under international law.50 These accounts suggest that 
it is unlikely that an action might be brought to enforce the no-harm rule against states and if 
they attempt SAI and cause harm to the atmosphere. Viewing the no-harm rule solely through 
the lens of state responsibility and liability therefore implicitly suggests that it has a limited 
capacity to protect the atmosphere from threats of harm.   
2.4 RECONSIDERING THE POTENTIAL OF THE NO-HARM RULE 
These three approaches highlight a number of gaps in how the no-harm rule is understood in 
literature on geoengineering governance. As noted above, there is a general lack of awareness 
in non-legal literature as to the binding legal status of the no-harm rule as a principle of 
customary international law. There is also a need to better understand the content of the no-
harm rule and how it is to be interpreted to apply to SAI. Most significantly, however, there 
has been no detailed consideration of the potential of the no-harm rule to shape the behaviour 
of states to prevent or minimise the risks of transboundary harm and harm to the atmosphere if 
they should attempt SAI.51  
This reflects a broader gap in legal literature on the no-harm rule: that is, the way in which the 
no-harm rule actually operates to influence the behaviours of states has largely been taken for 
granted by legal scholars. As mentioned above, there is a considerable body of existing legal 
                                                 
46 Marvin S. Soroos, 'Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons' (1998) 40(2) Environment: Science and 
Policy for Sustainable Development 6, 1.  
47 A detailed discussion of the legal status of the atmosphere is provided in chapter 7.3.1. See also Alan E Boyle, 
'International Law and the Protection of the Global Atmosphere: Concepts, Categories and Principles' in Robin 
Churchill and David Freestone (eds), International Law and Global Climate Change (Graham & Trotman 
Limited, 1991) 7; Marvin S. Soroos, The Endangered Atmosphere: Preserving a Global Commons (University 
of South Carolina Press 1997), 208-223. 
48 See Boyle, above n 47, 16-17; Reichwein et al, above n 36, 178.  
49 Reichwein et al, above n 36, 178. 
50 Ibid, 178.  
51 But see Neil Craik, 'International Law and Geoengineering: Do Emerging Technologies Require Special 
Rules?' (2015) 5(2-4) Climate law 111. Craik examines whether the duty to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) can provide a structured, decision-making process for implementing geoengineering proposals 
so as to address environmental and social risks they might pose. As explained in chapter 6, the duty to conduct 
an EIA forms part of the duty of conduct or due diligence under the no-harm rule, as well as being a recognised 
rule of customary international law in its own right.  
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literature that examines the content and interpretation of the no-harm rule. It is widely 
recognised in this literature that the no-harm rule provides states with a ‘duty of conduct’ or 
‘due diligence’ to prevent or minimise significant transboundary harm and harm to the global 
commons before it manifests.52 The no-harm rule is therefore understood to set normative 
standards that states should comply with concerning activities that present a risk of significant 
transboundary harm and harm to the global commons. It is also understood to have shaped 
more specific obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA). Yet nothing 
has examined its practical operation in influencing state behaviour.  
The assessment of state practice in legal scholarship on the no-harm rule does not equate with 
consideration of how the no-harm rule influences the behaviour of states. Under article 38(1)(b) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order for a rule to qualify as custom, it 
must meet the elements of state practice and opinio juris sive necessitatis. That is, there must 
be sufficient evidence that the actions of states support the behaviour prescribed by the rule, 
and that the behaviour is motivated by a belief that the rule is obligatory.53 Some legal scholars 
hold different opinions as to what qualifies as ‘evidence’ of state practice and opinio juris.54 
Nonetheless, state practice is generally thought to include physical acts as well as ‘promissory 
acts’55 (i.e. ratification of an agreement, diplomatic statements, votes cast in the UN general 
                                                 
52 See, eg, Alan Boyle, 'Transboundary air pollution: a tale of two paradigms ' in S Jayakumar et al (eds), 
Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, 2015) 233, 236-241; 
Jacqueline Peel, 'Unpacking the elements of a state responsibility claim for transboundary pollution ' in S 
Jayakumar et al (eds), Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy (Edward 
Elgar 2015) 51, 67. The content of this obligation is examined in detail in chapters 6 and 7 of this project. 
53 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of German v 
Netherlands) (1969) ICJ Rep 3, 44. 
54 This has given rise to different ‘theories’ or ‘approaches’ to customary international law. This project 
acknowledges these different approaches. However, further consideration and evaluation of them is beyond the 
scope of this project, given that its focus is the role of the no-harm rule in international environmental 
governance and not proving its status as custom. See, eg, Michael Akehurst, 'Custom as a Source of 
International Law' (1976) 47(1) (January 1, 1976) British Yearbook of International Law 1; Daniel  Bodansky, 
'Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law ' (1995) 3 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 105; Hilary Charlesworth, 'The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law' (1998) 92 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 44; Bin  Cheng, 'United Nations 
Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?' (1965) 5 Indian Journal of International 
Law 23; Hiram. E. Chodosh, 'Neither treaty nor custom: the emergence of declarative international law' (1991) 
26 Tex. Int'l LJ 87; Anthony D'Amato, 'The Theory of Customary International Law' (1988) 82(ArticleType: 
research-article / Full publication date: APRIL 20-23, 1988 / Copyright © 1988 American Society of 
International Law) Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 242; J Patrick  
Kelly, 'The Twilight of Customary International Law ' (1999-2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 
449; Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., 'Custom on a Sliding Scale' (1987) 81(1) The American Journal of International 
Law 146; Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, 'Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation ' (2001) 95 The American Journal of International Law 757.   
55 Karol Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2nd ed, 1993), 70.  
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assembly). 56  Legal scholars typically refer to the fact that the no-harm rule has been 
incorporated into a number of binding and non-binding instruments to support its status as 
custom, including Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration.57 Such analysis is directed at establishing the status of the no-harm rule as a 
binding rule of customary international law and, as noted above, it is traditionally assumed in 
legal scholarship that if rules are binding, they will influence the behaviour of actors. It is 
therefore unsurprising that legal scholars have not further considered questions how the no-
harm rule might influence the behaviour of states.  
It is, however, surprising that international relations scholars have not widely considered 
questions of compliance with the no-harm rule. As mentioned in the introduction, the no-harm 
rule has had a long history – it has been formally recognised as a principle of customary 
international law for over seventy years. As is demonstrated in this project, the no-harm rule 
has been invoked in some disputes 58  but not in others. 59  This raises key questions of 
compliance and effectiveness of the no-harm rule, yet generally speaking, international 
relations scholars have not engaged with the no-harm rule. To borrow the words of Raustiala 
and Slaughter, there has been little engagement from legal scholars and international relations 
scholars alike on whether, when and how the no-harm rule ‘matters’ to the behaviour of 
states.60  
Answers to these questions are necessary to challenge some of the assumptions listed above. 
Understanding the role of the no-harm rule in international environmental governance (beyond 
its potential to form the basis of a claim for state responsibility) is needed to ensure that the 
potential of the no-harm rule to contribute to the governance of SAI is not being downplayed 
without sufficient cause. A better understanding of how the no-harm rule ‘matters’ to the 
behaviour and decision-making of states may also help non-legal scholars to recognise the rule 
                                                 
56 See, eg, Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 112; Patricia  Birnie, Alan  Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law 
and the Environment (Oxford Univerity Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 23.  
57 See, eg, Sands and Peel, above n 56, 113; Verheyen, above n 26, 147. 
58 See, eg, Trail Smelter (United States v Canada) (Awards) (1938 and1941) 3 RIAA 1905; Corfu Channel Case 
(United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4; Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) 
(Order of 13 September 2013) [2013] ICJ Rep 278; Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder 
Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v 
Costa Rica) (Judgment) (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015).  
59 Examples of situations where the no-harm rule was not invoked are the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the 
ongoing issue of smoke haze over South East Asia from forest fires in Indonesia. These example and others are 
discussed in chapter 8.3.8.   
60 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie  Slaughter, 'International Law, International Relations and Compliance ' in 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth  Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (Sage 
Publications, 2002) 538, 538.  
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and dispel the myth that there are no rules of international law that can constrain attempts at 
SAI. SAI therefore provides a lens to examine the content of the no-harm rule and how it should 
be interpreted to apply to activities that present risks of harm to the territory of other states and 
to the atmosphere. It also provides a lens to consider questions of compliance with the no-harm 
rule and how it is likely to influence the behaviour of states.  
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3 Research Design  
Parts of this chapter are published in Kerryn Brent, Jeffrey McGee, and Amy Maguire, ‘Does the ‘No-Harm’ Rule 
Have a Role in Preventing Transboundary Harm and Harm to the Global Atmospheric Commons from 
Geoengineering?’ (2015) 5(1) Climate law 35. Permission has been granted from the editor to reproduce sections 
of this article in this chapter (See appendix 2). 
 
 
This chapter explains the research design of this project. Section 3.1 draws on the research gaps 
and issues highlighted in the previous chapter to establish the research aims and specific 
research questions addressed in this project. Section 3.2 explains how doctrinal legal analysis 
is used to address the research aims and specific research questions. Section 3.3 explains how 
international relations (IR) theories can be used in addition to doctrinal legal analysis to deepen 
our understanding of compliance with international legal norms. This section also considers 
what type of IR approach is best suited to analyse the potential of the no-harm rule to promote 
compliance in the context of future attempts at SAI. Finally, section 3.4 provides an overview 
of interactional law theory, which is the approach used in this project to analyse questions of 
compliance with the no-harm rule.  
3.1 RESEARCH AIMS 
This project has three broad research aims directed at addressing the issues and research gaps 
identified in the previous chapter. The first broad aim of this project is to challenge the 
assumption that SAI is largely permitted under existing international law. The potential 
significance of customary international law to the governance of SAI (and geoengineering 
more generally) is not widely recognised or understood in geoengineering literature, especially 
the articles and reports targeting interdisciplinary audiences. This research addresses this issue 
by clarifying the scope no-harm rule and the obligations states may have under this rule should 
they decide to attempt SAI in the future.   
The second aim of this project is to rebut suggestions that the content of the no-harm rule is 
unclear and therefore incapable of guiding the behaviour of states when it comes to future 
attempts at SAI. As noted in the previous chapter, literature that suggests the no-harm rule 
and/or its application to SAI is unclear typically does not engage in a detailed analysis of key 
primary and secondary sources on the no-harm rule. Without this analysis, it is difficult to judge 
how the no-harm rule might apply or operate in the context of SAI. This project therefore 
undertakes a detailed analysis of these sources to establish the scope of the no-harm rule and 
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the nature of the obligations it provides states with. It then considers how the no-harm rule 
might be interpreted to apply to future attempts at SAI.  
The third broad aim of this project is to address the gap in the literature regarding the potential 
of the no-harm rule to influence the behaviour of states to prevent significant transboundary 
harm and harm to the global commons from SAI. In doing so, this research questions widely-
held assumptions regarding compliance with the no-harm rule. It challenges assumptions that 
states will comply with the no-harm rule because of its binding status, or that they will only 
comply if the no-harm rule can be enforced against them. This approach will complement 
existing consideration of the no-harm rule as a basis for state responsibility and reparations for 
harm caused. Through this analysis, this research provides a more comprehensive account of 
the role of the no-harm rule in international environmental governance. It therefore considers 
what factors may contribute to compliance with the no-harm rule and how the no-harm rule 
might be developed in order to improve the likelihood of compliance with it should SAI be 
attempted in the future.       
These three aims shape the specific research questions that are addressed in this project:  
1. What is the history, content and underlying purpose of the no-harm rule in 
international environmental law?  
2. To what extent does the no-harm rule, as currently formulated, respond to risks of 
transboundary harm and/or harm to the atmosphere from proposed SAI geoengineering 
activities?  
3. What changes to the no-harm rule might be required to enhance its capacity to 
respond to risks of transboundary harm and/or harm to the global atmospheric commons 
should SAI be attempted in the future? 
According to Hutchinson, the choice of research design should flow from the research 
questions.1 In other words, a valid research design is one that enables the researcher to answer 
the research questions. In order to address the research questions and achieve my research aims, 
this project draws upon two theoretical frameworks: doctrinal legal analysis and interactional 
international law theory. Doctrinal analysis is used to analyse the content of the no-harm rule, 
as currently formulated, and how it is likely to apply to SAI. However, questions of compliance 
                                                 
1 Terry Hutchinson, 'Doctrinal Research- Researching the Jury' in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), 
Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 726, 17-18. See also Mandy Burton, 'Doing empirical research: 
Exploring the decision-making of magistrates and juries' in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research 
Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 55. 
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with the no-harm rule and its capacity to influence the behaviour of states calls for an additional 
approach to complement doctrinal analysis. To answer these questions, this research applies 
interactional international law theory.  
The way in which this research design matches the above research questions is summarised in 
figure 3.1 below:  
Figure 3.1 Overview of Research Design  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following section explains the role of doctrinal legal analysis as a key element of my 
research design.  
3.2 USING DOCTRINAL LEGAL ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE THE CONTENT OF THE 
NO-HARM RULE     
This research uses doctrinal legal analysis to determine the content of the no-harm rule and 
analyse how it may be interpreted and applied to SAI. Doctrinal analysis is the traditional 
approach lawyers take to legal research. Generally speaking, it provides a framework for the 
study of legal concepts and principles.2 Hutchinson and Duncan describe doctrinal analysis as 
a two part process. The first part is the process of locating relevant legal rules in sources of 
law; the second part is interpreting and analysing the legal rules to explain their content, how 
                                                 
2 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research' (2012) 
17(1) Deakin Law Review 83, 84.  
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they ‘fit’ within the wider legal system and how they might apply to a legal problem.3 Doctrinal 
analysis therefore places emphasis on the use of primary legal sources, such as cases and 
statutes, to identify and interpret the law.  
The first part of the doctrinal analysis process – locating the relevant rules – plays a more 
prominent role in international law scholarship. According to Ku, the basic objective of legal 
scholars in international law is to assess the status of legal norms.4 The legal status of norms 
in domestic law is usually not an issue as laws are generally created by a recognised authority, 
such as a sovereign or parliament. However, as international law is a horizontal rather than a 
hierarchical system, legal scholars often feel the need to establish that a norm is law (i.e. that 
it is legally binding). The first key step in doctrinal legal analysis of international law research 
is therefore to assess the status of norms in accordance with the hierarchy international law 
sources as formally recognised in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
This involves locating international law as found in treaties, custom, general principles. 5 The 
decisions of international courts and tribunals and teachings of ‘highly qualified publicists’ can 
be used as a subsidiary means to determine international law.6 That is, they constitute evidence 
of the law and provide important sources for understanding and interpreting the content of 
international legal norms.7  However, they are not sources of law in their own right.8 
The limits of doctrinal analysis in the study of international law are well-recognised, 
particularly amongst non-legal scholars. Doctrinal analysis has been criticised as being overly 
descriptive, technical and ‘inaccessible to those who lack legal training.’9 A further criticism 
is that doctrinal legal analysis adopts an ‘authority’ paradigm that is essentially inward looking 
                                                 
3 Ibid 110-111; Hutchinson, above n 1, 13. See also Adilah Abd Razak, 'Understanding Legal Research' (2009) 
4 Integration & Dissemination 19, 20.  
4 Charlotte Ku, International Law, International Relations and Global Governance (Routledge, 2012) 21. 
5 The Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2008) 2, 24. Brownlie 
also notes that despite their status as a subsidiary source of international law, secondary sources are sometimes 
relied upon in the judgements of international and national courts and have occasionally had a formative 
influence on the development of certain areas of international law. See also J G Lammers, Pollution of 
International Watercourses: A Search for Substative Rules and Principles of Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1984), 503-
504. According to Lammers, the judgments of international courts and tribunals may have a formative effect on 
the development of international law by influencing state practice and opinio juris (at 504).  
8 Brownlie, above n 7, 24. Brownlie also notes that despite their status as a subsidiary source of international 
law, secondary sources are sometimes relied upon in the judgements of international and national courts and 
have occasionally had a formative influence on the development of certain areas of international law. 
9 Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack, 'International Law and International Relations: Introducing an 
Interdiciplinary Dialogue ' in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdiciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 3, 13. 
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and self-justifying.10 That is, the study of law is restricted to legal sources without reference to 
external sources, such as empirical evidence, to validate claims.11 Despite these shortcomings, 
Hutchinson insists that doctrinal analysis is indispensable to most legal research projects, 
because researchers must firstly understand the content of the law before they can research 
wider issues, such as the origins of law or its role in society.12 This reflects how doctrinal legal 
analysis is used in this project.  
This project uses doctrinal analysis to address research question (1) and to partly address 
questions (2) and (3). This research proceeds on the basis that the no-harm rule is a principle 
of customary international law as confirmed by the ICJ in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory 
opinion.13 It does not seek to challenge this view. However, given the unwritten and dynamic 
nature of the no-harm rule as a principle of customary international law, locating the no-harm 
rule in relevant sources of international law remains an important first step.14 This research 
then engages in the second step of doctrinal legal analysis, which is to analyse the content of 
the no-harm rule as it currently stands and how it might be interpreted to apply to future 
attempts at SAI. Finally, on the basis of this analysis, this research recommends how the no-
harm rule might be developed so as to enhance its doctrinal clarity and application to SAI in 
the future.  
3.3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE NO-
HARM RULE  
Doctrinal analysis provides the necessary framework for establishing the content of the no-
harm rule, but an additional theoretical framework is needed to assess compliance with the no-
harm rule and its capacity to influence the behaviour of states. Doctrinal analysis is unable to 
answer these questions, primarily because its scope is confined to the internal study of law as 
a system, essentially examining ‘what the law is’15 in isolation from a wider consideration of 
how it practically operates.16 Doctrinal analysis does not provide a framework for considering 
                                                 
10 Geoffrey Samuel, 'Interdisciplinarity and the Authority Paradigm: Should Law Be Taken Seriously by 
Scientists and Social Scientists?' (2009) 36(4) Journal of Law and Society 431. See also Dunoff and Pollack, 
above n 9, 16.  
11 Dunoff and Pollack, above n 9, 16. 
12 Hutchinson, above n 1, 17. See also Council of Australian Law Deans, 'Statement of the Nature of Legal 
Research ' (2005) <http://www.cald.asn.au/resources >, 3.  
13 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 241-242 (‘Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion)’). 
14 See chapter 4.1. 
15 This is also referred to as lex lata. 
16 See Hutchinson, above n 1, 10, 15-16. 
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normative issues such as ‘what the law ought to be,’17 or the influence international law has on 
the behaviour of state and non-state actors.18 When it comes to customary international law, 
doctrinal legal analysis takes the question of compliance for granted. As noted by Koh ‘[t]he 
very concept of obligatory custom assumes that nations, by virtue of their sovereign statehood, 
had de facto consented to compliance’.19 A second theoretical framework is needed to assess 
the likelihood of compliance with the no-harm rule and recommend how the no-harm rule 
might be developed in order to improve this likelihood in the future.  
In order to address these issues this project uses IR theory. IR can be broadly defined as the 
‘study of the interactions among the various actors that participate in international politics’, 
including state and non-state actors. 20 The following section provides an overview of the 
development of interdisciplinary scholarship between international law and international 
relations, and in doing so highlights key theoretical approaches to compliance.    
3.3.1 The development of international law and international relations scholarship 
There is a long tradition of interdisciplinary research between international law (IL) and IR 
theory focusing on compliance. Both disciplines share a common interest in how actors in the 
international system can be governed.21 By engaging in interdisciplinary research and adopting 
different lenses of inquiry, IL and IR scholars have gained additional insight and generated 
new knowledge concerning international governance. 22  IR scholars have engaged with 
international law in order to explain the relationship between international law and state 
behaviour.23 IL also offers IR scholars a detailed understanding of legal rules and institutions.24 
Conversely, legal scholars have turned to IR as a source of theoretical approaches that can be 
used as lenses to consider issues concerning international legal norms and institutions.25 This 
section provides a brief overview of the development of IR scholarship and its engagement 
                                                 
17 This is also referred to as lex ferenda. For a detailed discussion of lex lata and lex ferenda in customary 
international law, see Noora Arajävi, 'Between Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda? Customary International (Criminal) 
Law and the Principle of Legality' (2010-2011) 163 Tilburg Law Review 163.  
18 Hutchinson, above n 1, 15. Hutchinson notes that one of the main criticisms of doctrinal legal analysis is that 
‘the researcher’s view is narrowly confined within the box labelled ‘law’ and not concerned with the effects of 
the law in the world external to the black letter box.’  
19 Harold Hongju Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599, 2608.  
20 Karen A  Mingst, Essentials of International Relations (W W Norton & Company 4ed, 2008) 2.  
21 Ku, above n 3, 4. See also Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'International Law, International 
Relations and Compliance ' in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds), Handbook of 
International Relations (Sage Publications, 2002) 538, 538. 
22 Ku, above n 3, 17.  
23 Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 21, 538.  
24 See Kenneth W Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’ 
(1989) 14 Yale Journal of International Law, 335, 339-340.  
25 Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 21, 538; Abbott, above n 24, 339-40; Dunoff and Pollack, above n 9, 10. 
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with international law. This overview is not a comprehensive history of interdisciplinary 
scholarship in this field — more detailed accounts can be found elsewhere.26 It is merely 
intended to provide the necessary context for understanding how IR theory can be utilised to 
examine questions of compliance with the no-harm rule.  
Modern IR scholarship developed following the end of World War II. Prior to WWII, 
international law was promoted as a ‘worthy cause’ that had the potential to promote 
international cooperation and peaceful relations.27 When international institutions and treaties 
such as the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact28 failed to prevent the outbreak of 
war, a number of scholars came to question the capacity of international law to influence the 
behaviour of states.29 Scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr were critical of the 
potential of international law and institutions to govern international relations.30 These new, 
‘realist’ scholars argued that international law could not effectively influence the actions of 
states without centralised enforcement mechanisms.31 They saw international law as having 
little influence over international relations, as it was only seen to play a meaningful role when 
it reflected the power interests of leading states.32 This marginalisation of international law 
triggered a ‘decades-long mutual estrangement’ between the disciplines of IL and IR. 33 
According to Abbott, IL scholars saw little point in engaging with a discipline that portrayed 
international law as impotent, and the overly ‘legalistic’ approach of IL scholars was of little 
interest to IR scholars.34 However, realist scholarship presented a new way of thinking about 
the role of international law in international relations, and in doing so paved the way for other 
theories to develop.35    
 
                                                 
26 See, eg, David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Héléne Lambert, 'International Law and International Relations' 
in  (Cambridge University Press 2ed, 2012); Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 21; Beth A Simmons, 
'Compliance with International Law' (1998) 1 Annual Review of Political Science 74.  
27 Thomas M. Franck, 'The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of 
Power Disequilibrium' (2006) 100(1) The American Journal of International Law 88, 89.  
28 The Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Germany Part 1 – The Covenant of the League of 
Nations, signed at Versailles June 28 1919; General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris, August 
27, 1928 (‘Kellog-Briand Pact’).   
29 Ku, above n 3, 21. For an historical overview, see Mingst, above n 20, 34-37.  
30 E H Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(Macmillan, 1946); Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (McGraw Hill, 1993). See also Armstrong, 
Farrell and Lambert, above n 26, 77-78.  
31 Dunoff and Pollack, above n 9, 5.  
32 Ibid, 5. Ku, above n 3, 21.  
33 Dunoff and Pollack, above n 9, 6. 
34 Abbott, above n 24, 337-338. 
35 Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 21, 540; Dunoff and Pollack, above n 9, 6.  
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Closely related to realism is rational choice theory.36 Rational choice theory similarly takes an 
interest-driven approach to international relations.37 It shares the underlying assumption with 
realism that states are rational actors that act in order to maximise their interests.38 In addition 
to power, these interests can include wealth, security or other such material or reputational 
gains.39 States are assumed to be motivated by a ‘logic of consequence’, in that their decision 
to create and/or comply with international law is determined by the likely outcome of their 
actions.40 Generally speaking, rational choice theorists suggest that rules of international law 
have a more prominent role to play in influencing the behaviour of states that realist theories.41 
However, these theories suggest that international law is primarily a functional instrument that 
states use to pursue individual and/or collective interests. In the words of Franck, rationalist 
approaches represent international law as a ‘disposable tool of diplomacy, its system of rules 
merely one of many considerations to be taken into account by government when deciding, 
transaction by transaction, what strategy is most likely to advance the national interest.’42 
While rationalist theories can provide a useful model for explaining how international law 
works, they present a limited view of the capacity of international law to independently 
influence the decision-making of states. As Goldsmith and Posner state, ‘the possibilities for 
what international law can achieve are limited by the configurations of state interests and the 
distribution of state power.’ 43  Rationalist approaches to international law have therefore 
triggered the development of alternative theories which challenge this view and seek to offer 
alternative explanations of compliance and the role of international law in international 
relations. 44   
 
                                                 
36 See, for example, the rationalist international law scholarship of Andrew T Guzman, How International Law 
Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University Press, Inc., 2008). See also the realist international law 
scholarship of Jack J Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2007) and neo-realist international relations theory of Kenneth N Walz, Theory of International Politics 
(Waveland Inc, 1979). 
37 This research acknowledges different sub-fields of rational choice theory, including game theory and 
transactional cost economics. See Jack Goldsmith et al, 'Introduction' (2002) 31(S1) The Journal of Legal 
Studies S1, S3.  
38 Ibid, S1.  
39 Goldsmith and Posner, above n 36, 7. See also Guzman, above n 36, 71-117. Guzman considers how 
reputational gains and losses can affect the behaviour of states.    
40 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders' (1998) 
52(4) International Organization 943, 949.   
41 See Guzman, above n 36, 11.  
42 Franck, ‘Power of Legitimacy’, above n 27, 89.  
43 Goldsmith and Posner, above n 36, 13. 
44 Dunoff and Pollack, above n 9.  
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One such alternative approach is to privilege the role of domestic and/or transnational 
institutions and actors in fostering compliance with international law.45 In this regard, there is 
no single, unified approach — different theories attach different significance to the role of 
domestic and transnational actors in promoting compliance. The ‘labels’ that are generally 
given to these approaches include liberalism 46  and legalism 47 . Generally speaking, these 
approaches do not view states as individual, unitary actors, as is the case with realist and 
rationalist approaches. Instead, states are characterised as entities made up of different sub-
actors and institutions with their own interests. 48  These include government and non-
government organisations. Broadly speaking, these theories suggest that compliance with 
international law stems from the internalisation, incorporation and/or enforcement of 
international law rules by actors at a transnational and domestic level.49 Therefore, the interests 
and/or values of these actors as opposed to individual ‘states’ are seen to be important in 
promoting compliance with international law.50 
On the opposite end of the spectrum to realism and rationalism are normative approaches to 
compliance. These are theories that suggest that compliance with international law stems from 
normative considerations, rather than being based on utilitarian considerations.  In IR theory, 
the most prominent school of thought is constructivism. 51  As with the other approaches 
mentioned above, there are different branches of constructivism. 52 However, the common 
theme in constructivist IR theory is that norms, identity and interest are seen to be mutually 
constitutive. Norms are seen to have the capacity to shape the identity and, hence, the interests 
and behaviour of actors. 53 Conversely, norms arise through processes of socialisation and 
                                                 
45 See, eg, Harold Hongju Koh, 'Transnational Legal Process' (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, 'International Law in a World of Liberal States ' (1995) 6 European Journal of International Law 
503. For a generalised explanation of how internal, domestic politics can affect compliance with international 
law and its capacity to influence environmental law problems, see Oran R Young and Marc A Levy, 'The 
Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes' in Oran R Young (ed), The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999) 1, 26-27.  
46 Slaughter, above n 45. 
47 Simmons, above n 26, 83. Simmons uses the term ‘democratic legalism’.  
48 Slaughter, above n 45, 241. Slaughter offers the metaphor of states as an atom, made up of various sub-
components that relate to one another.  
49 See, eg, Koh, above n 45; Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 21, 547.  
50 See Slaughter, above n 45, 242; Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 21, 547.  
51 See, eg, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 1989); Alexander 
Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State' (1994) 88(2) American Political Science 
Review 384; Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of 
International Relations (Routledge, 2005); Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society 
(Cornell University Press, 1996).  
52 Mingst, above n 20, 72.  
53 See Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, above n 26, 100-101.  
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interaction between actors. 54  In this view, identities, interests, and norms are socially 
constructed. Compliance with international law is therefore explained through the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’: states are socialised to comply with legal rules because it is the ‘right thing 
to do’.55 
The above paragraphs present only a brief overview of prominent IR theories.56 It is beyond 
the scope of this project to engage in a detailed examination of all relevant approaches or to 
prove that one approach is more ‘correct’ than the others. Several scholars working on 
questions of law and compliance have acknowledged that different theoretical approaches may 
be useful depending on the context in which they are applied. For example, Franck, whose 
theory of compliance with international law follows the logic of appropriateness, suggests that, 
depending on the circumstances, different motivational factors may exert a stronger influence 
than others on states considering whether to comply with international rules.57 Brunnée and 
Toope, whose theory similarly follows the logic of appropriateness, suggest that 
realist/rationalist power- and interest-based theories, which draw on the logic of consequence, 
may still be of some utility in explaining compliance with international law in some 
situations. 58  Guzman, a rational choice theorist, also proposes that alternative theories, 
including liberalism and constructivism, may offer explanations for compliance with 
international law where rational choice theory cannot.59 In effect, these theories offer different 
‘lenses’ to analyse questions of compliance. The relevant question is therefore not ‘which lens 
is more correct’, but which is best suited to address the research aims and questions of this 
project? That is, which theory is best suited to analyse the current capacity of the no-harm to 
promote compliance in the context of future attempts at SAI and recommend how the no-harm 
rule might be developed to enhance this capacity?  
The compliance theorists above acknowledge the potential benefit of other theoretical 
approaches but do not offer a clear approach for selecting one school of thought over the others. 
                                                 
54 Mingst, above n 20, 72; Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: 
An Interactional Account (Cambridge University Press 2010) 14.  
55 March and Olsen, above n 40, 951-952; Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 21, 540, 546.  
56 For more detailed accounts see, Raustiala and Slaughter, above n 21; Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, above 
n 26. 
57 Thomas M Franck, 'Legitimacy in the International Law System' (1988) 82 American Journal of International 
Law 705, 712.  
58 Brunnée and Toope, above n 54, 93.  
59 Guzman, above n 36, 20-21. For example, liberalism and constructivism may account for changes to state 
interests over time, and explain how those interests are formed.  
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This research therefore turns to the work of regime theorists Young and Levy to determine 
which theoretical approach is most suited to address the aims of this project. 
3.3.2 Selecting a theoretical approach to analyse compliance with the no-harm rule    
Young and Levy seek to understand how international environmental regimes influence the 
behaviour of state and non-state actors to address international environmental problems.60 
They define regimes as ‘social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, 
procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas.’61 
Young and Levy recognise that there are different reasons as to why some regimes successfully 
address environmental problems, and why others do not. 62  Their research identifies and 
examines six ‘behavioural mechanisms’ through which regimes influence the behaviour of 
actors.63 To a large extent, these mechanisms reflect the theoretical approaches to compliance 
outlined above, drawing on either the logic of consequence, logic of appropriateness or the idea 
that states are not necessarily unitary actors. Young and Levy recognise that different 
behavioural mechanisms (and sometimes multiple behavioural mechanisms) might account for 
the way in which regimes affect the behaviour of actors to achieve their aims.64 Their theory 
provides models to assess the extent to which the success or failure of a regime can be attributed 
to different behavioural mechanisms. 65  
At first glance, the no-harm rule may not appear to fit the definition of a ‘regime’. As a principle 
of customary international law, the no-harm rule is not as detailed as a multilateral 
environmental agreement. The no-harm rule is also general in the sense it does not address a 
specific issue area such as climate change or protection of the ozone layer. Despite these 
differences, the no-harm rule is nevertheless a socially constructed norm that has been created 
through the consent of states (as evidenced by state practice and opinio juris). Young and 
Levy’s behavioural mechanism models are not ‘case-study specific’- they are designed to be 
applied to different situations.66 They focus primarily on the behaviour of actors rather than the 
                                                 
60 Young and Levy, above n 45, 1-3.  
61 Marc A Levy, Oran R Young and Michael  Zürn, 'The Study of International Regimes' (1995) 1(3) 
(September 1, 1995) European Journal of International Relations 267, 274.  
62 Young and Levy, above n 45, 1.  
63 Ibid, 3. 
64 See ibid, 20. 
65 Ibid, 21.  
66 Ibid, 21.  
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specific form of a regime. As such, Young and Levy’s behavioural mechanism models can be 
applied to the no-harm rule.67   
Application of these behavioural mechanisms has been largely retrospective – Young, Levy 
and other authors have used them to analyse how existing regimes operate to address specific 
environmental problems. For example, these pathways have been used to analyse the 1998 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (‘MARPOL’)68, the regime 
governing the Barents Sea Fisheries69, and the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (‘LRTAP’) convention and US-Canadian Memorandum of Intent for addressing the 
problem of Acid Rain in Europe and North America.70 The no-harm rule has been recognised 
for over seventy years, but SAI is a future or ‘hypothetical’ environmental problem, in that it 
has not yet eventuated. The technology itself remains conceptual as it has not yet been field 
tested in the stratosphere. However, the fact that SAI is a future environmental problem does 
not mean that Young and Levy’s models are of little value.  
Behavioural mechanisms can be used prospectively to analyse compliance. One question that 
Young and Levy sought to address by developing their behavioural mechanism models is to 
identify when different behavioural mechanisms are ‘likely to come into play as significant 
determinants of behaviour’.71 This research therefore uses Young and Levy’s behavioural 
mechanisms to indicate the way in which the no-harm rule will likely operate to influence the 
behaviour of state and non-state actors in the context of future attempts at SAI. In other words, 
these behavioural mechanisms are used to identify which theoretical approach will be most 
relevant to examine questions of compliance with the no-harm rule in this project.  
Young and Levy propose six behavioural mechanism models: ‘regimes as utility modifiers’; 
‘regimes as enhancers of cooperation’; ‘regimes as bestowers of authority’; ‘regimes as 
learning facilitators’; ‘regimes as role definers’; and ‘regimes as agents of internal 
realignments’.72 This section considers the potential operation of these mechanisms in the 
context of the no-harm rule and SAI.  Through a process of elimination, this section 
                                                 
67 Young and Levy, above n 45, 19. 
68 Ronald  Mitchell et al, 'International Vessel-Source Oil Pollution ' in Oran R Young (ed), The Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes (The MIT Press, 1999) 33 
69 Olav Schram Stokke, Lee G Anderson and Natalia Mirovitskaya, 'The Barents Sea Fisheries' in Oran R 
Young (ed), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes (The MIT Press, 1999) 91. 
70 Don Munton et al, 'Acid Rain in Europe and North America ' in Oran R Young (ed), The Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and Behavioural Mechanisms (The MIT Press, 
1999) 155.  
71 Young and Levy, above n 45, 21. 
72 Ibid, 22-27.  
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recommends which models (and, hence, which theoretical approaches corresponding to those 
models) are best for analysing the potential effectiveness of the no-harm rule in this context.  
The first two models — regimes as utility modifiers and regimes as enhancers of cooperation 
— reflect ‘logic of consequence’ theories of compliance, such as rational choice theory, in that 
they attribute the behaviour of actors to desired outcomes. The model of ‘regimes as utility 
modifiers’ assumes that actors are ‘self-interested utility maximizers whose behaviour will be 
guided by institutional arrangements to the extent that they alter the costs and benefits 
individual actors attach to well-defined options.’73 The causal mechanism responsible for the 
behaviour of actors in this model is therefore the relative costs and benefits of action created 
by the regime. The second model, ‘regimes as enhancers of cooperation’ is similar to the first, 
as it also perceives actors as self-interested and unitary.74 However, the driver of behaviour is 
the desire to achieve collective outcomes and reap joint gains.75     
Foreseeability of outcomes is central to the function of these behavioural mechanisms. 
Foreseeability is important because it enables actors to judge the likely outcome of their 
decisions in order to calculate the cost or benefit that will flow from them. This is implied in 
statements that Young and Levy make regarding the Ozone Regime. They state that, at one 
point, it was unclear how this regime would evolve.76 This lack of foreseeability made it 
difficult for chemical manufacturers to decide whether to switch to HCFCs.77 In other words, 
it was difficult for the manufacturers to make a decision to follow the regime based on 
utilitarian considerations as the implications of such a decision was unclear. Young has further 
developed this argument in relation to the UNFCCC.78 He suggests that calculating the costs 
and benefits of taking steps to address climate change is ‘little more than guesswork’.79 Given 
the profound level of uncertainty, ordinary utilitarian considerations are likely to be of little 
use in influencing the behaviour of actors in relation to climate change.80 Therefore, as a 
general rule, utilitarian behavioural mechanisms are unlikely to exert a strong influence over 
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the behaviour of actors where the consequences of their actions are not reasonably 
foreseeable.81  
Foreseeability is an important factor for determining the behavioural mechanisms that the no-
harm rule will likely operate through in the context of future attempts at SAI. Leading 
geoengineering scientists and governance scholars suggest that future decisions by states to 
deploy SAI will be based on a utilitarian calculation: weighing the risks and uncertainties of 
SAI impacts against the risks and uncertainties of climate change. 82  However, the 
consequences of engaging in SAI may be too uncertain for states to calculate its net utility 
through a cost/benefit-style calculation. The magnitude of the uncertainty that surrounds 
geoengineering use and impacts (including SAI) was stressed by the Royal Society in its 2009 
report on geoengineering.83 The report notes that there is a poor understanding of the potential 
impacts and side-effects of geoengineering, and even less understanding of their probability.84 
Assessing the future outcomes of geoengineering will be more a situation of ‘indeterminacy’ 
or ‘ignorance’, as opposed to balancing foreseeable risks. 85  It is possible that some 
uncertainties may be reduced by future research, but the ‘possibility remains that an unknown 
hazard may be revealed at a later time.’86 In light of this irreducible uncertainty, it may be 
difficult for states to calculate the utility of engaging in SAI, and, hence, how the decision to 
comply with the no-harm rule will alter the costs and benefits likely to flow from it. For this 
reason, this research suggests that it is unlikely utilitarian considerations will significantly 
shape the decision-making of states to comply with the no-harm rule when it comes to field 
testing or deploying SAI. 
As utilitarian models are unlikely to significantly account for the behaviour of actors in the 
context of future SAI, it is necessary to consider the remaining four models proposed by Young 
and Levy that draw on non-utilitarian considerations. The model of ‘regimes as agents of 
                                                 
81 O. R. Young, 'Sugaring off: enduring insights from long-term research on environmental governance' (2013) 
13(1) International Environmental Agreements-Politics Law and Economics 87, 94-95.  
82 See Scott Barrett, 'Solar Geoengineering’s Brave New World: Thoughts on the Governance of an 
Unprecedented Technology' (2014) 8(2) (July 1, 2014) Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 249, 
254. See also David Keith and Gernot Wagner, ‘To help cool the climate, add aerosol’, Wired (5 October 2016) 
< https://www.wired.com/2016/10/help-cool-climate-add-aerosol/>; Floor Fleurke, 'Future Prospects for 
Climate Engineering within the EU Legal Order' (2016) 7 European Journal of Risk Regulation 60, 63, 71. 
Fleurke suggests that precaution could be used as a mechanism to enable states in the EU to engage in a risk-risk 
trade-off between geoengineering and climate change.  
83 The Royal Society, 'Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty ' (The Royal Society 
2009), 37–38. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid, 38. 
86 Ibid. 
Chapter 3 
 
76 
 
internal realignment’ characterises states as non-unitary actors.87 It emphasises the role of other 
actors at a transnational and domestic level, including corporations and NGOs.88 It suggests 
that regimes ‘affect behaviour by creating new constituencies or shifting the balance among 
factions or subgroups vying for influence within individual states or other actors.’89 In this 
sense, rules and regimes can be used by these actors as ‘ammunition’ to press their cause and 
change how states perceive and/or act in relation to environmental problems.90 This model 
therefore reflects liberal IR theories of compliance.  
It is possible that the no-harm rule could have some influence through this behavioural 
mechanism when it comes to future use of SAI. However, this would go against the current 
trend. As noted in the previous chapter, beyond the work of international law scholars, the 
potential significance of the no-harm rule is not widely understood in geoengineering literature. 
Given this current lack of understanding and awareness, it is difficult to imagine that the no-
harm rule will have a significant influence on the behaviour of actors at transnational and state 
levels. Young and Levy give examples of environmental and other interest groups that lobbied 
and built new alliances to influence behaviour of states and other key actors with regards to the 
MARPOL convention and the LRTAP convention. 91  There are certainly transnational and 
domestic environmental NGOs that lobby for environmental protection. But in spite of the no-
harm rule’s long history, there are no prominent examples of such groups specifically using the 
no-harm rule to press their own agenda, or of the no-harm rule influencing the alignment of 
domestic groups and organisation. It may be that greater research is needed in this regard. Then 
again, as explained further in chapter eight, the no-harm rule has been conspicuously absent 
from the dialogue surrounding key environmental disputes. Given this trend, it appears unlikely 
that the no-harm rule will have a strong effect on the behaviour of key state and non-state actors 
through this behavioural mechanism in the event of future attempts at SAI.   
Another behavioural mechanism that appears unlikely to play a major role in influencing the 
behaviour of states in the context of the no-harm rule and SRM is ‘regimes as learning 
facilitators.’ This model explains the effect of regimes on actor behaviour through the ways in 
which they stimulate individual and social learning processes. 92 The idea is that learning 
processes can give rise to new perspectives and understandings regarding the nature of 
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environmental problems and the potential of measures to solve them.93 These perspectives can 
redefine the interests of actors and how they choose to act in relation to an environmental 
problem.94 Young and Levy use LRTAP as an example of a regime that has functioned as a 
learning facilitator. They suggest that LRTAP caused states to reassess their interests in 
addressing long-range transboundary air pollution through enhancing their understanding of its 
causes and generating awareness of the impact it has on human health and the environment.95 
It is possible that procedural obligations under the no-harm rule, such as the duty to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) and the duty to notify and consult with other 
potentially affected states, may provide states with a deeper understanding of the potential risks 
and side effects of a proposed attempt at SAI. However, Young and Levy note that ‘the 
processes through which learning occurs are not well understood.’96 Given this theoretical 
uncertainty, and the current level of scientific uncertainty that surrounds SAI, it is unclear the 
extent to which the no-harm rule might cause states to reassess and redefine their interests 
concerning SAI.  
This narrows the choice of relevant behavioural mechanisms down to two: ‘regimes as 
bestowers of authority’ and ‘regimes as role definers’. Both models are non-utilitarian. Young 
and Levy suggest that non-utilitarian mechanisms ‘come into focus once the utilitarian 
emphasis on calculations of benefits and costs is set aside.’97 If actors cannot be forced to 
comply with international rules and regimes, and utilitarian considerations are unlikely to 
convince them that it is more beneficial to comply than not, rules and regimes must (by default) 
operate through non-utilitarian mechanisms, such as the logic of appropriateness.98 Young 
makes this argument in the context of the UNFCCC, using the language of ‘fairness’. He states 
that:  
[T]he only way forward is to devise governance systems that members feel obligated to abide 
by because they were developed through procedures regarded as fair and because their major 
provisions add up to what they can accept as an equitable deal.99 
 
Fairness may be important in the context of climate change, however, there are other means 
through which a sense of obligation to comply with international rules and regimes can be 
developed.  
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Young and Levy’s model of ‘regimes as bestowers of authority’ more broadly adopts the logic 
of appropriateness. It suggests that actors follow regimes out of a sense of legitimacy or 
authority.100 That is, actors comply because it is the right thing to do, and they have been 
socialised to understand that it is the right thing to do. 101  This model reflects logic of 
appropriateness theories of compliance with international law, such as the theories of 
legitimacy and fairness posed by Franck102 and the theory of legal obligation posed by Brunnée 
and Toope.103 This model also reflects constructivist IR theory.  
The suggestion that actors are socialised to understand that it is ‘right’ to comply with legal 
rules overlaps with the final model of ‘regimes as role definers’. 104  This model reflects   
constructivist understandings concerning the creation and role of norms in international 
governance. It suggests that norms (including legal norms), identities and interests are mutually 
constitutive. Actors may create rules, but rules in turn can shape the identity, interests and roles 
of actors.105 This model looks beyond utilitarian considerations to consider how states form 
their interest and define their roles in the first place. In other words, rules and regimes do not 
operate by appealing to the fixed interests of actors. They instead operate by changing the 
interests of actors and how they see their role in international relations.106 Young and Levy do 
not expressly recognise a relationship between ‘regimes as bestowers of authority’ and 
‘regimes as role definers’. However, broader IR literature suggests that these two mechanisms 
may operate together to a certain extent to promote compliance.107  For example, what actors 
consider to be the ‘appropriate’ course of action will likely be shaped by existing social 
structures and norms.108 
Young and Levy’s behavioural mechanisms therefore suggest that in the context of SAI, the 
no-harm rule would most likely operate through the behavioural mechanisms of ‘regimes as 
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bestowers of authority’ and ‘regimes as role definers’. In other words, compliance would most 
likely be norm driven and based on a logic of appropriateness. A theoretical approach that 
considers both of these behavioural mechanisms would therefore be best suited to analyse 
questions of compliance with the no-harm rule. Furthermore, given that the no-harm rule is a 
legal norm, and not a merely social norm, it makes sense to adopt a theory that is tailored to 
analysing legal rules.  
One possible approach is Franck’s theory of legitimacy and compliance with international 
law.109 Franck suggests that states are more likely to comply with legal rules that are perceived 
to be legitimate, that is, legitimate legal norms exert a ‘compliance pull’ on states which can 
overcome self-interest. 110  Franck’s understanding of legitimacy is largely procedural. He 
defines legitimacy to mean ‘that quality of a rule which derives from a perception on the part 
of those to whom it is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right process.’111 
To put it simply, Franck suggests that rules of international law will be perceived as legitimate 
and exert a compliance pull if they are created in a certain way and have certain characteristics. 
This goes beyond merely formalising law in a recognised source (i.e. the ‘pedigree’ of a law).112 
According to Franck, the legitimacy of a rule depends on the degree to which it satisfies four 
indicators: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence to a normative 
hierarchy.113 The greater the extent to which a rule exhibits these indicators, the stronger 
compliance pull it will exert on states.114 Franck argues that the capacity of a rule to exert a 
compliance pull on states depends on the extent to which these criteria are met.115 Franck’s 
theory therefore provides an approach for analysing compliance with international law based 
on the logic of appropriateness.  
However, Franck’s theory of legitimacy is not the best-suited to address the research aims of 
this project. This is because Franck’s theory of legitimacy only speaks to one behavioural 
mechanism: ‘regimes as bestowers of authority’. It does not address the interconnectivity 
between rules, the identities and interests of actors. Franck notes this limitation, stating that his 
theory’s focus on the properties of rules ‘does not yield a self-sufficient account of the process 
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by which nations are socialized into a rule-compliance community.’ 116  In other words, 
Franck’s theory of legitimacy does not fully address the way in which understandings of 
legitimacy and appropriateness are shaped in the first place. It therefore does not provide an 
approach for considering the behavioural mechanism of ‘regimes as role definers’ and how 
these two mechanisms might interact.   
This project instead uses Brunnée and Toope’s theory of interactional international law. 
Interactional law theory similarly draws on the logic of appropriateness to assess the capacity 
of legal norms to exert a ‘compliance pull’ on state and non-state actors. However, interactional 
law theory also incorporates constructivist understandings of how norms and the identities and 
interests of actors are mutually constitutive. It therefore provides an approach for considering 
how the no-harm rule might promote compliance through the behavioural mechanisms of 
‘regimes as role definers’ and ‘regimes as bestowers of authority’. By considering both 
behavioural mechanisms, interactional law theory will likely generate a more nuanced 
understanding of the potential of the no-harm rule to promote compliance when it comes to 
future attempts to govern SRM geoengineering. The following section examines interactional 
international law theory in more detail and explains how this theory is used in this project to 
assess the no-harm rule.  
3.4 INTERACTIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORY 
Interactional international law is a theory of legal obligation developed by Brunnée and 
Toope.117 It draws on constructivist IR theory and the legal theory of Lon Fuller118 to explain 
how legal obligation can be developed and maintained to enhance the compliance pull of rules 
of international law. As mentioned in chapter one, legal obligation is best described as a sense 
of legal legitimacy concerning individual legal norms and a broader sense of commitment or 
‘fidelity’ to upholding international law as a whole.119 According to Brunnèe and Toope, legal 
obligation is a characteristic that distinguishes legal norms from social norms and explains the 
particular way in which legal norms contribute to international relations and governance.120 
They claim that legal obligation enables international law to influence the behaviour of actors 
in the international law system, which lacks the hierarchical structure and central enforcement 
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mechanisms that characterise domestic legal systems.121 In this sense, interactional law theory 
explains the way in which legal norms influence the behaviour of state and non-state actors 
through the logic of appropriateness. However, interactional law theory does not merely seek 
to explain the role of legal obligation and legitimacy in international governance. It also 
explains how legal obligation is created and maintained through the way in which state and 
non-state actors interact with legal norms and with one another regarding rules of international 
law.  
Legitimacy is a central concept in interactional law theory. Brunnée and Toope define 
legitimacy as the capacity of a legal norm to generate a sense of ‘fidelity’ or legal obligation to 
international law as a system, and not just to individual rules.122 Legitimacy does not depend 
on the ‘pedigree’ of a norm, in that norms are not automatically legitimate if they have been 
formalised in treaties or customary law.123 In interactional law theory, the legitimacy of a norm 
and its capacity to generate a sense of legal obligation depends on whether it satisfies the three 
key elements of interactional law theory.124 These elements are shared understandings, Fuller’s 
‘criteria of legality’125 and practice of legality.126 According to interactional law theory, legal 
norms that satisfy all three elements have a high degree of legitimacy, and will therefore exert 
a strong sense of legal obligation and compliance pull. Conversely, norms that do not satisfy 
all elements will exert a weaker sense of legal obligation and are therefore less likely to promote 
compliance. These elements are explained in the following sections.  
3.4.1 The element of shared understandings  
The constructivist concept of ‘shared understandings’ is central to interactional international 
law theory. According to Brunnèe and Toope, in order for rules of international law to promote 
a sense of legal obligation, actors must share a certain level of shared understandings.127 These 
are ‘collectively held background knowledge, norms or practices’.128 Shared understandings 
provide legal norms with social legitimacy, which is the foundation from which more specific 
legal legitimacy can develop.129 Brunnèe and Toope suggest that shared understandings do not 
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necessarily need to be deep or complex in order to enable legal legitimacy and a sense of legal 
obligation to develop. That is, state and non-state actors do not need to ascribe to the same 
belief system, or hold the same political convictions.130 However, at a basic level, there needs 
to be widely shared understandings between actors concerning the need for normativity (i.e. 
the need for law to shape behaviour) and the role or object of the specific legal norm in 
question.131  
There are various accounts of how shared understandings are developed and maintained in 
constructivist IR theory. Brunnèe and Toope acknowledge the theory of ‘norm 
entrepreneurship’ proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink, in which state and/or non-state actors 
are responsible for actively building shared understandings around new norms.132 They also 
acknowledge alternative theories that suggest that shared understandings are promoted through 
the work of ‘epistemic communities’, which are knowledge-based networks of experts (e.g. the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).133 However, Brunnèe and Toope suggest these 
approaches only provide a ‘unidirectional’ account of how shared understandings are 
generated.134 That is, they explain the role of actors in developing shared understandings but 
fail to satisfactorily explain the ‘mutual influence between actors and cognitive or normative 
structures’ that is central to constructivist theory.135 
In order to explain this process of mutual engagement and interaction between actors and 
normative structures, Brunnèe and Toope draw on the theories of Etienne Wenger 136 and 
Emanuel Adler137. Wegner and Adler suggest that ‘communities of practice’ are instrumental 
to the development of shared understandings. Communities of practice are ‘groups of people 
informally bound together by shared expertise and passion for joint enterprise’.138 Wegner 
developed and explored this concept in a domestic setting.139 Adler adapted Wegner’s theory 
to international relations. He suggests that the international system can be viewed as being 
made up of various ‘communities of practice’, such as ‘communities of diplomats, of traders, 
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of environmentalists, and of human rights activists.’ 140  Communities of practice are not 
international actors in their own right, but co-exist and overlap with them.141 In Adler’s view, 
communities of practice facilitate the development of collective understandings, shared 
discourses, actor identities and social learning. 142 They can catalyse new political agendas and 
directions for global governance. 143  Communities of practice are therefore central to the 
evolution, dissemination and practice of norms in international relations.144   
The concept of communities of practice is adopted in interactional law theory. Brunnèe and 
Toope use Wegner and Adler’s communities of practice approach to explain the mutually 
inclusive process through which agents and structures interact to generate and maintain shared 
understandings of legal norms.145 They note that: 
The constructivist emphasis on the mutuality of agents and structures entails certain 
assumptions about how such understandings arise, and how they come to influence actors. On 
the one hand, agents generate and promote particular understandings, whether through norm 
entrepreneurship or through the work of epistemic communities. Shared understandings then 
emerge, evolve or fade through processes of social learning.146 
The concept of communities of practice overlaps with the third element of interactional law 
theory, namely the practice of legality. However, at this stage of inquiry, communities of 
practice are relevant in that they facilitate the social learning and practice that is necessary to 
develop wide shared understandings between state and non-state actors regarding legal 
norms.147  
3.4.2 Lon Fuller’s criteria of legality  
Shared understandings build social legitimacy around a legal norm, but Brunnèe and Toope 
maintain that more is needed to build legal legitimacy and a sense of legal obligation. 148 In 
order to explain how legal legitimacy and legal obligation are created, Brunnèe and Toope turn 
to the legal theory of Lon Fuller. Fuller was a legal scholar writing in the 1960’s. As a natural 
law theorist, Fuller was of the view that law and morality are interrelated, in that the validity 
or legitimacy of legal rules is related to moral considerations rather than whether a rule arises 
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from a formal legal source.149 This stands in contrast to the views of classical positivists such 
as John Austin, and modern positivists such as Herbert Hart, for whom legal rules do not 
necessarily need to satisfy any moral criteria in order to qualify as ‘law’ (i.e. law and morality 
are two separate concepts).150 In his book, The Morality of Law, Fuller developed a procedural 
theory of natural law. Fuller’s theory does not examine the substantive or ‘external’ morality 
of law (i.e. whether the content of a legal rule is moral). 151 Instead, Fuller’s theory is directed 
at understanding the ‘internal’ morality of law. In this sense, legal legitimacy or ‘legality’ is 
derived from the intrinsic characteristics of laws and the process through which they are 
administered, rather than their substantive content. Fuller therefore considers the ‘ways in 
which a system of rules for governing human conduct must be constructed and administered if 
it is to be efficacious and at the same time remain what it purports to be.’152  
Central to Fuller’s theory is his understanding of ‘law’. Fuller defines law as ‘the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.’ 153 He does not share the classical 
positivist view that legal norms are distinguished from social norms by the command of a 
sovereign and possibility of force being administered on non-compliance.154 Fuller claims that 
‘law’ is not dependant for its existence on an Austinian hierarchy of power and command to 
promote compliance. 155  Instead, Fuller proposes that a rule only qualifies as ‘law’ if the 
subjects of the law can reason with it and make choices regarding their conduct in light of the 
law.156 This creates a sense of ‘fidelity’ (i.e. a moral obligation) to individual laws and the legal 
system.157 Fuller also suggests that law is not defined by the pedigree or level of formality of 
the sources within which it is contained.158 Law should rather be understood ‘in terms of the 
activity that sustains it’.159 Brunnèe and Toope suggest that Fuller’s concept of law bears strong 
parallels with constructivist IR literature and the concept of ‘communities of practice’, as it is 
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through reasoning and interaction with law that a sense of ‘fidelity’ to law (or, in their words, 
‘legal obligation’) is created.160 
Fuller identifies eight procedural conditions that enable the creation of laws that citizens can 
reason with and are necessary for promoting fidelity to law as a system.161 Brunnèe and Toope 
have taken these ‘criteria of legality’ and integrated them into interactional law theory as the 
second key element: 
• The generality of law: there must be a rule that prohibits, permits or requires certain 
conduct.162   
• Promulgation: Law must be made generally available so that the subjects of the law are 
aware of the existence of the law and what it requires.163  
• Retroactive laws: Laws should not be imposed retrospectively as laws enacted in the 
future cannot influence conduct in the present.164 
• The clarity of laws: The content of law must be clear so that subjects can understand 
what is required of them to comply.165 
• Contradictions in the laws: Laws should not contradict one another by simultaneously 
requiring and prohibiting the same conduct.166 
• Laws requiring the impossible: Laws should not demand the impossible in that the 
conduct required by law must be realistic and capable of being carried out.167  
• Constancy of the laws through time: The law should not be changed too frequently.168 
• Congruence between official action and declared rule: Actors responsible for creating 
and/or enforcing the law must also act in congruence with the law.169 In the words of 
Fuller, there should be no ‘discrepancy between the law as declared and as actually 
administered.’170  
In some respects, these criteria bring to mind those used by Franck to measure the degree of 
legitimacy of rules of international law.171 Franck’s indicators of legitimacy primarily focus on 
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the procedure through which norms of international law are made (i.e. rules about making 
rules). In contrast, Fuller’s criteria of legality focus on the content and operation of the legal 
norms. However, unlike Franck, Fuller posited these criteria in a general sense, not in the 
specific context of international law.  
Brunnèe and Toope adapt Fuller’s criteria to explain the creation and role of legal obligation 
in the context of international law. In their view, adherence to Fuller’s criteria of legality 
distinguishes legal norms from social norms.172 They state that ‘[w]hen the eight criteria of 
legality are met, actors will be able to reason with rules because they will share meaningful 
standards.’173 As such, norms that adhere to the eight criteria of legality will generate ‘fidelity 
to law’ or, in their own words, a sense of ‘legal obligation’.174 That is, legal norms will tend to 
attract their own adherence regardless of the existence of enforcement mechanisms.175 This is 
because norms that satisfy the eight criteria of legality are legitimate in eyes of the law’s 
subjects.176 This understanding of international law focuses on the horizontal characteristics 
that enable it to function, as opposed to depicting law as dependant on a ‘top-down’ application 
of authority and power. 177  Fuller’s criteria of legality are therefore well-suited for 
understanding the creation of legitimate legal norms in international law, which lacks the 
centralised enforcement mechanisms and authoritative hierarchy of domestic legal systems.178  
3.4.3 Practice of legality 
In order for a sense of legal obligation to be generated and maintained, it is not enough that 
legal norms are created so that there are shared social understandings as to their purpose 
(element 1) and also substantially meet the eight criteria of legality (element 2).179 According 
to Brunnèe and Toope, there must also be a continuing ‘practice of legality’.180 This requires 
that the activities and practices of international actors are congruent with an existing legal 
norm.181 Moreover, the practice must also uphold and reinforce the criteria of legality as set 
                                                 
172 Brunnée and Toope, above n 54, 26-27. Brunnée and Toope claim that ‘[f]or international society, some 
distinction between legal obligations and broader social norms is crucial in upholding an admittedly weal rule-
of-law tradition.’ 
173 Ibid, 312. 
174 Ibid.  
175 Ibid. 
176 Brunnée and Toope, above n 54, 312. 
177 Ibid, 311. 
178 Brunnée and Toope, above n 54, 6.  
179 Brunnée and Toope, Interactional International Law, above n 129, 312;  
180 Brunnée and Toope, above n 54, 6-7; Brunnée and Toope, Interactional International Law, above n 129, 
312-313.  
181 Brunnée and Toope, Interactional International Law, above n 129, 313.  
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out above. 182  Activities that reinforce practice of legality include ‘legal argumentation, 
interpretation, implementation or enforcement measures.’183 
Practice of legality means that laws cannot simply be declared and then left idle. According to 
Brunnèe and Toope, laws must be continuously maintained through a practice of legality.184 
Without this practice, laws may only amount to being ‘paper norms’, in that they exist in 
writing (i.e. are enshrined in formal sources) but have no influence over the actual behaviour 
of state and non-state actors.185 Legal norms that are not ‘practiced’ can also fall into disuse or 
be undermined and reshaped by contrary practice.186 The participation of actors in creating and 
maintaining legal norms is therefore key to the development of legal obligation.187 This links 
back to the concept of communities of practice discussed above – they provide a forum to 
facilitate a mutual and sustained practice of legality between state and non-state actors.  
Interactional law theory provides a lens to assess the general capacity of the no-harm rule to 
promote compliance. This project analyses the no-harm rule against the elements of shared 
understandings, criteria of legality and practice of legality to determine how strong a sense of 
legal obligation, and hence compliance pull, it would likely exert over states in the context of 
future attempts at SAI. From this assessment, this research recommends how the no-harm rule 
might be developed to enhance the likelihood of compliance.  
3.4.4 Interactional law theory and customary international law  
Interactional law theory provides a new approach for specifically considering the way in which 
rules of customary international law influence the behaviour of state and non-state actors. As 
mentioned above, traditional doctrinal approaches to customary international law do not 
satisfactorily explain the way in which customary rules are formed or the role that it plays in 
international governance. In particular, they do not satisfactorily explain the formation and role 
of opinio juris- the belief that a certain practice is required by law. To borrow the words of 
Brunnèe and Toope ‘[h]ow is one to understand the idea that an abstract entity like a state 
‘believes’ something? How is the belief to be proved?’188 Opinio juris is typically inferred from 
                                                 
182 Brunnée and Toope, Interactional International Law, above n 129, 313.  
183 Jutta Brunnée, 'The Sources of Interactional Environmental Law: Interactional Law ' in Samantha Besson and 
d'Aspremont (eds), Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (2017- Forthcoming) 1, 4.  
184 Brunnée and Toope, above n 54, 352. 
185 Brunnée and Toope, Interactional International Law, above n 129, 313.  
186 Brunnée and Toope, above n 54, 352-353.  
187 Ibid, 353. 
188 Brunnée and Toope, above n 54, 47.  
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the existence of widespread concurrent practice, thereby overlapping with the requirement for 
state practice.189 Such accounts therefore do not clearly distinguish what opinio juris is.   
Few detailed, alternative accounts of customary international law have been provided by 
international relations theorists. Goldsmith and Posner provide an account of customary 
international law based on IR realist theories and rational choice theory. In their view, states 
comply with customary international law only out of material self-interest. 190  Customary 
international law either coincides with the material self-interests of a number of states, or strong 
states coerce weaker states to comply.191 In this view, customary international law cannot 
independently influence the behaviour of states.192 Moreover, the very existence of customary 
international law is based on the interests of states, and not an independent belief that a law 
should be complied with.193 In other words, opinio juris is nothing more than a legal fiction. 
Guzman takes an alternative approach. He suggests that customary law can independently 
influence the behaviour of states by affecting ‘state payoffs’ (i.e. the benefit or cost of 
behaviour).194 Guzman nevertheless notes that they do this because they are considered to be 
law. 195  In Guzman’s view, whether a norm is a legal norm relates to the magnitude of 
consequences attached to non-compliance – legal norms have more significant consequences 
that non-legal norms. 196  This generates an increased expectation of compliance amongst 
states.197 According to Guzman, opinio juris is merely a belief or expectation held by other 
states that ‘the acting state has a legal obligation.’198 It is this belief of other states that alters 
the payoff of compliance. 199  These two accounts therefore only offer explanations of 
customary international law based on the logic of consequence. 
Interactional law theory offers an account of customary international law based on the logic of 
appropriateness. According to Brunnèe and Toope: 
The interactional theory shows that a social norm, reflecting a shared understanding that meets 
the criteria of legality is upheld through practice that is congruent with the norm. This 
                                                 
189 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, 'A Theory of Customary International Law' (1999) 66(4) The 
University of Chicago Law Review 1113, 1117-1118.  
190 Ibid, 1115. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Guzman, above n 36, 188.  
193 Goldsmith and Posner,  'A Theory of Customary International Law', above n 189. 
194 Guzman, above n 36, 190. 
195 Ibid, 191.  
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constitutes a ‘practice of legality.’ This enriched form of practice is what would traditionally 
have been called opinio juris.200 
Interactional law theory therefore provides an explanation of opinio juris that sufficiently 
distinguishes it from ordinary state practice, thereby providing a clearer account of customary 
international law. It does not purport opinio juris to be a legal fiction. Nor does it distort the 
meaning of opinio juris by rationalising its role on the basis of material interest. In this sense, 
interactional law theory provides an explanation of customary international law that is more 
sympathetic to the traditional understandings of opinio juris. That is, the idea of opinio juris as 
‘a [subjective] belief that [a] practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law 
requiring it.’201   
Interactional international law is a relatively new approach. Brunnèe and Toope published this 
theory in 2010 in their book Legitimacy and Legality in International Law. In this book, they 
apply interactional law theory to the UNFCCC regime, the prohibition against torture and the 
prohibition against the use of force. The case studies therefore largely focus on rules of 
international treaty law.202 Moreover, interactional law theory has not been widely considered 
or applied beyond the work of its creators. This project takes the opportunity to ‘test’ this 
theory. It therefore takes a critical approach to applying interactional law theory to the no-harm 
rule. It reflects on how useful this theory is to analysing rules of customary international law 
such as the no-harm rule, as well as any limitations or difficulties.  
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explained the methodological and theoretical approaches used in this project to 
address the research aims and specific research questions. Doctrinal legal analysis will be 
employed throughout chapters four, five and six to establish the content of the no-harm rule 
and considers how it has evolved over time. Chapter seven engages in the next step of doctrinal 
analysis by considering how the no-harm rule would likely apply to future attempts at SAI. 
Interactional law theory will be used in chapter eight to assess the extent to which the no-harm 
rule is likely to promote a ‘compliance pull’ over states, should they decide to engage in field 
testing or full scale deployment of SAI. By combining these two approaches, this project aims 
                                                 
200 Brunnée and Toope, above n 54, 47.  
201 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of German v 
Netherlands) (1969) ICJ Rep 3, 44. 
202 The prohibition against torture is codified within the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS 113 (entered into force 
26 June 1987). 
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to develop a comprehensive understanding of the role of the no-harm rule in international 
environmental governance and recommend how it might be developed to better contribute to 
international environmental governance in the future.  
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4 Phase One of the Development of the No-Harm Rule 1938-
1972: Duty Not to Cause Transboundary Harm to Other 
States 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The no-harm rule is widely recognised as a principle of customary international law. The 
significance of this status is that the no-harm rule is binding on all states. As a binding rule of 
customary international law, the no-harm rule might enable international law to respond to the 
threats of transboundary harm and harm to the atmosphere posed by SRM geoengineering in 
the absence of a specific international agreement on the topic. As mentioned in chapter two, 
legal scholars recognise that the no-harm rule could form the basis for states to hold other states 
responsible if they attempt SAI and cause transboundary harm and/or harm to the global 
commons.1 However, there has been little consideration of the potential of the no-harm rule to 
provide a form of ex ante governance of SAI to respond to the risks of SAI before they 
materialise. The potential of the no-harm rule to contribute to the international governance of 
SAI in this manner warrants greater consideration.  
This chapter is the first of three that examine the historical development of the no-harm rule as 
a principle of customary international law. Analysing the historical development is crucial for 
engaging in doctrinal legal analysis of the rule. As previously discussed, doctrinal legal analysis 
is the traditional approach used by legal scholars researching legal concepts and principles.2 It 
can best be described as a two part process: the first part is to locate the law in relevant sources; 
the second part is to interpret and analyse these sources to determine the content of the rule and 
how it might apply to a problem.3 According to Hutchinson and Duncan, the first part of 
doctrinal research is to essentially determine the ‘objective reality’ of the law.4 This is not to 
                                                 
1 See Barbara Saxler, Jule Siegfried and Alexander Proelss, 'International liability for transboundary damage 
arising from stratospheric aerosol injections' (2015) 7(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 112. See also David 
Reichwein et al, 'State Responsibility for Environmental Harm from Climate Engineering' (2015) 5(2-4) Climate 
law 142. 
2 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, 'Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research' (2012) 
17(1) Deakin Law Review 83, 84. See also Chapter 3.2.  
3 Ibid, 110-111; Terry Hutchinson, 'Doctrinal Research- Researching the Jury' in Dawn Watkins and Mandy 
Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 726, 13. See also Adilah Abd Razak, 'Understanding 
Legal Research' (2009) 4 Integration & Dissemination 19, 20.  
4 Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 2, 110. See also Terry Hutchinson, Research and Writing in Law (Thompson 
Reuters (Professional) Australia 3rd ed, 2010) 37.  
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say that that there is a settled or objective understanding of the law.5 Instead, the first step of 
legal doctrinal analysis is to merely establish a positive statement of the law, such as law 
contained in the text of domestic legislation.6 This step is more complicated in the case of 
customary international law as it is formed by congruent state practice over time and the opinio 
juris of states.7 Customary international law is therefore evidenced in multiple sources. It also 
continues to develop over time. Consequently, in order to establish what the no-harm rule is at 
the present time, it is necessary to trace its development. The historical analysis of the no-harm 
rule over the next three chapters therefore provides the necessary foundations for interpreting 
and applying the no-harm rule to the future use of SAI. 
The timeline below provides a visual representation of the development of the no-harm rule as 
a principle of customary international law through key sources. Each source has been selected 
because it represents a turning-point in the development of the no-harm rule and/or has 
significantly contributed to how legal scholars, jurists and states understand the content of the 
no-harm rule. The decisions of international courts and tribunals are prominent in this analysis. 
They are not primary sources of international law in accordance with article 38 of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice. However, as Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell note, they 
‘provide the most authoritative guidance on the state of the law at the time they are decided.’8 
The timeline begins with the Trail Smelter arbitration9: the first judgment of an international 
court or tribunal that recognised the no-harm rule. The timeline continues to the present day 
(2016) and is scaled to represent the number of years between each source.  
  
                                                 
5 Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 2, 110. Hutchison and Duncan note that critical legal scholars would be 
quick to point out that many legal norms are contested.  
6 Hutchinson and Duncan, above n 2, 110.  
7 Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38(1). See also North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic 
of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of German v Netherlands) (1969) ICJ Rep 3, 44 in which the ICJ 
confirmed that both elements are necessary for the formation of customary international law. This understanding 
of customary international law is consistent with that of the earlier Permanent Court of International Justice. See 
Case of the SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ (series A) No 10, 18. 
8 Patricia  Birnie, Alan  Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford 
Univerity Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 140. See also J G Lammers, Pollution of International Watercourses: A Search 
for Substative Rules and Principles of Law (Martinus Nijhoff 1984), 504. Lammers notes that the decisions of 
international courts and tribunals are often invoked by states ‘as evidence of what the rules and principles of 
international law are on a given point’.  
9Trail Smelter (United States v Canada) (Awards) (1938 and1941) 3 RIAA 1905. 
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Figure 4.1 Timeline of the development of the no-harm rule in key sources 
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This timeline divides the development of the no-harm rule into three phases. The first phase 
begins with the Trail Smelter arbitration in 1938/1941. In this phase, the no-harm rule 
developed so as to apply to transboundary harm to the territory of other states. The second 
phase begins in 1972 with principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. In this phase, the no-
harm rule was further developed to extend beyond the territorial jurisdiction of states to also 
include harm to the global commons. This phase is also characterised by a growing emphasis 
on the no-harm rule as a positive duty to prevent harm, rather than merely as a means of 
responding to harm after it has been caused. The commencement of the third phase is marked 
by the ILC’s 2001 Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities.10 This phase is distinguished by the no-harm rule being largely characterised as a 
‘duty of conduct’ or ‘due diligence’ obligation. Consequently, there is a strong focus in key 
sources on the procedural obligations that flow from the no-harm rule.  
This chapter examines the first phase in the development of the no-harm rule: the duty not to 
cause transboundary harm to the territory of another state. Following this introduction, 4.2 
examines the seminal decision of the International Arbitration Tribunal in the 1938/1941 Trail 
Smelter arbitration. Section 4.3 examines how the International Court of Justice’s judgment in 
the 1949 Corfu Channel case contributed to the development of this rule. Section 4.4 analyses 
the way in which the decision in the 1959 Lake Lanoux arbitration contributed to the early 
understanding of the no-harm rule.   
4.2 1938 AND 1941: TRAIL SMELTER CASE (UNITED STATES V CANADA)   
The origins of the no-harm rule can be traced back to the 1938/1941 Trail Smelter arbitration.11 
This case was the first time that an international tribunal recognised the negative transboundary 
consequences of air pollution.12 It was also the first time an international tribunal recognised 
the duty not to cause serious transboundary harm.13 A number of legal scholars have questioned 
its present value as precedent, as the arbitration was triggered by a bilateral agreement and the 
decision relied heavily on US domestic law.14Nevertheless, as the first case to articulate the 
                                                 
10 ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries’ (2001) 
II(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 149 (‘Draft Articles on Prevention’). 
11 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and1941) 3 RIAA 1905.  
12 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2012), 4.  
13 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and1941) 3 RIAA 1905. 
14 See, eg, Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 8, 144; Allen L Springer, Cases of Conflict: Transboundary 
Disputes and the Development of International Environmental Law (University of Toronto Press, 2016) 24-28; 
Jaye Ellis, 'Has International Law Outgrown Trail Smelter? ' in Rebecca M Bratspies and Russell A  Miller 
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no-harm rule, the Trail Smelter arbitration is therefore the logical starting point for considering 
the development of the no-harm rule.  
4.2.1 Background to the arbitration  
This case concerned transboundary air pollution produced by a zinc and lead smelter. The 
smelter was owned by the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada Limited, 
near the town of Trail in British Colombia, Canada. The Consolidated Mining and Smelting 
Company of Canada (the Company) acquired the smelter in 1906. 15  Over the next three 
decades, the Company developed the Trail Smelter, until it became ‘one the best and largest 
equipped smelting plants’ on the North American continent.16 The company added two tall 
smoke stacks in 1925 and 1927, thereby increasing the amount of zinc and lead ore that it could 
process.17 This also increased the amount of air pollution produced by the smelter. By 1930, 
the Trail Smelter was emitting approximately 600-700 tons of sulphur dioxide daily into the 
atmosphere.18 The Trail Smelter is located on the Colombia River about 11km (7 miles) north 
of the border with the US state of Washington.19 The surface wind at Trail tended to blow from 
the northeast down the river valley.20 As a result, the wind carried sulphur dioxide fumes from 
the Trail Smelter across the border into Stevens County in Washington State.21  
From 1925, residents in Stevens County, Washington began to complain that fumes from the 
Trail Smelter were causing damage to their property.22 The Company settled a number of early 
complaints directly with property owners.23 In 1927, the US Government officially took up the 
matter on behalf of its citizens.24 In 1928, the US and Canadian Governments jointly referred 
the issue of transboundary air pollution to the International Joint Commission for investigation. 
The International Joint Commission issued its report in 1931. The report recommended that 
Canada pay the US compensation in the sum of $350,000 for damage caused by fumes from 
                                                 
(eds), Transboundary Harm in International Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 56; Karin Mickelson, 'Rereading Trail Smelter ' in Rebecca M Bratspies and Russell A 
Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in International Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) 79 
15 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1917. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, 1913. 
20 Ibid, 1914. The decision of the Tribunal contains more detail about the prevailing wind conditions in the area, 
including seasonal variations (at 1923-1924).   
21 Ibid, 1917. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, 1918. 
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the Trail Smelter.25 The report also made recommendations for the settlement of future claims 
for damages from citizens, and suggested that the Company take measures to reduce the amount 
of sulphur dioxide produced by the smelter.26 Nevertheless, the problem of transboundary air 
pollution persisted, and in 1933 the US recommenced diplomatic negotiations with Canada.27  
On the 15th April 1935, the US and Canada concluded the Convention for Settlement of 
Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C (‘Convention for Settlement’) to 
permanently settle the dispute. 28 Under article II, the US and Canada agreed to refer the 
question of transboundary harm from 1932 onwards to an international tribunal for arbitration. 
Article III of the Convention for Settlement set out four questions that were addressed by the 
Tribunal. First, the Tribunal had to determine whether the Trail Smelter had caused damage to 
the state of Washington since the 1st January 1932.29 Second, if damage was established, the 
Tribunal was then asked to decide ‘whether the Trail Smelter should be required to refrain from 
causing damage in the State of Washington in the future and, if so, to what extent?’30 Third, 
the Tribunal was asked to establish a regime for the future management of air pollution from 
the Trail Smelter.31 Fourth, the Tribunal was to consider what compensation (if any) should be 
paid in the event of future harm from the smelter.32  Under article IV of the Convention of 
Settlement, the Tribunal was to ‘apply the law and practice in dealing with cognate questions 
in the United States of America as well as international law and practice’ to answer the 
questions before it.33 
4.2.2 Decision of the Tribunal  
The US claimed that fumes from the Trail Smelter had caused damage to land and property in 
Washington State. It specifically claimed damages in respect of: cleared land and 
improvements thereon; uncleared land and improvements thereon; livestock; urban property; 
and business enterprises.34 The Tribunal considered these claims when addressing the first 
                                                 
25 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1918. This amount was for all damages up to and 
including the first day of January 1932.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at Trail B.C., United States-
Canada, opened for signature 15 April 1935, 893 U.S. Treaty Series (entered into force 3 August 1935) 
29 The Tribunal was also asked to determine the amount of compensation that should be paid for such damage. 
30 Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at Trail B.C., United States-
Canada, opened for signature 15 April 1935, 893 U.S. Treaty Series (entered into force 3 August 1935) art 
111(2).  
31 Ibid, art III(3). 
32 Ibid, art III(4)  
33 Ibid, art V.  
34 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA, 1905, 1920.  
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question as to whether the Trail Smelter had caused damage to Washington State. The Tribunal 
found that fumes from the Trail Smelter had caused damage to cleared land in the form of 
reduced crop yields.35 The Tribunal also found that damage had been caused to uncleared land, 
specifically to 200 acres of wild pasture land immediately adjoining the boundary with 
Canada36 and to timber land.37 The Tribunal was not satisfied that damage had been caused to 
livestock independently from the impact of reduced crop or grazing yield.38 The Tribunal was 
also not satisfied that damage had been caused to urban property, or that the fumes from the 
Trail Smelter had caused economic damage to business enterprises in the area.39 
As some of the claims for damage were established, the Tribunal proceeded to consider the 
second question before it, namely whether the Trail Smelter should refrain from causing 
damage in the future. That is, whether there was a rule in international law that prohibited this 
type of conduct. The Tribunal briefly considered the Alabama case40 and the writings of legal 
scholars to demonstrate that states have a general duty under international law to ‘respect other 
States and their territory’.41 However, there was no jurisprudence in international law that 
specifically dealt with the issue of transboundary air pollution or transboundary water 
pollution.42 As such, the Tribunal drew on decisions by the US Supreme Court concerning air 
and water pollution to inform its assessment as to whether the Trail Smelter should be required 
to refrain from causing future harm. The Tribunal held these decisions ‘may legitimately be 
taken as a guide in this field of international law.’43 It further stated that ‘the law followed in 
the United States in dealing with the quasi-sovereign rights of the States of the Union, in the 
matter of air pollution, whilst more definitive, is in conformity with the general rules of 
international law.’44 Given that the Parties had previously agreed to the application of United 
States law to resolve the dispute, the Tribunal’s deference to precedent from the United States 
Supreme Court was not contentious in the context of the dispute.45  
                                                 
35 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA, 1905, 1924.  
36 Ibid, 1926. 
37 Ibid, 1927-1931. 
38 Ibid, 1931. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid, 1963; Alabama Claims (United States v Great Britain) (Awards) (1871) XXIX RIAA 125.  
41 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA, 1905, 1963. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid, 1964.  
44 Ibid.  
45  Stephen C  McCaffrey, 'Of Paradoxes, Precedents, and Progeny: The Trail Smelter Arbitration 65 Years 
Later ' in Rebecca M Bratspies and Russell A Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in International Law: Lessons 
from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 34, 36; Convention for Settlement of 
Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter at Trail B.C., United States-Canada, opened for signature 15 
April 1935, 893 U.S. Treaty Series (entered into force 3 August 1935) art IV.  
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It was on the basis of decisions of the United States Supreme Court that the Tribunal famously 
pronounced:  
[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United States, no State has 
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in 
or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.46  
The Tribunal consequently held that the Trail Smelter must not cause further damage through 
fumes to Washington State.47 It further stated that it is the ‘duty of the Government of the 
Dominion of Canada to see to it that this [the Company’s] conduct should be in conformity 
with the obligation of the Dominion under international law’.48 In other words, Canada was 
ultimately responsible for the conduct of the operators of the Trail Smelter.49 
In response to question three, the Tribunal decided it was necessary to establish a management 
regime for the Trail Smelter in order to prevent further transboundary damage occurring in 
Washington State.50 The Tribunal had employed technical consultants over a period of three 
years to investigate the operation of the Trail Smelter and the prevailing meteorological 
conditions in the area.51 Drawing on information provided by the technical consultants, the 
Tribunal set out the content of the management regime in its decision. The regime required the 
operators of the Trail Smelter to monitor and record meteorological conditions in the area as 
well as measure the concentration of sulphur dioxide emissions. 52 The Trail Smelter was 
required to provide this information to the governments of Canada and the United States on a 
monthly basis.53 The regime also set a daily limit on the allowable amount of sulphur dioxide 
emissions, taking into account seasonal variations in weather, and the prevalence of rain, snow, 
wind and turbulence.54 The Tribunal was confident that this regime would resolve the issue of 
transboundary damage via fumes from the Trail Smelter.55 However, addressing the fourth 
question of indemnity for future harm, the Tribunal nevertheless concluded that if fumes from 
the Trail Smelter should cause damage to Washington State in the future, ‘an indemnity shall 
be paid for such damage but only when and if the two Governments shall make arrangements 
                                                 
46 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1965. 
47 Ibid, 1966. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid, 1965-1966.  
50 Ibid, 1966.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, 1974-1978. 
53 Ibid, 1975. 
54 Ibid, 1975-1977.  
55 Ibid, 1980. 
Chapter 4 
 
99 
 
for the disposition of claims for indemnity’.56 In other words, adherence to the regime would 
not necessarily absolve the Trail Smelter from liability for future damage.  
4.3.3 Significance of the Trail Smelter arbitration  
As noted above, the tribunal in the Trail Smelter arbitration affirmed the existence of the ‘no-
harm’ rule in international law. According to Nanda and Pring, this set the stage for the further 
development of rules and principles in international law concerning transboundary pollution.57  
The Tribunal held that states do not have a right under international law to cause serious harm 
to the territory of other states. The Tribunal’s decision therefore indicated a threshold level of 
‘serious’ harm. That is, states have a right to engage in activities that cause transboundary harm 
so long as the severity of harm is below this threshold. Furthermore, the Tribunal’s decision 
with regard to question four suggested that the standard of care under the no-harm rule is a 
‘duty of result’. Namely, that states may be held liable for transboundary harm regardless of 
whether appropriate preventative measures have been taken. Some legal scholars have 
suggested the alternative – that the decision implies a duty of conduct or due diligence.58 
However, as noted by Goldie, the Tribunal imposed liability on Canada without proof of fault.59 
This weighs heavily in favour of a duty of result (i.e. a standard of care of strict liability).  
The particular context of the Trail Smelter arbitration must be taken into account when 
evaluating its precedential value in the present day. The Tribunal’s reliance on US domestic 
sources to interpret rules of international law has been heavily criticised by legal scholars. It 
has been suggested that the Tribunal was incorrect to assume that US law reflected international 
law at the time. According to McCaffrey, this was ‘a rather large analytical leap’ because no 
positive international law existed to form the basis of this assumption. 60 Ruben similarly 
suggests that the Tribunal’s analogy between states in international law and states in the US 
                                                 
56 Trail Smelter (Awards) (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1980. 
57 Ved P Nanda and George (Rock) Pring, International Environmental Law and Policy for the 21st Century 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2ed, 2013) 81-82.  
58 See Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 10. The commentaries to the Draft Articles imply that the Trail 
Smelter arbitration set this standard of care, stating that the Trail Smelter established a ‘principle of prevention’. 
See also Timothy Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (Cambridge University Press, 
2009) 133; Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Cristina  Hoss, 'Trail Smelter and Terrorism: International Mechanisms to 
Combat Transboundary Harm' in Rebecca M Bratspies and Russell A Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in 
International Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2006) 225, 227-
230. Dupuy and Hoss qualify this interpretation of the Trail Smelter arbitration, describing it as a ‘reactionary 
approach’ to due diligence, compared to the more proactive approach set out by the ILC in the 2001 Draft 
Articles on Prevention. But see Sands and Peel, above n 12, 712. Sands and Peel suggest that this case can be 
interpreted both ways.  
59 L. F. E. Goldie, 'Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of International Law' (1965) 14(4) 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1189, 1230.  
60 McCaffrey, above n 45, 36.  
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federal system was inaccurate. 61  Ruben criticises the Tribunal for not properly examining 
whether US case law at that time was an appropriate reflection of international law.62 The 
Tribunal’s reliance on US domestic law is therefore important to keep in mind when 
considering the contribution of the Trail Smelter arbitration to the development of the no-harm 
rule.  
It is also important to acknowledge that the Trail Smelter arbitration was litigated on the basis 
of a pre-existing bilateral treaty. According to Stephens, the importance of the Trail Smelter 
arbitration is often overstated by legal scholars as they do not give appropriate consideration 
to this context.63 Stephens claims that ‘frequent reference to the case conveys a misleading 
impression that transboundary pollution cases are routinely and effectively resolved by inter-
state dispute settlement.’64 Okowa further notes that the Convention for Settlement narrowed 
the focus of the tribunal, causing it to primarily consider apportionment of damage, rather than 
the formulation of general rules of international law. 65  Nevertheless, legal scholars have 
generally accepted that the Tribunal’s finding expresses the state of customary international 
law in the first half of the 20th century; namely, that states do not have the right to cause serious 
injury to the territory of others.66  
4.3 1949: THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE (UNITED KINGDOM V ALBANIA)  
Eight years after the Trail Smelter arbitration, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) handed 
down its judgment in the Corfu Channel case.67 Unlike the Trail Smelter arbitration, the Corfu 
Channel case did not involve an issue of transboundary pollution. It concerned the sinking of 
British ships in Albanian waters. Nevertheless, the majority judgment of the ICJ is often cited 
by legal scholars as having affirmed the general duty to prevent transboundary harm as 
articulated by the Tribunal in the Trail Smelter arbitration.68 
                                                 
61 Alfred P Rubin, 'Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration [Abridged]' in Rebecca M Bratspies and 
Russell A Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in International Law- Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitraiton 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 46, 48-51.  
62 Ibid, 48-51.  
63 Stephens, above n 58, 124-125. This source has also provided stylistic inspiration for the layout for the source 
analyses in chapters four, five and six.  
64 Ibid, 124. 
65 Phoebe Okowa, State Responsibility for Transboundary Air Pollution in International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 67.  
66 See, eg, ibid 68; Nanda and Pring, above n 57;  
67 The Corfu Chanel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4.  
68 See, eg, Gillian D Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (LexisNexis, 2006), 
790; Okowa, above n 65, 68; Nanda and Pring, above n 57, 82;  
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4.3.1 Background to the dispute 
In the Corfu Channel case, the ICJ addressed claims made by the United Kingdom and Albania 
concerning two related incidents. First, on 22 October 1946, four Royal British Navy ships 
were sailing northward through the Corfu Strait, between the Greek island of Corfu and the 
coast of Albania. Two of the ships, the Saumarez and the Volage, struck sea mines in Albanian 
waters. The explosions heavily damaged both ships, killing 44 crew members and injuring a 
further 42.69 In accordance with a special agreement concluded between the United Kingdom 
and Albania, the ICJ was asked to determine whether Albania was responsible under 
international law for the explosions and the resulting damage and loss of life, and also whether 
Albania had a duty to compensate the United Kingdom for this harm.70  
The United Kingdom claimed that Albania was responsible for the minefield: either it had been 
deliberately laid by the Albanian Government between 15 May and 22 October 1946, or 
alternatively that the Albanian Government knew of the existence of the minefield within its 
territorial waters.71 The United Kingdom further claimed that the Albanian Government had 
failed to warn of the existence of the minefield, even though it knew that British ships were 
passing through the area.72 The United Kingdom therefore argued that Albania had breached 
its international legal obligations and was required under international law to make reparations 
for the damage to British ships and the consequential loss of life and injury to their crews.73 In 
response, Albania claimed that it could not be established that it had laid the mines, had caused 
a third party to lay the mines on its behalf, or knew that the mines were in its territorial waters.74 
It therefore argued that it could not be held responsible for the consequences of the explosions 
and, hence, was not obliged to pay compensation to the United Kingdom.75 
The second incident that was considered by the ICJ took place shortly after on 12-13 November 
1946. In response to the explosions, the British Royal Navy conducted mine sweeping 
operations in Albanian waters without the consent of the Albanian Government.76 Albania 
claimed that, in doing so, the United Kingdom had breached its international legal obligations 
                                                 
69 The Corfu Chanel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 10. 
70 Ibid, 6.  
71 Ibid, 10. 
72 Ibid. Britain claimed that the failure to give warning of the minefield was a breach of the Hague Convention 
VIII of 1907. 
73 Ibid, 11. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid, 12.  
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by violating the territorial sovereignty of Albania.77 The Court was therefore also asked to 
decide whether the United Kingdom had violated the sovereignty of Albania. However, the 
judgment of the ICJ in relation to this second incident is not considered further in this chapter, 
as it is does not contribute to the development of the no-harm rule.  
4.3.2 Judgment of the ICJ and its contribution to the no-harm rule 
The Court considered whether Albania was responsible for the explosions and the damage they 
caused to the British ships and crew. There was no evidence to suggest that Albania had laid 
the mines itself. 78  The Court also was not satisfied that the minefield had been laid by 
Yugoslavia in collusion with the Albanian Government.79 However, the fact that the Albanian 
government was not involved in laying the minefield did not preclude responsibility from being 
established. The Court noted that the Albanian Government maintained strict control over the 
area where the minefield was located, therefore making it unlikely that it was ignorant of its 
existence.80 Albanian authorities would also have been able to observe the minefield being laid 
from locations along the coastline.81 The Court therefore concluded that the minefield could 
not have been laid without the knowledge of the Albanian Government.82  
Given that the Albanian Government knew about the minefield, the Court also held that 
Albania had a duty under international law to notify and warn ships in the area. In support of 
this duty, the Court cited the Hague Convention of 1907 No VIII relative to the Laying of 
Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.83 The Court also cited ‘elementary considerations of 
humanity’ and the ‘principle of the freedom of maritime communication’.84 Finally, the Court 
held that every state has an obligation ‘not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States.’85 This statement more closely resembles the longstanding 
legal maxim of sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own property in such a way that 
                                                 
77 The Corfu Chanel [1949] ICJ Rep 4. 
78 Ibid, 16.  
79 Ibid, 16-17.  
80 Ibid, 20. 
81 Ibid, 22.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Hague Convention of 1907 No VIII relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, opened for 
signature 17 October 1907, (entered into force 26 January 1907).  
84 The Corfu Chanel [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22.  
85 Ibid.  
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you do not injure other people's).86 However, it is also said to support the no-harm rule flowing 
from the Trail Smelter arbitration, even though the ICJ made no reference to that case.87  
While the Corfu Channel case supported the existence of the no-harm rule, it did not further 
develop the rule’s substantive content. It did not expand on the threshold level of harm, or 
clarify the types of harm that the no-harm rule might respond to. The majority of the court 
expressed the no-harm rule in the language of the rights of states, rather than referring to 
physical pollution or harm. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell point out that despite this different 
framing, the ICJ did not provide further clarification as to what the rights of states were. 88 The 
decision certainly gave no indication as to what the rights of states were concerning 
environmental protection.89  
The only relevant development stemming from the ICJ decision is the proposition that states, 
as part of their obligation not to commit acts contrary to the rights of other states, must warn 
other states of any imminent danger to their interests.90 This is reflected in the contemporary 
procedural duty to notify and consult with other states, which is discussed in more detail in 
chapter six. However, this does not automatically mean that, during this phase, the ICJ 
interpreted the no-harm rule as providing states with an obligation of conduct or ‘due 
diligence’. Goldie states that, as with the Trail Smelter arbitration, the ICJ imposed liability for 
harm on Albania without proof of negligence.91  
4.4 1957: LAKE LANOUX ARBITRATION (SPAIN V FRANCE) 
4.4.1 Background to the dispute 
The dispute in the Lake Lanoux arbitration concerned the use of a shared waterway between 
France and Spain.92 Lake Lanoux is located in the Pyrénées in France. Its waters flow into the 
                                                 
86 Overview: sic utero tuo ut alienum non laedas, Oxford Reference,  
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100504563> . 
87 See, eg, Okowa, above n 65, 68; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 8, 144; Nanda and Pring, above n 57, 
82. 
88 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 8, 144. See also Lammers, above n 8, 526.  
89 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 8, 144. See also Lammers, above n 8, 526; Stephens, above n 58, 123. 
90 See Nanda and Pring, above n 57, 82. See also, Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 8, 144.   
91 Goldie, above n 59, 1230. But see Lammers, above n 8, 527. According to Lammers, it can be inferred that 
the failure of Albania to warn the British ships was known to the Court, and that the Court therefore based 
Albania’s responsibility on this omission.  
92 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v Spain) (1957) 24 ILR 101 (‘Lake Lanoux Arbitration’). For further details 
of the background of this case, see Lammers, above n 8, 508-509.  
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River Carol which then flows from France into Spain.93 The French Government proposed to 
divert water from Lake Lanoux away from the River Carol and into the River Ariège for the 
purpose of generating hydroelectricity.94 They further proposed to redirect the same volume of 
water back to the River Carol via a tunnel so that the volume of water flowing into Spain was 
unaltered.95  
Spain objected to France’s proposal. Spain argued that the proposal would violate its rights 
under the 1866 Treaty of Bayonne and Additional Act.96 The Treaty of Bayonne delineated the 
boundary between France and Spain in the Pyrénées area and also established shared water 
rights in this area.97 Spain claimed that France’s proposal breached these rights by unilaterally 
altering the waters of the River Carol. This is because, although France intended to restore the 
water to the River Carol, the flow of water would no longer be natural and would be subject to 
the control of France.98 Spain further argued that France had a duty to consult with Spain and 
obtain its consent prior to beginning the project.99 While Spain specifically asked the Court to 
decide this question on the basis of the Treaty of Bayonne, in its submissions, Spain also 
suggested that such a duty existed under customary international law. Spain referred to other 
treaties between co-riparian states to argue that France had a general duty to obtain the consent 
of Spain before altering a shared watercourse.100 The dispute was submitted to international 
arbitration.  
4.4.2 The decision and its relevance to the no-harm rule 
In submitting the case for arbitration, Spain and France specifically asked the Tribunal to 
decide the dispute on the basis of the Treaty of Bayonne. They did not ask the Tribunal to 
determine and apply general principles of international law, including the no-harm rule.101 The 
decision of the Tribunal therefore largely focuses on interpreting and applying the content of 
the Treaty of Bayonne. However, the Tribunal’s analysis of two issues has some bearing on the 
no-harm rule as a principle of customary international law.  
                                                 
93 Lake Lanoux Arbitration 24 ILR 101, 101-102. For further description of the background to the dispute, see 
Stephens, above n 58 166-168. 
94 Lake Lanoux Arbitration 24 ILR 101, 105-107.  
95 Ibid, 109-110.  
96 See ibid, 102-105.  
97 Ibid. See articles 8-19 as recorded in the award. 
98 Ibid, 112-114.  
99 Ibid, 113. 
100 Ibid, 112. 
101 Ibid, 121. 
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The first relevant issue was whether the proposed diversion and restoration of water into the 
River Carol by France ‘altered’ the waters of the River, and hence, violated Spain’s rights under 
the Treaty of Bayonne. Spain did not allege that France’s proposal would pollute the waters of 
the River Carol, nor change its chemical composition or temperature.102 Spain also did not 
claim that the volume of the water in the river would be reduced.103 The Tribunal held that 
France’s proposal therefore would not ‘alter’ the waters of the River Carol. 104  That is, 
restitution of the water alone, without any other impacts, would not violate the rights of Spain 
under the Treaty of Bayonne.   
In obiter, the Tribunal hypothetically considered the application of customary international 
law. The Tribunal stated that:  
[I]f it is admitted that there is a principle which prohibits the upstream State from altering the 
waters of a river in such a fashion as seriously to prejudice the downstream State, such a 
principle would have no application to the present case, because it has been admitted by the 
Tribunal, in connection with the first question examined above, that the French scheme will not 
alter the waters of the Carol.105 
This statement is generally interpreted by legal scholars as having affirmed the no-harm rule 
as articulated by the Tribunal in the Trail Smelter arbitration.106 This statement further suggests 
that mere utilisation of a shared resource may not be enough to qualify as ‘harm’ in order to 
trigger the no-harm rule. In other words, there must also be some kind of detrimental effect on 
the resource itself.107 For example, in the case of a shared watercourse there must be a change 
in chemical composition of the water, a reduction in quantity of water, or some other alteration 
that impacts upon the ability of the downstream state to utilise the shared watercourse.108     
The second relevant issue was whether co-riparian states had a general duty to obtain the 
consent of other states and negotiate an agreement prior to commencing projects that will 
substantially change a shared waterway. 109 In its Memorial to the Tribunal, Spain referred to 
various multilateral agreements, the decisions of German, Swiss and the United States federal 
courts and the written opinions of over thirty publicists in support of this duty.110 The Tribunal 
recognised that states have an international obligation ‘to seek, by preliminary negotiations, 
                                                 
102 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (1957) 24 ILR 101, 123.  
103 Ibid.  
104 Ibid, 123, 129.  
105 Ibid, 129.   
106 See, eg, Sands and Peel, above n 12, 197; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 8, 144; Stephens, above n 58, 
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terms for an agreement, without subordinating the exercise of their competences to the 
conclusion of such an agreement.’111 That is, they have an obligation to consult with other 
states and attempt to reach an agreement, but are not obliged to conclude such an agreement. 
According to the Tribunal, an obligation to conclude an agreement would unduly restrict the 
sovereignty of states.112 This is because a co-riparian state could restrict the sovereign right of 
the other state to act as it will within its own territory simply by refusing to reach agreement.113 
Therefore: 
[T]he rule that States may utilize the hydraulic power of international watercourses only on 
condition of a prior agreement between the interested States cannot be established as a custom, 
even less as a general principle of law.114 
4.4.3 Significance of the Lake Lanoux arbitration  
The Lake Lanoux arbitration reinforced the no-harm rule as a tool for balancing and protecting 
the sovereign interests of states, rather than as a rule for protecting the environment per se. 
According to Stephens, the Tribunal only considered the impact of the French proposal on the 
utilisation of the River Carol for human purposes, and ignored potential ecological impacts.115 
He notes that the decision focused on ‘ensuring the return of an equivalent amount of water to 
the watercourse, not how that return was effected and certainly not whether an upstream project 
would result in the permanent alteration of the watercourse environment.’116 Lammers further 
notes that the Tribunal did not give any detailed consideration to France’s obligations under 
customary international law concerning water pollution.117 The narrow focus of the Tribunal 
on human, rather than environmental interests is also demonstrated by its decision as to what 
constituted ‘alteration’ of a shared watercourse. The decision suggests that, in order for an 
activity to be considered to alter a shared watercourse, it must involve harm to the human 
interests of a downstream state. 118  Therefore, even though the Lake Lanoux arbitration 
concerned a common environmental resource, the scope of the no-harm rule remained bound 
to the rights and interests of states. 
Similarly to the Corfu Channel case, the Lake Lanoux arbitration also suggested that procedural 
obligations might flow from the no-harm rule. The Tribunal confirmed that upstream states 
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have a duty to notify and consult with downstream states with regards to proposed activities 
that are likely to cause significant transboundary harm.119 This must be done in good faith.120 
The Tribunal did not consider the duty to consult and notify beyond the context of shared 
watercourses. It is arguable that, at the time of the Lake Lanoux arbitration, this procedural 
obligation only applied in this context, as there was insufficient state practice to support a 
broader application.121 Nevertheless, the Tribunal’s consideration of the rights of states in this 
regard is general and readily translates to other circumstances of transboundary harm. The Lake 
Lanoux arbitration therefore supports the existence of a general procedural obligation to consult 
and notify other states with regards to activities that pose a risk of transboundary harm.122 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the first phase in the development of the no-harm rule. The cases 
examined here indicate that during this phase the scope of the no-harm rule was limited to 
‘serious’ harm caused to the territory or interests of other states. Furthermore, the scope was 
also limited to harm to human interests, and did not respond to environmental harm per se. The 
no-harm rule was characterised as a tool for balancing and protecting the sovereign rights of 
states rather than as a tool for environmental protection.123  
The standard of care for states to satisfy their obligations under the no-harm rule is less clear 
during this phase. It is possible for the decisions of the Trail Smelter arbitration, Corfu Channel 
case and the Lake Lanoux arbitration to be interpreted to support either a standard of strict 
liability (duty of result) or fault-based liability (duty of conduct).124 As demonstrated above, 
certain aspects of these judgments reflect the content of the duty of conduct or ‘due diligence’ 
obligation as found in more recent interpretations of the no-harm rule.125 For example, the 
decisions in the Corfu Channel case and Lake Lanoux arbitration suggest that states may have 
a duty to notify other states of harm that might result from their actions. However, the lack of 
                                                 
119 See Mari Koyano, 'The Significance of Procedural Obligations in International Environmental Law: 
Sovereignty and International Co-operation ' (2011) 54 Japanese Yearbook of International Law 97, 102. See 
also Nanda and Pring, above n 57, 83.  
120 Lammers, above n 8, 517. 
121 See, e.g. Koyano, above n 119, 108-109. Koyano further suggest that even today there may be insufficient 
state practice to support this procedural obligation as a rule of customary international law.  
122 See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 8, 177-178. 
123 See Kerryn Brent, Jeffrey McGee and Amy Maguire, 'Does the ‘No-Harm’ Rule Have a Role in Preventing 
Transboundary Harm and Harm to the Global Atmospheric Commons from Geoengineering?' (2015) 5(1) 
Climate law 35, 41. 
124 Sands and Peel, above n 12, 712.  
125 This is discussed further in chapter 6 and chapter 7.  
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consideration of fault in these cases weighs in favour of a duty of result during the first phase 
of the no-harm rule’s development. This standard of care and the scope of the no-harm rule 
began to change throughout the second phase of the no-harm rule’s development.  
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5 Phase Two of the Development of the No-Harm Rule 1972-
2001: Prevention of Harm and Extending the No-Harm Rule 
to the Global Commons   
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined the development of the no-harm rule during the first half of the 
twentieth century. During this first phase, the no-harm rule was predominantly directed at 
balancing and protecting the rights of states. Its scope was confined to transboundary harm 
between states. Sources during this phase also suggest that the no-harm rule only applied to 
harm to human interests. That is, it did not respond to environmental harm per se. It also did 
not extend to harm caused beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of states to global commons areas, 
such as the high seas or the atmosphere.1 However, this interpretation of the no-harm rule 
began to change during the second phase of its development.  
In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the international community became increasingly concerned about 
the widespread, global consequences that human activities were having on the natural 
environment.2 During this period, a body of rules began to emerge addressing international 
environmental issues.3 Notable examples are the 1959 Antarctic Treaty4, the 1963 Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (‘Partial 
Test Ban Treaty’) 5 , and the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
(‘Ramsar Convention’)6. However, the scope of treaty-making was far from comprehensive. 
As noted by Sands and Peel, until this point international efforts at environmental governance 
                                                 
1 The legal status of the atmosphere is discussed in further detail in chapter 7. The atmosphere may overlap with 
the territorial airspace of states. However, as a fluid body of gases it cannot be physically delineated or 
controlled. It is beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of any one state and therefore can be considered to be a global 
commons. See Marvin S Soroos, 'Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons' (1998) 40(2) Environment: 
Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 6, 7.  
2 This concern is illustrated in publications such as Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Hamish Hamilton, 1963) and 
Garrett Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243. See also Ved P Nanda and 
George (Rock) Pring, International Environmental Law and Policy for the 21st Century (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2ed, 2013) 97.  
3 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2012), 29.  
4 The Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 72 (entered into force 23 June 1961). 
5 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, opened for 
signature 5 August 1953, 480 UNTS 45 (entered into force 10 October 1963).  
6 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, opened for signature 2 February 1971, 996 UNTS 246 
(entered into force 21 December 1975). 
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had developed in a ‘piecemeal fashion, and the lack of co-ordination hampered efforts to 
develop a coherent international environmental strategy.’7  
The 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(‘Stockholm Declaration’) marked a turning point in international law and policy. This was the 
first time states had come together to discuss a global strategy for responding to international 
environmental issues. 8  The Stockholm Declaration also marked a turning point in the 
development of the no-harm rule. Following this declaration, there was a shift in focus away 
from mere reparation for transboundary harm towards a positive duty of prevention. 
Understanding of the scope of the no-harm rule was also extended to include harm to the global 
commons.  
This chapter examines the second phase in the development of the no-harm rule 1972-1997, 
set out in the timeline below: 
Figure 5.1 Timeline of the second phase of the development of the no-harm rule  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
7 Sands and Peel, above n 3, 29. See also Nanda and Pring, above n 2, 98.  
8 See, eg, Jutta Brunnée, 'The Stockholm Declaration And The Structure And Processes Of International 
Environmental Law' in Aldo Chircop, Ted McDorman and Susan  Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean Regime-
Building (Brill Nijhoff, 2009) 41, 49. Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law 
(Hart, 2011) 7. Beyerlin and Marauhn state that the Stockholm Conference was convened to provide a 
centralised and coordinated response to international environmental problems.   
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Section 5.2 analyses the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and principle 21. Section 5.3 considers 
the contribution of the 1974 Nuclear Tests cases to this new phase in the development of the 
no-harm rule. Section 5.4 examines principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, and how other principles 
contained in the Rio Declaration emphasised the duty to prevent transboundary harm and harm 
to the global commons. Section 5.5 analyses how the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (‘Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion’) confirmed the 
extended version of the no-harm rule for the global commons to be a rule of customary 
international law. Finally, section 5.6 explores the decision of the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project, and considers how the submissions made by Hungary in that case 
foreshadowed the third phase in the development of the no-harm rule.   
5.2 1972: PRINCIPLE 21 OF THE DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm in June 
1972. It was the first international conference to address global environmental concerns 
alongside issues of human welfare and development. The key outcome of the conference was 
the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (‘Stockholm 
Declaration’).9 The Stockholm Declaration consists of 26 principles to ‘inspire and guide the 
peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human environment’. 10 
Although the Stockholm Declaration in itself is non-binding,11 the no-harm rule is reformulated 
in principle 21.  
5.2.1 Background to the UN Conference on Human Development and the Stockholm 
Declaration  
The UN Conference on Human Development was originally proposed by Sweden in 1968.12 
In a letter to the United Nations Social and Economic Council, Sweden urged the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to convene a conference to address the impact of industry 
                                                 
9 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc.A/CONF/48/14/REV.1 
(16 June 1972) (‘Stockholm Declaration’).   
10 Stockholm Declaration, preamble. 
11 Beyerlin and Marauhn, above n 8, 7;  
12 Consideration of the Provisional Agenda for the Forty-Fifth Session, Addendum, The question of convening 
an international conference on the problems of human environment: Letter dated 20th May 1968 from the 
Permanent Representative of Sweden addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN SCOR, 44th 
sess, Agenda Item 23, UN Doc E/4466/Add.1 (22 May 1968). For a comprehensive overview of development of 
the Stockholm Declaration see Louis B Sohn, 'The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment' (1973) 
14(3) Harvard International Law Journal 423.  
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and technology on the natural environment, and associated impacts on human wellbeing.13 The 
primary goal of the conference was to ‘encourage, and to provide guidelines for, action by 
Governments and international organizations designed to protect and improve the human 
environment and to remedy and prevent its impairment, by means of international 
cooperation’.14 A Preparatory Committee was established to assist the Secretary-General in 
organising and preparing the conference. 15  This preparation included the drafting of a 
declaration to be adopted at the conference.  
The Preparatory Committee intended the declaration to contain a set of universally 
recognisable principles as well as broad goals and objectives for the protection of the 
environment.16  The members of the Preparatory Committee widely agreed that the contents of 
the declaration should be ‘inspirational and concise’ and should primarily serve as ‘an effective 
instrument for education and stimulate public awareness and community participation in action 
for the protection of the environment.’17 Moreover, it was also decided that the declaration 
itself ‘should not formulate legally binding provisions’.18 From early on, the goal of states in 
drafting the Stockholm Declaration was merely to create a set of soft-law principles to guide 
the development of global environmental policy.    
Following further debate during the conference, the final text of the Stockholm Declaration 
was adopted by acclamation.19 However, state support for the outcomes of the conference, 
including the Stockholm Declaration, was not unanimous. The German Democratic Republic 
had not been allowed to attend the conference. In response, socialist countries of Eastern 
                                                 
13 Ibid. The UNGA adopted the decision to convene the conference in Problems of the human environment, GA 
Res 2398,UN GAOR 23rd sess, 1733th mtg, (3 December 1968). 
14 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, GA Res 2581, UN GAOR, 24th sess, 1834 mtg, (15 
December 1969).   
15 ‘Constitution of the Conference’ in Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5-
16 June 1972, United Nations Publication, A/CONF.48/14/Rev., 37.  The preparatory committee consisted of 
‘highly qualified representatives nominated by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, France, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iran, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Nigeria, Singapore, Sweden, Togo, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Arab 
Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Yugoslavia 
and Zambia’. See also, Sohn, above n 12, 425. 
16 Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 2nd sess, 
A/Conf.48/PO49 (26 February 1971) [30]-[32].  
17 Ibid, [29]. See also, Sohn, above n 12, 426.  
18 Ibid, [33]. See also, Sohn, above n 12, 427.  
19 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5-16 June 1972, United Nations 
Publication, A/CONF.48/14/Rev., 66. For a detailed overview of the debate during the conference, see Sohn, 
above n 12, 430-431.  
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Europe (including the USSR) and Cuba boycotted the conference.20 Following the conference 
in the UNGA Second Committee, these countries declared that they did not consider 
themselves bound by the conference outcomes and that they did not support all the principles 
of the Stockholm Declaration.21 China also expressed that it still had ‘reservations with regard 
to some of the principles it embodies.’22 Trinidad and Tobago criticised the outcomes of the 
conference, including the Stockholm Declaration, as inadequate to address the needs of 
developing countries and operating to their detriment. 23  Chile voiced similar concerns, 
suggesting that the conference had focused too heavily on ‘problems affecting the 
industrialized capitalist countries’ and not enough on those affecting developing countries.24 
While South Africa agreed in principle with the content of the Stockholm Declaration, it could 
not accept its content in toto because of its reference in principle 1 to its internal policy of 
apartheid.25 Nonetheless, on 15 December 1972 the UNGA passed resolution 2994, drawing 
the attention of governments to the Declaration and ‘[e]xpressing its satisfaction that the 
Conference and the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment succeeded in focusing the attention of Governments and public opinion on the 
need for prompt action in the field of the environment.’26 
                                                 
20 Allen L Springer, Cases of Conflict: Transboundary Disputes and the Development of International 
Environmental Law (University of Toronto Press, 2016), 30.  
21 See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1469th mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1469 (24 October 1972) [11]-
[12], [40]-[42]; United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General 
(continued), UN GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1470th mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1470 (24 
October 1972) [30]-[42]; United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary 
General (continued), UN GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1472nd mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1472 
(25 October 1972) [1]-[4], [30]-[36]; United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the 
Secretary General (continued), UN GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1473rd mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc 
A/C.2/SR.1473 (26 October 1972) [4]-[29]. 
22 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1472nd mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1472 (25 October 1972) 
Summary records of the Second Committee of the General Assembly 1472nd Meeting, Agenda item 47 
A/C.2/SR.1472 (25 October 1972) [44]. See also, Sohn, above n 12, 432.  
23 Ibid, [53].  
24 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1468th mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1468 (20 October 1972) [39]. 
25 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1479th mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1479 (2 November 1972) [17]. 
See also, Sohn, above n 12, 433.  
26 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, GA Res 2994, UN GAOR, 27th sess, Agenda Item 
47, UN Doc A/RES/27/2994 (15 December 1972). The resolution was adopted with 112 votes for and 10 
abstentions. The position of member states is not known as the vote was unrecorded. See Resolutions adopted by 
the General Assembly at its 27th Session, Dag Hammarkjöld Library 
<http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/27>. 
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5.2.2 Reformulation of the no-harm rule in principle 21  
The no-harm rule is reformulated in principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which affirms: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction 
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction. (emphasis added) 
Principle 21 balances the no-harm rule against the principle of state sovereignty. In this sense, 
the rule remains anchored in the concepts of state sovereignty and non-interference from which 
it developed in its first phase.27 However, principle 21 extended the no-harm rule to include 
harm to the global commons in addition to transboundary harm to the territory of other states.28 
Principle 21 also extended the no-harm rule with respect to the ‘jurisdiction or control’ of states. 
That is, it not only applies to the activities of states within their own territory, but also to 
activities carried out on ships or aircraft registered within a state.29 As such, principle 21 may 
also apply to the activities of corporations incorporated within a state.30 Finally, principle 21 
reshaped the no-harm rule as a ‘positive duty’ in that states have a responsibility to actively 
prevent environmental harm, not merely to make reparations once harm is caused.31  
While principle 21 developed the no-harm rule in some respects, it also left a number of key 
issues unanswered. First, principle 21 does not clearly state whether there is a threshold level 
of harm necessary to trigger application of the no-harm rule.32 Second, it does not define the 
standard of care that states must satisfy in order to discharge their obligations under the no-
harm rule.33 Third, it does not clarify what types of harm qualify as environmental damage.34 
Fourth, while it extends the scope of the no-harm rule to the global commons, it does not clarify 
                                                 
27 See also Brunnée, above n 8, 43.  
28 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford 
Univerity Press, 3rd ed, 2009), 145; Sands and Peel, above n 3, 32.  
29 Sands and Peel, above n 3, 32. 
30 Sohn, above n 12, 493; Springer, above n 20, 33.  
31 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 28, 147. This comment is made with regards to principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration. Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration reflects the no-harm rule as formulated in principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration.   
32 See Springer, above n 20, 33. Springer suggests that principle 21 removed the previous threshold of ‘serious’ 
harm, as well the high standard of proof required by the formulations in the Trail Smelter arbitration.  
33 Sands and Peel, above n 3, 196. But see Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, 'Strict Liability in International 
Environmental Law' in  Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes (2007) 1133. Kiss and 
Shelton suggest that principle 21 could be interpreted as imposing a duty of absolute responsibility (i.e. duty of 
result) on states for any transboundary harm, regardless of whether it is fault based or accidental.   
34 Sands and Peel, above n 3, 196. See also Timothy Stephens, International Courts and Environmental 
Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 153. But see Günther Handl, 'Territorial Sovereignty and the 
Problem of Transnational Pollution ' (1975) 69 American Journal of International Law 50, 67. According to 
Handl, principle 21 only refers to material damage.   
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how principles of state responsibility might subsequently be invoked if states do not comply 
with the no-harm rule regarding these areas.35 According to Brunnée, principle 21 remains 
‘largely bilateral in its outlook’ and was not formulated in such a way as to respond to more 
complex impacts of the activities of states on the global environment.36 Finally, as noted by 
Stephens, principle 21 does not elaborate on any procedural obligations of prevention that 
might flow from the no-harm rule, such as the duty to notify and consult with other states.37 
Principle 21 has therefore been criticised as providing ‘little practical guidance’ to states as to 
the application of the no-harm rule.38  
Records from the Second Committee of the General Assembly shed further light on the content 
of principle 21. During the Stockholm Conference, states were unable to reach an agreement 
on the issue of environmental cooperation between states.39 Following the conclusion of the 
conference, thirty seven states introduced Draft Resolution A/C.2/L.1227 designed to resolve 
this issue.40 Paragraph 2 called on the UNGA to recognise that: 
[C]o-operation between States in the field of the environment, including co-operation for the 
implementation of Principle 21 and 22 of the “Declaration on the Human Environment”, will 
be effectively achieved if official and public knowledge is provided of the technical data 
relating to the work to be carried out by States within their national jurisdiction with a view to 
avoiding significant harm which may occur in the human environment of the adjacent area.41 
(emphasis added) 
The reference to principle 21 in this paragraph sparked fresh consideration of its content.  
Several states suggested that the wording of the above paragraph might modify the standard of 
care required by principle 21.42 Canada was concerned that the wording implied that states 
would satisfy their obligations under principle 21 so long as they made publicly available 
technical data of activities that pose a threat of transboundary harm or harm to the global 
commons.43 According to Canada, ‘something more than the publication of information’ was 
                                                 
35 Brunnée, above n 8, 44.   
36 Ibid. 
37 Stephens, above n 34, 153.  
38 Ibid.  
39 See Summary records of the Second Committee of the General Assembly, 1467th Meeting, 27th, Agenda item 
47 (20 October 1972) 131-132 [10].   
40 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Co-operation between States in the field of the 
human environment, UN GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th sess, Agenda Item 47, A/C.2/L.1227 (16 October 1972).   
41 Ibid, [2].  
42 The UNGA subsequently adopted International responsibility of States in regard to the environment, GA Res 
2996, UN GAOR, 27th sess, 2112th mtg, UN Doc A/RES/2996 (15 December 1972), which stated that ‘no 
resolution adopted at the twenty seventh session of the General Assembly can affect principles 21 and 22 of the 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.’ 
43 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1469th mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1469 (24 October 1972) [38]. 
Ireland and Finland shared Canada’s concern in this regard. See United Nations Conference on the Human 
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clearly required to satisfy this obligation.44 Similarly, Mexico stated that the obligation under 
principle 21 could not be ‘met by merely informing neighbouring countries’ and that the above 
paragraph ‘could lead to the ridiculous situation where the State faced with a serious threat to 
its environment would only be entitled to be notified that such damage would be caused.’45 
New Zealand agreed that principle 21 would not be satisfied merely by exchanging 
information, as it clearly called for states to ‘to exercises responsibility so as to ensure that they 
did not cause damage to the environment of other States.’46 These comments suggest that, at 
the time of the Stockholm Declaration, some states were of the opinion that states could not 
discharge their obligations under the no-harm rule merely by fulfilling a procedural obligation 
to notify. In other words, the standard of care was higher. However, it is unclear whether this 
higher standard of care remained a duty of conduct, in the sense that states had to take further, 
positive action to prevent their activities from causing transboundary harm or harm to the 
global commons, or whether the relevant standard of care was one of strict responsibility (i.e. 
a duty of result).  
Draft Resolution A/C.2/L.1227 also went further than the text of principle 21 in that it indicated 
a threshold level of ‘significant’ harm. New Zealand made further comments regarding this 
threshold. It stated that use of the term ‘significant harm’ might weaken the scope of principle 
21, leaving it open to interpretation as to what activities triggered the application of the rule.47 
This statement suggests that at least one state was of the view that principle 21 applied to all 
sources of transboundary environment harm and harm to the environment of the global 
commons, regardless of the level of severity.        
                                                 
Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1471st mtg, 
Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1461 (25 October 1972) [56]; United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1472nd mtg, 
Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1472 (25 October 1972) [12].  
44 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1469th mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1469 (24 October 1972) [38]. 
45 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1470th mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1470 (24 October 1972) [48]. 
Summary records of the Second Committee of the General Assembly 1470th Meeting, Agenda item 47, (24 
October 1972) 158.  
46 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1472nd mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1472 (25 October 1972), [43]. 
47 Ibid. 
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Support for the balance of sovereign rights implicit in the no-harm rule and principle 21 does 
not appear to have been universal. The USSR48, China49 and Cuba50 made statements that 
suggest they did not recognise the balance between state interests implicit in the construction 
of principle 21. That is, they considered the right of states to exploit their own resources and to 
follow their own developmental policies to take precedence over the prevention of 
transboundary harm. However, these statements were in the minority and must be contrasted 
with widespread support for principle 21. For example, Canada stated that ‘Principle 21 in fact 
accorded with existing international law as did the principle of the duty to inform one another 
of the environmental effects of their activities.’51 The United States interpreted principle 21 in 
light of existing rules of state responsibility, claiming that:  
[N]othing contained in this principle [21] or elsewhere in the Declaration, diminishes in any 
way the obligation of States to prevent environmental damage or gives rise to any right on the 
part of States to take actions in derogation of the rights of other States or of the community of 
nations. The statement on the responsibility of States for damage caused to the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is not in any way a limitation 
on the above obligation, but an affirmation of existing rules concerning liability in the event of 
default on the obligation.’52 
 
Principle 21 has had a profound impact on the development of international environmental law. 
In the decades since the Stockholm Conference, principle 21 has been acknowledged and 
reiterated in numerous multilateral agreements.53 It is repeated almost verbatim in the 1992 Rio 
                                                 
48 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1470th mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1470 (24 October 1972) [34]: 
‘The Soviet Union was opposed to any attempt to limit State sovereignty over natural jurisdiction and control, 
which had been won after a prolonged struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism.’ 
49 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1472nd mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1472 (25 October 1972) [52].  
China stated that ‘All international agreements and actions relating to environmental preservation must strictly 
respect the Sovereign rights of States.’ 
50 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Report of the Secretary General (continued), UN 
GAOR, 2nd Comm, 27th Sess, 1473rd mtg, Agenda Item 47, UN Doc A/C.2/SR.1473 (26 October 1972) [9].  
Cuba stated that ‘… while all States had a duty to avoid causing damage to third countries when executing their 
development plans, exploiting their resources or applying their environmental policies, they also had the right to 
ensure their own development, establish their priorities and formulate their environmental protection policies on 
the basis of their own conditions, values and particular features, without foreign intervention of any sort.’   
51 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5-16 June 1972, United Nations 
Publication, A/CONF.48/14/Rev, 64.  
52 Ibid, 66.  
53 See, eg, Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into 
force 29 December 1993) (‘CBD’) art 3; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for 
signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (Entered into force 21 March 1994) (‘UNFCCC’) preamble; Convention 
on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 1979, 1302 UNTA 217 
(entered into force 16 March 1983) (‘LRTAP’) preamble; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 293 (entered into force 22 September 1988) (‘Ozone 
Convention’) preamble.   
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Declaration.54 Finally, as discussed further below, the extended version of the no-harm rule 
for the global commons has since been confirmed as customary international law by the ICJ. 
Principle 21 is now synonymous with the no-harm rule. However, as seen below in the Nuclear 
Tests case, this impact was not instantaneous. 
5.3 1974: NUCLEAR TESTS CASES (NEW ZEALAND V FRANCE; AUSTRALIA V 
FRANCE) 
Shortly after the Stockholm Conference in 1973, Australia and New Zealand initiated separate 
proceedings against France in the ICJ concerning France’s nuclear test program in the Pacific. 
Transboundary nuclear fallout, and contamination of the atmosphere and oceans from 
radioactive fallout was a central issue. In their submissions to the ICJ, Australia and New 
Zealand framed their arguments predominantly around the principle of state sovereignty, rather 
than the no-harm rule as formulated in the Stockholm Declaration principle 21. Furthermore, 
the ICJ did not render a judgment on the merits of these cases, because in 1974, France made 
a unilateral declaration, terminating its atmospheric nuclear testing program. This declaration 
was held to be legally binding by the ICJ, and, as such, the majority no longer saw a need to 
rule on the merits of the case.55 The majority of the Court determined the object of Australia 
and New Zealand’s cases as being to prevent any future atmospheric nuclear testing by France 
in the Pacific.56 But legal scholars have nevertheless recognised these disputes as important to 
the development of international environmental law and the no-harm rule.57  Correspondence 
between the Parties and their submission to the ICJ shed further light on how states viewed 
their international obligations regarding transboundary pollution and the prevention of harm to 
the global commons.  
                                                 
54 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN 
Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (3-14 June 1992) (‘Rio Declaration’).  
55 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Reports 253, [51]-[52], [59]; Nuclear Tests 
Case (New Zealand v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Reports 457, [52]-[62].   
56 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Reports 253, [27]; Nuclear Tests Case (New 
Zealand v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Reports 457, [45] 
57 Legal scholars have placed particular emphasis on the contribution of the interim orders awarded by the 
Court. See, eg, L F E Goldie, 'The Nuclear Tests Cases: Restraints on Environmental Harm ' (1974) 5(3) Journal 
of Maritime Law and Commerce 491; Stephens, above n 34, 137. They have also emphasised the contribution of 
dissenting opinions. See, eg, Sands and Peel, above n 3, 196; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 28, 201; 
Stephens, above n 34, 137.  
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5.3.1 Background to the dispute     
Following the end of the Second World War, a number of states engaged in the atmospheric 
testing of nuclear weapons, included the Soviet Union and the United States.58 At the time, 
atmospheric testing was believed to have minimal impacts on the rights of other states and was 
regarded as necessary and reasonable in the early stages of the Cold War.59 By the 1960s, the 
attitude of the international community towards atmospheric nuclear testing had changed. 
Scientific understanding of the impacts of nuclear radiation had advanced and there was 
growing concern within the international community of the long-term impacts of nuclear 
radiation on human health and the health of the global environment.60 In 1963, the Soviet 
Union, United States and United Kingdom concluded the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests 
in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (Partial Test Ban Treaty).61 The treaty 
prohibited atmospheric nuclear testing in order to ‘put an end to the contamination of man's 
environment by radioactive substances’.62 The treaty was readily supported by other states, 
including Australia and New Zealand.63 France did not sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty. In 
1963, the same year that the Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded, the French Government 
announced that it would commence a program of atmospheric nuclear testing from its overseas 
territory in French Polynesia.64 Despite the growing international opposition to atmospheric 
nuclear testing, from 1966 to 1972 the French government conducted 29 atmospheric nuclear 
tests from Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia.65 
                                                 
58 An infamous example is the atmospheric nuclear test from 1946-1958 conducted by United States government 
from Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. See ‘Bikini Atoll nuclear test: 60 years later and islands still 
unliveable’, The Guardian, 2 March 2014 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/02/bikini-atoll-
nuclear-test-60-years>.  
59 Anthony D’Amato, 'Legal Aspects of the French Nuclear Tests' (1967) 61 American Journal of International 
Law 66, 68.  
60 See Stephens, above n 34, 138-139.  
61 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, opened for signature 
5 August 1963, 480 UNTS 45 (entered into force 10 October 1963).  
62 Ibid, art 1.  
63 Australia signed on the 8 August 1963 and ratified on the 12 November 1963; New Zealand signed on the 8 
August 1963 and ratified on the 10 and 16 October 1963. A full list of initial signatories follows the text of the 
agreement.  
64 See Goldie, above n 57, 498. France had initially conducted atmospheric and underground nuclear testing in 
Algeria, but this program ceased following UN General Assembly Resolution Question of French nuclear tests 
in the Sahara, GA Res 1379, UN GAOR, 14th sess, 840th mtg, UN Doc A/RES/1379 (20 November 1959) (at 
497). For a brief history on French colonisation in the Pacific and sovereignty over these islands, see D’Amato, 
above n 59.  
65 ‘Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of New Zealand’ Nuclear Tests Case 
(New Zealand v France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 2, Annex II; Application Instituting Proceedings, Nuclear Tests 
Case (Australia v France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 1, 6.   
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Australia and New Zealand objected to France’s program because of the location of the test 
site in the Pacific region.66 In diplomatic correspondence prior to commencing judicial action, 
they raised numerous objections, ranging from public health concerns to the violation of state 
sovereignty. For example, a note from the New Zealand Embassy to the French Ministry of 
Foreign affairs acknowledged that there was ‘widespread public apprehension that fallout from 
any tests in the vicinity will produce hazards to health and contaminate food supplies, both land 
and marine, in the Cook Islands and indeed in New Zealand itself.’67 On the 3rd January 1973, 
the Australian Ambassador to Paris in a note to the French Foreign Minister stated:  
In the opinion of the Australian Government, the conducting of such tests would not only be 
undesirable but would be unlawful- particularly in so far as it involves modification of the 
physical conditions of and over Australian territory; pollution of the atmosphere and of the 
resources of the seas; interference with freedom of navigation both on the high seas and in the 
airspace above; and infraction of legal norms concerning atmospheric testing of nuclear 
weapons.68 
   
France denied that its conduct breached existing rules of international law. In correspondence 
to the Australian Prime Minister, France stated that as no harm had yet occurred to the territory 
or citizens of Australia, it ‘finds it hard to see what is the precise rule on whose existence 
Australia relies.’69 France further argued that it had a right to conduct the tests on grounds of 
self-defence. In a letter to the Australian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
France highlighted that it had been invaded three times within the past century and that 
universal nuclear disarmament had not yet been achieved.70 Given the ongoing security threat 
posed by nuclear weapons, France stated that it ‘must imperatively endow itself with the means 
of ensuring its security and preserving its vital interests.’71 France also claimed that it had 
implemented sufficient precautionary measures to ensure the safety of neighbouring states and 
other states in the region.72 Such measures included the remote location of the test site and the 
                                                 
66 D’Amato, above n 59, 66-67. According to D’Amato, Chile and Peru also lodged diplomatic protests over the 
tests, and the United States refused on a number of occasions to transport French personnel to the Pacific Islands 
on the basis of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. He also notes that the local Polynesian community unanimously 
opposed the tests, fearing the effects of radioactive pollution. 
67 ‘Note from New Zealand Embassy to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, 14 March 1963 in ‘Application 
Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of New Zealand’ Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v 
France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 2, 13-14.  
68 ‘Note of 3 January 1973 of the Australian Ambassador, Paris, to the French Foreign Minister’ in  
Application Instituting Proceedings, Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 1, 50. 
69 ‘Note De L’Ambassadeur De France à Canberra, en date du 7 Février 1973, au Premier Ministre et Ministre 
des Affaires Éstrangères de L’Australie [Traduction]’ in Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) [1973] ICJ 
Pleadings 1, 57.   
70 Ibid, 53.  
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid, 55.  
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monitoring of global levels of radioactive contamination.73 However, New Zealand did not 
consider these measures to have sufficiently negated the risk of harm from nuclear radiation to 
their territory, the atmosphere and the ocean. As noted by New Zealand: ‘an activity that is 
inherently harmful is not made acceptable even by the most stringent precautionary 
measures.’74  
As the disputes could not be resolved through diplomatic means, Australia and New Zealand 
initiated proceedings before the ICJ. France did not accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the 
disputes, as it believed the ICJ to be ‘manifestly not competent’ to decide the cases.75  As such, 
France did not make any written or oral submissions in either dispute. In considering the 
question of jurisdiction and admissibility, the Court had to consider whether Australia and New 
Zealand were requesting a judgment as to the status of the legal relationship they shared with 
France, or whether they were asking for ‘a judgment requiring one of the Parties to take, or 
refrain from taking, some action.’76 The Court therefore had to consider the nature and content 
of the claims in both disputes.   
5.3.2 The no-harm rule and the Nuclear Tests cases 
The primary focus of the Nuclear Tests cases was ongoing violation of state sovereignty.77 In 
their submissions to the Court, Australia and New Zealand did not seek to claim damages in 
relation to material harm caused by tests that had already been conducted.78 Australia and New 
Zealand instead argued that any future atmospheric nuclear testing by France would continue 
to violate their sovereign rights as states regardless of whether material harm could be 
demonstrated.79 Australia claimed that the tests breached its right to ‘be free from atmospheric 
nuclear weapon tests’ and that the deposition of radioactive fallout in its territory was a 
violation of state sovereignty.80 New Zealand also argued that the tests would violate its right 
to be free from radioactive material entering its territory, including its airspace and territorial 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
74 Letter from New Zealand Prime Minister to French Foreign Minister, 9 March 1973’ in ‘Application 
Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of New Zealand’ Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v 
France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 2, 37.  
75 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Reports 253, [13].  
76 See Ibid, [22]-[24]. 
77 See Handl, above n 34, 50-52. 
78 Ibid.  
79 For further examination of this issue, see ibid.  
80 ‘Application Instituting Proceedings’, Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 1, 26-28.  
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waters. 81  Interestingly, neither state chose to allege breach of the no-harm rule in their 
submissions to the Court.   
The focus on territorial sovereignty by both states did not however mean that their submissions 
were void of environmental concerns. For example, in its application, Australia further noted 
that:  
Radio-active products released over the oceans inevitably settle on the surface of the sea, whatever 
precautions are taken, are absorbed into the water and eventually into the life-chains which comprise 
the marine ecosystems. Species of such living natural resources, being contaminated with radio-
active material, might, dependent on their migratory habits, contaminate the diet of ether species, 
including man, in widely distributed zones.82 
 
New Zealand’s claim went further, to suggest that states may owe an obligation erga omnes to 
all members of the international community to protect the environment of the global commons 
from radioactive contamination.83 New Zealand claimed that continued atmospheric testing 
would violate its right and the rights of all members of the international community ‘that no 
nuclear tests that give rise to radioactive fallout be conducted’ and ‘to the preservation from 
unjustified artificial radioactive contamination of the terrestrial, maritime and aerial 
environment’.84 New Zealand therefore suggested that these were obligations erga omnes that 
France owed to all members of the international community.85 Although New Zealand did not 
explicitly refer to the no-harm rule as articulated in the Trail Smelter arbitration or as 
reformulated in the Stockholm Declaration, its argument was nevertheless in keeping with the 
no-harm rule as extended to the global commons by principle 21.  
Explanations have been advanced as to why neither state was willing to stake its claim directly 
on principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. One explanation is that this was a strategic 
decision. Handl notes that, by basing its claim on a breach of territorial sovereignty, Australia 
argued that proof of harm from radioactive fallout was not required to establish a breach.86 
Similarly, Stephens suggests that this may have been a tactic to avoid the challenge of having 
to establish causation of harm.87 The other explanation is that at the time of the case, the legal 
status of principle 21 may have been unclear. That is, the duty to prevent transboundary harm 
                                                 
81 ‘Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of New Zealand’, Nuclear Tests Case 
(New Zealand v France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 2, 8.  
82 Application Instituting Proceedings, Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 1, [39]. 
83 See also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 28, 131.  
84 ‘Application Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of New Zealand’ Nuclear Tests Case 
(New Zealand v France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 2, 8. See also, Stephens, above n 141. 
85 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 28, 131.  
86 Handl, above n 34, 51-52. 
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and harm to the global commons was not yet firmly established as a principle of customary 
international law.88 It was highlighted above that several states did not necessarily agree with 
the normative contours of principle 21 following the negotiation of the Stockholm Declaration. 
Further, France had declined to accept that its program violated any existing legal norms on 
the basis that no recognisable damage had been caused to Australia or New Zealand.  This view 
was supported by Judge Ignacio-Pinto in dissent against the interim measure for protection that 
was granted to both Australia and New Zealand on 22 June 1973. He argued that states only 
had a duty in international law to compensate for harm once it had been caused.89  In other 
words, he did not consider that states had a positive duty to prevent transboundary harm from 
occurring, even in the context of extremely risky activities, such as nuclear testing.90  
The Nuclear Tests cases did not cease in the 1970’s. In 1995, New Zealand sought to reinitiate 
proceedings against France, following the decision of the French government to conduct a 
series of underground nuclear tests in the region.91 However, focusing exclusively on the 
earlier dispute provides a window for considering how states and the ICJ viewed international 
law relating to transboundary pollution and harm to the global commons at that time. The 
Nuclear Tests cases suggest that the opinion of states (as well as judges) was mixed concerning 
the status of the no-harm rule and its application to more complex incidences of transboundary 
pollution. Further, the correspondence between Australia, New Zealand and France highlights 
a number of important questions concerning the content of the no-harm rule at this time. First, 
did the no-harm rule only respond to harm after it had been caused, or did it also respond to the 
creation of a risk of future harm? Second, what (if any) measures were states required to 
undertake to minimise the risk of future harm? Third, how did the no-harm rule interact with 
other rules of international law, such as the right to self-defence? These questions are further 
addressed in the sources examined below.   
 
                                                 
88 See also, ibid, 142.  
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5.4 1992: PRINCIPLE 2 OF THE RIO DECLARATION  
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration) was one of three 
documents concluded at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
hosted in Rio in 1992 (‘Rio Conference’). 92 The goal of the Conference was to develop 
strategies to promote environmental protection and sustainable development.93 The original 
goal of the Rio Conference was to negotiate a legally binding ‘Earth Charter’.94 However, this 
proposal was rejected by developing states as placing undue emphasis on environmental 
protection over development. 95 Therefore, like the Stockholm Declaration, it was decided 
before the Rio Conference that the Rio Declaration would not be legally binding.  
Nevertheless, from the outset, the General Assembly acknowledged the no-harm rule, as 
formulated by 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, as a binding principle of customary 
international law.96 Leading up the conference, the General Assembly in Resolution 44/228 
reaffirmed that states have a duty to prevent transboundary harm and harm to the global 
commons under Stockholm principle 21. 97  It also affirmed that states are responsible in 
international law for the ‘damage to the environment and natural resources caused by activities 
within their jurisdiction or control through transboundary interference’. 98 Prior to the Rio 
conference, states within the Preparatory Committee proposed different formulations of 
                                                 
92 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, UN 
Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1(3-14 June 1992) (‘Rio Declaration’). 
93 See, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, GA Res 228, 2nd Comm, 44th sess, 85th 
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94 See Günther Handl, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Declaration) 1972 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), United Nations 
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96 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, GA Res 228, 2nd Comm, 44th sess, 85th mtg, 
UN Doc A/RES/44/228.  
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principle 2.99 Some of these proposals sought to change the wording and scope of principle 2 
from Stockholm principle 21.100 For example, Canada and Austria proposed: 
All individuals, organizations and States shall respect the environment of other individuals, 
organizations and States, and the Earth’s ecosystem; and treat the global commons of the Earth 
in a manner at least as favourable as their own environment, keeping in mind the interests of 
human kind as a whole.101  
According to Duciv-Paoli and Viñuales, Canada and Austria sought to broaden the scope from 
principle 21 to also provide non-state actors with environmental obligations.102 They also state 
that the proposal departed from ‘the sovereignty referential’ inherent in principle 21 and instead 
sought to introduce ‘non-traditional concepts such as ‘eco-systems’, global commons’, and 
‘human kind.’103 The proposals from the Preparatory Committee indicate that some states may 
have wished to extend the scope of the no-harm rule, but they do not suggest that states 
disagreed with the content of the no-harm rule as it was currently formulated or its status as a 
principle of customary international law. General Assembly Resolution 44/228 indicates that 
by the time of the Rio Conference, it was widely accepted by states that they had a positive 
duty to prevent transboundary harm and harm to the global commons, as well as a duty to make 
reparations for transboundary harm should it occur. 
The no-harm rule as formulated in principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration was restated in 
principle 2 of the Rio Declaration: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. (emphasis added) 
The wording of principle 2 of the Rio Declaration is the same as principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration, with the exception that it refers to the environmental and developmental policies 
of states. This change reflects the concept of sustainable development which is emphasised 
throughout the Rio Declaration.104  
                                                 
99 Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli and Jorge E Viñuales, ‘Principle 2: Prevention’ in Jorge E Viñuales (ed) The Rio 
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The focus on sustainable development has been criticised by some legal scholars as having 
detracted from the Rio Declaration’s overall contribution to international law for the 
prevention of harm to the environment. According to Nanda and Pring, the content of the Rio 
Declaration ‘pales in comparison to the multiple Stockholm provisions mandating the 
safeguarding of natural resources and ecosystems’. 105 However, such criticisms overlook the 
fact that the Rio Declaration went beyond the scope of the Stockholm Declaration, outlining a 
number of procedural measures that support the prevention of transboundary harm and harm 
to the global commons. For example, principle 14 discourages the relocation and transfer to 
other states of dangerous activities or substances. Principle 15 encourages states to apply a 
precautionary approach when conducting risky activities, stating that ‘[w]here there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ Principle 17 
asserts that states shall undertake an environmental impact assessment for all ‘proposed 
activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment’. Principle 19 
declares that for such activities, states must also notify and consult with other potentially 
affected states.  
Unlike the no-harm rule itself, at the time of the Rio Declaration these procedural obligations 
may not have been a part of customary international law.106 However, according to Birnie, 
Boyle and Redgwell, their inclusion in the Rio Declaration reflected contemporary 
developments in international law and state practice concerning transboundary harm.107 Birnie, 
Boyle and Redgwell argue that the Rio Declaration therefore provided a ‘strong starting point 
for the further elaboration of this part of international environmental law by the International 
Court of Justice and the International Law Commission.’108 As demonstrated in chapter four, 
the procedural obligation to notify and consult had already been briefly considered in early 
cases. States, jurists and the International Law Commission would continue to emphasise its 
importance over the coming decades. 
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5.5 1996: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ADVISORY OPINION ON THE 
LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
On 15 December 1994, the General Assembly adopted resolution 49/75K, which requested that 
the ICJ provide an advisory opinion as to whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was 
permitted under international law.109 The question was hypothetical, without reference to the 
activities of specific states.110 However, it was posed in a heated political context. On one hand, 
there were growing calls within the international community for elimination of nuclear 
weapons. According to Matheson, the request was championed by a coalition of governments 
and NGO’s with the overall goal of complete nuclear disarmament.111  On the other hand there 
were states against complete disarmament, such as the United States and Russia. Furthermore, 
France had recently resumed nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific.112 It was against this 
context that the ICJ delivered its advisory opinion.  
As an advisory opinion, the decision of the ICJ is authoritative but non-binding on states, but 
it nonetheless represents an important milestone in the development of the no-harm rule. The 
broad framing of the question gave the ICJ scope to consider numerous rules of international 
law. This led the ICJ to consider the no-harm rule and recognise the extended no-harm rule for 
the global commons as customary international law.  
In answering the question before it, the Court firstly had to decide what international laws were 
relevant to assess the legality of the use of nuclear weapons.113 The majority of the Court held 
that the most ‘directly relevant applicable law’ was international law relating to the use of 
force.114 The advisory opinion therefore primarily considers this area of international law. 
However, the majority of the Court also recognised that other international laws might apply 
to the threat or use of nuclear weapons. It considered the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights115 and the prohibition against genocide116 to be potentially relevant, but the 
                                                 
109  Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of 
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application of these rules was dependant on the specific circumstances of any future use of 
nuclear weapons. As such, the majority opinion did not analyse them in great detail.  
The majority also briefly considered the relevance of international law for the protection of the 
environment.117 In doing so, they stated the following:    
The Court recognizes that the environment is under daily threat and that the use of nuclear 
weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the environment. The Court also recognizes that the 
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very 
health of human beings, including generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation 
of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment 
of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international 
law relating to the environment.118 (emphasis added) 
 
The majority of the Court qualified this obligation in the context of armed conflict.119 It held 
that international law for the protection of the environment was not intended to deprive states 
of the right to act in self-defence.120 States need only take environmental considerations into 
account when assessing whether their response to a threat is necessary and proportionate.121 
Therefore, according to this interpretation the no-harm rule does not prohibit the use of nuclear 
weapons in armed conflict.  
The wording of the above statement reflects the formulation of the no-harm rule in Stockholm 
principle 21 and Rio principle 2 in that it extends the no-harm rule to the global commons. A 
number of states had cited these principles in their written and oral submissions in this case.122 
The majority decision did not reiterate principle 21/ principle 2 verbatim. It used the word 
‘respect’ instead of ‘do not cause damage’. According to Sands and Peel, the ICJ did not intend 
to significantly alter the content of the no-harm rule with this change in language.123 However, 
the use of the term ‘respect’ could be interpreted as changing the content of the no-harm rule. 
On the one hand, it could be interpreted as broadening the scope of the no-harm rule to include 
circumstances of transboundary interference and interference with the global commons where 
no physical harm has occurred.124 On the other hand, ‘respect’ could also be interpreted as 
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implying a lower standard of care compared to the formulation under Stockholm principle 
21/Rio principle 2.   
The opinions of dissenting judges in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion offer a different 
perspective on the no-harm rule. Judge Weeramantry was of the opinion that the no-harm rule, 
flowing from the Corfu Channel case, Stockholm principle 21 and Rio principle 2, creates a 
positive obligation for states to improve the environment, rather than merely refrain from 
causing harm. 125  He disagreed with the majority of the Court that states need only take 
protection of the environment into account during an armed conflict. Instead, he argued that 
the use of nuclear weapons would breach the no-harm rule:   
[A]ny State action which damages the environment in the way that nuclear weapons do is a 
violation of the obligation of environmental protection which modern international law places 
upon States. A contrary view would negative the basic logic of environmental law and send a 
tremor through the foundations of this vital subdiscipline of modern international law.126 
Similarly, Judge Koroma disagreed with the majority’s approach to the protection of the 
environment. Koroma argued that, when considering the legality of the use of nuclear weapons 
in the context of international environmental law, the relevant issue was not whether the no-
harm rule would deny a state the right to self-defence, but the impact nuclear weapons would 
have on the environment.127 In his opinion, the majority should have considered the radioactive 
effects of nuclear weapons, and their widespread contamination of the natural and human 
environment.128 His argument implies that the use of nuclear weapons would likely breach the 
no-harm rule for this reason. However, as dissenting opinions, these are less authoritative 
interpretations of the no-harm rule. 
Neither the advisory opinion nor dissenting opinions went so far as to elaborate further on the 
content of the no-harm rule. However, the dissenting opinions suggest that the no-harm rule is 
not merely custom but a fundamental rule of international law. Weeramantry and Koroma did 
not go so far as to explicitly categorise the duty to prevent transboundary harm and harm to the 
global commons as a jus cogens norm.129 However, their analyses suggests that the no-harm 
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rule cannot be derogated from by other international laws, even one as paramount as the right 
of self-defence.  
5.6 1997: THE GABČÍKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (HUNGARY V SLOVAKIA) 
In 1997, the year following the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the ICJ handed down its 
judgment in the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (‘Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project’). 130 The dispute involved the interpretation and termination of a joint agreement 
between Hungary and Slovakia concerning a system of dams along a section of the Danube 
River between the two states.131 In 1977, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Slovakia became an 
independent state in 1993)132 entered into a treaty for the joint construction and operation of 
the dams. The object of the agreement was to ensure that the project did not impact on the water 
quality of the Danube, and to guarantee that each party would comply with its obligations in 
constructing and operating the dams.133 In 1989, Hungary suspended and abandoned work on 
its part of the project. One of the questions before the Court was whether Hungary was entitled 
to do this and thereby terminate the treaty under international law.134  
In its judgment, the majority of the ICJ repeated its dictum from the Nuclear Weapons advisory 
opinion, acknowledging the no-harm rule as a principle of customary international law.135 
Despite this recognition and the environmental issues inherent in this case, the majority did not 
consider whether the no-harm rule had been breached.136 One of the justifications put forth by 
Hungary for terminating the treaty with Slovakia was that performance of the treaty conflicted 
with new principles of international environmental law that had subsequently developed.137 
Hungary’s argument drew attention to the precautionary principle and emerging procedural 
obligations of the duty to cooperate, consult and notify other states, and the duty to conduct an 
environmental impact assessment. The content of the no-harm rule was not expressly 
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considered in the majority judgment. 138  However, the arguments raised by Hungary 
nevertheless signalled the direction of the future development of the no-harm rule.   
5.6.1 The no-harm rule and emerging procedural obligations  
In its memorial to the Court, Hungary associated the precautionary principle with the no-harm 
rule. The precautionary principle had been expressed in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, 
but unlike the no-harm rule was generally considered to be soft law and hence non-binding. 
Hungary stated that the ‘[m]ain principle of international environmental law is that 
environmental degradation must be prevented.’139 That is, the no-harm rule is an overarching 
principle of customary international law. It suggested that the precautionary principle was not 
distinct from the no-harm rule, but merely a more developed form.140 Hungary stated that:  
The effective application of the obligation of prevention can be jeopardised, due to scientific 
uncertainty, and this can result in irremediable environmental damage. Thus, action must be 
taken at an early stage based upon models of potential consequences.141 
On this view, the precautionary principle is integral to the function of the no-harm rule as it 
might enable it to respond to risks of future harm even in light of scientific uncertainty. While 
Hungary did not explicitly state so, this characterisation implies that the precautionary principle 
is, by association, also a binding principle of customary international law. 
Hungary drew a similar connection between the no-harm rule and the duty to cooperate. It 
stated that ‘the prevention and the control of environmental deterioration is necessarily based 
on cooperation between the concerned states.’142 It referred to the principle flowing from the 
Lake Lanoux arbitration: that states must enter into meaningful negotiations with one another 
concerning activities that risk causing transboundary harm.143 Hungary also referred to the duty 
to notify and consult with other states regarding activities that may have a significant effect on 
the environment of other States. 144  It further implied the obligation to conduct an 
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environmental impact assessment and communicate the findings was also a part of the duty to 
consult and notify.145  
These interpretations were not further examined in this case. In its counter-memorial, Slovakia 
did not specifically address these emerging duties. It merely argued that it did not consider 
there to be any binding, peremptory norms of international environmental law that could 
override the provisions of the treaty.146 Moreover, it claimed that the principles asserted by 
Hungary were too general to override the provisions of the treaty under the principle of lex 
specialis. 147 The majority of the Court also did not take this opportunity to examine the 
relationship between the no-harm rule, the precautionary principle and other procedural 
obligations. It merely stated that the treaty in question was not static and that new norms of 
international environment law (without specifying which ones) may have been incorporated by 
the parties through a process of consultation and negotiation.148  
The reluctance of the Court to consider and apply these emerging norms of customary 
international law has been criticised by legal scholars. According to Stec and Eckstein, the 
Court had the opportunity to examine and apply the precautionary principle, but instead chose 
to take a conservative approach in its judgment.149 Okowa and Evans suggest that, in making 
the generalised statement that the treaty ought to be interpreted in light of new norms of 
international environmental law, the majority of the Court implied that that the precautionary 
principle and other developing norms of international law had in fact become binding ‘hard 
law’ rules, without examining state practice and opinio juris. 150  Boyle 151and Stephens152 
similarly point out that the majority did not clarify why such norms ought to be taken into 
account. The fact that the Court did not consider the relationship of these emerging norms to 
the no-harm rule suggests that, at the time of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project this 
relationship remained unclear.  
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Hungary’s characterisation of the no-harm rule as an overarching legal principle from which 
other procedural obligations are derived therefore appears to be progressive and may not have 
reflected the understanding of other states at that time. However, this approach signifies a 
growing focus on the duty of due diligence and procedural obligations. This focus is sharpened 
and further developed in the next phase in the development of the no-harm rule.  
5.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the no-harm rule during its second phase of development. During 
this phase, the no-harm rule was developed beyond the original sic utero formulation that was 
seen in the early Trail Smelter arbitration and Corfu Channel case. The no-harm rule remained 
grounded in balancing the rights of states, but was nevertheless reformulated to take on a 
stronger environmental focus. This new focus is especially evident in the way in which states 
(through the Stockholm and Rio declarations) extended the scope of the no-harm rule to include 
harm to the global commons. While there may have been some doubt earlier on as to the status 
of the extended no-harm rule, the decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion 
leaves no doubt that states have an obligation under customary international law to prevent 
activities under their jurisdiction and control from harming the global commons. Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly, key sources during this phase indicate that states now had a positive 
obligation to prevent environmental harm to the territory of other states and to the global 
commons. That is, states had an obligation that extended beyond merely compensating for harm 
after it had been caused.  
However, important aspects of the content of the no-harm rule remained unclear during this 
phase. By the end of this phase it was clear that states had a positive obligation to prevent harm, 
but it was not yet clear exactly what this entailed. The sources examined in this chapter also do 
not provide clear guidance as to whether the severity of harm must reach a certain threshold 
level in order to give rise to obligations under the no-harm rule. It was during the third phase 
of the no-harm rule’s development that these issues were further clarified.  
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6  Phase Three of the Development of the No-Harm Rule 2001-
2016: Due Diligence and Procedural Obligations  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter five examined the second phase in the development of the no-harm rule. The beginning 
of this phase was marked by principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. In this phase, the scope 
of the no-harm rule was extended to apply to harm to the global commons. The no-harm rule 
was reformulated in key sources with a stronger environmental focus. It was also reformulated 
to provide states with a positive duty to prevent transboundary harm and harm to the global 
commons, rather than merely hold states responsible for harm after it had been caused. 
However, significant aspects of the content of the no-harm rule remained unclear. Stockholm 
principle 21, Rio principle 2 and the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion did not clearly 
state a threshold level of harm necessary to trigger application of the no-harm rule. Key sources 
also did not clearly articulate the standard of care for states to discharge their obligations under 
the no-harm rule. While some sources, such as the Rio Declaration and the submission of 
Hungary in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, indicated that there were procedural 
obligations related to the no-harm rule, such procedural obligations were not yet accepted as 
part of customary international law and their relationship to the no-harm rule remained unclear. 
Consequently, the precise content of the no-harm rule and what states needed to do to satisfy 
their obligations under it remained unresolved.  
This chapter examines the third phase in the development of the no-harm rule. Key sources in 
this phase clarified the scope and standard of care of the no-harm rule. In particular, the no-
harm rule is characterised as providing states with a duty of conduct or ‘due diligence’ to 
prevent harm. Additionally, procedural obligations that had begun to gain traction in state 
practice during the previous phase, such as the duty to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) and to consult and notify with other potentially affected states, are seen as 
following from the no-harm rule during this phase. That is, they are seen as integral to fulfilling 
the duty of due diligence to prevent significant transboundary harm.      
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Phase three is illustrated in the timeline below:  
Figure 6.1 Timeline of phase three of the development of the no-harm rule  
 
 
This phase is heralded by the International Law Commission’s 2001 Draft Articles on the 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm (‘Draft Articles on Prevention’),1 an attempt by the ILC 
to codify and progressively develop the no-harm rule and associated procedural obligations. 
The Draft Articles are discussed in section 6.2. Section 6.3 examines the 2010 decision of the 
ICJ in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (‘Pulp Mills’).2 In this case, the ICJ affirmed the no-
harm rule as a duty of due diligence and significantly contributed to the understanding of states 
and legal scholars regarding the procedural obligation to conduct an EIA. Section 6.4 analyses 
the 2011 advisory opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea in Responsibilities and Obligations of States with Respect to Activities in 
the Area (‘Activities in the Area’)3. In focusing on the liability of states under Part XI of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’), the Seabed Dispute Chamber 
also considered the content of the no-harm rule as a principle of customary international law. 
Section 6.5 addresses the Case Concerning Aerial Herbicide Spraying (‘Aerial Herbicide 
Spraying’) 4  between Ecuador and Colombia. This contentious case was settled in 2013 
privately between the Parties before oral hearings could be heard and a judgment rendered.5 
However, the no-harm rule was central to this case, and the written submissions of Ecuador 
                                                 
1 ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries’ (2001) 
II(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 149 (‘Draft Articles on Prevention’). 
2 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14 (‘Pulp Mills’).  
3 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the 
Area (Advisory Opinion), [2011] ITLOS Reports 10 (‘Activities in the Area’). 
4 Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) (Order of 13 September 2013) [2013] ICJ Rep 278 (‘Aerial 
Herbicide Spraying’).  
5 Ibid.  
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and Colombia raise significant questions concerning the application of this rule and 
demonstrate how two states understand the duty of due diligence.6 Finally, section 6.6 analyses 
the judgment of the ICJ in two recent cases involving Costa Rica and Nicaragua: Certain 
Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and Construction of a Road in Costa 
Rica along the San Juan River (Certain Activities).7 These cases were joined in 20138, and the 
ICJ rendered its judgment in December 2015. This is the first time the ICJ has applied the no-
harm rule in a contentious case (as opposed to merely considering it in obiter dicta) since the 
1949 Corfu Channel case. The ICJ’s judgment further clarifies the procedural obligations to 
conduct an EIA and consult and notify with other states. However, the ICJ’s approach to the 
standard of care in this case muddies the waters. It can be interpreted as suggesting that states 
may also have a duty of result under the no-harm rule. Certain Activities may therefore mark 
the beginning of a fourth phase in the development of the no-harm rule.            
6.2 2001: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE 
PREVENTION OF TRANSBOUNDARY HARM FROM HAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES  
The International Law Commission (ILC) is as an international body established by the UN 
General Assembly in 1947 to codify and progressively develop international law.9 In 1974, the 
ILC embarked on a project to codify, clarify and progressively develop International liability 
for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law. 10  The 
original aim of this project was to spell out the content of the duty to prevent transboundary 
harm and establish rules of liability for transboundary harm once it had been caused.11 In 1997, 
                                                 
6 See Alan Boyle, 'Transboundary air pollution: a tale of two paradigms ' in S Jayakumar et al (eds), 
Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, 2015) 233, 235.  
7 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction of 
a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) (International Court of 
Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015) (‘Certain Activities’) 
8 Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Order of 17 April 
2013) [2013] ICJ Rep 166; Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa 
Rica) (Order of 17 April 2013) [2013] ICJ Rep 184.   
9 The ILC was created by UN General Assembly by Establishment of an International Law Commission, GA 
Res 174, UN GAOR, 2nd sess, 123rd mtg,  (21 November 1947). The Statute of the International Law 
Commission is contained therein. The object of the ILC is set out under article 1(1). The mandate of the ILC 
stems from article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations. 
10 See ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-sixth session (6 May-26 July 
1974)’ [1974] II(1) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 305 [163]. This project was originally 
proposed by the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly in 1973. See Report of the International Law 
Commission, GA Res 3071, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 28th sess, 2186th mtg, UN Doc A/RES/3071(XXVIII) (30 
November 1973).   
11 See ‘Preliminary report on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited 
by international law, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur’ [1980] II(1) Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 247, 262-266. 
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the ILC decided to split the topic in two, separating prevention of harm from liability.12 This 
was largely because of key differences between the scope of each topic. 13  This decision 
resulted in two draft documents: the 2001 Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities14 (‘Draft Articles on Prevention’) and the 2006 Draft Principles on 
the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities 
(‘Draft Principles on Loss’).15 The Draft Principles on Loss address the issue of liability for 
private (i.e. non-state) actors for transboundary harm. As such, they are not directly relevant to 
the interpretation of the content of the no-harm rule. By contrast, the Draft Articles on 
Prevention deal with the content of the no-harm rule and the procedural obligations that flow 
from it for states.  
The Draft Articles on Prevention provide a non-binding interpretation of the no-harm rule and 
related procedural obligations. The ILC is comprised of international legal experts who act in 
their personal capacity, and not as official state representatives.16 As such, the Draft Articles 
on Prevention are technically akin to the works of prominent publicists within the hierarchy of 
international law sources set out under article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ.17 Moreover, the 
ILC does not clearly distinguish between the codification of existing customary international 
law and progressive development within its projects.18 The Draft Articles on Prevention draw 
heavily on prior interpretations of the no-harm rule, including the Trail Smelter arbitration, 
Stockholm principle 21 and Rio principle 2.19 However, they contain a mixture of codified 
customary law, emerging legal principles and progressive development where state practice 
and jurisprudence was lacking or inconclusive.20 Consequently, the formulation of the no-harm 
                                                 
12 See ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International 
Law, Report of the Working Group’, International Law Commission, 49th sess (12 May – 18 July 1997) 
A/CN.4/L/536 1997, 2 [3]. 
13 See Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, ‘First report on prevention of transboundary damage from hazardous 
activites’, International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International 
Law, (1998) International Law Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/487 and Add.1, 182-183.  
14 Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 1. 
15 ‘Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous 
activities’, [2006] II(2)  Yearbook of the International Law Commission 59. 
16 International Law Commission, Membership (20 July 2015) International Law Commission 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml#a5>  
17 Fernando Lusa Bordin, 'Reflections of Customary International Law: The Authority of Codification 
Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in International Law' (2014) 63(03) International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly 535, 537.   
18 See International Law Commissions, About the Commission: Organization, programme and methods of work- 
Methods of Work (12 January 2016) International Law Commission <http://legal.un.org/ilc/methods.shtml>.  
19 See also Timothy Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (Cambridge University Press, 
2009) 157.  
20 See definitions of progressive development and codification in article 15 of the Statute of the International 
Law Commission. 
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rule contained in the Draft Articles on Prevention may not entirely accord with the 
understanding and practice of states. Nonetheless, the Draft Articles on Prevention have 
significantly shaped how states,21jurists22 and legal scholars23 understand the scope of the no-
harm rule and its duty of care. The Draft Articles on Prevention have been praised for providing 
a more precise interpretation of the no-harm rule than other sources24 and several legal scholars 
have expressed the opinion that they reflect existing customary international law.25  
6.2.1 The scope of the Draft Articles on Prevention 
The Draft Articles on Prevention specifically focus on so-called ‘hazardous’ activities that 
present a risk of future harm. The ILC’s rationale for this focus was that the prevention of 
transboundary harm is preferable to compensation after it has occurred.26 The duty to prevent 
transboundary harm is reformulated in draft article 3, which states that ‘[t]he State of origin 
shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event 
to minimize the risk thereof.’27 The focus of the Draft Articles on Prevention is therefore the 
management of risk.28 The ILC’s interpretation of the no-harm rule in the Draft Articles on 
Prevention therefore reflects this approach. The Draft Articles take for granted that risk of 
transboundary harm is foreseeable.29 As such, the Draft Articles on Prevention only apply to 
activities that pose a reasonably foreseeable risk of transboundary harm.30  
                                                 
21 See, eg, ‘Memorial of Ecuador’ Arial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) International Court of 
Justice, General List No 138, 29 April 2009, 273, 278-280, 282, 286-287; ‘Memorial of Costa Rica Volume I’ 
Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), General List no 150 
(5 December 2011) [5.6]; ‘Memorial of Nicaragua Volume I’ Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the 
San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) General List no 152 (19 December 2012) 142, 144, 146, 174.   
22 See, eg, Activities in the Area, [2011] ITLOS Reports 10, [116] (‘Activities in the Area’). 
23 See, eg, Jacqueline Peel, 'Unpacking the elements of a state responsibility claim for transboundary pollution ' 
in S Jayakumar et al (eds), Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy (Edward 
Elgar 2015) 51, 67; Boyle, above n 6, 233, 237; David Reichwein et al, 'State Responsibility for Environmental 
Harm from Climate Engineering' (2015) 5(2-4) Climate law 142, 155.  
24 Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Cristina  Hoss, 'Trail Smelter and Terrorism: International Mechanisms to Combat 
Transboundary Harm' in Rebecca M Bratspies and Russell A Miller (eds), Transboundary Harm in 
International Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2006) 225, 230. 
25 See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford 
Univerity Press, 3rd ed, 2009), 141. They describe the Draft Articles on Prevention as an ‘authoritative 
exposition of the existing law’. See also Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: 
Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), 154; Catherine Redgwell, 
'Transboundary pollution: principles, policy and practice ' in S Jayakumar et al (eds), Transboundary Pollution: 
Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, 2015) 11, 15.   
26 Draft Articles on the Prevention, above n 1, 148.  
27 Ibid, 153. 
28 Ibid, 150.  
29 Boyle, above n 6, 237.  
30 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 25, 142.  
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The scope of the Draft Articles on Prevention (and hence the duty to prevent transboundary 
harm) is set out in draft articles 1 and 2. The duty only applies to activities that are not otherwise 
prohibited under international law.31 Prohibited activities are dealt with in the ILC’s 2001 draft 
articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.32  The Draft Articles 
on Prevention also only apply to physical harm, being ‘harm caused to persons, property or the 
environment’.33 Non-physical harm, such as pure economic loss is therefore beyond the scope 
of the Draft Articles on Prevention. They also only apply to activities that are to take place 
within the territory, jurisdiction or control of a state.34 This includes activities undertaken from 
a ship flying the flag of a state.35 The scope extends to activities that take place in areas that a 
state has significant control over but over which it may not have individual sovereign rights.36 
This would include activities undertaken during the unlawful occupation of another state’s 
territory.37  
The Draft Articles on Prevention only apply to risks of harm above a certain threshold level of 
severity. Activities must ‘involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm’.38 This 
reflects the no-harm rule as formulated in the Trail Smelter arbitration and the Lake Lanoux 
arbitration. 39  The commentaries acknowledge that the meaning of ‘significant’ harm is 
ambiguous and will need to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The Draft Articles 
nevertheless outline a broad definition, being ‘something more than “detectable” but need not 
be at the level of “serious” or “substantial”.’40 It also provides a composite definition of ‘risk 
of causing significant transboundary harm’, being ‘high probability of causing significant 
transboundary harm and a low probability of causing disastrous transboundary harm’.41  This 
definition combines magnitude of harm with probability of harm to create a spectrum. The ILC 
intended this spectrum to encompass activities which fall between four margins: low to high 
probability and significant to disastrous severity. 42 This spectrum brings ‘ultra-hazardous’ 
                                                 
31 Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 1, 150. 
32 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001) II(2) 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 31.  
33 Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 1, 151-152.  
34 Ibid, 150.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid, 151. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, 149 art 1.  
39 Ibid, 152.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid, 151-152. 
42 Draft Articles on the Prevention, above n 1, 152. The commentaries specifically state that it was the intention 
of the commission to create a spectrum between these two classifications of risk of harm.  
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activities within the scope of the Draft Articles on Prevention, such as the risks of 
transboundary harm posed by nuclear activities.43 
Finally, scope of the Draft Articles on Prevention is limited to transboundary harm, being harm 
to the territory of another state.44 The Draft Articles on Prevention therefore do not address 
harm to the global commons. Harm to the global commons was originally considered early on 
in the development of this project. In 1990, Special Rapporteur Barboza advocated addressing 
harm to the global commons under the ILC’s mandate of progressive development. 45 However, 
it was later noted by Special Rapporteur Rao that some states were of the view that harm to the 
global commons was a separate issue that warranted independent consideration by the ILC. 46  
It therefore was not included in the final draft.  
6.2.2 The standard of care and procedural obligations under the Draft Articles on Prevention  
The standard of care under the Draft Articles on Prevention is a duty of conduct or ‘due 
diligence’. That is, states must exert their ‘best possible efforts to minimize the risk’ of 
transboundary harm. 47  This standard of care reflects contemporary developments in 
international treaty law.48 According to the commentaries to the Draft Articles ‘the duty of due 
diligence… is not intended to guarantee that significant harm be totally prevented, if it is not 
possible to do so.’49 As such, a state would not automatically be considered to have breached 
its obligations under the Draft Articles simply because an activity within their jurisdiction or 
control results in significant transboundary harm. 50 It would instead have to be shown that a 
                                                 
43 Draft Articles on the Prevention, above n , 149. See also Stephens, above n 19, 157; Birnie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, above n 25, 141. According to Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, this definition includes situations like the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, where there is an unlikely risk of disastrous transboundary consequences.  
44 Draft Articles on the Prevention, above n 1, 152 art 2. 
45 Julio Barboza, ‘Sixth report on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of act not 
prohibited by international law’, International Law Commission, (1990) Un Doc A/CN.4/428, 101 [72], [74]. 
46 Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, ‘First report on prevention of transboundary damage from hazardous activities’, 
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, 
(1998) International Law Commission, UN Doc A/CN.4/487 and Add.1, 198 [107]-[109].  
47 Draft Articles on the Prevention, above n 1, 153. 
48 Due diligence obligations had become prevalent in international environmental agreements. See, eg, United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 16 November 1994) (‘UNCLOS’) art 194; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 
opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 293 (entered into force 22 September 1988) art 2. This 
standard of care had also been implied by Hungary in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project. See chapter 5. The 
ILC also referred to the dispute between Germany and Switzerland concerning the 1986 Sandoz chemical spill 
in support of this standard of care. See also Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 1, 154. 
49 Draft Articles on the Prevention, above n 1, 154. 
50 See Boyle, above n 6, 237. According to Boyle, breach would not be established by showing a risk of harm or 
that actual harm was caused. Proof of harm or risk of harm merely establishes that ‘the State has a duty to act’ 
and does not tell us ‘that the State has failed in its duty to act.’ 
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state did not take sufficient measures to minimise the risk (i.e. did not exercise reasonable due 
diligence in the given circumstances).51 
Under the Draft Articles on Prevention, the degree to which a state must attempt to minimise 
the risk of transboundary harm will depend on the probability and severity of the risk at hand.52 
In other words, the degree of due diligence required by a state is proportionate to the risk.53 
The Draft Articles on Prevention also suggest that the degree of due diligence may change over 
time with advances in scientific understanding and technology.54 However, generally speaking, 
due diligence will involve ‘reasonable efforts by a State to inform itself of factual and legal 
components that relate foreseeably to a contemplated procedure and to take appropriate 
measures, in a timely fashion, to address them.’55 This includes enacting and enforcing relevant 
domestic law and policies.56 Additional procedural obligations articulated in the Draft Articles 
include a duty to cooperate57, the prior assessment of risk (such as conducting an EIA)58, and 
notification59 and consultation60 with states that are likely to be affected. These procedural 
obligations comprise the basic standard of due diligence that states must meet to satisfy the 
general obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm.61 Under this formulation, the 
relevant question for establishing breach of the no-harm rule is whether a state has complied 
with these procedural obligations, rather than whether an activity resulted in significant 
transboundary harm.62  
6.2.3 Significance of the Draft Articles on Prevention 
As mentioned above, the Draft Articles on Prevention provide a detailed interpretation of the 
no-harm rule. Until this point in time, the scope and standard of care for the no-harm rule was 
expressed in a piecemeal fashion across a number of sources. The ILC drew on the decisions 
of international courts and tribunals and multilateral agreements to provide a comprehensive 
account of the content of the no-harm rule.63 In particular, the Draft Articles provide a clear 
                                                 
51 Redgwell, above n 25, 16.  
52 Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 1, 154 
53 Ibid, 155. 
54 Ibid, 154 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, 153-154. This is also set out under draft article 5. 
57 Ibid, art 4. 
58 Ibid, art 7. 
59 Ibid, art 8. 
60 Ibid, art 9. 
61 Ibid, 153.  
62 See Peel, above n 23, 67.  
63 See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 25, 141.  
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account of the duty of due diligence and relevant procedural obligations flowing from that 
duty. 64  The accessible and clear treatment of the no-harm rule in the Draft Articles has 
influenced how states, jurists and international law scholars understand and interpret the no-
harm rule.  
Nevertheless, the Draft Articles on Prevention have shortcomings. First, as noted above, the 
Draft Articles do not distinguish between codification of existing customary international law 
and progressive development, meaning that some of the provisions contained within them may 
not accurately represent how states understand their obligations under the no-harm rule. 
Second, the Draft Articles do not clearly represent alternative interpretations of the no-harm 
rule, including suggestions that states have a duty of result or ‘strict liability’ for harm from 
ultra-hazardous activities.65 Third, the Draft Articles do not clearly address activities that are 
inherently harmful. That is activities which, by their very nature, will result in transboundary 
harm, and for which the likelihood and/or severity of harm cannot be minimised through due 
diligence and procedural obligations.66 As noted by Handl, the Draft Articles do not expressly 
acknowledge the possibility that, for inherently harmful activities, the only logical way to 
satisfy the duty of due diligence would be not to engage in the activity at all.67  Finally, the 
Draft Articles do not address the prevention of harm to the global commons. In this sense, their 
scope is significantly narrower than the no-harm rule under customary international law. This 
also means that the no-harm rule, duty of care and procedural obligations contained in the Draft 
Articles were not formulated to address the global commons, and therefore might not readily 
translate to this issue.  
Despite these shortcomings, over 15 years since their publication, the interpretation of the no-
harm rule in the Draft Articles on Prevention has gained considerable traction, as demonstrated 
in the following three cases.  
 
                                                 
64 Stephens, above n 19, 157-158.  
65 See, eg, L F E Goldie, 'Concepts of strict and absolute liability and the ranking of liability in terms of relative 
exposure to risk' (1985) 16 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 175; John M. Kelson, 'State 
Responsibility and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity ' (1972) 13(2) Harvard International Law Journal 197; 
C Wilfred Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law Recueil des Cours (Brill Nijhoff, 
1966).  
66 See arguments made by Australia and New Zealand in the Nuclear Tests cases in chapter 5.3.  
67 Günther Handl, 'Transboundary Impacts' in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 531, 540.  
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6.3 2010: PULP MILLS ON THE RIVER URUGUAY (ARGENTINA V URUGUAY) 
The Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay68 (‘Pulp Mills’) involved a dispute between Argentina 
and Uruguay darting back to 2003 concerning Uruguay’s construction of two pulp mills along 
the River Uruguay, which forms a shared border with Argentina.69 In 1975, Argentina and 
Uruguay entered into the Statute of the River Uruguay,70 a treaty which established a regime 
for the shared use and management of the River, including the creation of an administrative 
commission comprised of representatives from both states (Commission for the River 
Uruguay).71 Argentina claimed that that Uruguay had breached its substantive and procedural 
obligations under the Statute of the River Uruguay by authorising and beginning construction 
of the pulp mills.72  
The judgment primarily focused on the interpretation and application of the Statute of the River 
Uruguay. A key question was whether Uruguay had breached the substantive obligation under 
article 41 of the Statute of the River Uruguay to prevent pollution and preserve the aquatic 
environment of the river by adopting appropriate rules and measures. 73 This included the 
obligation to conduct a ‘full and objective’ environmental impact assessment.74 Although the 
obligation in question was contained in a treaty, its similarity to the no-harm rule led the court 
to also consider obligations under customary international law.75  
6.3.1 The obligation to prevent transboundary pollution and conduct an environmental 
impact assessment  
In interpreting Uruguay’s obligation to prevent pollution under article 41 of the Statute of the 
River Uruguay, the majority of the Court briefly considered the no-harm rule under customary 
international law. It held that: 
                                                 
68 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay)(judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 14 (Pulp Mills). 
69 For an overview of the factual background and political context of this dispute, see Allen L Springer, Cases of 
Conflict: Transboundary Disputes and the Development of International Environmental Law (University of 
Toronto Press, 2016) 198-206.  
70 Statute of the River Uruguay, Argentina-Uruguay, opened for signature 25 February 1975, 1295 UNTS 340 
(entered into force 18 September 1976).  
71 The Court considered the role of the Commission for the River Uruguay at Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, 
[84]-[93].   
72 ‘Memorial Argentina (translation)’, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), International 
Court of Justice, General List No 135, 15 January 2007, 92-138.   
73 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14,  28.  
74 Ibid, 28 
75 See Donald K Anton, 'Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment) 
[2010] ICJ Rep (20 April 2010)' (2010) 17 Australian International Law Journal 213, 213.  
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A State is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take 
place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the 
environment of another State.76   
The majority referred to the Court’s earlier statement in the Nuclear Weapons advisory 
opinion— that the obligation to prevent transboundary harm and harm to the global commons 
is now a part of customary international law. 77  It further characterised the obligation of 
prevention as one of due diligence, that is:  
[a]n obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also 
a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control 
applicable to public and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by 
such operators, to safeguard the rights of the other party.78   
This interpretation of the duty of due diligence supports that of the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
Prevention.79 
The majority further held that the duty of due diligence had to be interpreted in light of recent 
developments in international law, including the practice of conducting an EIA.80 The ICJ 
affirmed that states have a duty under customary international law to conduct an EIA when 
engaging in activities that risk having significant transboundary impacts.81 In other words, 
states have a stand-alone obligation under customary international law to conduct an EIA. 82 
However, the majority also confirmed that conducting an EIA is integral to the duty of due 
diligence, stating that:  
[D]ue diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not be 
considered to have been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect the régime of the 
river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an environmental impact assessment on the 
potential effects of such works.83 
 
The duty to conduct an EIA is in line with principle 17 of the Rio Declaration and draft article 
7 of the ILCs Draft Articles on Prevention. The judgment in the Pulp Mills case further suggests 
                                                 
76 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, [101]. 
77 Ibid, 78. See also chapter 5.  
78 Ibid, [197]. 
79 Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 1, art 3, art 5 (on the implementation of legislative and monitoring 
measures). 
80 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, [204]. This reflects the Court’s earlier position in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project. See chapter 5.5. 
81 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, [204]; See also Anton, above n 75, 219; Springer, above n 69, 212.   
82 See Alan Boyle, 'Developments in the International Law of Environmental Impact Assessments and their 
Relation to the Espoo Convention' (2011) 20(3) Review of European Community & International Environmental 
Law 227, 227.  
83 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, [204].  
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that, in certain circumstances, states may need to monitor and assess the impacts of an activity 
on an ongoing basis.84  
The dispute required the Court to consider whether the content of an EIA is prescribed under 
customary international law. Argentina and Uruguay had both accepted that states have a duty 
to conduct an EIA under international law where an activity poses a risk of significant 
transboundary harm. 85  However, they disagreed as to the scope and content of the EIA 
necessary to comply with international law.86 Although Uruguay had conducted an EIA prior 
to authorising the construction of the Pulp Mills, Argentina argued that it had been insufficient 
to satisfy Uruguay’s obligation under international law. For example, it did not take into 
account all potential impacts from the Pulp Mills as required by international law. 87 
Conversely, Uruguay claimed that international law (including the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
Prevention) did not dictate the content and manner in which an EIA is to be conducted and that 
this was to be determined in accordance with national law.88 The majority of the Court agreed 
with Uruguay.  Unless a state is party to the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (‘Espoo Convention’)89 (which neither party was in 
this case) the content of an EIA is to be determined by domestic legislation.90 The judgment 
nevertheless suggests two exceptions. First, states ought to consider the ‘nature and magnitude 
of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment’ when 
determining the scope and content of an EIA.91 Second, under customary international law, an 
EIA ‘must be conducted prior to the implementation of a project.’92 As such, the way in which 
an EIA is to be conducted is not entirely at the discretion of states.93 
6.3.2 Significance of the Pulp Mills Case to the no-harm rule 
The majority decision in the Pulp Mills case affirmed the standard of care of the no-harm rule 
under customary international law as one of due diligence. It also affirmed the obligation of 
                                                 
84 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, [205] 
85 Ibid, [203]. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, opened for signature 25 
February 1991, 1989 UNTS 309 (entered into force 10 September 1997) (‘Espoo’). Espoo is a regional 
European convention. South American states are therefore not party to Espoo. See Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (6 May 2017) United Nations Treaty Collection 
< https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-4&chapter=27&lang=en>. 
90 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, [205]. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Boyle, above n 6, 247. 
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states to conduct an EIA, and its relationship to the no-harm rule. However, leaving the content 
of an EIA to the discretion of individual states could be problematic.  According to Anton, this 
creates the ‘potential for inconsistency and varying levels of rigour’ in EIAs.94 It is unclear 
what states must do to satisfy this obligation in good faith. Overall, this decision suggests that, 
unless a state is party to the Espoo Convention, international law has a limited capacity to 
ensure that it conducts an EIA so as to effectively identify and manage risks of transboundary 
harm.  
The Court’s interpretation of the duty of due diligence, and the centrality of EIAs to this duty, 
supports the ILC’s construction of the no-harm rule in its Draft Articles. The majority of the 
Court did not directly rely on the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention to inform its judgment. 
However, Argentina and Uruguay both used the Draft Articles to inform their interpretation of 
their international legal obligations. In its memorial, Argentina cited the commentary to the 
Draft Articles to establish that EIAs are an important contribution to the prevention of 
transboundary harm. 95  Uruguay relied extensively on the Draft Articles to inform its 
interpretation of the obligation of due diligence under customary international law.96 This 
suggests that, although the Draft Articles are not legally binding, some states nevertheless 
consider them to be highly authoritative interpretations of their international legal obligations.  
6.4 2011: INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA’S ADVISORY 
OPINION ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF STATES SPONSORING 
PERSONS AND ENTITIES WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA   
The Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to 
activities in the Area97 (‘Activities in the Area’) is a 2011 advisory opinion of the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (‘ITLOS’). ‘The Area’ 
is defined under article 1 of UNCLOS as ‘the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’ Article 136 declares the Area to be the ‘common 
                                                 
94 Anton, above n 75, 221.  
95 ‘Memorial Argentina (translation)’, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), International 
Court of Justice, General List No 135, 15 January 2007, 84. 
96 ‘Counter-Memorial of Uruguay’, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), International Court 
of Justice, General List No 135, 20 July 2007, [2.39]-[2.42].  
97 Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) 
(International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 February 2011) (‘Activities in the Area’). 
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heritage of mankind’.98 Any activities conducted in the Area must therefore benefit mankind 
as a whole.99 The exploration of resources in the Area is therefore regulated under UNCLOS, 
and is subject to approval by the International Seabed Authority.100 This advisory opinion 
therefore essentially focused on the rights and obligations of states concerning a global 
commons area. While it primarily concerned treaty obligations, the advisory opinion has also 
substantially contributed to the interpretation of customary international law.101 
6.4.1 Background and the question before the ITLOS  
The Seabed Disputes Chamber may, at the request of the UNCLOS Assembly or the Council 
of the International Seabed Authority (‘the Council’), provide an advisory opinion on matters 
within the scope of their activities under article 191 of UNCLOS. The Pacific Small Island 
Developing State of Nauru petitioned the Council to request the advisory opinion.102  In 2008, 
two state sponsored corporations from Nauru and Tonga applied to the International Seabed 
Authority to authorise a plan of work for exploration of the Area.103 However, in 2009 the 
applicants postponed their applications.104  
The reason for postponing the applications was the question of state liability for the activities 
of private companies in the area, including responsibility and liability for environmental 
damage. Nauru argued that developing states lacked the technical expertise and resources to 
undertake activities in the Area alone. Therefore, the only way developing states might 
participate in seabed mining would be to engage and/or sponsor private mining corporations to 
explore and/or exploit the Area. It was unclear whether a state could be held responsible for 
the activities of private companies in these circumstances. Nauru argued developing states 
could not afford to be held liable for the actions of private companies it might sponsor to 
                                                 
98 Article 137 provides further details of the legal status of the Area. See also Donald K Anton, Robert A 
Makgill and Cymie R. Payne, 'Seabed mining - advisory opinion on responsibility and liability' (2011) 41(2) 
Environmental Policy and Law 60, 60.  
99 UNCLOS Article 140 (1).   
100 As per Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982, opened for signature 28 July 1994, 1836 UNTS 3 (entered into force 28 July 
1996), Annex I. 
101 See Duncan French, ‘From the Depths: Rich Pickings of Principles of Sustainable Development and General 
International Law on the Ocean Floor – the Seabed Disputes Chamber’s 2011 Advisory Opinion’ (2011) 26 The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 525, 526-527. 
102 Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 
February 2011) 17.  
103 As developing states, this request was pursuant to UNCLOS Annex III, Art 8. See Ibid, 16. See also Anton, 
Makgill and Payne, above n 98, 61.  
104 Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 
February 2011) 16. See also Anton, Makgill and Payne, above n 98, 61. 
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conduct activities in the Area.105 As such, the risk of such liability would entirely preclude 
developing states from being able to participate in deep seabed mining.106 Nauru stated that an 
advisory opinion was needed ‘so that developing States can assess whether it is within their 
capabilities to effectively mitigate such risks and in turn make an informed decision on whether 
or not to participate in activities in the Area.’107  
The Council asked the Seabed Disputes Chamber to provide an advisory opinion on three 
specific questions:  
1. What are the legal responsibilities and obligations of States Parties to the Convention with 
respect to the sponsorship of activities in the Area in accordance with the Convention, in 
particular Part XI, and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982?  
2. What is the extent of liability of a State Party for any failure to comply with the provisions 
of the Convention, in particular Part XI, and the 1994 Agreement, by an entity whom it has 
sponsored under Article 153, paragraph 2 (b), of the Convention?  
3. What are the necessary and appropriate measures that a sponsoring State must take in order 
to fulﬁl its responsibility under the Convention, in particular Article 139 and Annex III, and the 
1994 Agreement?108 
 
To address question 1, the Seabed Disputes Chamber examined key provisions of Part XI of 
UNCLOS. One of these provisions was Article 139(1), which provides:  
States Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities in the Area, whether carried 
out by States Parties, or state enterprises or natural or juridical persons which possess the 
nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals, shall be 
carried out in conformity with this Part. The same responsibility applies to international 
organizations for activities in the Area carried out by such organizations.109 (emphasis added) 
 
The meaning of ‘responsibility to ensure’ was therefore key to determining the responsibility 
of sponsoring states. The Seabed Dispute Chamber characterised this as a due diligence 
obligation.110 It held that:  
The sponsoring State’s obligation “to ensure” is not an obligation to achieve, in each and every 
case, the result that the sponsored contractor complies with the aforementioned obligations. 
Rather, it is an obligation to deploy adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the 
utmost, to obtain this result. To utilize the terminology current in international law, this 
                                                 
105 Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 
February 2011) 16. 
106 Ibid, 16-17. See also, French, above n 101, 529. 
107 Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 
February 2011), 17. 
108 Ibid, 15.  
109 See also ibid, [100]. The court also identifies as key provisions for the obligation of sponsoring states article 
153(4) and annex III, article 4(4) (at [99]).    
110 Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 
February 2011), [110]. 
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obligation may be characterized as an obligation “of conduct” and not “of result”, and as an 
obligation of “due diligence”. 111 
 
6.4.2 Obligation of due diligence and procedural obligations 
While analysing the nature of the obligation under Part XI of UNCLOS, the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber also considered the meaning of due diligence under customary international law. It 
referred to the ICJ’s judgment in the Pulp Mills case and confirmed that due diligence entails 
adopting and enforcing relevant rules at a domestic level.112 Unlike the ICJ in the Pulp Mills 
case, the Seabed Disputes Chamber directly affirmed the ILC’s interpretation of the duty of 
due diligence in article 3 of the Draft Articles on Prevention. That is, states do not have to 
absolutely prevent transboundary harm; they merely have to exert their best possible efforts to 
minimise the risk of harm eventuating.113 In the context of liability of sponsoring states, this 
means that states are not ‘liable for each and every violation committed by persons under its 
jurisdiction’.114 The Chamber further suggested that the content of a duty of due diligence may 
change depending on the context of an activity, the risks involved and the development of new 
scientific or technical knowledge.115 For example, the Chamber suggested that mining in the 
Area is riskier than mere exploration, entailing a higher standard of due diligence.116 Therefore, 
as a general rule of thumb, the riskier an activity, the greater the standard of due diligence 
required from states. 
The Seabed Disputes Chamber also considered the relationship between procedural obligations 
and the duty of due diligence. The Chamber held that states have a duty to apply a precautionary 
approach in order to limit the risk of serious or irreversible damage, as per Rio principle 15.117  
The Chamber held that ‘the precautionary approach is also an integral part of the general 
obligation of due diligence of sponsoring States.’118 It also suggested that the obligation to take 
                                                 
111 Ibid, [110]. 
112 Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 
February 2011), [115]. This obligation has recently been considered in greater detail by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) (Awards) (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, Case No 2013-19, 12 July 2016.   
113 Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 
February 2011), [116] citing commentary to draft article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 1. 
See also, French, above n 101, 539. 
114 Ibid, [112]. 
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a precautionary approach is a part of customary international law.119 This suggests that states 
are not absolved of their duty to prevent significant transboundary harm under customary 
international law just because there is scientific uncertainty surrounding the likelihood and 
scope of negative impacts associated with a proposed activity. 
The Seabed Dispute Chamber further considered the duty to conduct an EIA. Once again, it 
confirmed the decision of the majority judgment in the Pulp Mills case: that states have a direct 
obligation under customary international law duty to conduct an EIA and that this is also 
necessary to satisfy their obligation of due diligence to prevent harm.120 The Chamber further 
affirmed that customary international law does not dictate the content of an EIA.121 It also drew 
a connection between the duty to conduct an EIA and the duty to notify and consult, stating 
that ‘in light of the customary rule mentioned by the ICJ, it may be considered that 
environmental impact assessments should be included in the system of consultations and prior 
notifications set out in article 142 of the Convention’.122 However, the Chamber did not clarify 
this relationship under customary international law.  
6.4.3 The significance of Activities in the Area  
The advisory opinion on Activities in the Area builds on existing jurisprudence to strengthen 
an interpretation of no-harm rule that requires states exhibit a duty of conduct or due diligence. 
It affirms the approach taken by the majority of ICJ in the Pulp Mills case and directly affirms 
the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention.123 The Chamber used the Draft Articles to inform its 
interpretation of the duty of due diligence under Part XI of UNCLOS and customary 
international law. It essentially referred to the Draft Articles as if they were a binding source 
of international law.124 This deference to the Draft Articles enhanced the perceived authority 
of the Chamber’s interpretation of the no-harm rule. However, as demonstrated below in the 
discussion of the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case, this has not prevented some states from 
questioning the validity of the ILC’s interpretation.   
 
                                                 
119 Ibid, [135]. 
120 Activities in the area (Advisory Opinion) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No 17, 1 
February 2011) [145]. See also French, above n 101, 541. 
121 Ibid, [148]-[149]. 
122 Ibid, [148]. 
123 French, above n 101, 539-540.  
124 See also Bordin, above n 17.  Bordin suggests that reliance by the ICJ on various draft codification 
conventions produced by the ILC has become a more frequent occurrence in certain areas of international law, 
particularly the area of state responsibility.   
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6.5 2013: CASE CONCERNING AERIAL HERBICIDE SPRAYING (ECUADOR V 
COLOMBIA) 
The Aerial Herbicide Spraying Case involved a dispute between Ecuador and Colombia.125 
Ecuador initiated proceedings against Colombia in the ICJ in 2008 regarding Colombia’s aerial 
herbicide spraying program. 126 The program’s purpose was to destroy illegal cocaine and 
poppy plantations in a region close to the border with Ecuador.127 Ecuador alleged that the 
herbicides had drifted into its territory, causing significant transboundary harm. The no-harm 
rule was therefore central to this dispute. 
The judgment of the ICJ in this case was eagerly anticipated by legal scholars. The ICJ had 
considered the no-harm rule in obiter in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project and the Pulp Mills 
case. However, the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case presented the Court with the opportunity to 
interpret and apply the no-harm rule as a principle of customary international law in a 
contentious case. The last time the no-harm rule under customary international law (as opposed 
to being contained in a treaty) had been applied in a contentious case was in the 1949 Corfu 
Channel case. According to Boyle, this was the ICJ’s first opportunity to consider a dispute 
concerning transboundary air pollution. 128 It was also the first time such a dispute had come 
before any international court or tribunal since the Trail Smelter arbitration.129 Sands and Peel 
noted that the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case presented the ICJ with ‘an opportunity to revisit 
and clarify the issue of the level of environmental damage from atmospheric forms of pollution 
that is actionable under international law.’130 The case also gave the ICJ an opportunity to 
consider the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention and consider the accuracy of their 
interpretation of the no-harm rule.131   
                                                 
125 Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) (Order of 13 September 2013) [2013] ICJ Rep 278 (‘Aerial 
Herbicide Spraying’). 
126 ‘Application Instituting Proceedings’, Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia), International Court 
of Justice, General List No 138, 31 March 2008, 4.  
127 Ibid, 4.  
128 Boyle, above n 6, 235.  
129 Ibid.  
130 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2012), 242.  
131 Robert Esposito, 'The ICJ and the Future of Transboundary Harm Disputes: A Preliminary Analysis of the 
Case Concerning Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v. Colombia)' (2010) 2(1) Pace International Law Review 
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Unfortunately for legal scholars, these opportunities never came to pass. In 2013, the case was 
removed from the ICJ’s List. 132 The Parties settled the dispute by way of a special agreement 
before oral hearings were heard or a judgment rendered. 133 The ICJ therefore did not have the 
opportunity to rule on the merits of the case or elaborate on the content of the no-harm rule.134 
However, the documents submitted in this case are nevertheless valuable. The written 
submissions of Ecuador and Colombia demonstrate how two states interpreted their 
obligations, and the obligations of other states, under the no-harm rule at this time.  
Ecuador submitted that Colombia’s aerial herbicide spraying program had caused significant 
transboundary harm within its territory. Ecuador claimed spraying had occurred ‘near, at and 
across’ its border, and had caused ‘serious damage to people, to crops, to animals, and to the 
natural environment on the Ecuadorian side of the frontier’.135 Ecuador also alleged that the 
spraying posed a ‘grave risk of future damage over time.’ 136  It therefore claimed that 
Colombia’s aerial herbicide spraying program violated its rights under customary and 
conventional international law, and that Colombia had ‘failed to meet its obligations of 
prevention and precaution.’137 Ecuador initiated proceedings with a view to preventing further 
harm and for Colombia to indemnify it for the damage it had sustained.138  
The submissions of both parties raise four key issues regarding the no-harm rule. First, what 
sources accurately reflect the content of the no-harm rule under customary international law? 
Second, what activities give rise to obligations under the no-harm rule? Third, what must states 
do to discharge the duty of due diligence to prevent transboundary harm? Fourth, what (if any) 
procedural obligations must states fulfil under the no-harm rule? These issues and the 
arguments of both Parties are considered further below.  
6.5.1 The relevant sources of international law  
Ecuador’s claim that Colombia had breached its obligations under the no-harm rule relied 
heavily on the ILC’s Draft Articles and various multilateral agreements. Ecuador 
acknowledged the contributions of the Trail Smelter arbitration, the Stockholm Declaration, 
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and Rio Declaration to the development of the no-harm rule.139 However, it declared that the 
ILC’s Draft Articles provided a more detailed formulation.140 Ecuador also cited numerous 
multilateral environmental agreements to support its interpretation of the no-harm rule, 
including the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (‘LRTAP’), 141 
UNCLOS and the Espoo Convention.  
Colombia challenged Ecuador’s use of these sources. It argued that the international 
agreements relied on by Ecuador did not accurately reflect Colombia’s obligations under 
customary international law.142 Ecuador and/or Colombia were not party to LRTAP, UNCLOS 
or the Espoo Convention. Colombia also pointed out that many of the agreements Ecuador 
referred to were regional agreements.143 While they may create regional custom they did not 
hold sway over states in South America.144 Colombia was therefore of the view that it was only 
bound by the general formulation of the no-harm rule as pronounced by the ICJ in the 1996 
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.145   
Colombia also disagreed with Ecuador’s reliance on the ILCs interpretation of the no-harm rule 
in its Draft Articles on Prevention. It claimed that these were an exercise in progressive 
development and did not accurately reflect customary international law.146 Colombia noted that 
few states had voiced their support for the Draft Articles as codifying existing customary 
law.147 Colombia acknowledged that the no-harm rule provided states with an ‘obligation of 
due diligence to prevent or minimize transboundary harm’, but it highlighted that it (and a 
number of other states) did not accept every detail of the Draft Articles as reflecting customary 
international law.148 For example, Colombia did not consider itself to be bound by draft article 
7 to conduct an EIA.149  Colombia proceeded to refute Ecuador’s arguments based on the Draft 
Articles, but it pointed out that it nonetheless did not consider itself to be bound by them.150 
                                                 
139 ‘Memorial of Ecuador Volume 1’ Arial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) International Court of 
Justice, General List No 138, 29 April 2009, [8.5]-[8.6].  
140 Ibid [8.6].  
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UNTA 217 (entered into force 16 March 1983) (‘LRTAP’). 
142 ‘Counter Memorial of the Republic of Colombia Volume I’, Arial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) 
International Court of Justice, General List No 138, 29 March 2010, [8.8], [8.68]-[8.70]. 
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These submissions suggest that states hold different views as to the content of the no-harm rule. 
In particular, Colombia’s submissions suggest that not all states accepted the ILC’s 
interpretation as authoritative as this time. Colombia’s Counter-Memorial was submitted to the 
ICJ in 2010, before the Seabed Dispute Chamber’s 2011 advisory opinion on Activities in the 
Area. It nevertheless raises questions regarding the Seabed Dispute Chamber’s deference to the 
Draft Articles and challenges the inference they are an authoritative representation of 
customary international law.  
6.5.2 The scope of the no-harm rule  
Given Ecuador’s reliance on the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention, it is unsurprising that its 
interpretation of the scope of the no-harm rule reflects that of the ILC. Ecuador similarly 
interpreted the no-harm rule as applying to harm caused to ‘persons, property or the 
environment.’151 It referred to the same threshold level of ‘significant harm’, citing the ILC’s 
definition.152 It also adopted the ILC’s ‘spectrum’ of risk of significant harm, in that the no-
harm rule encompasses activities that have a low probability of disastrous harm and a high 
probability of significant harm.153 Ecuador considered activities to give rise to obligations 
under the no-harm rule when they pose a foreseeable risk of harm. 154  Finally, Ecuador 
suggested that the burden of proof for establishing a risk of significant harm should be 
interpreted in light of the precautionary principle as expressed in principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration. That is, ‘[a]n international tribunal must therefore take account of scientific 
uncertainty in determining whether harmful consequences are foreseeable or not.’155 
As noted above, Colombia rejected Ecuador’s arguments primarily on the basis that the ILC 
Draft Articles do not represent existing customary international law. It further argued that, even 
if it were bound by these articles, its activities did not satisfy the definition of risk of significant 
harm, in that the aerial herbicide spraying program did not carry a high probability of 
significant transboundary harm or a low probability of disastrous harm.156 Colombia further 
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disagreed with Ecuador’s invocation of the precautionary principle. In Colombia’s opinion, the 
precautionary principle was not a binding norm of customary international law. It stated that  
The precautionary principle does not constitute as such an international obligation; it is usually 
formulated by international tribunals in adjectival terms, and as an “approach” rather than a 
“principle”. It may be seen as providing guidance as to how States should conduct themselves in 
matters concerning sustainable development. There is no reason to think that it modifies the 
substantive law as concerns transboundary harm.157 (emphasis added) 
This is not consistent with the Seabed Disputes Chamber’s understanding of the precautionary 
approach in Activities in the Area. 158  It raises the possibility that the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber’s characterisation of the precautionary approach may only be relevant in the context 
of UNCLOS, and not to customary international law.  
6.5.3 The duty of care under the no-harm rule  
Ecuador characterised the duty of care under the no-harm rule as a ‘duty of conduct’ or ‘due 
diligence’ type obligation. Drawing on the ILC Draft Articles Ecuador argued that, given the 
aerial herbicide spraying program posed a foreseeable risk of significant transboundary harm, 
Colombia had a duty to take adequate precautionary measures to prevent and/or minimise such 
harm. 159  It claimed that Colombia had failed to satisfy this obligation. 160  According to 
Ecuador, the standard of due diligence expected of a state should be appropriate and 
proportional to the degree of risk of transboundary harm that an activity entails.161 Ecuador 
characterised Colombia’s spraying program as being ‘inherently hazardous’.162 In other words, 
environmental harm, harm to humans and harm to animals was fundamental to the nature of 
herbicides being used. It therefore argued that the only appropriate way in which Colombia 
could minimise the risk of transboundary harm was to ‘eliminate all risk’ of the herbicide 
drifting into its territory.163 It suggested that Colombia ought to have established a buffer zone 
along the border with Ecuador within which aerial herbicide spraying was prohibited to prevent 
the herbicides from drifting into Ecuador’s territory.164 It also suggested that Colombia could 
have further reduced the risk of transboundary harm by using a less harmful herbicide.165 
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159 ‘Memorial of Ecuador Volume 1’ Arial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) International Court of 
Justice, General List No 138, 29 April 2009, [8.24], [8.26]. 
160 Ibid, [8.24]. 
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Finally, Ecuador alleged that Colombia ought to have notified Ecuador when spraying was 
taking place.166 In Ecuador’s view, Colombia had therefore ‘manifestly failed to take all the 
appropriate precautionary measures within its power to prevent transboundary drift from 
causing significant harm in Ecuador.’167  
Colombia agreed with the general proposition that the no-harm rule provided an obligation of 
conduct or due diligence. 168 However, Colombia denied that its aerial herbicide spraying 
program constituted an ‘inherently hazardous’ activity. 169  According to Colombia, the 
proposition that it must eliminate all risk sought to transform the duty of due diligence ‘into a 
virtual guarantee’ that harm would be absolutely prevented.170 Such a high standard of care did 
not accord with the ICJ’s formulation of the no-harm rule in the Nuclear Weapons advisory 
opinion. It noted that the ICJ had formulated the no-harm rule:  
[S]olely in terms of an obligation to ensure “respect” for the environment of other States, and the 
word was no doubt carefully chosen. It is clear that the Court did not intend to establish a standard 
in which all risk of harm was excluded.171  
In other words, Colombia did not recognise a duty to absolutely eliminate risk of harm, no 
matter the nature of the activity in question.  
The submissions of both parties demonstrate a common understanding that states have a due 
diligence obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm. However, what this standard 
of care entails in relation to specific activities appears to be unsettled. Given this is a 
contentious case, it is unsurprising that both states disagreed on this point. However, their 
submissions reveal a broader question: do inherently hazardous or harmful activities attract a 
different standard of care? The submissions of Ecuador indicate a higher standard of care. It 
may well be that the only way to prevent transboundary harm from some activities is not to 
engage in them at all. While Ecuador characterised the standard of care as one of due diligence, 
the proposition that a state must eliminate all risk from inherently hazardous activities more 
closely reflects a duty of result.172  
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6.5.4 Failure to adequately enforce domestic rules and regulations    
The submissions by Ecuador and Colombia raise questions regarding the duty of states to 
establish and enforce relevant domestic laws as part of their duty of due diligence under the 
no-harm rule. In particular, what qualifies as adequate compliance and enforcement? In its 
Counter-Memorial, Colombia outlined the specific action it had taken at a domestic level to 
prevent significant transboundary harm. This included conducting the program in accordance 
with an Environmental Management Plan under domestic law; using modern equipment and 
technology; ongoing review of the chemical composition of the spray mixture; scientific review 
of the program; government and external audit; and the adoption of strict regulations for the 
spraying of the herbicide, such as height, speed, wind and droplet size rules.173 Colombia 
therefore argued that it had satisfied its obligation of due diligence through domestic law 
regarding the aerial herbicide spraying program.174 
However, Ecuador argued that Colombia had breached its obligation of due diligence as it had 
failed to comply and/or enforce relevant domestic law.175 Ecuador claimed that the spraying 
flights routinely failed to comply with the prescribed height and speed regulations.176 Ecuador 
further claimed that Colombia had failed to prevent spraying in buffer-zones and other 
protected areas under its own laws.177 According to Ecuador, the pilots of the aircraft were 
inadequately trained and had routinely ignored the operational requirements to prevent the 
herbicide from drifting into Ecuador’s territory.178 Ecuador therefore argued that Colombia had 
breached its duty of due diligence by failing to enforce domestic law and regulations to prevent 
significant transboundary harm.179  
Failure to comply with and enforce relevant domestic law could play a more prominent role in 
international environmental litigation in the future. According to Boyle: 
A failure to enforce the law is in many respects the simplest failure of due diligence. Other 
failings are less easy to prove and expert technical evidence may be required. Moreover, while 
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General List No 138, 31 January 2011, [2.72]-[2.154]. 
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governments do not normally advertise their failure to control transboundary risks by having 
no laws on the subject, it may be far from easy to challenge the adequacy of those laws, or the 
choice of technology which is alleged to have caused the risk.180 
This was a key issue in the recent decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the South 
China Sea Arbitration.181 This was in the specific context of provisions under UNCLOS and 
not customary international law, but nonetheless highlights how the duty to enact and enforce 
domestic law could be used strategically by states to demonstrate a breach of due diligence in 
international litigation.   
6.5.5 Significance of the dispute   
No judgment was rendered in the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case. However, the arguments of 
Ecuador and Colombia provide evidence of state practice concerning the no-harm rule. More 
importantly, they indicate that the efforts of the ILC may not have led to a uniform 
understanding of the no-harm rule. Colombia’s submissions offer a stark reminder to states and 
legal scholars that while the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention present a detailed and convenient 
interpretation of the no-harm rule, they are not in themselves legally binding. Key issues 
therefore remain open to considerable interpretation, including the understanding of 
‘significant’ harm and the extent of the obligation of due diligence.   
The timing of Ecuador and Colombia’s submission of the Memorial and Counter-Memorial 
respectively makes it somewhat difficult to assess their significance. These documents were 
submitted shortly before the decisions in the Pulp Mills case and Activities in the Area. In the 
case of Colombia’s Counter-Memorial it is questionable whether Colombia would have made 
similar arguments in light of the decisions in these cases. For example, would Colombia’s 
arguments have been any different concerning the duty to conduct an EIA, the precautionary 
approach and the relative authority of the ILC Draft Articles? On the other hand, Ecuador and 
Colombia’s interpretations of the no-harm rule were not influenced by the contemporaneous 
views of the ICJ and the ITLOS. This arguably enhances the significance of these sources. 
They provide evidence of how two states understood their international legal obligations under 
the no-harm rule free from the persuasive views of these bodies.  
                                                 
180 Boyle, above n 6, 242-243.  
181 The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) (Awards) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 
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6.6 2015: CERTAIN ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT BY NICARAGUA IN THE BORDER 
AREA (COSTA RICA V NICARAGUA) & CONSTRUCTION OF A ROAD IN COSTA 
RICA ALONG THE SAN JUAN RIVER (NICARAGUA V COSTA RICA)  
On the 16 December 2015, the ICJ handed down its judgment in Certain Activities Carried Out 
by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction of a Road In Costa 
Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (‘Certain Activities’ case).182 The 
judgment addressed two disputes concerning activities conducted by Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
in the vicinity of the San Juan River. The disputes were joined by Order of the Court in 2013.183 
The no-harm rule was at the centre of both disputes. The Certain Activities case presented the 
ICJ with a long-awaited opportunity to consider the content of the no-harm rule and apply it in 
a contentious case. In this respect, the Certain Activities case is a landmark decision.  
The majority judgment clarifies several key issues concerning procedural obligations on states 
flowing from the no-harm rule, but adds little clarity over the standard of care under the no-
harm rule. Unlike the ITLOS, the ICJ does not directly refer to or endorse the ILC’s 
interpretation of the no-harm rule in the Draft Articles on Prevention. For these reasons, the 
ICJ’s judgment in Certain Activities raises more questions concerning the no-harm rule than it 
answers. It gives the impression that the content of the no-harm rule is far from settled, and 
that there may be room for further development of this rule in the future.  
6.6.1 Background of dispute in Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border 
Area (Certain Activities dispute) 
This dispute concerned the alleged incursion and occupation of Costa Rican territory by 
Nicaragua’s military in an area near the mouth of the San Juan River. The San Juan River runs 
along the border between Nicaragua and Costa Rica towards the Caribbean Sea. In accordance 
with an international agreement negotiated by the Parties in 1858 (1858 Treaty of Limits), the 
                                                 
182 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction 
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boundary between the two states runs along the bank on the Costa Rican side of the river.184 
This agreement gave Nicaragua dominion over the waters of the river, but granted Costa Rica 
the right to navigate the river for commercial purposes. 185 In spite of this agreement, the 
jurisdiction and sovereign rights of both parties had been subject to several disputes over the 
previous 150 years.186  
Costa Rica claimed that on the 18 October 2010, Nicaragua began dredging the San Juan River 
and commenced construction of an artificial channel on the Costa Rican side of the river.187 In 
its application to the Court, Costa Rica alleged that Nicaraguan soldiers had incurred into Costa 
Rica territory, felling trees and depositing sediment while constructing the channel.188 It also 
claimed that Nicaragua established a camp which occupied approximately three square 
kilometres of Costa Rican territory. 189  Costa Rica therefore argued that Nicaragua had 
breached its sovereignty and right to territorial integrity. 190  Costa Rica also argued that 
Nicaragua had breached the prohibition against the threat or use of force, owing to the presence 
of Nicaragua’s military in Costa Rican territory.191 In its memorial to the Court, it characterised 
Nicaragua’s actions as ‘nothing less than an invasion of foreign territory and an attempt at 
annexation.’192 Part of the judgment focuses on the issue of state sovereignty and will not be 
considered further as it does not relate to the development of the no-harm rule.193  
                                                 
184 Treaty of Limits, Costa Rica – Nicaragua, signed 15 April 1858 (entered into force 26 April 1858). See also 
Award in regard to the validity of the Treaty of Limits between Costa Rica and Nicaragua of 15 July 1858 
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Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015), [59].  
185 Certain Activities (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015), [59]. 
186 See Ibid, [59]-[62]. 
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188 ‘Application Instituting Proceedings’, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area 
(Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (International Court of Justice, General List No 150, 18 November 2010) [4] 
189 Ibid, [4]. 
190 Certain Activities (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015), [65]. 
191 ‘Application Instituting Proceedings’, Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area 
(Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (International Court of Justice, General List No 150, 18 November 2010), 4.  
192 ‘Memorial of Costa Rica Volume I’ Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa 
Rica v Nicaragua), General List no 150 (5 December 2011) [4.65]. 
193 The majority of the Court found that Nicaragua’s activities (excavating channels and establishing a military 
camp) had breached Costa Rica’s territorial sovereignty. As Nicaragua was responsible for these breaches, 
Nicaragua was also obliged under the secondary rules of state responsibility to ‘make reparation for the damage 
caused by its unlawful activity’. Certain Activities (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 
16 December 2015), [93]. Owing to this finding, this Court did not consider the application of international 
environmental law to Nicaragua’s activities on Costa Rican territory, including the construction of the channels. 
Instead it confined its analysis of international environmental law to this question as to whether ‘Nicaragua’s 
dredging activities in the Lower San Juan carried a risk of significant transboundary harm.’ (at [105]). The 
majority judgement also did not address issues concerning use of force. The majority considered that the 
relevant conduct of Nicaragua had already been addressed in relation to the breach of territorial sovereignty. 
While the Court did not rule out the possibility that Nicaragua’s activities also constituted an unlawful use of 
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Costa Rica further alleged that Nicaragua had breached international environmental law by 
failing to fulfil procedural requirements to prevent transboundary harm and the substantive 
obligation not to cause harm to the territory of other states.194 In its application to the Court, 
Costa Rica claimed that Nicaragua had caused ‘serious damage’ to the territory it had occupied 
and that the construction of the canal would ‘seriously affect the flow of water to the Colorado 
River’, which flows from the San Juan River. 195  Costa Rica also argued that further 
construction would cause additional damage to wetlands and wildlife in its territory.196  
In its Counter-Memorial, Nicaragua defended the legality of its activities. First, Nicaragua 
argued that its dredging program of the San Juan River was consistent with its right to maintain 
the navigability of the river.197 Second, Nicaragua suggested that the 1858 Treaty of Limits was 
lex specialis and that general principles of international law only applied insofar as they did 
not contradict the terms of this treaty.198 Nicaragua was therefore of the view that the no-harm 
rule, the duty to consult and notify other states and the duty to conduct an EIA were secondary 
to the terms of the 1858 Treaty of Limits.199 Third, Nicaragua stated that it had conducted an 
EIA in compliance with its own domestic laws and had made the findings publicly available, 
regardless of whether it was legally obliged to do so.200 According to Nicaragua, the EIA 
demonstrated the dredging program did not pose a risk of significantly altering the flow of the 
Colorado River, nor was it likely to significantly affect Costa Rican territory.201 Nicaragua 
therefore argued that it had not breached its obligation under customary international law as its 
activities did not pose a risk of significant transboundary harm.202  
                                                 
force, it held that as the unlawful nature of these activities had already been established there was no need to 
examine it any further (at [97]).  
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Chapter 6 
 
162 
 
6.6.2 Background of dispute in Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan 
River (Construction of a Road dispute) 
This dispute concerned the construction of a road by Costa Rica within its own territory along 
the San Juan River. Costa Rica began construction of the road in December 2010.203 Following 
commencement of construction, Costa Rica published a decree that declared a state of 
emergency in connection with Nicaragua’s alleged incursion into its territory as outlined above, 
and claimed that the construction of the road was necessary to maintain national security.204 
Nicaragua objected to construction of the road. In its application to the Court, Nicaragua 
claimed that the project had already resulted in significant amounts of sediment being dumped 
into the San Juan River.205 It further claimed that the felling of trees and removal of topsoil 
along the riverbank would lead to erosion, further increasing sedimentation of the river.206 
Nicaragua was concerned that an increase in sedimentation might affect the water quality of 
the river, marine life and biodiversity of the surrounding ecosystem.207 In addition to having 
major ecological impacts, Nicaragua also claimed that the construction of the road might have 
subsequent social, cultural and economic impacts.208 For example, it risked causing impacts to 
fishing, other hydrological resources and ecotourism in the region.209 
In its memorial to the Court, Nicaragua claimed Costa Rica had breached its international 
environmental obligations. This included the ‘obligation to use its territory in a manner that 
does not caused harm to its neighbour’, its duty to assess the risk of transboundary harm by 
conducting an EIA, and the duty to consult and notify with potentially affected states.210 
Nicaragua further submitted that: 
Costa Rica exercised no diligence, due or otherwise, with respect to its Road project. It did not 
respect “the duty of vigilance and prevention which [due diligence] implies”. Therefore, due 
diligence cannot “be considered to have been exercised, [since] a party planning works liable 
to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an environmental 
impact assessment on the potential effects of such works.”211 
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In Nicaragua’s view, Costa Rica had declared an emergency situation merely to circumvent 
domestic law and its international legal obligations. 212  It argued that ‘…Costa Rica has 
attempted to force the actual situation onto the Procrustean bed of its law’s definition of 
“disaster” in order to justify a colossal and environmentally destructive project’.213 Nicaragua 
submitted that such invocation of national law to justify an internationally wrongful act was a 
violation of article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties214 and customary 
international law.215  
Costa Rica refuted these allegations. First, Costa Rica stood by its justification that, because of 
the Emergency Decree, it was exempt from conducting an EIA under its own domestic law.216 
Second, Costa Rica argued that the construction of the road did not pose a risk of significant 
transboundary harm. As such, the threshold for triggering the duty to conduct an EIA and to 
consult and notify with other states had not been met.217 Finally, Costa Rica claimed that 
Nicaragua had not established that significant transboundary harm had been caused to the San 
Juan River, nor that there was a risk of this occurring in the future.218 As such, it had not 
breached its obligations under international law.  
6.6.3 Judgment of the International Court of Justice  
Procedural obligations 
A key issue in both disputes was whether both Parties had breached the procedural obligation 
to conduct an EIA. In considering Costa Rica’s arguments in the Certain Activities dispute, the 
ICJ affirmed its pronouncement in the 2010 Pulp Mills case. That is, states are required under 
customary international law to conduct an EIA where there is a risk of significant 
transboundary harm and that this is necessary to discharge the duty of due diligence. 219 
However, the ICJ went beyond its statement in the Pulp Mills case, holding that:  
[T]o fulfil its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant transboundary 
environmental harm, a State must, before embarking on an activity having the potential 
adversely to affect the environment of another State, ascertain if there is a risk of significant 
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transboundary harm, which would trigger the requirement to carry out an environmental impact 
assessment.220 
In other words, states have an additional obligation to first ascertain whether an activity poses 
a risk of significant transboundary harm. The majority of the Court held that if the result of this 
initial assessment is affirmative, then a state must conduct an environmental impact 
assessment, the content of which should reflect the nature and magnitude of the activity in 
question. 221  In considering Nicaragua’s claim in the Construction of a Road dispute, the 
majority further suggested that the obligation to ascertain risk could be satisfied by conducting 
a preliminary risk assessment for a proposed activity.222 
The judgment further suggests that the obligation to notify and consult is similarly contingent 
on the outcome of an environmental impact assessment. 223 The Court held that:  
[I]f the environmental impact assessment confirms that there is a risk of significant 
transboundary harm, a State planning an activity that carries such a risk is required, in order to 
fulfil its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant transboundary harm, to 
notify, and consult with, the potentially affected State in good faith, where that is necessary to 
determine the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.224 
 
A finding of risk of significant harm is therefore needed at each stage to give rise to the 
procedural obligation to conduct an EIA and notify and consult respectively.  
The ICJ followed these stages when considering whether Nicaragua had breached its 
procedural obligations to prevent significant transboundary harm.225 The majority noted that 
in 2006, Nicaragua had conducted a study of the impacts of the dredging program which 
concluded that it would not significantly impact on the flow of the Colorado River.226 The 
majority did not provide further details, but stated that on the basis of the evidence before it, it 
was satisfied that the program did not ‘give rise to a risk of significant transboundary harm, 
either with respect to the flow of the Colorado River or to Costa Rica’s wetland.’ 227 
Consequently, Nicaragua was not obliged under customary international law to carry out an 
EIA.228 Nor was it obliged to further notify and consult with Costa Rica.229 As there was no 
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risk of significant transboundary harm, the question as to whether the 1858 Treaty of Limits 
created lex specialis was also a moot point. The majority merely noted that: 
[T]he fact that the 1858 Treaty may contain limited obligations concerning notification or 
consultation in specific situations does not exclude any other procedural obligations with regard 
to transboundary harm which may exist in treaty or customary international law.230  
 
The majority went into greater detail when considering whether Costa Rica had breached its 
procedural obligations in the Construction of a Road dispute. The majority considered ‘the 
nature and magnitude of the project and the context in which it was to be carried out.’231 The 
proximity of the road to the river was a relevant factor. The Court held that this increased the 
likelihood of sediment being discharged into the river.232 The majority further held that the risk 
of increased sedimentation was exacerbated by the possibility of natural disasters, such as 
hurricanes, tropical cyclones and earthquakes. 233  The road also passed through Ramsar-
protected wetlands, heightening the risk of significant harm because of the particular sensitivity 
of that environment.234 The majority therefore concluded that the construction of a road by 
Costa Rica posed a risk of significant transboundary harm. 235 Consequently, Costa Rica had 
an obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment of the road.236  
The majority considered Costa Rica’s claim that a state of emergency exempted it from 
conducting an EIA under domestic legislation. The majority acknowledged its pronouncement 
in the Pulp Mills case that ‘it is for each State to determine in its domestic legislation or in the 
authorization process for the project, the specific content of the environmental impact 
assessment required in each case’.237 However, the majority held that this does not give states 
licence to use domestic law to exempt themselves from their international obligation to carry 
out an EIA.238 The majority further noted that Costa Rica had not sufficiently demonstrated 
that an emergency situation existed; there was no imminent threat of military confrontation in 
the area where the road was being constructed.239 Construction of the road had commenced 
prior to the formal declaration of a state of emergency.240 As there was no emergency situation, 
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the majority refrained from considering whether such a situation would exempt a state from 
carrying out an EIA.241 This issue remains open for the Court to examine at a later date. The 
majority therefore concluded that Costa Rica had an obligation to carry out an environmental 
impact assessment prior to the commencement of construction of the road. 
The Court then turned its attention to whether Costa Rica had complied with the obligation to 
conduct an EIA. Costa Rica had conducted several studies on the Road, but these studies were 
conducted after the project had been commenced.242 The majority affirmed its pronouncement 
in the Pulp Mills case that states have a continuing obligation to carry out an EIA and monitor 
the effects of a project.243 However, it asserted that ‘the obligation to conduct an environmental 
impact assessment requires an ex ante evaluation of the risk of significant transboundary 
harm’.244 That is, states must conduct an EIA before commencing a project. It therefore held 
that Costa Rica had not complied with its obligation under customary international law to 
conduct an EIA prior to commencing construction of the road.245 As Costa Rica had not 
fulfilled this obligation, the majority of the Court did not further examine whether it had 
complied with its obligation to consult and notify with Nicaragua under customary 
international law.246  
In his separate opinion, Judge Ad Hoc Dugard criticised the majority judgment for taking a 
more ‘scrupulous’ analysis in the Construction of a Road dispute compared to the Certain 
Activities dispute.247 He argued that the majority did not follow the same approach in both 
disputes; if it had, it would also have found that Nicaragua’s activities posed a significant risk 
to Costa Rica’s wetlands. 248  According to Dugard, the majority should have taken into 
consideration Ramsar wetlands within Costa Rican territory as it had in the Construction of a 
Road dispute.249 By the Court’s own reasoning, the wetlands should have lowered the threshold 
level for ‘significant’ transboundary harm.250 This is an important difference, but it appears to 
have been the result of a different approach to evidence, rather than a different formulation of 
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the procedural duties flowing from the no-harm rule. The Court provided more detail of its 
assessment of relevant evidence in Construction of a Road, but its analysis in Certain Activities 
still followed the same logic. That is, it was underpinned by an assessment of whether there 
was a risk of significant transboundary harm. 
 
Substantive obligation 
The majority’s assessment as to whether Nicaragua had breached its substantive obligation to 
prevent significant harm under customary international law was equally brief. The majority 
recalled the formulation in the Pulp Mills case, that: 
[U]nder customary international law, “[a] State is . . . obliged to use all the means at its disposal 
in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, 
causing significant damage to the environment of another State.” 251 
The Pulp Mills case characterised this as an obligation of due diligence, and not a duty of 
result.252 However, the majority’s consideration of the substantive obligation to prevent harm 
is somewhat confused in Certain Activities. The majority clearly recognised an obligation of 
due diligence in the context of procedural obligations. However, it did not clearly express this 
duty of care with regard to the substantive obligation in the Certain Activities dispute. The 
majority merely held that Costa Rica had failed to establish that Nicaragua’s dredging program 
caused harm to its territory.253 As there was no significant transboundary harm, the majority 
concluded that Nicaragua had not ‘breached its obligations by engaging in dredging activities 
in the Lower San Juan River.’254 Although brief, the majority’s focus on whether significant 
transboundary harm was caused is more in keeping with a duty of result, than a duty of conduct.  
The Court’s approach to the Construction of a Road dispute further muddies the waters 
regarding the relevant standard of care. The majority defined its approach as follows: 
[T]he Court will make its own determination of the facts, on the basis of the totality of the 
evidence presented to it, and it will then apply the relevant rules of international law to those 
facts which it has found to be established255 
Specifically, the majority began its inquiry by first considering whether, on the basis of the 
evidence before it, Costa Rica’s construction of a road had caused significant transboundary 
harm to Nicaragua. The Court then considered whether Nicaragua had breached its substantive 
                                                 
251 Ibid, [118]. 
252 Above 6.3.  
253 Certain Activities (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015), [119]. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid, [176]. 
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obligations under customary international law, including whether Costa Rica had breached its 
obligation ‘not to cause’ significant transboundary harm. In other words, the majority judged 
Costa Rica’s compliance with the substantive obligations under the no-harm rule on the 
outcome of its activities, and not on whether it had acted with due diligence.  
In order to determine whether Costa Rica’s activities had caused harm to Nicaragua, the ICJ 
had to consider the issue of sediment. First, it assessed the extent to which construction of the 
road had increased the amount of sediment in the river. It concluded that ‘the amount of 
sediment in the river due to the construction of the road represents at most 2 per cent of the 
river’s total load’.256 It then considered whether this sediment had caused significant harm. The 
majority noted that the river’s sediment load is naturally high and that the volume of sediment 
from the construction of the road was therefore ‘insignificant’ by comparison.257 Drawing on 
the understanding of ‘significant’ in the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention, Nicaragua had 
argued that provided the change in sediment load was measurable, this was sufficient to qualify 
as significant transboundary harm.258 However, the majority dismissed this argument in the 
given circumstances. It held that:  
Sediment is naturally present in the river in large quantities, and Nicaragua has not shown that 
the river’s sediment levels are such that additional sediment eroded from the road passes a sort 
of critical level in terms of its detrimental effects. Moreover, the Court finds that, contrary to 
Nicaragua’s submissions, the present case does not concern a situation where sediment 
contributed by the road exceeds maximum allowable limits, which have not been determined 
for the San Juan River.259  
An increase in sediment alone therefore did not constitute significant transboundary harm.260 
The majority further held that, given the high natural variability of the river’s sediment load, 
the relative impact of sediment from construction of the road was low.261 The increase in 
sediment therefore did not meet the threshold level of ‘significant’ transboundary harm. 
The majority also considered whether the 2 per cent increase in sediment had consequently 
caused any other significant transboundary harm to the river’s morphology, navigability, and 
to Nicaragua’s dredging program. Nicaragua had argued that, as the river already carried a high 
sediment load, any further increase in sediment would hinder its dredging activities and 
increase the impact on surrounding wetlands.262 The Court stated that it was uncertain as to 
                                                 
256 Certain Activities (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015), [186]. 
257 Ibid, [189]. 
258 Ibid, [190]. 
259 Ibid, [192] 
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whether the sediment from the road was responsible for these further impacts on the river.263 
There were other factors that might have caused this, independent of Costa Rica’s activities.264 
In other words, the ‘chain of causation’ could not be established that linked the sediment from 
Costa Rica’s road to the harm claimed by Nicaragua. Moreover, the Court was not convinced 
that a 2 per cent increase in sediment would significantly affect Nicaragua’s dredging 
burden.265 Nicaragua had not established this claim, nor had it established the claim that the 
river’s morphology or ecosystem had been significantly altered.266 Claims that the road had 
negatively affected communities living along the river were also unsubstantiated.267 The Court 
therefore concluded that, as none of Nicaragua’s claims of transboundary harm had been 
established, Costa Rica had not ‘breached its substantive obligations under customary 
international law concerning transboundary harm.’268 Once again, it is difficult to reconcile this 
approach with a duty of due diligence, as the majority’s determination was purely based on 
whether harm had been caused.    
6.6.4 Significance of the judgment  
Procedural obligations 
The Certain Activities case clarifies when states must fulfil procedural obligations flowing 
from the no-harm rule. It suggests that procedural obligations do not all arise at the same time, 
but instead flow progressively from each other. According to Brunnée, this aspect of the 
majority judgment may strengthen the capacity of the no-harm rule to prevent significant harm 
as it clarifies ‘the circumstances in which the related procedural obligations are triggered.’269 
States must be proactive in ascertaining if an activity within their jurisdiction and control poses 
a risk of significant transboundary harm. Following a preliminary risk assessment, the 
obligation to conduct an EIA and to notify and consult will be triggered in succession if there 
is a risk of significant transboundary harm. The threshold level of harm therefore not only 
determines the scope of the substantive obligation under the no-harm rule, but also when states 
must fulfil procedural obligations.  
                                                 
263 Ibid, [203] 
264 Ibid, [204]. 
265 Ibid, [205]. 
266 Ibid, [205]-[212]. 
267 Certain Activities (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015), [216]. 
268 Ibid, [217].  
269 Jutta Brunnée, 'Procedure and Substance in International Environmental Law: Confused at a Higher Level? ' 
(2016) 5(6) ESIL Reflections 1, 2.  
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Despite the importance of the threshold level of ‘significant’ harm, this case does not clarify 
how this threshold is to be determined. As noted above, the majority held that Nicaragua’s 
dredging program did not pose a risk of significant transboundary harm to Costa Rica and had 
not resulted in significant transboundary harm. However, it did not provide further details as 
to how it reached this conclusion. The judgment is more detailed concerning the Construction 
of a Road dispute. The majority’s determination that there was a risk of significant 
transboundary harm was based on a number of factors, including the likelihood of natural 
disasters and the proximity of Ramsar-protected wetlands. However, as pointed out by Judge 
Ad Hoc Dugard in his separate opinion, the majority does not appear to have given equal 
consideration to these factors in both disputes. 270  The requirement to consider Ramsar-
protected wetlands is listed under Appendix III to the Espoo Convention, but is not necessarily 
established as a criterion under customary international law. Furthermore, the majority does 
not follow or endorse the understanding of ‘significant’ harm set out in the ILC Draft Articles 
on Prevention. The determination of significant transboundary harm appears to be a complex 
decision based on a number of competing factors, but it is unclear precisely what these factors 
are and why the majority chose to rely on them in its decision making. Greater transparency 
concerning the Court’s determination of relevant factors and the weighting that should be 
attributed to them in future cases might provide states with greater certainty concerning this 
threshold. This would also assist states to determine when a proposed activity is likely to give 
rise to procedural obligations under the no-harm rule.  
Standard of care 
The Certain Activities case raises a number of questions concerning the standard of care under 
the no-harm rule. The sources examined in this chapter demonstrate that, during the third phase 
of the no-harm rule’s development, states, international jurists and legal scholars widely 
understood the relevant standard of care to be a duty of conduct.271 Breach of the no-harm rule 
was therefore determined by whether a state had failed to ‘apply the restraints on transboundary 
injurious activates that it may reasonably be expected to adopt’ in the given circumstances, not 
whether harm had been caused.272 As stated by Boyle: 
                                                 
270 Above 6.6.3. 
271 See, eg, Jacqueline Peel, 'The Practice of Shared Responsibility in relation to Climate Change' (2015) 71 
SHARES Research Paper 1, 20;  
272 Redgwell, above n 25, 16.  
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A violation [of the obligation of conduct] is not established by showing actual pollution or risk 
of pollution. Proof of pollution or the risk of pollution establishes only that the State has a duty 
to act. It does not tell us that the State has failed in its duty to act.273 
However, the way in which the majority of the Court considered breach of the substantive duty 
in Certain Activities suggests that the standard of care is not so clear cut.  
Brunnée similarly suggests that the judgment in this case complicates the understanding of the 
due diligence standard of care.274 Brunnée focuses on the relationship between procedural 
obligations and the substantive due diligence obligation to prevent harm. According to 
Brunnée, the judgment in Certain Activities calls into question whether failure to fulfil a 
procedural obligation is enough to establish breach of the substantive (due diligence) duty to 
prevent harm, in the absence of a finding of significant transboundary harm.275 The ability to 
establish breach without proof of harm would have its advantages. It could help establish a 
wrongful act in circumstances where proof of harm, causation or attribution is difficult to 
establish.276 As noted by Brunnée: 
Violations of procedural obligations are more easily established and, by holding states to their 
procedural duties, they can sometimes be prompted to correct harmful conduct, or at least to 
take more effective preventive measures going forward.277 
The majority judgment appears to be at odds with academic opinion, which largely supports 
the view that proof of harm itself is not necessary to establish breach of the obligation of due 
diligence.278  
However, the confusion in the Certain Activities case arguably runs deeper than the relationship 
between procedural and substantive obligations. It raises questions regarding the nature of the 
standard of care itself. If proof of harm is necessary to establish breach of the substantive 
obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm, this does not fit the traditional 
understanding of a duty of due diligence. Breach would be contingent on result, not on conduct. 
In considering the substantive obligations in these disputes, the majority did not consider the 
conduct of Costa Rica and Nicaragua – only whether significant harm had been caused. This 
approach more strongly reflects a ‘duty of result’ being strict or absolute responsibility for 
harm, rather than due diligence.  
                                                 
273 Boyle, above n 6, 237.  
274 Brunnée, above n 269, 1-2.  
275 Ibid, 2.  
276 Ibid, 6.  
277 Ibid, 6.  
278 Ibid, 6. Brunnée also notes that this issue was highlighted in the separate opinions of several judges in this 
case. Cf Benoît  Mayer, 'The relevance of the no-harm principle to climate change law and politics ' (2016) 19 
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A minority of legal scholars suggests that states may have two obligations when it comes to 
transboundary pollution: an obligation ‘not to cause’ harm and an obligation to ‘prevent’ harm. 
For example, Sands and Peel suggest that the former obligation is an extension of the principle 
of good neighbourliness and was derived from the sovereign rights of states.279 In contrast, the 
latter obligation, which is reflected in the ILC Draft Articles, is one of due diligence that ‘seeks 
to minimise environmental damage as an objective in itself.’280 Beyerlin and Marauhn suggest 
that the no-harm rule entails both a prohibitive obligation and a preventative obligation.281 In 
other words, a duty of result and a duty of conduct. Saxler, Siegfried and Proelss hold a similar 
view.282 They note that while most legal scholars only recognise a preventative obligation (i.e. 
due diligence), this does not necessarily mean that the prohibitive obligation, stemming from 
the Trail Smelter arbitration, has been ‘completely absorbed by the principle of prevention’.283  
The majority judgement in the Certain Activities case can be interpreted as re-enlivening these 
suggestions. 
However, the idea that states have two different obligations concerning transboundary 
pollution is not supported by state practice. As noted by Verheyen, state practice typically does 
not support strict or absolute responsibility for significant transboundary harm. 284   The 
exception to this are ‘ultrahazardous’ activities. There is no uniform definition of 
ultrahazardous activities under customary international law. However, this term appears to 
include activities where the ‘risk of harm from an activity is transnational in character, major 
in degree, and cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care’.285 Examples of such 
activities include nuclear power, space activities and weather modification.286 There is some 
state practice in support of a more onerous standard of care for ultrahazardous activities, 
especially nuclear activities. 287  The dispute in Certain Activities did not involve an 
                                                 
279 Sands and Peel, above n 129, 197, 201.  
280 Ibid, 201. 
281 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, International Environmental Law (Hart, 2011) 40-41.  
282 Barbara Saxler, Jule Siegfried and Alexander Proelss, 'International liability for transboundary damage 
arising from stratospheric aerosol injections' (2015) 7(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 112, 122.  
283 Ibid. 
284 Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State 
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285 John M. Kelson, 'State Responsibility and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity ' (1972) 13(2) Harvard 
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ultrahazardous activity, so it is difficult to know what to make of this aspect of the majority 
judgment. The standard of care could therefore benefit from further clarification in future cases. 
  
The interpretations of the ITLOS and ILC 
The majority judgment in Certain Activities does not directly engage with or endorse the 
interpretation of the no-harm rule found in two key sources. The first source that is 
conspicuously absent is the Activities in the Area advisory opinion. Brunnée highlights that the 
majority did not engage with the Activities in the Area advisory opinion when considering 
procedural and substantive obligations to prevent transboundary harm.288 She notes that the 
Court did not endorse the ITLOS’s progressive approach to due diligence, which recognised a 
relationship between the no-harm rule and the precautionary approach. 289  According to 
Brunnée: 
The most significant dimension of this approach to prevention and precaution is the increased 
importance that it accords to procedural obligations, including in particular EIA obligations, 
and the lowering of thresholds that it entails for the triggering of these obligations.290 
The fact that the majority did not engage with the advisory opinion suggests that it did not 
agree with the Seabed Dispute Chamber’s interpretation, at least insofar as it applies to 
customary international law, as opposed to obligations under UNCLOS. It is possible that the 
understanding of the ICJ and the ITLOS concerning due diligence has fragmented.  
The majority opinion also does not directly engage with the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention. 
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, the ILCs Draft Articles on Prevention have 
significantly influenced the content and the interpretation of the no-harm rule over the past 
fifteen years. They have been relied upon by states in their submissions before the ICJ, cited 
by the ITLOS and declared by renowned legal scholars as an authoritative representation of 
customary international law. However, the majority judgment in Certain Activities does not 
cite or draw upon the Draft Articles on Prevention to inform its interpretation of the no-harm 
rule and subsequent procedural obligations. This is the case even where the approach of the 
ILC clearly supports that of the ICJ (i.e. a sequential approach to procedural obligations).291 
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Given the level of momentum and perceived authority that the Draft Articles on Prevention 
have gathered, their absence from this judgment is conspicuous.  
In past judgments, the ICJ has not hesitated to refer to other ILC projects to support its 
interpretation of customary international law. The most obvious example is the ILC’s 2001 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility) that provide a non-binding interpretation of the secondary rules of state 
responsibility. 292  As with the Draft Articles on Prevention, the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility contain provisions that seek to codify and progressively develop customary 
international law in this area.293 However, as noted by Bordin, the ICJ has nonetheless applied 
the provisions of the Articles on State Responsibility in its judgments in contentious cases in a 
similar manner to binding treaty rules. 294  The form of the Draft Articles on Prevention 
therefore does not sufficiently explain why they were absent from the majority judgment in 
Certain Activities. That the majority did not use or endorse the Draft Articles on Prevention 
raises questions regarding the ILC’s interpretation of the no-harm rule. It implies that the Draft 
Articles on Prevention may not be an accurate representation of existing customary 
international law. The primary significance of Certain Activities is, therefore, that it raises 
further significant questions concerning the content of the no-harm rule, rather than clearly 
developing it. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter considered key sources from the third phase of the development of the no-harm 
rule. During this phase, a strong understanding developed amongst states, international jurists 
and international law scholars of the no-harm rule providing a duty of conduct or due diligence, 
and the important role of procedural obligations flowing from that duty. A strong understanding 
also developed that harm must be significant in order to give rise to obligations under the no-
harm rule. However, precisely how this threshold is to be interpreted in different scenarios 
remains unclear. Furthermore, with the exception of the Activities in the Area advisory opinion, 
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development of the no-harm rule during this phase was primarily in the context of 
transboundary harm, as opposed to harm to the global commons.  
The recent decision of the ICJ in the Certain Activities case disrupts the otherwise linear 
development of the no-harm rule during this phase. In many respects, it raises significant 
further questions concerning the content of the no-harm rule, rather than developing it. Issues 
that appeared to be settled during the third phase, such as the standard care and role of 
procedural obligations, now appear less certain. This case may prompt legal scholars to 
reconsider earlier interpretations of the no-harm rule. The Certain Activities case therefore 
suggests that further development of the no-harm rule remains possible. Only time will tell 
whether this case in fact heralds the beginning of a fourth phase in the no-harm rule’s 
development.  
Chapter 7 
 
176 
 
7 Application of the No-Harm Rule to SAI  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous three chapters analysed how the content of the no-harm rule has developed since 
the 1938/1941 Trail Smelter arbitration. Chapter six considered the third phase in the no-harm 
rule’s development. During this phase, the no-harm rule was interpreted as providing states 
with a duty of conduct or due diligence to prevent significant transboundary harm and harm to 
the global commons. Procedural obligations are central to fulfilling this duty. The 2015 Certain 
Activities case has raised a number of questions concerning the precise nature of the 
relationship between the duty of due diligence and procedural obligations. It has also raised 
questions concerning the relevant standard of care under the no-harm rule, and the possibility 
that states have two duties concerning transboundary pollution – a duty of result not to cause 
significant harm, and a duty of conduct to take steps to prevent harm from being caused in the 
first place. Regardless of the accuracy of this interpretation, the Certain Activities case serves 
as a timely reminder that, as a principle of customary international law, the content of the no-
harm rule is not set in stone, and may continue to develop into the future.  
The purpose of this chapter is to understand how the no-harm rule might respond to future 
attempts at SRM. This chapter applies the understanding of the no-harm rule established over 
the past three chapters to proposed solar radiation management (SRM) geoengineering. As 
explained in chapter one, this research primarily focuses on stratospheric aerosol injection 
(SAI) proposals as they are the most likely to be field tested and/or deployed. This chapter asks 
whether proposed SAI activities are likely to fall within the scope of the no-harm rule and, if 
so, what states must do to fulfil their obligations under this rule.  
In order to give greater clarity and focus, this chapter bases its analysis on three hypothetical 
scenarios. They are used throughout this chapter to highlight potential issues concerning the 
application of the no-harm rule to future attempts at SAI. These scenarios are set out in section 
7.2. Section 7.3 considers whether attempts at SAI would fall within the scope of the no-harm 
rule. Section 7.4 considers what states must do to fulfil their obligations under the no-harm rule 
if they engage in SAI activities. Section 7.5 concludes that no-harm rule has the potential to 
make an important contribution to future geoengineering governance. It provides considerable 
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guidance on what states must do should they decide to attempt SAI, but it needs to be further 
developed to enhance States’ understanding of how it is to apply to the risks of SAI.  
7.2 HYPOTHETICAL SAI SCENARIOS 
This section outlines three hypothetical scenarios devised to illustrate how field testing and 
deployment of SAI might occur in the future. These scenarios are based on the potential side-
effects and uncertainties of SAI raised in geoengineering literature and are intended to provide 
an illustrative empirical foundation for doctrinal analysis of the no-harm rule in the context of 
SAI. The states and scientists identified in these scenarios are fictitious and are not intended to 
represent the actual or anticipated actions or circumstances of any current state.  
Figure 7.1 Scenario map 
 
Scenario 1: Small scale field testing with transboundary impacts   
Assume it is 2021, and in 2020 State A funded the development of SAI geoengineering by its 
National Scientific Research Organisation (NSRO). A research team employed by the NSRO 
developed a system that uses a modified weather balloon with a 15km-long hose attached to 
spray minute sulphur dioxide particles into the stratosphere from a government research facility 
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in the northwest of State A, at a location 200km south of the border with State B. This location 
was selected as it is close to the equator. This is the optimum latitude for SAI as the particles 
will remain in the stratosphere for longer than if released into the atmosphere at higher 
latitudes.1 The system was designed so that the sulphur dioxide particles will react with oxygen 
in the atmosphere to form droplets of sulphuric acid, which will disburse to form a fine 
reflective layer in the stratosphere. 2  
The NSRO research team began testing the 
operation of this delivery system by spraying 
water vapour. Once the research team was 
satisfied with the mechanical operation of 
the delivery system, it commenced a series 
of ‘small-scale’ field tests that involved 
spraying the sulphur dioxide particles into 
the stratosphere.3 This was known as Project 
‘Alpha’: 500 kilotons of sulphur dioxide was sprayed into the stratosphere over a three month 
period. The goal of Project Alpha was to: study the reflective properties of the particles; learn 
how to produce particles that are the optimum size to reflect solar radiation and remain 
suspended in the stratosphere for an extended period of time; examine how particles interact 
with one another in the stratosphere; and assess the cost of operating the balloon-and-hose 
delivery system.4 The amount of sulphur dioxide released into the atmosphere from Project 
Alpha was only 1/26th of what is produced annually by volcanic eruptions around the globe (i.e 
approximately 13,000 kilotons)5. It is also significantly less than the annual human emissions 
of sulphur into the troposphere (i.e. approximately 100,000 kilotons).6   
                                                 
1 Alan Robock, 'Stratospheric Aerosol Geoengineering' in Roy  Harrison and Ron Hester (eds), Geoengineering 
of the Climate System (The Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014) 162, 164. Robock also states that at this latitude, 
natural atmospheric circulation patterns would carry the particles towards the poles, causing them to spread.  
2 See ibid, 164.  
3 Solar Radiation Governance Initiative, Solar radiation management: the governance of research (2011) 
http://www.srmgi.org/report/ 47 ('SRMGI Report'). As noted in chapter 1, this project follows the distinctions set 
out in the SRMGI Report. The SRMGI Report categorises small-scale field tests as those in which SAI particles 
would be deployed into the atmosphere outside of a laboratory in order to gain more knowledge of the effects 
and risks of SAI, but not with a purpose of producing large-scale climatic effects.   
4 See David  Keith, A Case for Climate Engineering (The MIT Press, 2013) 81-84.  
5 See Robock, above n 1, 165.  
6 Ibid. See also Keith, above n 4, 81-82. Keith proposes small-scale field tests that would ‘use less than a 
hundred kilograms of aerosol material— less than one ten-millionth of what we would need to add every year to 
make a readily measurable impact on the climate.’ 
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From Project Alpha, the NSRO research team learned how to create particles that are the 
optimum size to remain suspended in the stratosphere for up to 12 months and to effectively 
reflect solar radiation. The research team did not observe any negative impacts on the 
environment or the atmosphere from project Alpha, because the scale of the tests was too small 
to distinguish any impact SAI might have from other human causes and/or natural processes.  
In the twelve months following Project Alpha, scientists in state B observed a slight episodic 
increase in the frequency and severity of acid rain in the southern areas of its territory, which 
are largely used for agricultural purposes or are designated as National Parks. Lakes and 
streams that are sensitive to ‘episodic acidification’ (a brief increase in pH levels from acid rain 
or snow7) are affected by this increase in acidity. There is no scientific evidence that any 
species of fish or other aquatic organisms have died as a result of the increase in acidity. 
However, scientists in State B have observed a decrease in the body-weight and size of some 
species of fish that are sensitive to an increase in acidity.    
Scenario 2: Large-scale field testing with impacts on the ozone layer 
Assume it is 2023. In 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released 
its Sixth Assessment Report. The report stated that global mean surface temperatures have 
increased at a faster rate than predicted in its 2014 Fifth Assessment Report. The IPCC 
indicated that it is ‘extremely likely’ that this has been caused by the increased level of 
greenhouse gas emissions from human activities, with global greenhouse gas levels having 
risen in 2022 to 415ppm. The report repeats the statement from the Fifth Assessment report:  
Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes 
in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and 
irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change would require 
substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with 
adaptation, can limit climate change risks.8 
The Sixth Assessment Report also concludes that the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions at 2015 Paris COP to the UNFCCC are not ambitious enough to curb further 
warming and decrease the likelihood of ‘severe, pervasive and irreversible’ climate change 
impacts. Those pledges put the earth on a path to a rise in mean surface temperature of 2.2-3.4 
                                                 
7 See Acid Rain, US Environmental Protection Agency, 
<http://www3.epa.gov/acidrain/effects/surface_water.html>. 
8 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 'Summary for Policymakers' in Climate Change 2014: Synthesis 
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014) <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/> 8.  
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˚C above pre-industrial levels, well above the 1.5 to 2.0 degrees contained in the text of the 
Paris Agreement.9  
The government of State A therefore 
decides that it was important to learn more 
about the potential of SAI to quickly address 
the rising global mean surface temperatures 
associated with climate change. It funded 
the NSRO research team to conduct more 
SAI field tests on a larger scale than Project 
Alpha. The goal of this new project, 
(‘Project Bravo’) was to produce a 
measureable effect on local meteorological 
conditions. The research team field tested 
SAI on a continuous basis for twelve 
months. It slowly increased the amount of 
sulphur dioxide spraying into the 
atmosphere up to a total of 5,000 kilotons. 
The research team was confident that, at this 
concentration, they would be able to 
distinguish the impact of SAI on the local 
climate. 10  The NSRO research team 
monitored the impact SAI had on the climate 
at a local/regional scale and observed any 
undesirable side-effects.  
At the end of Project Bravo, the NSRO 
research team observed a reduction in average surface temperatures of 0.2-0.5˚C across the 
northern regions of State A where the field tests were conducted. No significant side-effects 
were observed in the territories of State A or State B. However, in September 2023, the World 
Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Environmental Program observed the 
                                                 
9 Paris Agreement, opened for signature 12 December 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016) < 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php>. 
10 See Keith, above n 4, 84-86. Keith suggests that, if it is not possible to discern the cooling effect of an SAI 
experiment of a similar scale to this, it may be possible to detect other effects, such as ‘changes in stratospheric 
temperature, the intensity and character of solar radiation, the surface energy balance of ice sheets and some 
ecosystem effects’ (at 85).  
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largest reduction in stratospheric ozone concentration over Antarctica since 2006. State C has 
a border with State A to the South, and extends into the Southern Ocean. The Bureau of 
Meteorology in State C recorded significantly higher levels of UV radiation in the southern 
regions of its territory due to the reduction in stratospheric ozone concentration. The National 
Medical Council of State C stated that the increased level of UV radiation is likely to increase 
the incidence of skin cancer and cataracts of citizens living in these areas by 2-3% over the 
next 10 years.  
Scenario 3: Full-scale deployment by two states with impacts on regional precipitation 
Assume it is 2026. 11  In 2024, the 
government of State A funded a long-term 
SAI program called Project Charlie. The 
goal of Project Charlie was to spray 10,000 
kilotons of sulphur dioxide per annum into 
the stratosphere on a continual basis to 
reduce global temperature by approximately 
0.2˚C. The idea was to use SAI in 
conjunction with emission reduction and 
CDR geoengineering strategies to counteract 
a percentage of global warming from climate 
change, and extend time for the international 
community to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions to safer levels.12 In the meantime, 
the NSRO research team continued to 
monitor for any adverse side-effects.     
State E is an archipelago of small low-lying 
islands off the east-coast of States A and D. 
It is classified as a developing country according to the World Economic Situation and 
                                                 
11 See ibid 88. According to Keith, the earliest SAI could feasibly be deployed on an ongoing basis would be 
around 2025.  
12 See, eg, Douglas G. MacMartin, Ken Caldeira and David W. Keith, 'Solar geoengineering to limit the rate of 
temperature change' (2014) 372(2031) Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 1; Yu A Izrael et al, ‘The ability of strospheric 
climate engineering in stabilizing global mean temperatures and an assessment of possible side effects’, (2014) 
15 Atmospheric Science Letters 140.  
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Prospects.13 The average height above sea level of each island is 1.2 metres and the highest 
point in the archipelago is only 2.5 metres. In the summer months, State E is prone to cyclones. 
State E is threatened by rising sea levels and an increase in the severity of cyclones associated 
with climate change. The government of State E therefore followed the geoengineering efforts 
of State A with great interest. It was disappointed with State A’s decision to only reduce global 
temperatures by 0.2 ˚ C as this will not be enough to mitigate the more severe risks it faces from 
climate change.  
Without coordinating with State A, State E initiated its own SAI program. The combined effect 
of both programs caused global mean surface temperatures to drop by 0.5˚C within twelve 
months. However, the international community is concerned about the long-term side effects 
of these programs. It is also concerned about the financial capacity of State E to continuously 
maintain its SAI program. If State E suddenly stops deployment of SAI, this could trigger the 
‘termination effect’, causing global temperatures to rapidly rise and adversely impact on 
environmental and human systems.14  
In the summer of 2025, following the SAI deployment by states A and E, precipitation patterns 
in the region were significantly altered.15 The annual monsoon was considerably weaker than 
usual in States C and D, producing 70% less rainfall than the previous year. Both states were 
affected by severe drought.16 By the summer of 2026, agricultural productivity in States C and 
D was halved and their dams fell to 15% capacity or less. Agriculture is the primary export 
industry of State D. The profit margins of associated companies and businesses were affected 
by the drought, and the economy of State D suffered a significant recession.  
Use of the scenarios 
Before continuing, it is important to clarify how these scenarios are used in this chapter to meet 
the aims of this project. Each scenario outlines a possible future SAI activity, how it is 
conducted and the effects it has on the climate, the atmosphere and/or the territory of other 
states. While each scenario follows through to the point where harm is caused, this is merely 
for illustrative purposes. It is not for the purpose of considering causation or secondary rules 
                                                 
13 See World Economic Situation and Prospectus- update as of mid-2016 (unedited advanced copy) (United 
Nations, 2016). 
14 See chapter 1.2.2. See also Victor Brovkin et al, 'Geoengineering climate by stratospheric sulfur injections: 
Earth system vulnerability to technological failure' (2009) 92(3-4) Climatic Change 243.  
15 See Kevin E. Trenberth and Aiguo Dai, 'Effects of Mount Pinatubo volcanic eruption on the hydrological 
cycle as an analog of geoengineering' (2007) 34(15) Geophysical Research Letters L15702.  
16 See ibid.  
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of state responsibility for transboundary harm after it has been caused. This chapter, and the 
project as a whole, takes a forward-looking approach to the no-harm rule. As explained in 
chapters one, two and three, this project assesses the potential of the no-harm rule to contribute 
to the ex-ante governance of SAI. That is, to influence the behaviour of states so as to prevent 
significant transboundary harm and harm to the global commons. It is beyond the scope of this 
research to consider secondary rules of state responsibility. As the focus is on responding to 
risks of future harm, causation – establishing that the activity in question caused harm in a 
specific instance –  is not important to this analysis.17 The remainder of this chapter therefore 
asks two questions of the scenarios: (1) would the proposed SAI activity fall within the scope 
of the no-harm rule; and if so, (2) what should the states in question have done to fulfil their 
obligations under the no-harm rule to prevent significant transboundary harm and/or harm to 
the global commons?  
7.3 WOULD SAI FALL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE NO-HARM RULE? 
The previous three chapters demonstrated how the scope of the no-harm rule has developed 
over the past 70 years. It is clear from this analysis that activities which pose a foreseeable risk 
of significant transboundary harm and/or harm to the global commons will trigger obligations 
under the no-harm rule.18 There is no clear ‘test’ for foreseeability in international law.19 
Verheyen suggests that in the context of the no-harm rule, foreseeability, at a basic level, 
requires some level of knowledge that a risk might materialise at some point in the future.20 It 
is difficult to make this assessment on the basis of hypothetical scenarios. Moreover, 
foreseeability of risk is entwined with a state’s procedural obligations under the no-harm rule. 
The decision of ICJ in the Certain Activities case suggests that states have a positive duty to 
ascertain whether an activity poses a risk of significant transboundary harm.21 In assessing 
                                                 
17 Causation and attribution would be key issues in establishing state responsibly and liability if a state should 
attempt SAI and caused transboundary harm. For a detailed discussion see David Reichwein et al, 'State 
Responsibility for Environmental Harm from Climate Engineering' (2015) 5(2-4) Climate law 142. 
18 See, eg, Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22. See also Shinya 
Murase, ‘Third report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, International Law 
Commission, 68th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/692 (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016), 9-10. 
19 Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility 
(Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005) 182.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction 
of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) (International Court of 
Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015) [104], [154] (‘Certain Activities’). See also Shinya 
Murase, ‘Third report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, International Law 
Commission, 68th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/692 (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016), 9-10.  
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whether an activity poses a foreseeable risk of harm, states might also be required to take a 
precautionary approach.22 This issue is therefore further addressed alongside standard of care 
in section 7.4 below.23   
The scope of the no-harm rule can otherwise be broken into three distinct elements.24 In order 
for a proposed SAI activity to trigger the no-harm rule:  
(1) It must pose a risk of having a transboundary effect beyond areas of sovereign 
jurisdiction or control of the source state (i.e. the state attempting the activity or within 
which the activity is to take place). This includes the territory of other states and global 
commons areas; 
(2) In order to qualify as ‘harm’, the impact must flow from a physical act and be 
detrimental in nature; and 
(3) Harm must meet the threshold level of ‘significant’. 
The following sections consider whether SAI proposals are likely to meet these elements.  
7.3.1 Element 1: Transboundary impact 
The no-harm rule does not respond to risks of harm solely within the territory of a source state.25 
In order for an activity to trigger the no-harm rule, it must pose a risk of having an impact 
beyond the jurisdiction of the source state. A proposed SAI activity would satisfy this element 
if it presented a risk of having an impact on the territory of another state. This reflects the 
original scope of the no-harm rule flowing from the Trail Smelter arbitration.26  
SAI proposals risk having both direct and/or indirect impacts on the territory of other states. 
According to Craik, a direct impact from SAI on the territory of another state ‘may occur if the 
released materials, deposited through a precipitate, have some harmful impact.’27 Scenario 1 
provides an example of a direct impact on the territory of state B – the sulphate particles created 
                                                 
22 See Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in 
the Area (Advisory Opinion), [2011] ITLOS Reports 10, [128] (‘Activities in the Area’). See also Patricia Birnie, 
Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (Oxford Univerity Press, 3rd ed, 
2009), 155. According to Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, one interpretation of the precautionary approach is that 
states must be ‘more cautious about identifying risks’.   
23 For the sake of this section, it is assumed that the harm in each of the hypothetical scenarios was reasonably 
foreseeable if the state in question had conducted a preliminary risk assessment and environmental impact 
assessment (EIA). 
24 Identification of these elements is inspired by the work of Xue Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 4-10.  
25 Reichwein et al, above n 17, 156. 
26 Trail Smelter (United States v Canada) (Awards) (1938 and1941) 3 RIAA 1905. 
27 Neil Craik, 'International Law and Geoengineering: Do Emerging Technologies Require Special Rules?' 
(2015) 5(2-4) Climate Law 111, 127. 
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by Project Alpha in State A contributed to acid rain, increasing the acidity of waterways in 
State B and effecting marine species. SAI could also product indirect impacts by triggering ‘a 
physical change in atmospheric properties that can be shown to impact on another state’s 
environment’.28 The transboundary impacts in scenarios 2 (risk of harm to human health from 
ozone depletion) and 3 (drought from changes to regional precipitation patterns) fit this 
description.29 Indeed, many of the potential side-effects of SAI identified in scientific literature 
on geoengineering are best described as indirect. Other examples include the potential effect 
of scattered sunlight on plant growth, and reduced availability of sunlight for solar power 
generation.30 
This raises the question: are risks of indirect transboundary harm within the scope of the no-
harm rule? It may be difficult to establish causation for indirect impacts from SAI after the 
fact.31 Establishing factual causation would probably be challenging (i.e. establishing a link 
between SAI and ozone depletion, and further link between that amount of ozone depletion and 
an increase in incidences of skin cancer or eye cataracts).32 Even if factual causation can be 
established, it may also be challenging to establish ‘normative’ causation— the harm caused 
may be considered too remote from an SAI activity to hold the source state liable.33 However, 
there is nothing in the previous three chapters to suggest the risks of indirect transboundary 
harm from SAI will be beyond the scope of the no-harm rule. In this context, the issue is one 
of foreseeability of risk, as opposed to causation of harm. Therefore, so long as the risks of 
transboundary harm from SAI in the above scenarios is foreseeable, then this element would 
be satisfied, regardless of whether the harm is direct or indirect in nature.  
A proposed SAI activity could also satisfy this element of the no-harm rule by posing a risk of 
having impacts on a global commons area. As mentioned in chapter five, the ICJ confirmed 
this extended scope of the no-harm rule in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.34 
According to Brunnée, commons areas are ‘located beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; 
                                                 
28 Ibid, 127-128. 
29 See also ibid 127-128. Craik also categorises reduced sunlight from particles in the atmosphere as an indirect 
impact.  
30 See Alan Robock, '20 reasons why geoengineering may be a bad idea' (2008) 64(2) Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 14, 16.  
31 See Reichwein et al, above n 17, 158-159. Reichwein et al note that tests for causation are not settled under 
international law and also vary between national jurisdictions. However, they suggest that international tribunals 
typically follow the distinction between factual and normative causation.  
32 Ibid, 159. 
33 Ibid.   
34 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, [29] (‘Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion)’).  
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they are not subject to appropriation by states.’35 The high seas, the Antarctic land/ice mass 
and outer space are traditionally recognised as global commons areas.36 Scientists recognise 
that SAI would do nothing to reduce high levels of CO2 in the atmosphere.37 SAI would do 
nothing to address climate change impacts such as ocean acidification, and may therefore lead 
to further degradation of the marine environment of the high seas.38 However, a key concern 
raised in scientific literature is the potential for SAI to have detrimental side-effects on the 
atmosphere and global climate system. The scenarios in this chapter incorporate two of these 
concerns. Scenario 2 involves the risk of further depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer.39 
Scenario 3 involves the possibility that SAI could have a detrimental effect on regional climate 
and precipitation patterns.40 Furthermore, regardless of potential negative side effects, SAI 
would be conducted in the atmosphere. It inherently involves modification of the atmosphere. 
It is therefore important to consider whether the element of transboundary effect would be 
satisfied by activities that modify and/or harm the atmosphere per se.  
The international legal status of the atmosphere is uncertain. The atmosphere does not share 
the same physical characteristics as other traditionally recognised global commons areas such 
as the high seas, Antarctica and outer space. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
defines that atmosphere as:  
The gaseous envelope surrounding the Earth. The dry atmosphere consists almost entirely of 
nitrogen (78.1% volume mixing ratio) and oxygen (20.9% volume mixing ratio), together with 
a number of trace gases, such as argon (0.93% volume mixing ratio), helium and radiatively 
active greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide… and ozone. In addition, the atmosphere 
                                                 
35 Jutta Brunnée, 'Common Areas, Common Heritage and Common Concern' in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée 
and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 
2007) 550, 557.  
36 See ibid, 558-561. 
37 See, eg, Philip J Rasch et al, 'An overview of geoengineering of climate using stratospheric sulphate aerosols' 
(2008) 366(1882) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering 
Sciences 4007, 4010; Robock, above n 30, 15.  
38 See, eg, Rasch et al, above n 37, 4010; Phillip Williamson and Carol Turley, 'Ocean acidification in a 
geoengineering context' (2012) 370(1974) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: 
Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 4317, 4318.  Robock, above n 30, 15. 
39 For further consideration of this issue see The Royal Society, 'Geoengineering the climate: science, 
governance and uncertainty ' (The Royal Society 2009) (‘Royal Society Report’), 31; S Schäfer et al, The 
European Transdisciplinary Assessment of Climate Engineering (EuTRACE): Removing Greenhouse Gases 
from the Atmosphere and Reflecting Sunlight away from Earth (2015) <http://www.eutrace.org/> 43-44 
('EuTRACE Report'); National Research Council, Climate Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool the Earth 
(The National Academies Press, 2015) <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18988/climate-intervention-reflecting-
sunlight-to-cool-earth> 86 ('NRC SRM Report').  
40 For further consideration of the potential impact of SAI on atmospheric circulation and the global hydrogen 
cycle see, eg, ibid, 31;  EuTRACE Report, above n 39, 52; NRC SRM Report, above n 39, 83. The NRC SRM 
Report considers this impact in relation to regional use of SAI, as opposed to global use.  
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contains the greenhouse gas water vapour, whose amounts are highly variable but typically 
around 1% volume mixing ratio. The atmosphere also contains clouds and aerosols.41 
As a ‘gaseous envelope surrounding the Earth’, the atmosphere is not physically separated from 
the territory of states. It flows through the various territorial airspaces of states42, thereby 
overlapping with the sovereign jurisdiction of states.43 In this sense, harm to the atmosphere is 
not truly ‘transboundary’ in the same way as harm to the environment of the high seas or 
Antarctica, which are physically distinct from the territory of a source state.44 For this reason, 
the atmosphere is not res communis (‘common property’) as this term only applies to areas that 
are physically distinct and not subject to state sovereignty.45 
The concept of ‘common heritage of humankind’ is similarly ill-suited to define the legal status 
of the atmosphere. This term is applied under UNCLOS to the minerals of the deep seabed.46 
Writing on behalf of the ILC in its First Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere, Murase 
states that common heritage of mankind ‘implies that a resource must be exploited and 
conserved for the benefit of mankind as a whole, such designation would usually require a far-
reaching institutional apparatus to control the allocation of exploitation rights and benefits.’47 
This focus on exploitation and the division and allocation of exploitation rights is largely at 
odds with the need to protect the atmosphere and its nature as a fluid and indivisible global 
system.48  
The legal status of the atmosphere is not clarified in international agreements concerning issues 
of atmospheric harm or pollution.49 For example, the Ozone Convention defines the ozone 
                                                 
41 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Annex III: Glossary’ in Climate Change 2013: The Physical 
Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2013) < http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_AnnexIII_FINAL.pdf>1448-1449. 
42 See Shinya Murase, ‘First report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, 
International Law Commission, 66th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/667 (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2014) 53.  
43 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 22, 337-338. See also Marvin S. Soroos, The Endangered Atmosphere: 
Preserving a Global Commons (University of South Carolina Press 1997), 218. Under article 1 of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature 7 December 1944 (entered into force 4 April 
1947) (‘Chicago Convention’), a state has ‘complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory’.  
44 Reichwein et al, above n 17, 157.  
45 Shinya Murase, ‘First report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, International 
Law Commission, 66th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/667 (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2014) [86]; Birnie, Boyle 
and Redgwell, above n 22, 338.   
46 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 16 November 1994) art 136 and 137 (‘UNCLOS’).  
47 Shinya Murase, ‘First report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, International 
Law Commission, 66th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/667 (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2014) [87]. 
48 See also Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 22, 338.  
49 Marvin S. Soroos, 'Preserving the Atmosphere as a Global Commons' (1998) 40(2) Environment: Science and 
Policy for Sustainable Development 6, 33. See also Prue Taylor, An Ecological Approach to International Law: 
Responding to the challenges of climate change (Routledge, 1998) 94-97.  
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layer, but not the atmosphere. The ozone layer is defined under Article 1(1) as ‘the layer of 
atmospheric ozone above the planetary boundary layer.’ According to Taylor, this definition 
automatically places the ozone layer beyond sovereign airspace at the threshold of outer 
space.50 She states that the Ozone Convention therefore neatly avoided the problem of having 
to distinguish the atmosphere from sovereign airspace.51 The preamble to the UNFCCC also 
does not clarify the legal status of the atmosphere. It acknowledges the issue of climate change 
to be a ‘common concern of humankind’. According to Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, the 
concept of common concern signifies that the issue of climate change is of international 
concern and transcends state borders.52 However, the UNFCCC does not apply this concept to 
the atmosphere as a whole. Moreover, the precise legal implications of this concept are 
unclear.53 That is, whether it provides states with any specific rights or obligations in relation 
to the atmosphere, or whether it clearly distinguishes the atmosphere from sovereign airspace.54 
Writing on behalf of the ILC in its First Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere, Murase 
nevertheless suggests the common heritage of humankind may evolve into an obligation erga 
omnes owed to the international community as a whole to protect the atmosphere.55  
The above approaches provide little guidance on whether the atmosphere can be sufficiently 
distinguished from the territory of states in order to satisfy the element of transboundary effect. 
This research proposes that this issue can be clarified by focusing on the issue of control over 
the atmosphere, rather than physical separation between the atmosphere and sovereign 
territory. Stockholm principle 21 and Rio principle 2 reformulated the no-harm rule to include 
‘areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’. The ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory 
opinion instead used the term ‘areas beyond national control’.56 Although the atmosphere flows 
                                                 
50 Taylor, above n 49, 95.  
51 Ibid. But see Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 22, 338. 
52 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 22, 338-339. 
53 See Brunnée, above n 35, 564-566; Shinya Murase, ‘First report on the protection of the atmosphere’, 
Protection of the Atmosphere, International Law Commission, 66th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/667 (5 May-6 June 
and 7 July-8 August 2014) 57 [89]; Soroos, above n 43, 219.   
54 See Brunnée, above n 35, 564-566; Shinya Murase, ‘First report on the protection of the atmosphere’, 
Protection of the Atmosphere, International Law Commission, 66th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/667 (5 May-6 June 
and 7 July-8 August 2014), 57 [89];  Soroos, above n 43, 219. The same argument can also be made concerning 
the new wording proposed by the ILC in its Draft Articles on the Protection of the Atmosphere. The ILC in its 
2015 report suggests that ‘the protection of the atmosphere from atmospheric pollution and atmospheric 
degradation is a pressing concern of the international community as a whole.’ Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Seventh Session (4 May – 5 June and 6 July – 7 August 2015) UN GAOR, 
70th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/70/10, Chapter 5 [53]. This wording differs from that of common concern of 
humankind. It suggests that the atmosphere falls under a new category of ‘pressing concern’. However, as with 
common concern, it is unclear what the legal implications of this third category might be.   
55 Shinya Murase, ‘First report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, International 
Law Commission, 66th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/667 (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 August 2014) 57 [89]. 
56 Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 241-242. 
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through state airspace, it is nonetheless impossible for states to exercise individual sovereign 
control over the atmosphere.57 A strong argument can therefore be made that the atmosphere 
is a global commons and that harm to the atmosphere per se is within the scope of the no-harm 
rule.58  
This interpretation would have significant implications for the capacity of the no-harm rule to 
respond to future attempts at SAI. As mentioned above, SAI by its very nature involves 
modification of the atmosphere. Strictly speaking, any attempt at SAI, from small-scale field 
test to full scale deployment, would satisfy the element of transboundary effect by virtue of 
having an impact on the atmosphere. In other words, it may not be necessary to foresee a 
specific risk of harm to the atmosphere or risk of harm to the territory of other states in order 
for this element to be satisfied. For example, Project Bravo in scenario 2, may be considered 
to involve a transboundary effect simply by the fact that it was intended to change the 
atmosphere and climate system, albeit at a local scale. Furthermore, if the risk of ozone 
depletion was foreseeable, there would be little doubt that Project Bravo is going to have a 
transboundary effect. The SAI activities in all three scenarios would therefore easily satisfy 
this first element. However, in order to trigger obligations under the no-harm rule they must 
satisfy two further elements.  
7.3.2 Element 2: Transboundary impacts must be harmful and flow from a physical act  
As a general rule of customary international law, the scope of the no-harm rule is relatively 
broad, potentially accommodating a wide range of transboundary impacts. Key sources 
nevertheless suggest that there are two requirements that define the types of harm that fall 
within the scope of the no-harm rule. Transboundary impacts must stem from a physical act or 
activity and also qualify as ‘harm’ in the sense that they have a detrimental or negative 
consequence. Neither of these requirements are likely to be particularly contentious when 
considering whether a future attempt at SAI will fall within the scope of the no-harm rule. 
                                                 
57 Soroos, above n 43, 220.  
58 See also Shinya Murase, ‘Third report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, 
International Law Commission, 68th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/692 (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016), 
17-19. Murase distinguishes between that atmosphere above other global commons areas, such as the high seas 
and Antarctica, and the atmosphere over the territory of states. He nevertheless suggests that states have a duty 
to prevent harm to the atmosphere in both instances.  
Chapter 7 
 
190 
 
However, in order to provide a clear and thorough analysis, this chapter considers these 
requirements in further detail below.59 
In order to fall within the scope of the no-harm rule, the likely transboundary impacts of a 
proposed SAI activity must qualify as ‘harm’. The analysis in chapters four, five and six 
suggests that ‘harm’ is loosely defined under customary international law. The only clear 
requirements for a transboundary impact to qualify as ‘harm’ under the no-harm rule is that it 
must stem from a physical act or activity and have a detrimental or negative consequence. 
The need for an impact to stem from a physical act can be inferred from trends in international 
case law. The disputes in the cases examined in chapters four, five and six all involve harm or 
risks of harm from physical acts. This trend suggests that the no-harm rule may not respond to 
risks of transboundary harm from non-physical acts such as harm to another state as a result of 
state action involving ‘the expropriation of foreign property, discriminatory trade practices or 
currency policies.’60 The ILC endorsed this requirement in article 1 of the Draft Articles on 
Prevention, which states that ‘[t]he present articles apply to activities not prohibited by 
international law which involve a risk of causing significant transboundary harm through their 
physical consequences’ (emphasis added).61 This excludes transboundary harm caused by the 
monetary or socioeconomic policies of states.62 Any impacts stemming from a future SAI 
activity would satisfy this requirement, as it is a physical activity. This requirement therefore 
would not prevent the risks of harm outlined in the above scenarios from falling within the 
scope of the no-harm rule. 
However, the facts in scenario 3 pose an important and related question regarding the nature 
of harm: is non-physical harm within the scope of the no-harm rule if it is a consequence of a 
physical act?63 Scenario 3 involves economic loss flowing from drought caused by reduced 
regional precipitation and/or altered monsoon patterns. This risk is not expressly noted in 
geoengineering literature, but the Royal Society report implies that drought caused by SAI 
                                                 
59 See also Benoit Jacqmotte, 'Definition and Assessment of the Concept of Harm in a Regime of Transboundary 
Harm Prevention ' (1998) 3(2) Austrian Review of International & European Law 233, 241. Jacqmotte also 
suggests that it is important to provide an individual assessment of the meaning of harm.    
60 Hanqin, above n 24, 5.  
61 ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries’ (2001) 
II(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 149 (‘Draft Articles on Prevention’). 
62 Ibid, 151.  
63 This is similar to the category of ‘consequential’ economic loss under domestic tort law. That is economic 
loss to a party that occurs as a result of physical damage. This is distinct from so-called ‘pure economic loss’ 
where economic loss results without any physical harm having been caused to a party.  See Amanda Stickley, 
Australian Tort Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2013) 200-201. 
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could subsequently have significant socio-economic impacts. 64  This chapter therefore 
considers if the example of consequential economic loss falls within the scope of the no-harm 
rule.  
 
The issue of economic loss was raised in the Trail Smelter arbitration. The United States 
claimed that damage caused by the fumes emitted from the Trail Smelter had reduced the 
‘economic status’ of residents living in affected areas and as a result, ‘business men 
unquestionably suffered loss of business and impairment of the value of good will’.65 The 
Tribunal in the Trail Smelter arbitration held that the claimed consequential economic harm to 
businesses in that case was ‘too indirect, remote and uncertain’.66 However, the Tribunal did 
not disqualify economic loss from being recoverable under the no-harm rule. The Tribunal 
merely suggested that it was too remote in the case before it. 
Economic loss in the form of harm to industry was raised in the Fukuryu Maru incident. In 
1954, the United States conducted a thermonuclear test on Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. A 
Japanese tuna fishing boat in the region was exposed to radioactive fallout from the test. As a 
result, the ship’s crew was injured, and the ship and its catch were contaminated.67 This specific 
incident was part of a larger problem— the United States nuclear testing program on Bikini 
Atoll contaminated the catch of a number of other ships operating in the region and had a 
significant impact on the Japanese fishing industry. 68  According to Margolis, significant 
numbers of fish had to be destroyed during 1954 due to radioactive contamination, and ‘[w]hat 
was not destroyed, people were afraid to eat.’69 This had a detrimental impact on the Japanese 
fishing industry, which was very important to Japan’s economy at that time.70 The United 
States settled Japan’s claim with an ex gratia payment of two million dollars.71 Japan’s claim 
was therefore not the subject of international litigation. Nonetheless, in a telegram to the US 
Department of State, the US Ambassador to Japan advised that:  
                                                 
64 Royal Society Report, above n 39, 31. For example, the report suggests that reduced precipitation in regions 
could impact on food security, and have regional effects similar to those associated with climate change. 
65 Trail Smelter (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1931  
66 Ibid, 1931.  
67 See Emanuel Margolis, 'The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law' (1955) 64(5) The Yale Law 
Journal 629, 637.  
68 Ibid, 638.  
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid.  
71 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Under Secretary 
of State (Hoover), 29 December 1954, Office of the Historian,  
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p2/d844>.  See also ibid, 639.  
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Formula of a single lump-sum would obviate litigiousness of interim claim as now formulated 
and would avoid precedent for indirect damages to fishing industry which might establish basis 
for extensive and continuing liability in Japan and elsewhere.72 (emphasis added) 
This statement indicates that the United States considered harm to industry to be potentially 
actionable under customary international law, as it wished to avoid any act on its behalf that 
might lead to more claims for such harm in the future. 
The Trail Smelter arbitration and the Fukuryu Maru incident both involved liability for harm 
after the fact. They suggest that states may be held liable for economic harm, so long as it flows 
from a physical impact and is not too remote a consequence of an activity. Since these disputes, 
the no-harm rule has evolved to provide states with a positive duty of prevention. 73  By 
extension, it can be argued that states similarly have a duty to prevent such consequential 
impacts. When considering if a proposed SAI experiment falls within the scope of the no-harm 
rule, it might therefore be prudent for states to also consider any social or economic 
consequences that might result from their proposal. This may also be important for assessing 
the likely severity of harm, which is discussed further below.  
In order for an activity to fall within the scope of the no-harm rule, the likely consequences of 
the activity must qualify as ‘harm’. ‘Harm’ is not explicitly defined under customary 
international law.74 However, the language of the no-harm rule as expressed by the Trail 
Smelter arbitration (which refers to ‘injury’) and Stockholm principle 21/Rio principle 2 (which 
refer to ‘damage’) implies that there must be some kind of adverse or detrimental consequence. 
In other words, mere change to the environment of another state or the global commons may 
not be sufficient to qualify as ‘harm’ and give rise to obligations under the no-harm rule. This 
was implied in the decision in the Lake Lanoux arbitration, in which the Tribunal did not 
consider diversion and restitution of the waters of the River Carol by France to have violated 
Spain’s rights.75 This understanding is further supported by international agreements, which 
require an activity to have ‘adverse’ ‘destructive’ or ‘deleterious’ effects.76  
                                                 
72 Telegram from The Ambassador of Japan (Allison) to the Department of State, 6pm 15 April 1954, Office of 
the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p2/d757>.  
73 See chapters 5 and 6.  
74 See Jacqmotte, above n 59. Jacqmottee states that the meaning of harm varies between the different context of 
disputes and different international agreements. However, he notes that at the most basic level, harm involves 
detriment or loss (at 239).    
75 See chapter 4.4.2. 
76 See, eg, Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 
UNTS 293 (entered into force 22 September 1988) art 2(1); Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, opened for signature 10 December 1976, 1108 UNTS 
151 (entered into force 5 October 1978) art 1; Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened 
for signature 13 November 1979, 1302 UNTA 217 (entered into force 16 March 1983) art 1.  
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It is therefore necessary to consider whether the potential transboundary impacts from future 
attempts at SAI would qualify as ‘harm’. Certain potential impacts from SAI speak for 
themselves in this sense. For example, common sense dictates that negative impacts to human 
health77, property78 or agriculture79 from SAI would qualify as harm. The risk of harm to 
human health in scenario 2 would undoubtedly meet this requirement. The reduction in 
agricultural productivity in scenario 3 would therefore also be likely to meet this requirement. 
However, it is not readily apparent whether other potential impacts from SAI such as the 
episodic increase in the acidification of waterways in scenario 1 and depletion of the 
stratospheric ozone layer in scenario 2, would meet this requirement. When would these 
impacts be considered ‘harm’ as opposed to mere change to the environment?  
Existing international agreements provide some guidance as to when environmental impacts 
might be be considered harmful. Existing agreements define synonymous terms such as 
‘adverse impacts’ and ‘pollution’. For example, article 1 of the Ozone Convention defines 
‘adverse effects’ as: 
[C]hanges in the physical environment or biota, including changes in climate, which have 
significant deleterious effects on human health or on the composition, resilience and 
productivity of natural and managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to mankind.80 
 
Similarly, the LRTAP convention defines ‘air pollution’ under article 1(a) as:  
[I]ntroduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the air resulting in 
deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and 
ecosystems and material property and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate 
uses of the environment81 
 
                                                 
77 For example, Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4. See also, 
‘Memorial of Ecuador Volume 1’ Arial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) International Court of 
Justice, General List No 138, 29 April 2009, 1.10. Ecuador claimed that the immediate effects of the herbicide 
on citizens included ‘fever, eye and skin irritation, nausea, vomiting and diarrhoea’ (at [1.18)). 
78 For example, damage to ships in Corfu Channel [1949] ICJ Rep 4. 
79 Trail Smelter (1938 and 1941) 3 RIAA 1905, 1924 (reduced crop yield); ‘Memorial of Ecuador Volume 1’ 
Arial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) International Court of Justice, General List No 138, 29 April 
2009, [6.54]-[6.60] (harm to subsistence crops); [6.82]-[6.84] (harm to domesticated animals, including 
chickens, pigs and cattle); [6.86] (harm to aquaculture).  
80 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 
293 (entered into force 22 September 1988). 
81 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 1979, 1302 
UNTA 217 (entered into force 16 March 1983).  
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Similar definitions are provided under the UNFCCC82 and the ASEAN Haze Agreement.83 
Although these definitions are contained in treaties, the similarity between them provides 
support for a common understanding of harm under customary international law.84 References 
to a threshold level of severity of effects in these definitions can be set aside for the time being, 
as this is considered separately below. Taken together, these agreements suggest that changes 
to the physical environment from SAI would qualify as harm so long as they produce a 
deleterious effect of some kind on either humans, property or the environment.  Applying this 
understanding to scenario 1, the temporary acidification of the waterways in State B would 
probably qualify as harm as it had a deleterious impact on marine species. Depletion of the 
ozone layer in scenario 1 would also be likely to qualify as harm, given the risk it poses to 
human health.  
On the basis of this understanding, it could be argued that the mere introduction of particles 
into the atmosphere, without some kind of adverse or deleterious effect, would be beyond the 
scope of the no-harm rule. However, before coming to this view, scientists and policy-makers 
should consider whether the introduction of aerosol particles to the atmosphere will risk 
impacts on the function and/or resilience of the atmosphere as a system. New developments in 
Earth Systems Science suggest that this is an important consideration. Rockström et al have 
identified the amount of aerosol loading in the atmosphere as a one of nine global biophysical 
thresholds that, if crossed, could generate ‘unacceptable’ global environmental change and 
have disastrous consequences for humanity.85 Scientists are yet to determine the global limit 
for atmospheric aerosol loading, 86  however, they have calculated it for the South Asian 
monsoon region. According to Steffen et al, the current level of atmospheric aerosol loading 
over the South Asian monsoon region has entered into a ‘zone of uncertainty’, meaning that 
                                                 
82 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 
107 (Entered into force 21 March 1994) art 1(1) (‘UNFCCC’) ‘"Adverse effects of climate change" means 
changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious 
effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of 
socio-economic systems or on human health and welfare.’ 
83 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, opened for signature 10 June 2002 (entered into force 
25 November 2003) available at <http://haze.asean.org/asean-agreement-on-transboundary-haze-pollution/> art 
1(6): ‘“Haze pollution” means smoke resulting from land and/or forest fire which causes deleterious effects of 
such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems and material property and 
impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment.’ 
84 See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, above n 22, 17. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell suggest that treaties can provide 
support for basic rule and principles under customary international law.  
85 Johan Röckstrom et al, 'A safe operating space for humanity' (2009) 461(7263) Nature 472, 472.  
86 Ibid, 473 
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there is less system resilience to human interference and a greater risk of destabilisation.87 It 
could therefore be argued that any deliberate increase in atmospheric aerosol loading from SAI, 
especially in or adjacent to the South Asian monsoon region, will cause an adverse impact on 
the atmosphere. If the likely impact on the atmosphere’s function and resilience is also likely 
to qualify as ‘significant’, this would give rise to obligations under the no-harm rule.  
 
7.3.3 Element 3: Threshold level of harm  
Obligations under the no-harm rule only arise for risks of harm above a certain threshold level 
of severity. The ICJ in the Pulp Mills case and Certain Activities case affirmed that the 
threshold is ‘significant’ harm. In the Certain Activities case, this threshold was the determining 
factor as to whether the activities of the Parties triggered procedural obligations to prevent 
harm and whether the parties had breached the substantive obligation to prevent harm.88  
Would the risks of harm outlined in scenarios 1, 2 and 3 meet the threshold of ‘significant’? 
Legal scholars generally agree that the assessment as to whether an activity poses a risk of 
significant transboundary harm is something that needs to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.89 According to Redgwell, certain types of transboundary harm, such as transboundary 
pollution involving certain toxic or radioactive substances ‘may a priori be deemed 
significantly harmful.’90 International jurisprudence also suggests that certain risks of harm to 
humans, such as loss of life would probably qualify as ‘significant’ harm.91 However, on the 
whole, customary international law provides little guidance as to how to assess whether the 
risks posed by SAI proposals would qualify as significant.  
Certain aspects of the above scenarios can be drawn upon to estimate if the SAI activities within 
them would meet this threshold. For example, the increase in acidification of waterways in 
state B appears to be temporary, and confined to specific areas. The area affected is a national 
park, and may therefore be particularly vulnerable to increased acid deposition. Nonetheless, 
while it has impacted on marine species, none appear to have died. This gives the overall 
impression that the severity of harm may not be great enough to qualify as ‘significant’.  By 
                                                 
87 Will Steffen et al, 'Planetary boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing planet' (2015) 347(6223) 
Science 1259855-1, 1259855-2, 1259855-6 – 1259855-7. 
88 See chapter 6.5.2.  
89 Craik, above n 27, 129.  
90 Catherine Redgwell, 'Transboundary pollution: principles, policy and practice ' in S Jayakumar et al (eds), 
Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, 2015) 11, 15.  
91 See, eg, Corfu Channel Case [1949] ICJ Rep 4.  
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comparison, the impacts of SAI deployment in scenario 2 appear more severe. This scenario 
involves widespread drought across two states, with impacts on water security and agriculture. 
However, this assessment is merely based on a common sense-type assessment. The aspects 
drawn on to make this assessment are not legally prescribed under customary international law. 
There is also no guidance on how competing factors might be weighed against one another to 
make an overall determination. Finally, without a clearer understanding of what qualifies as 
‘significant’ harm, it is difficult to tell whether either of these scenarios would meet this 
threshold and trigger obligations under the no-harm rule.  
The ILC proposed a definition of ‘significant’ in its Draft Articles on Prevention, but this 
proposal does not clarify the issues outlined above. The commentaries to the Draft Articles on 
Prevention state that ‘“significant” is something more than “detectable” but need not be at the 
level of “serious” or “substantial”.92 This definition does little to reduce ambiguity. It provides 
a scale without any fixed reference points (i.e. when an impact is ‘substantial’, or ‘more than 
detectable’). This may ensure that the no-harm rule is potentially applicable to a wide-range of 
scenarios, but it leaves determining where a specific risk sits on this scale largely to guesswork. 
The main shortcoming of the Draft Articles on Prevention, however, is that they do not clarify 
what factors ought to be taken into account when assessing severity of harm, such as the 
vulnerability of the environment likely to be affected, the physical and/or temporal scale over 
which impacts are likely to be felt, or the irreversibility of the impacts. The Draft Articles 
therefore provide no guidance as to what factors are relevant for considering whether a 
proposed SAI activity presents a risk of ‘significant’ harm.  
The decision of the ICJ in the Certain Activities case further complicates matters. In this case, 
the ICJ did not endorse the ILC’s definition of significant harm, thereby detracting from the 
Draft Articles’ authority as an interpretation of customary international law. 93 Moreover, the 
ICJ did not provide an alternative definition of ‘significant’ harm that might be readily applied 
to other scenarios, such as SAI. In assessing the threshold level in the context of risk of 
transboundary harm, the ICJ also did not follow the ‘spectrum’ approach proposed by the ILC, 
in which magnitude of harm is weighed against and the probability of its occurrence.94 This 
formulation mirrors the standard approach to assessing risk of environmental harm in domestic 
                                                 
92 Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 59, 152.  
93 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction 
of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) (International Court of 
Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015) [192]. See chapter 6.6.3-4.  
94 Craik, above n 27, 129.  
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planning and/or environmental protection legislation. 95  In assessing whether a risk of 
transboundary harm met the required threshold to give rise to due diligence obligations, the 
ICJ only considered the severity or magnitude of the potential harm and not the likelihood of 
its occurrence.96 This approach suggests that severity of harm alone, and not the level of 
probability, is relevant for assessing whether an activity satisfies this threshold. Under this 
approach, even a small probability of significant transboundary harm from SAI could 
theoretically give rise to obligations under the no-harm rule.  
The absence of a clear, objective definition or criteria to determine what amounts to 
‘significant’ harm under customary international law may have profound consequences for the 
capacity of the no-harm rule to respond to the risks of SAI. States may have different 
understandings as to what qualifies as ‘significant’ harm. The lack of a common understanding 
was a problem with regard to the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster. According to Sands and 
Peel, ‘[t]he difficult of agreeing [sic] a threshold was illustrated by the Chernobyl accident, 
which raised numerous issues over what constituted harmful levels of radioactivity in the 
absence of legally binding international standards.’97 Without an objective definition or set of 
criteria for assessing severity of harm, states (and their policy makers and/or scientists) have 
an overly generous discretion to characterise the severity of transboundary harm and harm to 
the atmosphere from SAI as they choose. 
The lack of an objective definition or set of criteria for determining ‘significant’ transboundary 
harm is likely to be more problematic for risks of harm from SAI to the atmosphere. Unlike 
other risks, such as harm to human health, property and agriculture, harm to the atmosphere 
has not been considered by an international court or tribunal. Accordingly, there is no precedent 
to guide any such assessment. Multilateral environment agreements dealing with specific 
sources of harm to the atmosphere, such as the UNFCCC and the Ozone Convention refer to 
the threshold level of significant harm, but similarly do not provide an objective definition that 
might inform the interpretation of customary international law. 98  Appendix III of the 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (‘Espoo’) sets 
                                                 
95 For example, under the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). See Matters 
of Environmental Significance: Significant impact guidelines 1.1 Environmental Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999, (2013) Australian Government Department of the Environment < 
https://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/42f84df4-720b-4dcf-b262-48679a3aba58/files/nes-
guidelines_1.pdf> 2-3. 
96 See chapter 6.6.3-4.  
97 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 710. 
98 UNFCCC art 1(1); Ozone Convention art 1(2).  
Chapter 7 
 
198 
 
out a general list of criteria that states may use when considering if an activity is likely to cause 
significant transboundary harm.99 However, with the exception of Canada, this convention has 
only been ratified by European states.100 Due to its limited membership, the Espoo Convention 
should not automatically be regarded as reflecting or generating customary international law.101 
The issue of severity of harm is further complicated because risks of harm to the atmosphere 
from SAI, such as increase in stratospheric aerosol loading or depletion of the stratospheric 
ozone layer (as in scenario 3), would not occur in isolation. Instead, they would exacerbate or 
contribute to pre-existing environmental problems.  
How then should the severity of such impacts be assessed?  A possible method to assess harm 
to the atmosphere per se from SAI would be to consider the percentage by which SAI 
contributes to an existing problem, such as stratospheric aerosol loading or ozone depletion. 
This approach was taken by the ICJ in the Certain Activities case regarding the increase in 
sedimentation in the San Juan River. The ICJ assessed the severity of the increase in 
sedimentation on the basis that it was only a two percent increase.102  Due to the fact that large 
quantities of sediment were already present in the river and that the amount of sediment 
naturally varied over time, the ICJ characterised the two percent increase as ‘insignificant’ and 
below the threshold level of significant harm.103 A similar approach could be taken to assess 
severity of likely impacts from SAI on the atmosphere and global climate system. For example, 
the percentage increase of atmospheric aerosol loading, or increase in radiative forcing.   
However, establishing the percentage of change from SAI would not, on its own, resolve the 
issues posed by a lack of objective definition or criteria. Without a definition or set of criteria 
to provide a clear, objective point of reference, the level of a percentage change to an 
environmental system says nothing about the severity of an impact. The decision of the ICJ in 
                                                 
99 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, opened for signature 25 
February 1991, 1989 UNTS 309 (entered into force 10 September 1997) (‘Espoo’).  
100 See Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, United Nations Treaty 
Collection <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028002887c1>. 
101 It is possible for a treaty to ‘attract concordant state practice from non-state parties’ and for this practice to 
generate a new rule of customary international law. Donald K Anton, Penelope Mathew & Wayne Morgan, 
International Law: Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2005) 212. However, it is unclear whether the 
Espoo Convention has generated EIA standards under customary international law. In the Aerial Herbicide 
Spraying case, Colombia indicated that it did not believe itself to be bound by the Espoo Convention, that there 
was no equivalent convention in Latin America, and that there was no obligation under customary international 
law to conduct an EIA. ‘Counter Memorial of the Republic of Colombia Volume I’, Arial Herbicide Spraying 
(Ecuador v Colombia) International Court of Justice, General List No 138, 29 March 2010, [8.68], [8.73]-[8.75], 
[8.87]. This is only one example, but it demonstrates that at least one state holds the view that it is not bound by 
the Espoo Convention and that its provisions do not reflect customary international law.     
102 See chapter 6.6.3.  
103 Certain Activities (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015), [189], 
[192]. 
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the Certain Activities case implied that a percentage change still needs to be assessed within 
the context of a particular case. The ICJ stated that: ‘… the present case does not concern a 
situation where sediment contributed by the road exceeds maximum allowable limits, which 
have not been determined for the San Juan.’104 This statement suggests that, while a small 
percentage increase in pollution may not be considered ‘significant’ for one system, it may be 
significant for other systems. However, it remains unclear what factors ought to be taken into 
account when assessing the significance of a percentage change in the context of a given 
situation. Without any clear objective factors or standards, it will be very difficult to 
characterise any percentage of change to the atmosphere from SAI as significant or 
insignificant. The introduction of general definition of significant harm, including clear 
objective criteria or standards against which harm is to be measured, is therefore needed to 
provide greater certainty as to when risks of harm from SAI, especially harm to the atmosphere, 
would satisfy this threshold.105  
7.3.4 Concluding remarks on the scope of the no-harm rule and SAI 
The above analysis suggests that, generally speaking, proposals to engage in SAI would 
probably fall within the scope of the no-harm rule. The label attached to a proposed SAI activity 
may, on its own, be a poor indication of whether a state has international obligations under the 
no-harm rule. Regardless whether a proposal is considered a ‘small-scale’ field test or ‘full-
scale’ deployment, application of the no-harm rule is determined by three elements: (1) Is the 
proposal likely to have a transboundary impact? (2) Will the impacts qualify as harm and be 
the result of a physical act? (3) Will the harm meet the threshold level of ‘significant’? Analysis 
of these elements in light of the hypothetical scenarios suggests that it may not be hard for SAI 
proposals to satisfy elements (1) and (2). The most difficult element to satisfy appears to be 
element (3). This difficulty stems from doctrinal ambiguity concerning the meaning of 
‘significant’ harm, as opposed to the nature of SAI proposals.  
The lack of an objective definition or set of criteria for determining significant harm may not 
be problematic in all circumstances. It may still be possible to determine with a reasonable 
degree of certainty if certain risks of harm from SAI meet this threshold. For example, prior 
cases suggest that harm to human interests, such as health or property will likely qualify as 
significant’ without the need for further assessment. For this reason, the risks of harm to human 
                                                 
104 Certain Activities (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015), [192]. 
105 How a set of criteria might be developed is considered in chapter 9.3.2. 
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health from depletion of the ozone layer in scenario 2 may meet this threshold without needing 
to be further quantified. Risk of widespread harm to agriculture in scenario 3 is also likely to 
satisfy this element.  
However, other risks are more difficult to assess. As noted above, without further guidance it 
is difficult to conclude whether the episodic increase in the acidification of waterways in 
scenario 1 will meet this threshold. Moreover, the lack of a clear understanding of significant 
harm makes it impossible to assess when a risk of harm to the atmosphere per se from a future 
attempt at SAI would be ‘significant’ so as to trigger obligations under the no-harm rule. Taken 
in isolation from other impacts, it is difficult to tell whether the risk of harm to the ozone layer 
in scenario 2 would meet this threshold. Similarly, it is unclear when changes to regional 
precipitation patterns in scenario 3 would, on their own, be considered significant harm to the 
atmosphere and climate system. In the absence of further indirect impacts on the territory of 
another state, it may be impossible to determine when a risk of harm to the atmosphere per se 
will trigger obligations under the no-harm rule. In this sense, the practical operation of this 
element does not adequately support the normative aspiration to prevent significant harm to 
the global commons per se under the no-harm rule.  
7.4 WHAT MUST STATES DO TO COMPLY WITH THE NO-HARM RULE IF THEY 
ATTEMPT SAI? 
This section considers the standard of care required to satisfy the no-harm rule. If a proposed 
SAI activity falls within the scope of the no-harm rule, what obligations will states then have 
to satisfy? This section begins by considering what states must do to satisfy the duty of conduct 
(i.e. due diligence) to prevent significant transboundary harm. This includes relevant 
procedural obligations. This section suggests that future attempts at SAI may warrant a higher 
standard of care. It therefore considers the possibility that future attempts at SAI might attract 
a standard of strict responsibility for harm (i.e. a ‘duty of result’).  
This section focuses on state obligations because, as a principle of customary international law, 
the no-harm rule only binds state actors. It does not automatically bind non-state or private 
actors, such as companies, non-governmental organisations or individual citizens. However, 
the no-harm rule may nevertheless be relevant if a non-state actor should attempt SAI. Under 
the customary international law rules of state responsibility, the activities of non-state actors 
may be attributed to a state in certain circumstances, for example, if a private individual or 
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company is acting under the instruction, direction or control of a state.106 Depending on the 
circumstances, a state could therefore potentially be held responsible for breaching the no-harm 
rule even if SAI was conducted by a private actor. Furthermore, as explained in greater detail 
below, in order to fulfil their due diligence obligation states may have a duty to enact and 
enforce domestic law to prevent significant transboundary harm from SAI.107 This in turn 
would potentially affect the activities of private individuals and companies. Therefore, the no-
harm rule could have significant bearing (albeit indirectly) on non-state actors should they wish 
to attempt SAI.  
7.4.1 Duty of conduct to prevent significant transboundary harm and harm to the global 
commons from SAI 
States wishing to attempt SAI in the future have a duty of conduct or ‘due diligence’ to prevent 
their actions from causing significant transboundary harm to the territory of other states and to 
the global commons. In accordance with the decision in the Pulp Mills case, this means that a 
state must use ‘all the means at its disposal’ to prevent activities under its jurisdiction from 
causing significant transboundary harm and harm to the global commons.108 Therefore, if a 
proposed SAI activity falls within the scope of the no-harm rule, the state in question must 
exert its best possible efforts to prevent it from causing significant harm to other states and the 
atmosphere.  
Exactly what these efforts should be will depend on the context of the SAI activity being 
proposed. The ILC Draft Articles on Prevention state that the relevant standard of due diligence 
should be ‘appropriate and proportional to the degree of risk of transboundary harm.’ 109 
Therefore, in the hypothetical scenarios, the relevant standard of due diligence would in part 
be determined by the nature of the proposed SAI activity alone and the degree of risk it presents. 
The Draft Articles on Prevention suggests that relevant considerations include the size, location 
and climatic conditions relating to a project. Special Rapporteur Murase in his third report on 
                                                 
106 See ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) 
II(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission 31, art 8 (‘Draft Articles on State Responsibility’). See 
also Zafiro Case (Great Britain v United States) (1925) 6 RIAA 160, 163; Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v US) (Merits) (1986) ICJ Rep 14 [64]-[65]; Bosnian Genocide case 
(Bosnia v Serbia) (2007) ICJ Rep 43, 205. 
107 For an example of what domestic geoengineering law might look like, see An Act Relating to Health and 
Safety- Geoengineering, State of Rhode Island, H 7578 (11 February 2016). For further discussion of this Bill, 
see Forum Discussion- Rhode Island H7578: The Climate Geoengineering Act of 2016, The Forum for Climate 
Engineering Assessment, (22 August 2016) < http://ceassessment.org/forum-discussion-rhode-island-h-7578-
the-climate-geoengineering-act-of-2016/>. 
108 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, [101]. 
109 Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 59, 154. 
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the Protection of the Atmosphere for the ILC suggests that when it comes to activities relating 
to the atmosphere, the required standard of care will depend on the scale and magnitude of a 
planned activity as well as the ‘significance or irreparability of the adverse effects which that 
activity is expected to cause, or is likely to cause’.110 In scenarios above, the required standard 
of due diligence that States A and E must satisfy will therefore depend in part on the nature of 
the proposed SAI activity. As a result, large-scale field tests (scenario 2) and full-scale 
deployment (scenario 3) will attract a higher standard of care than small-scale field tests 
(scenario 1).  
The standard of due diligence may depend on factors in addition to the nature of the activity. 
Peel suggests that the relevant standard of due diligence may also depend on the ‘capacities 
and capabilities of the States concerned.’111 This understanding of due diligence reflects the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities as articulated in Rio principle 7.112 This 
does not mean that developing states have carte blanche to engage in activities that pose a risk 
of transboundary harm, or that a lower standard of due diligence will be justifiable in all 
circumstances.113  In this regard, Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell draw attention to the Pulp Mills 
case, noting that ‘Uruguay – a developing state – made no attempt to dispute Argentina’s claim 
that the applicable standard of care was anything less than state-of-the-art technology’.114 
Similarly, in the Activities in the Area Advisory Opinion, the Seabed Disputes Chamber did 
not differentiate the responsibility of developing states from developed states when sponsoring 
deep seabed mining activities, in order to ensure ‘high standards of protection of the marine 
environment’.115 It is therefore difficult to conclude if and how the different capabilities of 
developing states, such as State E, should be taken into account if they wish to attempt SAI. If 
they are to be taken into account relevant considerations might include the extent to which the 
state can effectively control its own territory and the resources it has available to address the 
risk of harm.116 These details have not specifically been set out in the scenarios. However, as 
                                                 
110 Shinya Murase, ‘Third report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, 
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a developing country, the relative capacity of State E to prevent harm might be lower than state 
A, and may justify a lower standard of care.117   
The flexibility inherent in this understanding of due diligence has its drawbacks. It has been 
criticised as setting a ‘vague’ standard of care.118 It is challenging to pinpoint precisely what 
response by a source state would be considered ‘appropriate and proportional’ to the potential 
risks posed by SAI field testing or deployment. Nevertheless, the analysis in chapter six 
suggests that in order to satisfy the obligation of due diligence states must also satisfy a number 
of subsidiary obligations that are more specific and well-defined. These are examined in turn 
below.  
Duty to adopt and enforce domestic law 
In order to satisfy the duty of due diligence, states must enact ‘appropriate rules and measures’ 
at a domestic level in order to prevent significant transboundary harm and harm to the global 
commons from proposed SAI activities.119 This obligation was affirmed by the ICJ in the Pulp 
Mills case.120 In that case, the ICJ held that states must also adopt:  
[A] certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control 
applicable to public and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by 
such operators, to safeguard the rights of the other party.121  
Enforcement was a key issue in the 2016 judgment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) in the South China Seas Arbitration.122 This decision was in the context of the general 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment of the high seas under article 192 of 
UNCLOS, which codifies the no-harm rule. The PCA held that while China had adopted rules 
and measures prohibiting harmful fishing practices, it had not adequately enforced them.123 It 
therefore held that China had breached its obligation of due diligence under article 192.124 In 
order to satisfy the duty of due diligence, states A and E would therefore need to enact 
appropriate rules concerning SAI and vigilantly enforce them.  
                                                 
117 See, Peel, above n 111, 64. Peel suggests that developing states might claim that they should be held to a 
lower standard of care than developed states. 
118 See ibid, 63.  
119 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, [197]. See also ‘Reply of Ecuador Volume I’, Arial Herbicide Spraying 
(Ecuador v Colombia) International Court of Justice, General List No 138, 31 January 2011 [2.72]-[2.154].  
120 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14. 
121 Ibid, [197]. 
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At the present time, it is unclear precisely what rules would be appropriate at a domestic level 
for SAI. It was noted in the Pulp Mills case that, where relevant, the rules and measures adopted 
by states must conform to applicable international guidelines, such as those promoted by 
international technical bodies.125 This is of little use for SAI. As noted in chapter one, scientists 
and policy-makers have proposed non-binding, voluntary codes of conduct for geoengineering 
research.126 However, these are not universally accepted. At the present time, there are no 
official international guidelines for regulating SAI that states A and E might draw on to inform 
domestic lawmaking. 
In lieu of official guidelines, it could be argued that the only appropriate option for states A 
and E will be to enact a moratorium under domestic law against SAI field testing and/or full 
scale deployment. The current scientific understanding of the potential impacts of SAI is 
extremely limited.127 A moratorium would therefore be in keeping with the precautionary 
approach, as discussed below. A moratorium is further supported by the 2010 Conference of 
the Parties decision X/33 to the Convention on Biological Diversity (‘CBD’).128 Decision X/33 
which called for ‘no climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity’ to 
take place ‘until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities and 
appropriate consideration of the associated risks.’129 The exception to this moratorium is small-
scale experiments conducted in a controlled environment.130 Decision X-33 is non-binding on 
states and applies to geoengineering activities in general (not just SAI). However, given the 
wide membership of the CBD (196 states) it is a strong indication of the current view of states 
concerning relevant conduct for geoengineering. 131  It suggests that, until there is greater 
scientific understanding of the likely impacts of SAI, the only appropriate measure that states 
might take at a domestic level would be to prohibit any field testing or deployment.  
Short of an outright prohibition, what other options might a state consider for domestic 
regulation? One option would be to enact laws that require public and/or private operators to 
                                                 
125 Pulp Mills [2010] ICJ Rep 14, [197]. See also Alan Boyle, 'Transboundary air pollution: a tale of two 
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apply for a permit on the basis of an EIA before commencing any outdoor experimentation. 
States could also pass laws requiring continuous monitoring and review of the impacts and 
side-effects of any SAI attempts.132 In order to further satisfy the requirements for enforcement 
and administrative control, states could enact regulation to facilitate government and/or 
external audit of any SAI field testing or deployment programs.133 As scientific understanding 
improves, it may be appropriate for states to enact more specific rules, such as the type and 
quantity of aerosols to be used and the timeframe and atmospheric conditions within which 
they are to be released.134 
A number of these measures have been set forth in a bill introduced in February 2016 to the 
General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island in the United States titled The Climate 
Geoengineering Act of 2016.135 The Bill has not yet been adopted –  it is being held for further 
study.136 However, it is the first attempt by a state (in the domestic or international sense) to 
regulate SRM geoengineering. The object of the Bill is to prevent negative impacts from SRM 
(including SAI) within the territory of Rhode Island if it is attempted. If passed into law, the 
Bill will require any person (including individuals, companies and government bodies) that 
proposes to attempt SRM to conduct an EIA for research and deployment of SRM about a 
certain threshold of radiative forcing (the amount of solar radiation reflected away from the 
Earth).137 SRM proposals, including field testing and full-scale deployment, will be subject to 
an approval process and ongoing impact assessment. 138  The Bill also seeks to establish 
domestic enforcement measures against persons who do not comply, being a fine and/or 
imprisonment.139 It is beyond the scope of this research to assess the adequacy of this Bill. 
Nonetheless, it provides a concrete example of regulatory measures states might take at a 
                                                 
132 An example of such a system is the management regime established by the Tribunal in the Trail Smelter 
arbitration. See chapter 4.4.2. 
133 See ‘Counter Memorial of the Republic of Colombia Volume I’, Arial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v 
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domestic level to prevent significant harm – including transboundary harm and harm to the 
atmosphere from SAI.  
Procedural obligations flowing from the no-harm rule  
States wishing to attempt SAI must satisfy a number of procedural obligations relating to the 
duty to prevent significant transboundary harm. The Certain Activities case affirmed that states 
have three procedural obligation that flow sequentially on from one another.140 These are the 
obligation to ascertain risk, the obligation to conduct an EIA and the obligation to notify and 
consult with other potentially affected states.  
Before attempting SAI, States A and E must ascertain if the proposed activity poses a risk of 
significant transboundary harm or harm to the atmosphere. As mentioned above, this 
procedural obligations overlaps with the issue of foreseeability of harm. Whether an activity 
poses a foreseeable risk of significant harm is not simply a question of scope. States essentially 
have a positive obligation to ascertain whether a proposed activity presents a risk of significant 
transboundary harm or harm to the global commons.141 States A and E could satisfy this 
obligation by conducting a preliminary risk assessment.142  
If preliminary assessment confirmed a risk of significant transboundary harm or harm to the 
atmosphere, States A and E would then be obliged to conduct an EIA.143 The decision in the 
Pulp Mills case suggested that this obligation exists separately under customary international 
law. 144 However, it is also essential to fulfil the duty of due diligence under the no-harm rule. 
As stated by Judge Owada in his separate opinion in the Certain Activities case:  
[C]onducting an environmental impact assessment is one important constituent element of the 
process that emanates from the international obligation of States to act in due diligence to avoid 
or mitigate significant transboundary harm145 
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141 Certain Activities and Construction of a Road, (International Court of Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 
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Despite the fundamental role of EIA, customary international law does not explicitly prescribe 
the content of an EIA. At a minimum, it must be conducted before a proposed SAI activity is 
commenced.146 It must take into account the nature and magnitude of a proposed SAI activity 
and the likely adverse impacts it might have on the environment.147 According to Boyle, an 
EIA must also ‘assess possible effects on people, property and the environment of other States 
likely to be affected.’ 148 However, the ICJ in the Pulp Mills cases, made clear that it is 
otherwise up to individual states to determine the specific content of an EIA under customary 
international law.149 That is, it is up to states to decide the way in which the EIA is to be 
conducted (e.g. the methodology of the EIA), who carries it out, and how the results of the EIA 
are to be made public.150 States that are party to the Espoo Convention would be bound by 
more detailed guidelines set out under that agreement.151 However, this convention has only 
been ratified by European states and Canada,152 so the application of its guidelines is limited. 
The vast majority of states in the international system (including the US, China and other major 
developing countries) therefore have a great deal of discretion as to how they might conduct 
an EIA for any future attempts at SAI.   
International law scholars have nevertheless made recommendations as to how states might 
conduct an EIA for geoengineering research activities. According to Craik, ‘[t]he baseline 
requirements to satisfy due diligence would include the identification of environmental 
impacts, a determination of the risk that the impacts pose, publication of the results, and usually 
an opportunity for public consultation.’153 Hubert and Reichwein propose that a comprehensive 
EIA might include consideration of the scale, duration and intensity of a proposed SAI activity, 
and set out contingency plans in case of an emergency.154 Craik further suggests that states 
should assess cumulative impacts that may develop over time and continually monitor and 
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assess geoengineering activities.155 It would be prudent for States A and E to follow these 
suggestions when conducting an EIA for their respective SAI activities. According to Hubert 
and Reichwein, it would also be prudent for states to also consider any other geoengineering 
activities when conducting an EIA.156 Therefore, in scenario 3, it would be prudent for State E 
to take into account the SAI program of state A when conducting an EIA for its own SAI 
program.  
In scenarios 1 and 2, it might also be prudent for State A to consider whether field testing is 
necessary to achieve the research aims of the respective projects. Craik and Hubert and 
Reichwein agree that states ought to consider alternative and less risky methods of research for 
field testing as part of conducting an EIA for SAI. This may not be prescribed under customary 
international law.157 However, according to Craik ‘[a]ssessing alternatives is considered by 
many as central to the EIA process, since alternative-analysis gives decision-makers and the 
public a range of options to compare, including the option of not proceeding with the 
activity.’158 In this sense, an EIA might further complement decision-making processes under 
domestic law as discussed above. Craik further suggests that considering alternative options 
would be paramount to prevent significant transboundary harm from geoengineering given the 
lack of clear safety standards.159 Therefore, before proceeding with the SAI field tests in 
scenarios 1 and 2, it would be prudent for State A to consider whether the aims of Projects 
Alpha and Bravo might be achieved by other means, such as climate modelling, laboratory 
experiments or observing the properties of naturally occurring atmospheric aerosols.160  
If the EIA confirms a risk of significant transboundary harm or harm to the global commons, 
states A and E would then have a duty to notify and consult with potentially affected states.161 
This is relatively straightforward for the risks of transboundary harm posed to states B, C and 
D as it is clear who the source state should notify and consult with. However, it is not clear 
who States A and E should notify and consult with regarding risks of significant transboundary 
harm posed to the atmosphere, such as depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer and changes 
to regional precipitation patterns. There is no individual representative body responsible for the 
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protection of the atmosphere as a whole.162 It could be argued that states themselves should 
still be notified because all states share an equal interest in the protection of the atmosphere.163 
But it would not be appropriate for an individual state to be notified and consulted regarding 
potential impacts on the atmosphere from SAI. As an alternative, Craik proposes that the 
international community be notified and consulted as a collective through existing international 
organisations.164 Potential options include the UN General Assembly and the UN Security 
Council. However, it is beyond the scope of this research to consider the suitability of these 
bodies and the extent to it would be within their mandate to consult with states on behalf of the 
atmosphere should they wish to attempt SAI. 
Obligation to take a precautionary approach  
States A & E may be required to adopt a precautionary approach. The precautionary approach 
is articulated in Rio principle 15: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
According to Scott, there is no substantive difference between the ‘precautionary approach’ 
and ‘precautionary principle’ – both are commonly used to refer to the same requirement.165 
For the sake of consistency, this project will continue to use the term ‘approach’ where 
possible. Regardless of terminology, it is unclear whether the precautionary approach is a 
binding rule of customary international law in its own right. 166  Furthermore, the precise 
meaning of the precautionary approach is disputed.167 One possible interpretation is that states 
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must be more cautious when responding to identified risks.168 Another interpretation is that 
states must be more cautious in identifying risks where there is scientific uncertainty.169  
Either way, the precautionary approach may shape how states A and E ought to interpret their 
obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm and harm to the global commons from 
SAI. The ICJ in the Pulp Mills case held that the precautionary approach did not reverse the 
burden of proof.170 But it nevertheless suggested that the precautionary approach may influence 
how states are to interpret their international environmental obligations.171 Judge Cançado 
Trindade in his separate opinion in Certain Activities explained that the precautionary approach 
influences the interpretation of the no-harm rule as follows: 
[W]hile the principle of prevention assumes that risks can be objectively assessed so as to avoid 
damage, the precautionary principle assesses risks in face of uncertainties, taking into account 
the vulnerability of human beings and the environment, and the possibility of irreversible 
harm.172 
In other words, it requires states to take a more flexible approach in the face of scientific 
uncertainty for determining when an activity poses a foreseeable risk of harm. 
In this view, States A and E should take a precautionary approach to assessing whether the 
proposed SAI activities in the scenarios pose a foreseeable risk of significant transboundary 
harm and/or harm to the global commons. It may not be possible for each state to identify the 
nature and extent of all risks posed by SAI.173 There may be insufficient scientific data to 
‘demonstrate or quantify the risk or prove a cause-and-effect relationship’ between the SAI 
proposal and a possible adverse effect.174 For example, it may not be scientifically possible to 
demonstrate with certainty the risk of acidification of waterways in scenario 1, ozone depletion 
in scenario 2, or drought in scenario 3. However, regardless of any such uncertainty, States A 
and E would still have a duty of due diligence to take preventive measures. In particular, they 
would still be required to conduct an EIA and notify and consult with States B, C and E 
respectively.  
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The risks of SAI versus the risks of climate change  
It important to briefly consider the relationship between the risks posed by SAI and the risks 
posed by climate change. As noted in chapter two, a number of legal scholars have queried the 
way in which the no-harm rule should be interpreted to apply to geoengineering, as 
geoengineering is intended to address the risks of transboundary harm and harm to the global 
commons posed by climate change.175 This issue is highlighted in scenario 3, in which state E 
decides to attempt SAI in order to avert the severe risks it faces from climate change. The risks 
of climate change might be a relevant consideration in the context of a claim for state 
responsibility if significant transboundary harm is caused by SAI. Under the doctrine of state 
responsibility, there are numerous circumstances that preclude ‘wrongfulness’ (i.e. breach of a 
primary rule of international law), and hence state responsibility.176 Relevant considerations in 
the context of scenario 3 might include force majeure and necessity. 177  However, these 
considerations relate to secondary rules of state responsibly, and not to the content of the no-
harm rule as a primary rule of customary international law. There is nothing in the analysis in 
chapters four, five and six to suggest that the need to act against the risks of climate change 
would change the obligation of state E to prevent significant harm from SAI under the no-harm 
rule.178 State E’s obligations under the no-harm rule would therefore remain the same. 
7.4.2 Should SAI attract a higher standard of care?  
This section considers if future attempts at SAI would warrant a higher standard of care than 
the duty of due diligence as outlined above. The duty of due diligence presupposes that it is 
possible to take action to prevent and/or minimise the risks of significant transboundary harm 
and/or harm to the global commons from an activity. It does not address situations in which 
there is a foreseeable risk of significant harm which cannot be prevented or minimised.179  This 
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may limit the no-harm rule’s capacity to respond to the risks posed by SAI. It may be possible 
to reduce certain risks from SAI, such as the ‘termination problem’: the risk of rapid 
temperature increase if SAI is suddenly stopped and atmospheric concerntration of GHGs 
remains high.180 Reynolds, Parker and Irvine suggest that the likelihood and severity of the 
termination problem can be reduced by gradually ramping down the scale of SAI deployment, 
rather than suddenly stopping.181 In other words, the risk can be reduced by careful project 
design and management. However, certain impacts may be inherent in the technology itself, 
for example, widespread change to the global climate and an increase in atmospheric aerosol 
loading. In this sense, SAI is distinct from so-called ‘ultrahazardous activities’ as understood 
by the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention. That is, ‘an activity with a danger that is rarely 
expected to materialize but might assume, on that rare occasion, grave (more than significant, 
serious or substantial) proportions.’182 As the impacts are inherent in proposed SAI, satisfying 
the duty of due diligence may not adequately reduce their probability or likely severity.   
The possibility of a higher standard of care has been raised in prior disputes. In correspondence 
leading up to the 1972 Nuclear Tests Cases, New Zealand described atmospheric nuclear 
testing as an ‘inherently harmful’ activity, because certain risks could not be sufficiently 
prevented or minimised.183 It stated that ‘an activity that is inherently harmful is not made 
acceptable even by the most stringent precautionary measures.’184 More recently in the Aerial 
Herbicide Spraying case, Ecuador claimed that Colombia’s spraying program was ‘inherently 
hazardous’, and suggested that a higher standard of care was appropriate.185 The ICJ did not 
produce a judgment on the merits of either case, and therefore did not consider this issue. 
                                                 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 531, 540. Handl similarly 
suggests that this is a limitation of the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention.  
180 See chapter 1.2.2. 
181 Jesse L. Reynolds, Andy Parker and Peter Irvine, 'Five solar geoengineering tropes that have outstayed their 
welcome' (2016 (forthcoming))  Earth's Future doi: eft2.2016EF000416 3. Cf Wil Burns, ‘A Response to: Five 
solar geoengineering tropes that have outstayed their welcome’ 1 FCEA Commentary, < 
http://ceassessment.org/commentary-a-response-to-five-solar-geoengineering-tropes-that-have-outstayed-their-
welcome-wil-burns/>. 
182 Draft Articles on Prevention, above n 59, 149. The possibility that SAI might also qualify as an 
ultrahazardous activity is consider by Reichwein et al, above n 17, 166. See also Barbara Saxler, Jule Siegfried 
and Alexander Proelss, 'International liability for transboundary damage arising from stratospheric aerosol 
injections' (2015) 7(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 112. 
183 See chapter 5.3.1. 
184 Letter from New Zealand Prime Minister to French Foreign Minister, 9 March 1973’ in ‘Application 
Instituting Proceedings Submitted by the Government of New Zealand’ Nuclear Tests Case (New Zealand v 
France) [1973] ICJ Pleadings 2, 37.  
185 ‘Memorial of Ecuador Volume 1’ Arial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) International Court of 
Justice, General List No 138, 29 April 2009, [8.26]-[8.28]. See chapter 6.5.3.  
Chapter 7 
 
213 
 
Proposals to develop SAI bring this question to the forefront and suggest that it warrants further 
consideration.   
The current lack of scientific understanding and consensus concerning SAI also raises 
questions as to the efficacy of a duty of due diligence. SAI proposals are novel and without 
precedent. Unlike other so-called ‘ultrahazardous’ activities such as nuclear energy, there are 
no established international standards for SAI against which to assess the exercise of due 
diligence. This issue was raised above in the context of establishing ‘significant’ harm. 
However, SAI also presents an issue regarding the standard of care as there are no international 
guidelines that scientists and/or policymakers might use as a basis for determining the 
necessary standard of due diligence. In other words, it may not be possible to determine what 
action is ‘necessary’ to minimise the risk of significant transboundary harm or harm to the 
global commons from SAI.186  
This raises the question- do states have a higher standard of care when it comes to future 
attempts at SAI? In the context of the hypothetical scenarios above, would states A and E need 
to take more stringent measures to satisfy their obligations under the no-harm rule? Reichwein 
et al suggest that the standard of due diligence for SAI might be higher than other activities. 
They state that ‘[t]he mere possibility that an SAI deployment would pose the risk of serious 
or irreversible harm argues in favour of a high standard of care for a state in meeting its 
obligation of due diligence.’ 187  However, this standard may require more than just extra 
preventative or precautionary measures. According to Handl, the only logical way to satisfy 
the duty of due diligence for inherently harmful activities may be not to attempt them at all.188  
In other words, the relevant standard of care is still one due diligence, but it might be so high 
that States A and E would effectively be prohibited from attempting SAI.  
Alternatively, it could be argued that States A and E have a duty of result (i.e. strict/absolute 
responsibility) to prevent significant transboundary harm from SAI. In other words, they should 
be held liable for transboundary harm and/or harm to the global commons from SAI regardless 
of having satisfied the obligation of due diligence.189 There is some state practice exhibited in 
                                                 
186 See Kelson, above n 179, 227; Goldie, above n 179, 1203.  
187 Reichwein et al, above n 17, 180.  
188 Handl, above n 179, 540.  
189 See Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton, 'Strict Liability in International Environmental Law' in Tafsir Malick  
Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes (Brill 
Nijhoff, 2007) 1131, 1131. 
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international treaty-making to suggest that ultrahazardous activities attract a duty of result.190 
For example, under the 1972 Convention for Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
states are absolutely liable for damage caused by objects they have launched into space.191 
However, strict/absolute liability regimes tend to focus on liability for private actors, rather 
than states.192 Examples include the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage193, the Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage 1969194, and the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty.195 Brunnée suggests that states have been reluctant to impose strict liability 
on themselves even in instances of environmental damage from ultrahazardous activities.196 It 
is therefore uncertain whether states A and E would have a duty of result on this basis.  
The other possibility for imposing a duty of result on States A and E is the interpretation 
flowing from the Certain Activities case. That is, that states have two separate obligations 
concerning transboundary pollution: an obligation ‘not to cause’ harm and an obligation to 
‘prevent’ harm.197 As noted in chapter six, this interpretation of the no-harm rule also does not 
appear to be supported by widespread state practice. However, the idea that states may have 
two obligations has been raised by several legal scholars.198 Most recently, it has been raised 
by Murase in his third report as Special Rapporteur for the ILC’s new project on the Protection 
of the Atmosphere. Murase suggests that the no-harm rule stemming from the Trail Smelter 
arbitration ‘prohibits harmful transboundary impacts’.199 In other words, it provides a duty of 
result. According to Murase, the duty of states to take preventative measures (i.e. duty of 
conduct) is a ‘corollary’ of the no-harm rule. He further suggests that under this duty to prevent 
                                                 
190 See ibid, 1140; C Wilfred Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law Recueil des 
Cours (Brill Nijhoff, 1966); Kelson, above n 179. See also Sands and Peel, above n 97, 712. Sands and Peel 
suggest that strict liability for ultrahazardous activities may be a general principle of international law as this 
standard of care is often found in domestic law. For example, in the case of Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 
330.  
191 Convention for Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature 29 March 1972, 961 
UNTS 188 (entered into force 1 September 1972) art II.  
192 Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Responsibility of States for Environmental Harm in a Multinational Context – Problems 
and Trends’ (1993) 34(3) Les Cahiers de droit, 827, 839. 
193 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature 21 May 1963, 1063 UNTS 
266 (entered into force 12 November 1977) art IV.  
194 Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969, 
opened for signature 27 November 1992, 1956 UNTS 255, art 4.  
195 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 4 October 1991, [1998] 
ATS 6 (entered into force 14 January 1998) annex VI art 6(3). Liability attaches to operators, including state-
funded operators and commercial operators, such as tourist operators. See Sands and Peel, above n 97, 762-763.  
196 Brunnée, ‘The Responsibility of States for Environmental Harm’ above n 192, 839-840.  
197 See chapter 6.6.4. 
198 See ibid. 
199 Shinya Murase, ‘Third report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, 
International Law Commission, 68th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/692 (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016), 7. 
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harm, states have ‘two different obligations, one being the obligation to “prevent” before actual 
pollution or degradation occurs, and the other the duty to “eliminate”, “mitigate” and 
“compensate” after they have already occurred.’ 200  On this view, states have multiple 
obligations stemming from the same rule of customary international law.  
This interpretation of the no-harm rule could be significant when it comes to the prevention of 
significant transboundary harm and/or harm to the global commons from SAI. The addition of 
a duty of result may encourage states not to engage in SAI if the risks cannot be sufficiently 
minimised. It may also encourage them to give greater consideration to alternative courses of 
action. For example, in the case of proposed SAI field testing, it may motivate states to more 
thoroughly assess whether field testing is necessary or whether similar results might be 
achieved by less risky means. In the case of full-scale deployment, it may encourage states to 
give greater consideration to conventional mitigation strategies. Failing that, the duty of result 
may act as an incentive for states to take greater care, beyond what is required by due diligence, 
to ensure that harm does not result from an attempt at SAI. 201  Therefore, while this 
interpretation may not be supported by state practice, it may be an important direction for the 
progressive development of the no-harm rule. It could bolster its capacity to contribute to the 
international governance of SRM geoengineering.  
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered how the no-harm rule will likely apply to future attempts at SAI. 
It has used three hypothetical scenarios to analyse whether SAI is likely to fall within the scope 
of the no-harm rule and, if so, what states must do to satisfy their obligations under this rule. It 
demonstrates that future attempts at SAI will likely to fall within the scope of the no-harm rule, 
so long as they meet the threshold of ‘significant’ transboundary harm. However, without a 
clear definition or set of objective criteria, it is difficult to tell when this threshold is likely to 
be reached, especially for risks of harm to the atmosphere per se.   
Should a proposed SAI activity fall within the scope of the no-harm rule, states have a duty of 
due diligence to undertake their best possible efforts to prevent an attempt at SAI from causing 
significant transboundary harm and/or harm to the global commons. At a bare minimum, this 
                                                 
200 Ibid, 8.  
201 See Sands and Peel, above n 97, 711. Sands and Peel suggest that standard of care of strict or absolute 
liability is more likely to encourage states ‘to adopt special precautions when engaging in or permitting’ 
dangerous activities. 
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would include enacting and enforcing relevant domestic law, conducting a preliminary risk 
assessment, conducting a full EIA, notifying and consulting with potentially affected states, 
and interpreting these obligations in light of the precautionary approach. It is less certain 
whether states may be subject to a higher standard of care for SAI. However, a higher standard 
of care, such as a duty of result, may remedy some of the shortcomings of a duty of due 
diligence and better encourage the prevention of transboundary harm and/or harm to the global 
commons from SAI.  
Further development of the no-harm rule is required to enhance doctrinal clarity as to how it is 
likely to apply to future attempts at SAI. In particular, how it is likely to apply to risks of harm 
to the atmosphere per se. The likely influence of this uncertainty on compliance is explored 
further in the next chapter. However, this chapter demonstrates that, as it currently stands, the 
no-harm rule nevertheless provides a considerable level of guidance to states as to how future 
attempts at SAI might be conducted to prevent transboundary harm and/or harm to the global 
commons. For this reason alone, the no-harm rule has the potential to make an important 
contribution to geoengineering governance, and warrants more prominent consideration in 
geoengineering governance scholarship.  
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8 Assessing the Likelihood of Compliance with the No-Harm 
Rule for Future Attempts at SAI 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous four chapters engaged in legal doctrinal analysis of the no-harm rule and its 
potential application to SAI. Chapters four, five and six analysed the development of the no-
harm rule through key sources to establish its content. Chapter seven applied the content of the 
no-harm rule to possible future attempts at SAI. Chapter seven highlighted the extent to which 
the no-harm rule is likely to apply to future attempts at SAI and what states would likely have 
to do to fulfil their obligations under this rule. This analysis suggested that, at the very least, 
the no-harm rule provides states with a duty of due diligence to exert their best possible efforts 
to prevent significant transboundary harm and/or harm to the atmosphere from future SAI 
proposals. Due to the nature of SAI and the risks of transboundary harm inherent to these 
proposals, it is also possible that states may have a higher standard of care. The only way for 
states to satisfy their duty of due diligence may be to not engage in SAI at all. Alternatively, 
states may have a duty of result should an attempt at SAI cause significant transboundary harm 
or harm to the global commons. However, as it currently stands, customary international law 
does not provide sufficient guidance for determining when the risks posed by SAI meet the 
threshold of ‘significant’ harm. It is therefore difficult to assess when an SAI proposal would 
likely trigger obligations under the no-harm rule, especially concerning risks of harm to the 
atmosphere per se.  
On its own, doctrinal analysis provides only a partial assessment of the potential of the no-
harm rule to contribute to governance of SRM/SAI.1 In order to properly assess this potential, 
it is not only necessary to consider whether and how the rule might apply to SAI, but also to 
consider the rule’s practical operation. That is, whether the rule will likely influence the 
behaviour of states when it comes to future attempts at SRM. Doctrinal analysis does not 
address this type of question.2 It implicitly assumes that customary international law rules will 
influence the behaviour of states and other actors because they are legally binding.3  As noted 
                                                 
1 See chapter 3.2.  
2 See chapter 3.  
3 Brian D  Lepard, Customary International Law- A New Theory with Practical Applications (Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 99. See also Harold Hongju Koh, 'Why Do Nations Obey International Law?' (1997) 
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in chapter three, doctrinal analysis provides a framework for analysing what the law is (in a 
conceptual sense) and how it might apply to a particular problem. However, doctrinal analysis 
does not theorise how international law might actually shape the behaviour of states.4  
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to go beyond doctrinal analysis and assess whether the 
no-harm rule is likely to influence the behaviour of states if they decide to attempt SAI in the 
future. In other words, this chapter considers the extent to which the no-harm rule is likely to 
promote compliance from states. In chapter three, it was established that the no-harm rule is 
most likely to influence the behaviour of states in the context of future attempts at SAI through 
non-utilitarian behavioural mechanisms. Specifically, through a ‘logic of appropriateness’5 and 
by influencing the identity and role of state actors.6 In order to assess the capacity of the no-
harm rule to influence the behaviour of states through these mechanisms, this project therefore 
turns to the latest theoretical development in international law and compliance theory: Brunnée 
and Toope’s theory of interactional international law.7  
Interactional international law is a theory of ‘legal obligation’. As explained in chapter 3, legal 
obligation is a sense of legal legitimacy and a commitment to upholding the law.8 Brunnée and 
Toope suggest that legal obligation accounts for the way in which legal norms contribute to 
international governance in a horizontal system without centralised enforcement mechanisms.9 
Brunnée and Toope draw on constructivist international relations (IR) theory and Lon 
Fuller’s10 theory of procedural natural law to explain the role of legal obligation and how it can 
be created and maintained to promote compliance with international law. According to 
interactional law theory, legal obligation is established and maintained by three key elements. 
The first element is shared understandings. That is, there needs to be widely shared 
understandings between actors concerning the need for normativity and the role or object of 
                                                 
106 Yale Law Journal 2599, 2608; Daniel Bodansky, 'The who, what, and wherefore of geoengineering 
governance' (2013) 121(3) Climatic Change 539, 542. 
4 See Terry Hutchinson, 'Doctrinal Research- Researching the Jury' in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), 
Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 726, 10, 15-16. 
5 James G March and Johan P Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders' (1998) 52(4) 
International Organization 943, 951-952.  
6  Oran R Young and Marc A Levy, 'The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes' in Oran R 
Young (ed), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1999) 1, 23-24, 25-26. In the terminology of Young and Levy, these are the behavioural mechanism models of 
‘regimes as bestowers of authority’ and ‘regimes as role definers’. See chapter 3.3.2. 
7 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 
(Cambridge University Press 2010), 7 (‘Legitimacy and Legality’). 
8 Ibid, 7. 
9 Ibid, 6, 20.  
10 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law- Revised Edition (Yale University Press, 1969). 
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the specific legal norm in question.11 The second element, drawing closely from Fuller, is 
comprised of eight ‘criteria of legality’, as previously identified in his seminal work on 
domestic law, the Morality of Law.12 Fuller claimed that these ‘criteria of legality’ are internal 
characteristics of law that promote ‘fidelity’ (i.e. adherence) to law.13 Brunnée and Toope adapt 
Fuller’s eight criteria to international law. The third and final element is a continuing practice 
of legality.14 That is, the activities and practices of international actors must be congruent with 
an existing legal norm and uphold and reinforce the criteria of legality. 15  According to 
interactional law theory, legal norms that meet these three are elements ‘legitimate’, will 
generate a strong sense of legal obligation, and ‘pull’ states towards compliance.16 
Before continuing, it is important to clarify how interactional law theory is used in this project. 
Brunnée and Toope have applied interactional law theory retrospectively to analyse 
development of the law in the issue areas of climate change, torture and use of force.17 In 
contrast, this project takes a more forward-looking and purposive approach to using 
interactional law theory. This chapter analyses the no-harm rule against the three elements of 
interactional law theory to establish its capacity to promote a sense of legal obligation among 
states and, hence, the likelihood that states will comply with it if they consider attempting SAI 
in the future. It is also important to note that the elements of shared understandings, criteria of 
legality and practice of legality are not mutually exclusive and to a certain extent are 
interrelated. Although this chapter attempts to addresses each element separately, some 
repetition of key concepts and issues is unavoidable in applying this theory. This repetition has 
been kept to a minimum. In applying interactional law theory to the no-harm rule, this project 
takes a critical approach to this theory. As noted in chapter 3, interactional international law is 
a relatively new theory that has not been widely considered or applied by legal or IR scholars 
(aside from Brunnée and Toope themselves). 18  This project considers the utility of this 
                                                 
11 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 80. See also Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, 
'Interactional international law: an introduction' (2011) 3(2) International Theory 307, 309-310 (‘Interactional 
International Law’); Emanuel Adler, Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of 
International Relations (Routledge, 2005) 22. 
12 Fuller, above n 10. 
13 Ibid, 96. 
14 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 15.  
15 Brunnée and Toope, Interactional International Law, above n 11, 313.  
16 See Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 53. 
17 Ibid, 17. 
18 The exception to this are several articles that discuss interactional international law theory published in a 
special edition of International Theory in 2011 (volume 3 issue 2). See Martti Koskenniemi, 'The mystery of 
legal obligation' (2011) 3(02) International Theory 319; Jeffrey L. Dunoff, 'What is the purpose of international 
law?' (2011) 3(2) International Theory 326; Christian Reus-Smit, 'Obligation through practice' (2011) 3(02) 
International Theory 339. 
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approach for analysing the way in which the no-harm rule, as a principle of customary 
international law, might influence the behaviour of states. Finally, the primary aim of this 
chapter is to assess the prospects of state compliance with the no-harm rule. However, 
interactional law theory acknowledges a broader range of actors in international relations.19 
Unlike the previous chapter, which only considered state actors, this chapter therefore also 
considers the role of non-state actors in contributing to building and maintaining the sense of 
legal obligation in the way states respond to the no harm rule.  
8.2 SHARED UNDERSTANDINGS AND THE NO-HARM RULE  
This section analyses the no-harm rule against the first element of interactional law theory- 
shared understandings. According to Brunnée and Toope, only a basic level of shared 
understandings is necessary for a ‘thin’ version of interactional law to exist.20 ‘Thin’ shared 
understandings can lay the foundation for ‘deeper’, more substantive shared understandings to 
grow through further interaction.21 Interactional law theory suggests that this is best facilitated 
through ‘communities of practice’.22 As explained in chapter three, communities of practice 
are groups of international actors (state and non-state) that facilitate the development of shared 
understandings through shared learning and interaction between actors and structures. This 
section therefore considers the extent to which there is an understanding between state and non-
state actors as to the need for the no-harm rule and its object.23 It then considers the extent to 
which the no-harm rule is supported by a community of practice. 
8.2.1 Different level of shared understandings for transboundary harm and harm to the 
global commons  
The no-harm rule has been widely acknowledged by states, legal scholars and international 
courts and tribunals as a binding principle of customary international law. As noted in chapter 
5, it has been reiterated by states in the Stockholm Declaration and Rio Declaration. It has also 
been included in the preamble or operative text of numerous multilateral environmental 
                                                 
19 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 77-86. 
20 Ibid, 68-69. 
21 Ibid, 81.  
22 See Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity (Cambridge University Press, 
1998); Adler, above n 11.  
23 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 80. ; Brunnée and Toope, Interactional international 
law, above n 11, 309-310; Adler, above n 11, 22. 
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agreements, including the UNFCCC24, UNCLOS25, and the Ozone Convention.26 However, 
widespread acknowledgement of the no-harm rule does not necessarily mean that there is 
widespread shared understanding of it, particularly amongst states. As noted by Brunnée and 
Toope, just because a rule is formalised as customary or treaty law does not mean that is 
satisfies the elements of interactional law theory.27 
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the no-harm rule for the prevention transboundary harm to the 
territory of other states is supported by a reasonable level of shared understanding. This stems 
from the robust shared understandings of state sovereignty and the rights of sovereign states to 
be free from outside interference that underpin the international legal system.28 According to 
Brunnée and Toope, all international legal interactions are built upon a shared understanding 
of the fundamental principles of state sovereignty, sovereign equality and non-intervention, 
and these principles ‘remain the frame of reference for global legal relations.’29  As noted in 
chapter 4, the no-harm rule developed as a corollary of state sovereignty.30 Its original object 
was to balance the sovereign rights of states. By virtue of the strong shared understanding that 
exists amongst states concerning state sovereignty and state sovereign rights, states also share 
a common understanding of the need to prevent transboundary harm to the territory of other 
states.   
The basis of this shared understanding is illustrated by the arguments made by Australia and 
New Zealand in the 1974 Nuclear Tests cases.31 As explained in chapter 5, transboundary harm 
from radioactive fallout was a key concern. However, both states framed their arguments in 
                                                 
24 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 
107 (Entered into force 21 March 1994) preamble (‘UNFCCC’).  
25 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 
(entered into force 16 November 1994) art 192 (‘UNCLOS’).  
26 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 22 March 1985, 1513 UNTS 
293 (entered into force 22 September 1988) preamble (‘Ozone Convention’). See also Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature 29 December 
1972, 1046 UNTS 138 (entered into force 30 August 1975) preamble (‘London Convention’); Convention on 
Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into force 29 December 1993) 
art 3 (‘CBD’); Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 13 November 
1979, 1302 UNTA 217 (entered into force 16 March 1983) preamble (‘LRTAP’).  
27 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 75.  
28 See also Jutta Brunnée, 'The Sources of Interactional Environmental Law: Interactional Law ' in Samantha 
Besson and d'Aspremont (eds), Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law ((2017) Forthcoming) 1 
< http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2784731> 9.  
29 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 71.  
30 See also, Brunnée, above n 28, 9. 
31 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Reports 253; Nuclear Tests Case (New 
Zealand v France) (Judgment) [1974] ICJ Reports 457. 
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terms of terms of breach of territorial sovereignty and sovereign rights. For example, Australia 
alleged that:  
France's activities in the South Pacific area are inconsistent with its obligation under general 
international law to respect the sovereignty of Australia over and in respect of its territory and 
thus to abstain from producing alterations of any kind in the Australian environment 
(atmosphere, soil, waters) by the deposition in its territory and the dispersion in its airspace of 
radio-active fall-out.32 
 
New Zealand similarly suggested that it had a right:  
[W]hich derives from its sovereignty, to control the level of radioactivity in its territory, 
territorial waters and airspace or of the right not to have harm caused to it and its people as a 
result of the entry into those areas of radioactive debris from nuclear testing.33 
 
These statements therefore suggest that Australia and New Zealand believed that transboundary 
radioactive fallout was a breach of their sovereign rights, including the right to be free from 
transboundary harm.  
Comments made by states regarding the ILC’s Draft Articles on Prevention provide a more 
recent example of how the understanding of states of the no-harm rule remains grounded in 
broader shared understandings of state sovereignty. France recommended that the Draft 
Articles clarify the limits of state sovereignty and state that:  
[T]he freedom of a State to carry on activities in its territory is not unlimited and that such 
freedom is subject to the obligation to prevent or minimize the risk of causing significant 
transboundary harm.34 
 
Turkey further stated that:  
[T]he rules pertaining to the prevention of transboundary damage should be based on mutual 
understanding and respect for each State’s rights, first and foremost respect for the sovereign rights 
of States.35  
 
Shared understandings of state sovereign rights, as opposed to environmental protection, 
therefore continue to support the need for normativity. That is, the need for a rule to prevent 
transboundary harm.  
                                                 
32 ‘Memorial on Jurisdiction and Admissibility Submitted by the Government of Australia’ Nuclear Tests Case 
(Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Pleadings 249, 331.  
33 ‘Memorial on Jurisdiction and Admissibility Submitted by the Government of New Zealand Nuclear Tests 
Case (New Zealand v France) [1974] ICJ Pleadings 145, [192]. 
34 ‘Comments and observations received from Governments: report of the Secretary-General’, International 
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International  Law (Prevention of 
Transboundary Damage from Hazardous Activities), UN Doc A/CN.4/509 (17 April 2000) 127, 129.   
35 ‘Comments and observations received from Governments: report of the Secretary-General’, International 
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International  Law (Prevention of 
Transboundary Damage from Hazardous Activities), UN Doc A/CN.4/509 (17 April 2000) 127, 130.  
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However, the no-harm rule for the prevention of harm to the global commons does not share 
the same normative foundations. As the global commons exist beyond the sovereign territory 
of states,36 the extended no-harm rule for the global commons is not supported by a shared 
understanding of state sovereignty and state rights. The no-harm rule for the global commons 
instead developed out of growing concern for the global environment. 37  As previously 
explained in chapter 5, such concern led to the reiteration of the no-harm rule in principle 21 
of the Stockholm Declaration and principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. Both declarations are 
widely supported by states and demonstrate a formal ‘aspiration’ to prevent harm to the global 
environment.38 However, once again, the extension of the no-harm rule to the global commons 
in these declarations does not automatically mean there is a strong shared understanding 
amongst states as to the need for the rule and its object.  
Actions may speak louder than words when assessing the shared understanding of states to 
protect the global commons from harm. Brunnée and Toope suggest that in some instances, 
shared understandings may be more accurately demonstrated through the physical actions of 
states rather than in verbal statements or pledges, such the support of international 
agreements.39 In analysing shared understandings concerning the prohibition against torture 
prior to September 11 2001, Brunnée and Toope noted that, the majority of states had ratified 
relevant treaties in support of this norm, but, when confronted with significant threats to 
national security, states either ignored or directly sanctioned the use of torture.40 According to 
Brunnée and Toope, the contradiction between state support for the prohibition of torture and 
actual practice suggest that:  
[T]he real shared understanding was that torture was wrong, but sometimes necessary, and 
would be tactically supported by state authorities, especially if the torture could be kept secret.41  
In other words, a lack of congruent practice with a posited norm may indicate a weak (or 
entirely different) shared understanding.  
This also appears to be the case with the prevention of harm to the global commons. Congruent 
practice with the no-harm rule is considered in greater detail below in 8.4.8, as one of Fuller’s 
criteria of legality. This issue is therefore examined in more detail below. For the purpose of 
the element of shared understandings, suffice it to say that there is a widespread lack of 
                                                 
36 See chapter 7.3.1. 
37 See chapter 5.  
38 See Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 232. 
39 Ibid, 232-233.  
40 Ibid, 232. 
41 Ibid, 233.  
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congruence between the no-harm rule and the actions of state with regards to preventing harm 
to the global commons. Despite the fact that the no-harm rule for the global commons is 
formally recognised as part of customary international law, states continue to engage in or 
endorse activities that harm the global commons, including pollution of the marine 
environment of the high seas and the atmosphere. Prominent contemporary examples include 
greenhouse gas emissions causing climate change, atmospheric pollution from forest fires in 
Indonesia,42 marine plastics pollution in the high seas43 and harm to the marine environment 
of the high seas by China as identified by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the South 
China Sea Arbitration.44 The contradiction between the no-harm rule for the global commons 
as formally posited and the actual behaviour of states therefore suggests that there is a fragile 
shared understanding between states regarding this norm.  
Stronger shared understandings may exist among non-state actors. The efforts of environmental 
NGO’s to protect the environment of global commons area, such as Greenpeace International45 
and the World Wildlife Fund46, implicitly support the no-harm rule for the prevention of harm 
to the global commons. Furthermore, over 6,000 organisations, including NGOs and 
international organisations, have endorsed the Earth Charter.47 This is a global civil society 
initiative launched on the 29 June 2000.48 The need to prevent harm to the global environment 
and adopt a precautionary approach is recognised under principle 6. 49  This indicates 
widespread support amongst non-state actors for operation of the no-harm rule to prevent 
significant harm to the global commons.  
Interactional law theory recognises the role of a diverse range of actors in building and 
maintaining shared understandings, including NGOs and civil society.50 In this sense, Brunnée 
and Toope do not explicitly privilege the understandings of states over other actors. However, 
                                                 
42 See Allen L Springer, Cases of Conflict: Transboundary Disputes and the Development of International 
Environmental Law (University of Toronto Press, 2016) 54-83. 
43 See, eg, Ljubomir Jeftic, Seba Sheavly, and Ellik Adler, Marine Litter: A Global Challenge, United Nations 
Environment Program, April 2009, < 
http://www.unep.org/Regionalseas/marinelitter/publications/docs/Marine_Litter_A_Global_Challenge.pdf>;  
Michelle Allsopp et al, Plastic Debris in the World’s Oceans, Greenpeace International, 2 November 2006, < 
http://www.unep.org/regionalseas/marinelitter/publications/docs/plastic_ocean_report.pdf>;  
44 The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) (Awards) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 
2013-19, 12 July 2016) [815]-[993].  
45 See Bountiful Oceans, Greenpeace International 
<http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/oceans/>. 
46 See Climate, WWF <http://www.wwf.org.au/what-we-do/climate>. 
47 See What is the Earth Charter?, Earth Charter Initiative < http://earthcharter.org/discover/what-is-the-earth-
charter>. 
48 Ibid.  
49 The Earth Charter, Earth Charter Initiative, <http://earthcharter.org/discover/the-earth-charter>. 
50 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 84-86. 
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given that states remain the primary actors in international law and the no-harm rule is directed 
at the behaviour of states, this research argues that there must be a widespread shared 
understanding between states for the no-harm rule to promote amongst them a strong sense of 
legal obligation. 
8.2.2 Communities of practice 
This project similarly argues that it is important for states to be involved in a community of 
practice around the no-harm rule. According to interactional law theory, communities of 
practice are necessary to develop deeper and more substantive shared understandings of legal 
norms.51 Communities of practice bring state and non-state actors together to share ideas and 
develop new shared understandings through mutual engagement and social learning.52 Brunnée 
and Toope state that ‘it is only when new actors, be they states, international organizations or 
non-state actors, become actively engage in a community of practice that its understandings 
come to be more widely shared (and, possibly, again re-shaped).’53 By this reasoning, if states 
are to develop deeper shared understandings of the no-harm rule (especially for the global 
commons) they must actively participate in a community of practice.  
The concept of communities of practice in international relations as posited by Adler is 
sufficiently broad to accommodate the interaction of state and non-state actors in a wide ranges 
of circumstances.54 As noted in chapter three, communities of practice are not international 
actors in their own right, but co-exist and overlap with them.55 According to Adler, they might 
include ‘communities of diplomats, of traders, of environmentalists, and of human rights 
activists.’56 However, Brunnée and Toope suggest that communities of practice are more likely 
to develop around treaty bodies and formal institutions. They state that:   
These spaces include international intergovernmental organizations, treaty regimes embedded 
in institutions such as conferences of the parties, treaty implementation mechanisms including 
compliance procedures, conferences that include state and other international actors, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental networks, expert and advocacy groups that promote 
norms and monitor implementation, and transnational media. Dense communities of practice 
are more likely to arise in situations where there is relatively institutionalized and sustained 
legal interaction.57   
                                                 
51 Ibid, 62-65. See also chapter 3.  
52 Ibid, 64.  
53 Ibid.  
54 See Adler, above n 11. 
55 Ibid, 15-16.  
56 Ibid, 15.  
57 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 356.  
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Brunnée and Toope highlight how a community of practice of state and non-state actors has 
developed around the UNFCCC. 58  This includes civil society, business organisations, 
universities and religious organisations.59 They note that, while these various actors often 
pursue different objectives, they nevertheless ‘share a collective understanding of the enterprise 
they are engaged in and why it is important.’60 Brunnée and Toope demonstrate how the 
procedural dimensions of the Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC, including regular COP meetings 
and inventory and reporting commitments, provided state and non-state actors with space and 
opportunities to frequently interact.61 
It is possible to identify actions by state and non-state actors that contributes towards a practice 
of legality for the no-harm rule. This third element of interactional law theory is examined in 
greater detail below. Key examples include international litigation in which states and 
international courts and tribunals contribute to a practice of legality by debating and enforcing 
the no-harm rule. 62 Similarly, international organisations contribute to a practice of legality by 
campaigning for the application and/or progressive development of the no-harm rule, 
especially in the context of climate change damage.63 This project however argues that, while 
it is possible to identify actions that support a practice of legality, this does not necessarily 
mean there is a community of practice for the no-harm rule. 
It is challenging to identify a community of practice for the no-harm rule for transboundary 
harm or harm to the global commons that involves both state and non-state actors, and involves 
sustained and mutual interaction between them. As a principle of customary international law, 
there is no treaty body to facilitate mutual interaction between state and non-state actors as in 
the above UNFCCC example. Moreover, while individual examples of practice can be 
identified, it does not amount to a community of practice to facilitate interactive lawmaking. 
Take the example of international litigation and the recent Certain Activities case.64 Costa Rica 
                                                 
58 Ibid, 142-146.  
59 Ibid, 142.  
60 Ibid, 143-144.  
61 Ibid, 194-204. 
62 Brunnée, above n 28, 10. 
63 See Roda Verheyen and Peter Roderick for WWF-UK, Beyond Adaptation: The legal duty to pay 
compensation for climate change damage (November, 2008). This report was also supported by Oxfam and the 
Stockholm Environment Institute (see acknowledgements in report). See also International Law Association, 
Declaration of Legal Principles relating to Climate Change, Resolution 2/2014, (76th Conference of the 
International Law Association 7-11 April 2014) Draft Article 7; ‘No-harm rule’ and climate change: briefing 
paper, Legal Response Initiative: Lawyers Responding to Climate Change, (24 July 2012) < 
http://legalresponseinitiative.org/legaladvice/no-harm-rule-and-climate-change/>. 
64 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction 
of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) (International Court of 
Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015).  
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and Nicaragua considered the meaning of the no-harm rule in the context of the dispute.65 In 
turn, the ICJ expressed its view on the no-harm rule. The ICJ’s decision will undoubtedly give 
rise to academic discussion concerning the content no-harm rule (this project being one such 
example). According to Brunnée and Toope, for a community of practice to exist, actors must 
engage in specific types of interaction to a sufficient degree. 66 Such types of interactions 
include ‘sustained mutual relationships… shared approaches to interaction, shared indicators 
of membership, knowledge of others and their roles in the joint enterprise, shared discourses 
and shortcuts to communication, and common criteria for the appropriateness of actions and 
outcomes.’67 By this account, international litigation is too episodic 68 and restricted in its 
participants (including state and non-state actors)69 to give rise of a community of practice 
around the no-harm rule.  
The work of international organisations also has not lead to sustained and mutual interaction 
between state and non-state actors regarding the no-harm rule. A key example here is the work 
of the International Law Commission its Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm (‘Draft Articles on Prevention’).70 In the Draft Articles on Prevention, the ILC sought 
to promote a specific and detailed understanding of the content of the no-harm rule. In this 
sense, the ILC can be described as attempting to act as a ‘norm entrepreneur’.71 However, the 
interpretation promoted by the ILC does not appear to have been widely embraced by states. 
As demonstrated by the submissions of Colombia in the Aerial Herbicide Spraying case, not 
all states recognise the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention as an authoritative interpretation of 
customary international law.72 The reluctance of some states to engage with the ILC’s Draft 
Articles on Prevention is further demonstrated through the UN General Assembly. Since the 
                                                 
65 See Chapter 6.6. 
66 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 70.  
67 Ibid, 70 n 70.  
68 International litigation may stimulate some interaction around the no-harm rule, but only on an ad hoc basis 
when disputes arise. Interaction between the Parties and the court or tribunal is also a one-way process. After the 
court or tribunal hands down its decision, engagement between parties and the court or tribunal typically ends. 
69 Aside from the jurists or arbitrators themselves, the only actors that may formally participate in international 
litigation are states. NGO’s and other non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations are not formally 
included in proceedings before most international courts and tribunals. See Ulrich Beyerlin, 'The Role of NGOs 
in International Environmental Litigation' (2001) 61 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 357, 357-357. 
According to Beyerlin, NGOs typically do not have standing before international courts, including the ICJ and 
the ITLOS. An exception is the European Union Court of Justice, where they may have standing in very limited 
circumstances. Beyerlin also notes that the ICJ and ITLOS are ‘very reluctant’ to acknowledge NGOs as amicus 
curiae in contentious proceedings (at 363-364). 
70 ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with Commentaries’ (2001) 
II(2) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 149 (‘Draft Articles on Prevention’). 
71 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 57. See also Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change' (1998) 52(4) International Organization 887, 896.  
72 See chapter 6.5.1.  
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Draft Articles on Prevention were finalised in 2001, the UN General Assembly has called on 
multiple occasions for states to give further consideration to them in light of the ILC’s 
recommendation that they form the basis of an international convention. In resolution 65/28 of 
2010 and 68/114 of 2013, the UN General Assembly commended the Draft Articles on 
Prevention to the attention of states, and invited governments to comment on their form and 
content.73 So far, states have not taken up this invitation. This lack of engagement with the 
Draft Articles on Prevention suggests that states are reluctant to endorse and legitimise this 
interpretation of the no-harm rule. Moreover, these examples suggest that the Draft Articles on 
Prevention have not encouraged states to mutually deliberate and further engage with the 
content of the no-harm rule. They therefore have not led to a widespread community of practice 
around the no-harm rule.    
The absence of a community of practice does not necessarily prevent the no-harm rule from 
generating a sense of legal obligation, but it may mean that deeper, more substantive 
understandings concerning the no-harm rule are unlikely to develop amongst state and non-
state actors. This is a considerable issue for the no-harm for the prevention of harm to the global 
commons, which is not already supported by a ‘thin’ level of shared understandings. It also 
means that state and non-state actors are less likely to resolve (or work to resolve) substantive 
aspects the no-harm rule that are currently ambiguous and limit its capacity to respond to the 
risks of SAI. For example, the relevant standard of care and the threshold level of ‘significant’ 
harm. Interactional law theory suggests that a widespread community of practice involving 
both state and non-state actors is therefore needed to further develop the no-harm rule in a 
manner that is perceived by state and non-state actors as socially legitimacy and will contribute 
to the sense of legal obligation generated by this rule.  
Nonetheless, creating a widespread community of practice for the no-harm rule may be easier 
said than done. As mentioned above, Brunnée and Toope privilege the role of international 
institutions in facilitating sustained, mutual interaction between state and non-state actors and 
the creation of communities of practice. This vision of communities of practice is relatively 
straightforward to conceptualise and apply in the context of treaty-based norms. But it is much 
more difficult to reconcile with norms of customary international law which, by their very 
                                                 
73 Consideration of prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities and allocation of loss in the 
case of such harm, GA Res 65/28, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 65th sess, Agenda Item 81, Un Doc A/RES/65/28 (6 
December 2010);  Consideration of prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities and allocation 
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nature, lack formal institutions and mechanisms. This project therefore flags this aspect of 
interactional law theory for future consideration and development. Greater guidance is needed 
to understand how communities of practice might be identified and/or built around norms of 
customary international law.  
8.3 FULLER’S EIGHT CRITERIA OF LEGALITY  
This section analyses the no-harm rule against Fuller’s eight criteria of legality. According to 
Brunnée and Toope, shared understandings provide the necessary social foundations for legal 
norms, but in order for interactional law to develop there must also be a sustained practice of 
legality which is ‘rooted in Fuller’s eight criteria of legality’.74 As noted in chapter three, these 
criteria are: (1) Generality (2) Promulgation (3) Retroactivity (4) Clarity (5) Contradiction (6) 
Impossibility (7) Constancy and (8) Congruence. The main focus of this section is to assess the 
no-harm rule against each criterion. However, this assessment is not wholly unconnected from 
the other two elements of interactional law theory. To a certain extent, Fuller’s criteria of 
legality overlap with shared understandings and the practice of legality. As noted by Brunnée 
and Toope: 
Fuller’s criteria of legality are not a mere checklist to tell us whether or not a particular legal 
form, e.g. treaty or a court decision, is properly designed as ‘law’. Instead, the criteria come 
alive when actors reason with the rules in continuing processes of mutual engagement, creating 
a community of legal practice.75 (emphasis added)  
The criteria of legality therefore connect with the other two elements of interactional law 
theory.  
8.3.1 Generality 
Fuller’s first criterion of generality is straightforward: there must be a rule that applies to a 
general class of persons.76   Brunnée and Toope have expanded on Fuller’s description, stating 
that there must be a rule that prohibits, requires or permits certain conduct.77 The no-harm rule 
requires states to take measures to prevent significant transboundary harm and harm to the 
global commons. Brunnée and Toope further clarify that to meet the criterion of generality, a 
rule must ‘not address only one case, but apply in principle to all.’78 In other words, it should 
apply equally to all relevant actors and scenarios. Brunnée and Toope suggest that universal 
                                                 
74 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 86.  
75 Ibid, 86.  
76 Fuller, above n 10, 46. 
77 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 26. 
78 Ibid, 301.  
Chapter 8 
 
230 
 
application of a rule or regime strongly contributes to its legitimacy and a sense of legal 
obligation because all states have the same rule applied to them and share an equal interest in 
how the rule is maintained and developed. 79 The no-harm rule applies universally to the 
activities of all states.80 The no-harm rule appears therefore satisfies the criterion of generality.  
8.3.2 Promulgation 
The no-harm rule meets Fuller’s second criterion of legality, which is promulgation. According 
to Fuller, law should be made generally available to those subject to it.81 This is so the subjects 
of the law know in advance what the law is and can critique and reason with the law.82 Brunnée 
and Toope suggest that the expression of international legal norms in formal sources plays a 
crucial role in international law: 
[B]y telling the world that the norm is seen by the actors in the system as a legal norm. They 
are a communicative device that signals the potential existence of an obligation and that also 
allows people to know prima facie what they are required to do or refrain from doing’83   
As a principle of customary international law, the no-harm rule is not as readily accessible as 
laws contained in international agreements. However, the no-harm rule has been reiterated by 
international courts and tribunals and the Stockholm and Rio Declarations. Therefore, while it 
is not promulgated in the same way as a treaty text, it has nevertheless been well communicated 
to states. If a state should decide to attempt SAI in the future, it would undoubtedly be aware 
of the no-harm rule.   
8.3.3 Non-Retroactivity  
The third criterion of legality is that laws should not be made retroactive.84 The no-harm rule 
may not have met this criterion when it was first articulated by the arbitral tribunal in the Trail 
Smelter arbitration. As explained in chapter four, the Tribunal predominantly drew on 
analogous cases between states within the US federation to articulate this rule.85 The extent to 
which the Tribunal’s pronouncement reflected customary international law at that time is 
questionable. Nevertheless, since the Trail Smelter arbitration, the no-harm rule for 
transboundary harm to states has been recognised as customary international law. The no-harm 
rule for harm to the global commons has been recognised as custom since the 1996 Nuclear 
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84 Fuller, above n 10, 51-62.  
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Weapons advisory opinion.86 Should a state decide to attempt SAI in the future, there would 
be no issue of retroactive application of the no-harm rule for transboundary harm or harm to 
the global commons.  
8.3.4 Clarity 
The no-harm rule has difficulties meeting Fuller’s fourth criterion of clarity. This criterion 
requires that actors are able to ‘understand what is permitted, prohibited or required by the 
law.’87 A key issue in this regard is the threshold level of ‘significant’ harm. As explained in 
chapter seven, whether an activity meets this threshold is currently determined on a case-by-
case basis. This may be less challenging for risks of transboundary harm that have been 
recognised in previous decisions of international courts and tribunals. 88  In certain 
circumstances it may be obvious that an activity poses a risk of significant harm. For example 
where an activity involves highly toxic or radioactive substances.89 However, to use the words 
of Brunnée and Toope, this is a ‘common sense’ type approach to establishing severity of harm 
that amounts to nothing more than a ‘legal ‘I know it when I see it’ test’.90 This type of 
approach is flexible and enables the no-harm rule to respond to a wide range of scenarios. Yet, 
it also means that the threshold level of harm is unclear and open to wide interpretation, 
especially in the context of harm to the global commons.91 
The absence of a clear definition of ‘significant’ harm creates uncertainty and space for actors 
to promote their own definitions. This issue overlaps with the element of shared 
understandings. Brunnée and Toope examined this phenomenon in relation to the prohibition 
on torture. The key element that defines ‘torture’ under the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is ‘severe pain or suffering’.92 
According to Brunnée and Toope, what qualifies as ‘severe pain or suffering’ is unclear, and 
this lack of clarity combined with a fragile shared understanding created space for the US 
Government under the G.W. Bush administration to redefine torture and create exceptions to 
the prohibition on the basis of necessity and national security.93 The US Government sought to 
                                                 
86 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226. 
87 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 251.  
88 Chapter 7.3.3. 
89 Catherine Redgwell, 'Transboundary pollution: principles, policy and practice ' in S Jayakumar et al (eds), 
Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy (Edward Elgar, 2015) 11, 15.  
90 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 252.  
91 See chapter 7.3.3. 
92 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for 
signature 26 June 1987, 1465 UNTS 113 (entered into force 26 June 1987) art 1.  
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redefine torture in such a way as to permit interrogation techniques such as waterboarding that 
did not cause ‘severe’ physical harm.94 The lack of clarity as to what amounted to ‘severe pain 
or suffering’ also influenced the element of shared understandings. According to Brunnée and 
Toope, it created a window for the US to act as a norm entrepreneur to seek to build new shared 
understandings as to what behaviour was prohibited by this rule.95 This project suggests that 
the key element of ‘significant’ harm under the no-harm rule is similarly unclear. This may 
create an opportunity for norm entrepreneurs to fill this gap with their own understanding of 
‘significant’ harm.    
Early attempts at norm-entrepreneurial activity can already be seen within geoengineering 
scholarship. Prominent researchers are promoting certain understandings as to what might 
qualify as an ‘acceptable’ level of side effects (or risk therefore) from SAI proposals. This is 
demonstrated by calls to progress to ‘small-scale’ SAI field testing.96 Proponents claim that 
field testing is needed to reduce uncertainty concerning the benefits and risks of SAI.97 It has 
also been suggested that so long as field tests are conducted below a certain scale, they will not 
have any measurable climatic impacts, especially not on a global scale.98 For example, Parson 
and Keith propose that a threshold might be established based on the ‘area, duration and size 
of radiative forcing perturbation’ of a proposed SAI field test, below which field testing might 
be deemed acceptable by governments. 99 The scientific validity of these claims has been 
challenged by other scientists in the field.100 However, regardless of their scientific validity, 
these claims ‘share a common supposition that small-scale testing should proceed even in the 
absence of further international agreement.’101 In this sense, arguments in favour of small-scale 
                                                 
94 See ibid, 239.  
95 Ibid, 352.  
96 See, eg, David W. Keith, Edward Parson and M. Granger Morgan, 'Research on global sun block needed now' 
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Morgan, above n 96. 
99 Parson and Keith, above n 96, 1279.  
100 See Robock et al, above n 96. Robock et al argue that in order for an SAI field test to produce measureable 
results it would have to be conducted on a large scale akin to full scale deployment. They propose that field 
testing would have to be conducted on a large enough scale and for a long enough period of time to distinguish 
the impacts of SAI from natural weather and climate variability. See also Schafer et al, above n 96.  
101 Schafer et al, above n 96, 766.  
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field testing represent early attempts by actors within the geoengineering community to 
construct shared understandings as to what types and scales of SAI deployment would be 
‘acceptable’ to states and, hence, would not require governance at an international level.  
The majority of these claims do not directly engage with or acknowledge the no-harm rule.102 
Nevertheless, by developing a shared understanding of what level of geoengineering is 
internationally acceptable they could indirectly bear on how the no-harm rule is to be 
interpreted to apply to future attempts at SAI. Suggestions that international governance is not 
needed for SAI below a certain scale of activity implicitly assume that the act of creating 
reflective particles in the atmosphere, and the extent and magnitude of any related side effects, 
would automatically be tolerated by other states. If such suggestions were to gain enough 
momentum, it is possible that they could be co-opted to determine when a proposed SAI 
activity gives rise to international legal obligations under the no-harm rule. For this reason, 
greater decision-making parameters are needed to help determine when an activity meets the 
threshold of ‘significant’ harm. 
Clarity is also an issue when it comes to interpreting procedural obligations in the context of 
harm to the global commons. As noted in chapter seven, states have a duty to notify and consult 
with other potentially affected states for activities that pose a risk of significant transboundary 
harm. However, it is unclear how this obligation translates to harm to the global commons.103 
This issue also intersects with the criterion of impossibility discussed further below.  
8.3.5 Contradiction 
The fifth criterion of legality is contradiction. That is, one law should not contradict or prevent 
compliance with another law.104 The no-harm rule conflicts with the concept of absolute state 
sovereignty. During the 19th Century, states were considered to have an absolute sovereign 
right to act as they wished within their own territory. This doctrine of absolute sovereignty is 
known as the ‘Harmon Doctrine’.105 However, this doctrine has long since been overturned in 
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favour of an understanding of state sovereignty that is qualified by the obligation to protect the 
rights of other states. This is evident in the decision of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Island of Palmas case, which held that: 
Territorial sovereignty… involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a State. This 
right has as corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other 
States, in particular their right to integrity and inviolability in peace and in war, together with 
the rights which each State may claim for its nationals in foreign territory.106  
 
The rights of states under the doctrine of state sovereignty are therefore no longer understood 
to be absolute. The no-harm rule upholds this understanding of state sovereignty and therefore 
meets the criterion of non-contradiction.  
8.3.6 Impossibility  
The sixth criterion of legality is that the law should be realistic and not demand the impossible 
of its subjects.107 The duty of due diligence provided by the no-harm rule does not demand the 
impossible of states. As noted in chapter seven, this duty in inherently flexible, accommodating 
different risks and also potentially the capabilities and capacities of states.108 In the context of 
transboundary harm, the procedural obligations flowing from this duty cannot be said to be 
overly onerous or unrealistic. The duty of due diligence therefore does not demand the 
impossible in this context.  
However, as noted above, the procedural obligations that flow from the duty of due diligence 
are not so straightforward when it comes to harm to the global commons. In particular, the duty 
to notify and consult with potentially affected states. Not only does this issue detract from the 
clarity of the no-harm rule, but it may also raise the issue of impossibility. As mentioned in 
chapter seven, it could be argued that as a global commons, all states share an equal interest in 
the protection of the atmosphere.109 However, it would be highly onerous if states were to 
individually notify and consult with all other states for activities that pose a risk of significant 
harm to the global commons. Until this obligation is further clarified, it may be impossible for 
states to satisfy it in the context of harm to the global commons.  
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Given the nature of SAI, states may have a duty of result (i.e. ‘strict liability’) under the no-
harm rule.110 It is therefore also important to consider if this would satisfy the criterion of 
impossibility. A duty of result would arguably be more onerous on states as they would be 
required to ensure that no significant transboundary harm results from any future attempts at 
SAI, regardless of fault. Fuller considered the possibility that strict liability norms demand the 
impossible. He notes that ‘[i]t is sometimes assumed that no form of legal liability can be 
justified unless it rests either on (1) an intent to do a harmful act, or (2) some fault or neglect.’ 
In other words, it is easy to assume that obligations of result demand the impossible as they 
may hold an actor to account for a result that they had no intention of creating, nor any ability 
to influence.  
However, according to Fuller, this does not mean that strict liability ‘demands the impossible’ 
in accordance with this criterion.111 Fuller gives examples of instances in which strict liability 
is justifiable and does not detract from the ‘inner morality’ of law. His arguments concerning 
strict liability for risky activities are of most relevance to the no-harm rule. Fuller suggests that 
strict liability for risky activities is justified as the true purpose of such rules is not to prohibit 
hazardous activities, but instead to attach a special kind of liability to them.112 In Fuller’s words 
‘enterprises creating special risks ought to bear the cost of injuries resulting from their 
operation’.113 When viewed in this light, a duty of result under the no-harm rule for SAI would 
not demand the impossible: it would merely shift responsibility for harm onto the state under 
whose control SAI is being conducted.   
8.3.7 Constancy/Predictability 
The seventh criterion of legality is constancy. According to Fuller, laws should not change too 
frequently over time.114 As demonstrated in chapters four, five and six, the content of the no-
harm rule has evolved over the past seventy years. However, key shifts in the content of the 
no-harm rule, such as its extension to the global commons, have been relatively infrequent. 
                                                 
110 See chapter 7.4.2. 
111 Fuller, above n 10, 71-75. 
112 Ibid, 75. Fuller uses the example of blasting operations to illustrate this point. He states that due to the nature 
of such operations ‘no amount of care or foresight can prevent occasional unintended injury.’ If the operator of 
such a risky enterprise was only held accountable for harm caused by fault they would have little incentive to 
take extra care in the blasting activities. Fuller describes strict liability in this scenario as a ‘kind of tax in the 
form of a rule that he must respond for any kind of damage that results from these operations, whether or not 
they can be attributed to any negligence’. The law should not be interpreted as ‘commanding the man using the 
explosives never to cause any damage, however innocently. Rather we should regard the rule as attaching a 
special liability to entry upon a certain line of conduct.’   
113 Fuller, above n 10, 75-76. 
114 Ibid, 79. 
Chapter 8 
 
236 
 
Other developments, such as the recognition of procedural obligations, are better described as 
refinements rather than ‘changes’ to the no-harm rule. That is, they have spelt out the content 
of the no-harm rule in greater detail, as opposed to changing it entirely. The no-harm rule 
therefore meets Fuller’s understanding of constancy.   
However, Brunnée and Toope have a more expansive understanding of this criterion. They 
suggest that this criterion not only requires constancy in the law but also predictability.115 That 
is, actors should be able to predict with a reasonable degree of accuracy when and how the law 
is to be applied. 116 Once again, the threshold of ‘significant’ transboundary harm poses an 
issue. It is challenging to determine with a reasonable degree of certainty when an activity such 
as SAI is likely to trigger the no-harm rule as there are no set decision-making parameters for 
determining when this threshold is met.117  
8.3.8 Congruence 
Fuller’s eighth criterion of legality is that there must be congruence between official actions 
and posited law.118 In the words of Brunnée and Toope, lawmaking is not a ‘one-way street’ in 
that the actions of those responsible for making and/or enforcing the law must uphold and 
comply with the law.119 Compliance with law is not merely a desired outcome, but part of the 
ongoing process of interactive lawmaking.120 In international law, states are responsible for 
making the law and are subject to it.121 States are also responsible for enacting and enforcing 
domestic law to uphold their international commitments. Therefore, in order to analyse whether 
the no-harm rule meets Fuller’s eighth criterion of congruence, it is necessary to look at the 
behaviour and practice of states and their officials with regard to this rule.  
Legal scholars have long recognised that there is a lack of congruence between the no-harm 
rule and the practice of states. According to Schachter:  
To say that a state has no right to injure the environment of another seems quixotic in the face 
of the great variety of transborder environmental harms that occur every day. Many result from 
ordinary economic and social activity; others occur by accident, often unrelated to fault.122 
                                                 
115 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 281-282.  
116 Ibid, 281-282.  
117 Ibid, 327. 
118 Fuller, above n 10, 81. Brunnée and Toope, Interactional International Law, above n 11, 311. 
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120 Ibid, 7, 122.  
121 Ibid, 40. See also Brunnée and Toope, Interactional International Law, above n 11 312.  
122 Oscar Schachter, 'The emergence of international environmental law' (1991) 44(2) Journal of International 
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Bodansky further notes that ‘transboundary pollution seems much more the rule than the 
exception in interstate relations.’123 These statements are general reflections and are not based 
on detailed empirical analysis. However, numerous examples of transboundary pollution 
readily come to mind in support of these statements. Recent examples include: the 2000 Baia 
Mare Cyanide Spill;124 the 2009 Montara oil spill;125 the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill;126 
the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster;127; the ongoing issue of the transboundary movement of 
smog from China over parts of South Korea and Japan;128 and China’s failure to protect and 
preserve the marine environment in the South China Sea Arbitration.129 The South China Sea 
Arbitration is the only one of these examples where an international court or tribunal has 
established a breach of due diligence on behalf of a state. Still, the regularity with which 
transboundary harm and harm to the global commons occurs suggests that states are not taking 
sufficient preventative measures. Given this regularity, it is beyond the scope of this research 
to provide a detailed examination of every instance of transboundary pollution or harm to the 
global commons. Instead, three prominent examples are illustrated below: the 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster, the ongoing Indonesian haze problem and ongoing issue of anthropogenic 
climate change.  
The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster is commonly cited as an example of state practice that is 
incongruent with the no-harm rule. When the nuclear reactor exploded, it released a radioactive 
                                                 
123 Daniel  Bodansky, 'Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law ' (1995) 3 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 105, 110-111.  
124 See Springer, above n 42, 84- 106. Cyanide from a gold mine in Romania entered shared river systems and 
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125 Oil from an Australian offshore oil field in the Timor Sea spilled into Indonesian waters, allegedly resulting 
in harm to local fish stocks and seaweed crops. See Jewel Topsfield, ‘Indonesian government poised to sue over 
Montara oil spill’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 October 2015, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/indonesian-
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See Rebecca K Richards, ‘Deepwater Mobile Oil Rigs in the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Uncertainty of 
Coastal States, (2011) 10 Journal of International Business & Law 387, 392-394.  
127 Radioactive waste from the crippled nuclear power plant in Japan has leaked into the Pacific Ocean, and has 
been detected as far as California and British Columbia. See Ken Buesseler, ‘5 years later, Fukushima radiation 
continues to seep into the Pacific Ocean’, PBS Newshour, 9 March 2016, 
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/fukushima-radiation-continues-to-leak-into-the-pacific-ocean/>.  
128 See, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/02/05/2003554261; Laura S Henry, Jasper Kim 
and Dongho Lee, ‘From Smelter Fumes to Silk Road Winds: Exploring Legal Responses to Transboundary Air 
Pollution over South Korea’ (2012) 11(3) Washington University Global Studies Law Review 565.  
129 The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v China) (Awards) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 
2013-19, 12 July 2016) [815]-[993]. See also Joshua Paine, Environmental Aspects of the South China Sea 
Award, EJIL: Talk! (21 July 2016) < http://www.ejiltalk.org/environmental-aspects-of-the-south-china-sea-
award/>. 
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plume high into the atmosphere.130 As a result, many European countries were contaminated 
by radioactive fallout from the disaster.131 Affected states also had to bear the cost of trying to 
mitigate the damage to their territory, including damage to agricultural, fishing and tourist 
industries.132 The widespread transboundary damage caused by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
indicates a lack of congruence between the actions of the Soviet Union and the no-harm rule. 
Mover, the Soviet Union failed to warn potentially affected states of the disaster until 2 days 
after the explosion.133 Its officials had also been negligent in operating the reactor.134 This 
suggests that the Soviet Union did not satisfy its duty of due diligence to prevent significant 
transboundary harm. Nevertheless, affected states did not bring a claim against the Soviet 
Union for breaching its obligation under customary international law.135 The Soviet Union also 
did not pay compensation to affected states.136  
A more recent example of incongruent state practice is the issue of transboundary haze 
pollution in South East Asia. Smoke haze is an ongoing problem in the region due to land 
clearing.137 In 1997 and 1998, deliberately lit fires in Indonesia spread across the provinces of 
Kalimantan and Sumatra, producing thick smoke haze that affected Thailand, Singapore, 
Malaysia and Australia. 138  The haze especially affected the health of citizens living in 
Singapore and Malaysia and had a detrimental impact on tourism in these states.139  The fires 
also had a direct impact on the atmosphere. A report by the Asian Development Bank states 
the burning of peat bog in the region alone was estimated to have released more than 700 
million megatons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.140 It is also questionable whether 
Indonesia met the necessary standard of due diligence prior to the outbreak of the fires. In 1995, 
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the Indonesian government banned the use of fire for land clearing.141 However, according to 
Springer, Indonesia’s capacity to monitor land clearing activities in the affected regions was 
constrained as ‘[p]oorly coordinated national agencies faced tight budgets and limited presence 
in the regions where the fires were being set.’142  It therefore could not and did not effectively 
enforce the ban.143   
Despite suffering hundreds of million dollars’ worth of damages and the potential lack of 
diligence on behalf of the Indonesian government, Singapore and Malaysia did little to suggest 
that Indonesia had breached its obligations under the no-harm rule.144 Furthermore, neither 
state sought compensation for damages.145 Springer states that the governments of Singapore 
and Malaysia were largely cooperative in their response to the situation. Instead of insisting 
that Indonesia was legally responsible for the fires and subsequent harm caused, they instead 
expressed concern for Indonesia and offered to help respond to the fires. 146  As with the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the governments of Singapore and Malaysia did not seek to invoke 
the no-harm rule.147 
The 1997/1998 fires led to the negotiation of the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary 
Haze Pollution.148 The objective of the agreement is to ‘prevent and monitor transboundary 
haze pollution as a result of land and/or forest fires which should be mitigated, through 
concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international co-operation.’149 The no-
harm rule was incorporated under article 3(1). Indonesia did not ratify the agreement until 14 
October 2014.150 Prior to its ratification, there was a fresh outbreak of fires in Indonesia in 
2013 that resulted again in hazardous levels of air pollution over Singapore and Malaysia.151 
Indonesia accepted responsibility and formally apologised for the fires. 152 However, once 
again, Singapore and Malaysia did not strongly emphasise that Indonesia was obliged under 
                                                 
141 David B Jerger Jr, 'Indonesia's Role in Realising the Goals of ASEAN's Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
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customary international law to ensure that activities in its jurisdiction and control do not cause 
transboundary harm. Nor did they claim compensation for harm under the doctrine of state 
responsibility.  
In the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the ongoing issue of Indonesian haze pollution, 
government officials on both sides of the fence appear to have acted incongruently with the no-
harm rule. First, accounts suggest that the states responsible for the harm failed to act diligently. 
That have also not sought to remedy harm caused through compensation. Second, and perhaps 
more significantly, the injured states have also failed to uphold the no-harm rule by not 
invoking or enforcing it against the perpetrating state. According to Brunnée and Toope, failure 
to enforce a legal norm can also indicate ‘a lack of ‘congruence’ between existing norms and 
international practice.’153 The failure of states to invoke or enforce the no-harm rule includes 
the no-harm rule for the global commons. Both scenarios involve harm to the global commons 
in addition to transboundary harm. Specifically, atmospheric pollution and, in the case of 
Indonesian fires, threats to biodiversity.154 However, as mentioned above, there are no clear 
secondary rules or legal mechanisms for states to bring proceedings for harm to the global 
commons. It is therefore unsurprising that states (including those not affected by transboundary 
harm) also did not seek to invoke any collective rights regarding the protection of the 
environment per se.155   
It could be argued that the Chernobyl disaster and the issue of transboundary haze from 
Indonesia are exceptional examples of state behaviour. After all, they are only two examples 
of transboundary harm and harm to the global commons. They also only involve a handful of 
states. Given the nature of the no-harm rule it is much easier to pinpoint examples of 
incongruent practice as opposed to compliance. Arguably, there would be less prominent, 
unpublicised examples in which states have acted diligently and taken all necessary steps to 
prevent harm from being caused.  However, there are other international environmental issues 
that demonstrate incongruent state practice on a much larger scale, suggesting that the 
behaviour of states with regards to Chernobyl and the Indonesian Haze dispute is indicative of 
a broader trend.  
                                                 
153 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 113.  
154 See Springer, above n 42, 69-70.  
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The most prominent example of widespread incongruent practice is anthropogenic climate 
change. States have recognised the cause of climate change and the risks of harm it poses for 
over twenty years. This is marked by the UNFCCC, which was negotiated by states in 1992 to 
respond to climate change. The no-harm rule is enshrined within the preamble to the UNFCCC. 
However, despite the negotiation of the UNFCCC and subsequent agreements under this 
regime, states have not taken necessary action to prevent significant harm from climate change 
by sufficiently reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Many states remain dependant on 
fossil fuels for their transportation and stationary energy needs. Moreover, experts suggest that 
the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions that states have set for themselves under the 
2015 Paris Agreement are insufficient to prevent the rise in global mean surface temperatures 
from exceeding the critical limit of two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.156 The 
recent election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States appears likely to 
compound this issue, as Trump has indicated the US will withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement.157  The current action on behalf of states therefore appears to be insufficient to 
meet the 1.5-2 °C target under the Paris Agreement and prevent dangerous levels of climate 
interference and the associated impacts this is likely to have on the territory of other states and 
global commons areas.  
Some risks of transboundary harm and harm to the global commons have already materialised. 
For example, rising global mean surface temperatures are causing sea levels to rise, resulting 
in extensive coastal erosion and threatening the existence of small island developing states, 
such as the Maldives and Kiribati.158 The rising level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is 
altering the pH level of the oceans, causing them to become more acidic and impacting on 
marine ecosystems.159 As noted above, the idea of invoking the no-harm rule as a basis for 
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climate change litigation has been mooted by NGOs and academics. It has also been considered 
by a small number of vulnerable states.160 However, generally speaking, obligations to prevent 
transboundary harm and harm to the global commons under the no-harm rule have taken a 
backseat to cooperation and negotiation within the UNFCCC regime.161  In this sense, climate 
change demonstrates widespread incongruence between the no-harm rule and the actions of 
states.      
8.3.9 Conclusion on criteria of legality 
The extent to which the no-harm rule meets Fuller’s criteria of legality is summarized in the 
following table: 
Figure 8.1 The degree to which the no-harm rule meets Fuller’s criteria of legality  
Criterion No-harm rule for 
transboundary harm  
No-harm rule for the 
global commons  
1. Generality High High 
2. Promulgation Medium-High Medium-High 
3. Non-Retroactivity High High 
4. Clarity Medium Low 
5. Contradiction High High  
6. Impossibility Medium-High Medium 
7. Constancy/Predictability Medium Low 
8. Congruence Low Low 
  
Figure 8.1 suggests the no-harm rule for transboundary harm meets five of Fuller’s eight 
criteria of legality to medium-high to high degree. It meets the criteria of clarity and constancy 
to a medium degree as previous decision of international courts and tribunals provide some 
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guidance on what might be considered significant transboundary harm. However, based on the 
examples analysed above, the no-harm rule for transboundary harm only meets the criterion of 
congruence to a low degree.  
By contrast, the no-harm rule for the global commons only satisfies four out of eight criteria to 
a medium-high to high degree. The difficulty in translating the procedural obligation to notify 
and consult means that it only satisfies the criterion of impossibility to a medium degree. The 
key differences however are the criteria of clarity and constancy/predictability, which are only 
satisfied to a low degree owing to the fact that states have an overly generous discretion to 
recognise when an activity poses a risk of significant’ harm to the global commons. The no-
harm rule for transboundary harm therefore meets the criteria of legality to a greater degree 
that the no-harm rule for harm to the global commons. 
This research has assessed each criteria on a scale, because there is some room for flexibility 
in Fuller’s approach. Fuller states that the extent to which a law must meet each of the eight 
criteria will depend on the type of rule in question.162 For example, he states that ‘it is generally 
more important that a man have a clear warning of his legal duties than that he should know 
precisely what unpleasantness will attend a breach’.163 Therefore, in Fuller’s view, rules do not 
necessarily have to meet every criteria to a high degree in order to qualify as ‘law’. However, 
Fuller suggests that a ‘total failure’ of a law to meet any one of these eight criteria means that 
a rule does not qualify as law ‘except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void contract 
can still be said to be one kind of contract.’164 The no-harm rule for transboundary harm does 
not qualify as ‘law’ in Fuller’s theory, as it does not sufficiently meet the criteria of congruence. 
The no-harm rule for harm to the global commons also falls short on account of the criteria of 
clarity and constancy/predictability.  
Brunnée and Toope echo Fuller’s view that the criteria of legality are ‘conditions for the 
existence of law.’165 However, it is important to remember how these criteria fit within the 
bigger picture of interactional law theory. They are one of three elements that contribute to the 
creation of interactional law and the cultivation of a sense of legal obligation amongst actors. 
Furthermore, as explored below, realisation of the criteria of legality is part of an ongoing 
process. In this sense, failure to meet a criterion of legality may not absolutely prevent a rule 
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from promoting a sense of legal obligation, but it may weaken this sense and, hence, the 
compliance pull it would likely have on states.      
8.4 PRACTICE OF LEGALITY  
The third element of interactional law theory is practice of legality. Practice of legality overlaps 
with Fuller’s criterion of congruence. 166 This is because a strong practice of legality requires 
congruence between law and official action.167 However, the element of practice of legality 
requires more than mere congruence with a posited norm. 168 According to Brunnée and Toope, 
in order for legal norms to generate a strong sense of legal obligation there must also be:  
[A] sustained and continuous effort to realize all the criteria of legality. This is not to say that 
practice must be absolutely consistent with the criteria of legality for legal rules to be created 
an upheld: but, recurring failures to meet the various criteria will ultimately erode, and even 
destroy, law.169  
Practice must therefore also include efforts to meet the criteria of legality. In other words, there 
must also be ‘norm application’ in addition to compliance. 170  This includes legal 
argumentation, interpretation and enforcement of legal norms.171  
It is through the element of practice of legality that interactional law theory comes full-circle. 
According to Brunnée and Toope, efforts to meet the criteria of legality are best facilitated by 
building spaces and opportunities for ongoing interaction between state and non-state actors. 
That is, it is best facilitated by the creation of communities of practice that promote inclusive 
and transparent lawmaking processes.172 In this regard, the element of practice of legality also 
interrelates with the first element of shared understandings.  
Given the extent to which practice of legality overlaps with the element of shared 
understandings and the criteria of legality, the analysis in this section is relatively brief. In this 
chapter, it has already been established that there is a widespread lack of congruence between 
the practice of states and the no-harm rule. This is not merely demonstrated by incidences of 
transboundary harm and harm to the global commons. It is also demonstrated by a failure of 
states to invoke and/or enforce the no-harm rule. According to Brunnée and Toope, incongruent 
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practice coupled with a failure to enforce a rule significantly detracts from the capacity of a 
legal norm to promote a sense of legal obligations. They state that  
[W]hen significant instances of non-complacence by one or more actors meet with no, or only 
selective, responses – when the community of practice does not insist that its rules are obeyed 
– international law will come under increasing strain.173 
In this view, the failure of states to invoke and/or enforce the no-harm rule in numerous 
circumstances detracts from the capacity of the no-harm to promote compliance. This is 
because enforcement plays a greater role than merely coercing states to comply with 
international law.174  
In interactional law theory, enforcement is instead seen as an activity that makes an important 
contribution to the practice of legality, and hence, legal obligation. It also contributes to the 
requirement for norm application and efforts to realise Fuller’s criteria of legality. In her own 
interactional international law analysis of the no-harm rule, Brunnée suggests there has recently 
been a ‘renaissance’ regarding the practice of neighbouring states and the no-harm rule.175 She 
highlights the Pulp Mills case, Aerial Herbicide Spraying case and the Certain Activities case. 
As contentious cases, they contribute to practice of legality. Each case involved argumentation, 
interpretation and/or enforcement of the no-harm rule. However, these three examples must be 
weighed against the numerous instances in which the no-harm rule was not argued, interpreted 
and/or enforced, such as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, Indonesian haze dispute and climate 
change damage examined above. They suggest that any such ‘renaissance’ in the application 
of the no-harm rule may not be sufficiently widespread (even in the context of neighbouring 
states) to generate a strong sense of legal obligation.   
It is also important to note that there a fewer examples of practice of legality for the no-harm 
rule for the global commons compared to transboundary harm. Argumentation and 
interpretation of the no-harm rule is largely isolated to legal scholarship. The ILC did not 
address the issue of harm to the global commons when developing its Draft Articles on 
Prevention. 176 The ILC has begun to consider the no-harm rule in its new project on the 
Protection of the Atmosphere. However the mandate of this project will likely prevent the ILC 
from interpreting and/or applying the no-harm rule to key issues such as climate change.177 
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The no-harm rule as a principle of customary international law has been considered in obiter 
in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the Activities in the Area advisory opinion, and the 
2016 South China Sea arbitration, but it has not been the subject of a contentious case. 
Moreover, there are no clear mechanisms for states to commence such cases and give rise to 
greater practice in the future.178 The no-harm rule for the global commons therefore has a much 
weaker practice of legality than the no-harm rule for transboundary harm.  
8.5 LEGAL OBLIGATION 
The above sections have considered in detail the extent to which the no-harm rule meets the 
elements of shared understandings, criteria of legality and practice of legality. What does this 
mean overall for the capacity of the no-harm rule to promote a sense of legal obligation in the 
context of future attempts at SAI? In order to reflect on this analysis, these results are 
summarised in the following table:  
Figure 8.2 Elements of interactional law theory  
Element No-harm rule for 
transboundary harm 
No-harm rule for harm to 
the global commons  
Shared Understandings Medium-High Low-Medium 
Criteria of Legality  Medium Low-Medium 
Practice of Legality  Low-Medium Low 
  
It is important to keep in mind that interactive lawmaking is an ongoing process, rather than an 
endpoint. Brunnée and Toope’s analysis of the climate change regime, the prohibition against 
torture and the prohibition against the use of force illustrates that the extent to which norms 
will meet the elements of interactional law theory will wax and wane over time. Legal 
obligation is a variable concept. It does not merely exist (in an ‘all or nothing’ sense). Instead, 
legal obligation is built, and must be cultivated and maintained.179 Furthermore, Brunnée and 
Toope suggest that the extent to which a norm is perceived as legitimate will affect the extent 
                                                 
178 This is discussed further in chapter 9.  
179 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 98.  
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to which it is complied with.180 In this view, the capacity of the no-harm rule to promote a 
sense of legal obligation and compliance pull over states in the context of SAI reflects the 
extent to which it satisfies the elements of interactional law theory.181  
This research suggests that there is considerable room for legal obligation to be further 
cultivated and maintained for the no-harm rule in the context of transboundary harm. The no-
harm rule for transboundary harm could better meet Fuller’s criteria of clarity, 
constancy/predictability and congruence. Practice of legality also needs to be bolstered to 
enhance the rule’s capacity to promote a sense of legal obligation in this context. Nevertheless, 
the no-harm rule for the prevention of transboundary harm satisfies the elements of 
interactional law theory to a greater extent than the no-harm rule for the prevention of harm to 
the global commons. It is therefore likely to promote a stronger sense of legal obligation and, 
hence, exert a greater compliance pull over states for risks of transboundary harm from SAI. 
Conversely, the no-harm rule is likely to promote a weaker sense of legal obligation in the 
context of risks of harm to the global commons from SAI. The capacity of the no-harm rule to 
pull states towards compliance will therefore be lessened in the context of risks of harm to the 
global commons from SAI. Interactional law theory therefore suggests that state compliance 
with the no-harm rule for future attempts at SAI can be expected to differ depending on the 
nature of the risks involved.  
The application of interactional law theory consequently provides a different perspective on 
the capacity of the no-harm rule to contribute to the governance of SAI than doctrinal legal 
analysis. Doctrinal legal analysis in chapter seven provided an understanding of how the no-
harm rule should apply to SAI and what types of behaviour it would require and/or prohibit 
from states if they should decide to pursue SAI in the future. On the other hand, interactional 
law theory indicates the extent to which the no-harm rule is likely to achieve these objectives 
by influencing the behaviour of states through a sense of legal obligation and the logic of 
appropriateness. In this sense, it provides a unique perspective on the no-harm rule compared 
to what can otherwise be found in legal scholarship. 
Analysing the no-harm rule through the lens of international law theory also provides a unique 
perspective on how this rule might be further developed to better contribute to the governance 
                                                 
180 Ibid, 99. Brunnée and Toope agree with Thomas Franck, who states that ‘the extent to which a rule is 
cognizable as a legitimate obligation affects the extent to which it is obeyed.’ See Thomas M  Franck, The 
Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press, 1990) 44. 
181 See Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 99. 
Chapter 8 
 
248 
 
of SAI. Brunnée and Toope describe interactional law theory as providing ‘concrete guidance 
in seizing opportunities for effective law-making’. 182  The above analysis does this by 
explaining how and why the capacity of the no-harm rule to promote compliance from states 
may be limited. It provides states, policymakers and international lawyers with targeted 
information on how the no-harm rule might be developed to improve this capacity. Some of 
the issues highlighted in this analysis overlap with issues identified by doctrinal legal analysis 
(i.e. the issue of ‘significant’ harm). However, other issues are distinct to interactional law 
theory, such as the need for a community of practice for the no-harm rule. Taking an interactive 
approach to the no-harm rule therefore provides a more nuanced picture of the role of the no-
harm rule in international environmental governance and highlights additional pathways for 
the development of the no-harm rule to enhance this role.  
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that, as a theoretical lens, there are a number of issues 
that interactional law theory does not consider. As highlighted in chapter three, Brunnèe and 
Toope recognise that power and material interests continue to play a role in determining 
compliance with international law, 183 but the elements of interactional law theory do not 
provide a means to consider how utilitarian considerations might interplay with legal 
obligation. This research used the work of Young and Levy to rule out the likely influence of 
utilitarian considerations in the specific context of SAI.184 However, such considerations may 
carry greater weight in the context other activities that pose a risk of transboundary harm and/or 
harm to the global commons.  
Interactional law theory provides a lens for considering how legal norms function as law by 
promoting a sense of legal legitimacy, legal obligation and compliance pull. It does not provide 
a lens for considering the substantive effectiveness of the no-harm rule. That is, how effectively 
the no-harm rule would solve or resolve the international environment issues posed by SAI. 
Furthermore, interactional law theory does not provide a framework to consider whether the 
no-harm rule promotes a ‘just’ or ‘equitable’ means to govern the risks of SAI, and how these 
considerations might influence compliance. Such considerations are largely beyond the scope 
of this project. However, they may be important to consider in future research to further 
enhance understanding of the role of the no-harm rule in international environmental 
governance.  
                                                 
182 See Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 17.  
183 See chapter 3.3.1; Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality, above n 7, 93.  
184 Chapter 3.3.2. 
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8.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has used interactional law theory to analyse the potential of the no-harm rule to 
promote a sense of legal obligation and compliance pull from states if they should attempt SAI 
in the future. This analysis suggests that the no-harm rule is likely to promote a greater sense 
of legal obligation for risks of transboundary harm, rather than risks of harm to the global 
commons. It therefore somewhat likely that states will comply with the no-harm rule in the 
context of transboundary harm. However, an interactional approach suggests that it is 
improbable that states will feel a strong sense of legal obligation to comply with the no-harm 
rule when it comes to risks of harm to the global commons.  
This conclusion is alarming, given the risks of harm to the atmosphere posed by SAI. It suggests 
that the capacity of the no-harm rule to respond to these risks is inadequate. This stands in stark 
contrast to the status of the extended no-harm rule as a binding rule of customary international 
law. The following chapter therefore considers how the no-harm rule might be developed to 
enhance its capacity in this regard.   
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9 Synthesis: Developing the No-Harm Rule for the Global 
Commons 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This project has taken two different approaches to analysing the potential of the no-harm rule 
to contribute to the governance of SAI. Chapters four to seven analysed the no-harm rule using 
legal doctrinal analysis. These chapters provided a detailed account of the historical 
development and current state of the no-harm rule, and how it is likely to apply to future 
attempts at SAI. Chapter eight used interactional law theory to assess the extent to which the 
no-harm rule is likely to promote a sense of legal obligation and, hence, how likely it is to pull 
states towards compliance should they consider attempting SAI.  
This chapter draws on the findings of doctrinal legal analysis and interactional law theory to 
consider the overall capacity of the no-harm rule to contribute to SAI governance, now and 
into the future. These findings suggest that, in its current form, the no-harm rule is better placed 
to respond to risks of transboundary harm from SAI proposals than risks of harm to the global 
commons. This is not to say that the no-harm rule necessarily provides an adequate means of 
governing risks of transboundary harm from SAI. The no-harm rule as it currently stands does 
not provide a panacea in this regard. However, this research demonstrates that it is currently in 
a better position to contribute to the governance of SAI in the context of transboundary harm 
compared to risks of harm to the global commons.  
Given the nature of SAI and the risks of harm it poses to the atmosphere, this project has argued 
there is a greater need to develop the no-harm rule to prevent significant harm to the global 
commons, than for transboundary harm. This chapter thus makes four recommendations to 
states, international organisations, and international law scholars for how they might develop 
the no-harm rule for the global commons. These are: (1) build a community of practice between 
state and non-state actors; (2) develop a set of criteria to assist states and decision-makers to 
determine when an activity poses a risk of significant harm to a global commons area; (3) 
clarify the means by which states can enforce the no-harm rule for the global commons; and 
(4) clarify how procedural obligations under the no-harm rule are to be interpreted in the 
context of the global commons. These developments would bolster the capacity of the no-harm 
rule to contribute to the governance of SAI by reducing doctrinal ambiguity and enhancing the 
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sense of legal obligation that states feel to comply with the no-harm rule. These developments 
would not necessarily transform the no-harm rule into a comprehensive governance regime for 
SAI, because key issues, including the practicalities of establishing a breach for the purpose of 
state responsibility or liability,1 would remain outstanding. These recommendations would 
however, bring the capacity of the no-harm rule to prevent significant harm to the global 
commons on par with its capacity to prevent transboundary harm. This would equip 
international law with a basic capacity to govern risks of significant harm to the global 
commons posed by SAI until such a time as a comprehensive international agreement might 
be negotiated and would strengthen the no-harm rule to respond to other activities that pose a 
risk of significant harm to the global commons. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 9.2 considers the overall capacity of the no-harm rule 
to respond to the risks of SAI. Section 9.3 proposes how the no-harm rule might be developed 
to enhance its capacity to contribute to respond to activities that pose a risk of significant harm 
to the global commons. Section 9.4 concludes by offering final observations on the potential 
of the no-harm rule to contribute to the international governance of SRM.  
9.2 THE CURRENT CAPACITY OF THE NO-HARM RULE TO RESPOND TO SAI 
Figure 9.2 below summarises the findings from chapters seven and eight. It illustrates the extent 
to which the content of the no-harm rule might apply to future attempts at SAI. This includes 
the extent to which it is clear that SAI will fall within the scope of the no-harm rule, and the 
extent to which obligations of states under the no-harm rule might be understood in this context. 
These findings are contrasted against the extent to which the no-harm rule meets the three 
elements of interactional law theory.   
  
                                                 
1 See chapter 2.3. See also David Reichwein et al, 'State Responsibility for Environmental Harm from Climate 
Engineering' (2015) 5(2-4) Climate law 142; Barbara Saxler, Jule Siegfried and Alexander Proelss, 
'International liability for transboundary damage arising from stratospheric aerosol injections' (2015) 7(1) Law, 
Innovation and Technology 112.   
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Figure 9.2 Findings of doctrinal legal analysis and interactional law theory   
  Transboundary Harm Harm to the Global Commons 
Doctrinal 
legal analysis 
   
Scope: Transboundary 
impact 
Clear Moderately clear  
 Nature of harm 
(detrimental + from 
a physical act) 
Clear Moderately clear  
 Threshold level of 
‘significant’ harm 
Moderately unclear  Unclear  
Standard of 
Care: 
Duty of due 
diligence  
Moderately unclear Moderately unclear 
 Enact and enforce 
domestic law 
Moderately clear Moderately clear 
 Initial assessment of 
risk  
Moderately clear Moderately clear 
 Environmental 
impact assessment 
Moderately unclear Moderately unclear 
 Notify and consult Clear Unclear 
 Precautionary 
approach  
Moderately clear Moderately clear 
Interactional 
law theory 
   
 Shared 
understandings  
Medium-High Low-Medium 
 Criteria of legality  Medium Low-Medium 
 Practice of legality Low-Medium Low 
 
The two different approaches taken to analysing the no-harm rule in this project make similar 
findings concerning its capacity to respond to the risks of SAI. They both demonstrate that the 
no-harm rule is better placed to respond to risks of transboundary harm than harm to the global 
commons. In the case of doctrinal legal analysis, it is clearer to interpret and apply the no-harm 
rule to risks of transboundary harm. It is relatively straightforward to determine if a proposed 
SAI activity triggers the no-harm rule because of a risk of significant transboundary harm. 
States still have wide discretion to determine if a risk of transboundary harm meets the 
threshold level of ‘significant’ harm. However, prior decisions of international courts and 
tribunals provide states and their decision-makers with a reasonable level of guidance in this 
regard, thereby reducing ambiguity.2  
                                                 
2 See chapter 7.7.3. 
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There is always going to be a certain level of ambiguity concerning the duty of due diligence; 
it is important that the no-harm rule remains flexible in this regard to accommodate a wide 
range of activities and risks. As demonstrated in chapter seven, exactly what a state must do to 
prevent significant transboundary harm from a proposed SAI activity will depend on the 
situation at hand, including the nature of the proposed activity and the capacity of the state 
involved.3 However, it is clear that states must fulfil procedural obligations as part of their 
obligation of due diligence. A state proposing to attempt SAI must first ascertain if it poses a 
risk of significant transboundary harm.4 If so, it is clear that the state must then conduct an EIA 
prior to commencing the activity (although the content of the EIA is not prescribed under 
customary international law). Finally, if the EIA confirms a risk of significant transboundary 
harm, the state in question must then notify and consult with other potentially affected states. 
Therefore, in a number of respects, the no-harm rule provides states with distinct obligations 
for SAI proposals that present a risk of significant transboundary harm.  
From the perspective of interactional international law, the no-harm rule meets the elements of 
shared understandings, criteria of legality, and practice of legality to a greater extent for 
transboundary harm than for harm to the global commons. The no-harm rule for transboundary 
harm is founded on robust shared understandings of state sovereignty and sovereign territorial 
rights.5 It also satisfies the criteria of legality to a greater extent.6 This is because its content is 
clearer and it is also easier to predict how the no-harm rule will be interpreted to apply to risks 
of transboundary harm. However, there is scope for improvement. In particular, the no-harm 
rule for transboundary harm does not meet the criterion of congruence.7 Efforts to argue and 
enforce the no-harm rule in recent cases before international courts and tribunals provide 
evidence of practice of legality. But, as demonstrated in chapter eight, this practice is not 
universal in all instances of transboundary harm.8 Although its capacity could be bolstered, the 
findings of this project nevertheless suggest that there is a reasonable prospect that the no-harm 
will exert a sense of legal obligation over states for risks of transboundary harm from SAI. This 
means that there is also a prospect that states will comply with the no-harm rule in this context.  
At this point, it is important to remember that this project focuses only on a distinct aspect of 
the potential of the no-harm rule to contribute to the governance of SAI. It considers the 
                                                 
3 See chapter 7.4.1. 
4 Chapter 7.4.1. 
5 Chapter 8.2.1. 
6 See chapter 8.3.9, figure 8.1. 
7 Chapter 8.3.8. 
8 Chapter 8.4.  
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potential of no-harm rule in the context of ex ante governance, to prevent harm before it occurs. 
It has not given detailed consideration to its role ex post. That is, the no-harm rule’s potential 
to respond to harm after it occurs by forming the basis of a claim of state responsibility. This 
potential of the no-harm rule has already been considered at length by legal scholars.9 As 
mentioned in chapter two, existing analysis highlights some fundamental difficulties with the 
no-harm rule in this respect. For example, it would be challenging to establish a causal link 
between an SAI activity and an alleged incident of transboundary harm.10 It may also be 
challenging to establish a breach of due diligence.11 Additionally, the state in breach of the no-
harm rule would need to consent to have the matter heard before an international court or 
tribunal. Only 72 states have made declarations in accordance with Article 36(2) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, recognising the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory.12 
Key states that have not accepted compulsory jurisdiction included the United States, Russia 
and China. The United Kingdom only recognises compulsory jurisdiction in disputes with 
countries outside Commonwealth.13 This precludes compulsory jurisdiction in disputes with 
the 52 states that are currently members of the Commonwealth.14 This represents a significant 
practical hurdle to holding states responsible for transboundary harm the might result from 
future attempts at SAI. The no-harm rule therefore does not provide a comprehensive means of 
governing risks of transboundary harm from SAI. However, until such time as a more robust 
international agreement might be negotiated, it provides international law with a basic avenue 
to respond to such risks before they eventuate.  
By contrast, the no-harm rule is inadequate in the context of risks of harm to the global 
commons and is unlikely to provide even a basic means of responding to risks of harm to the 
atmosphere from future attempts at SAI. One reason is that the no-harm rule as a principle of 
customary international law has not been applied to harm to the global commons in a 
contentious case.15 International courts and tribunals therefore have not had the opportunity to 
                                                 
9 See Saxler, Siegfried and Proelss, above n 1; Reichwein et al, above n 1. 
10 See Reichwein et al, above n 1, 157-166.  
11 See Saxler, Siegfried and Proelss, above n 1, 122-123. 
12 Jurisdiction: Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, International Court of 
Justice, (17 November 2016) < http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3>. Some of 
these declarations are conditional. See, eg, ‘Declaration made by Japan on the 6 October 2015’, Jurisdiction: 
Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, International Court of Justice, (17 
November 2016) < http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3>. 
13 ‘Declaration made by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island’, Jurisdiction: Declarations 
Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, International Court of Justice, (17 November 2016) < 
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3>. 
14 Member Countries, The Commonwealth, < http://thecommonwealth.org/member-countries>. 
15 See Chapter 7.3.  
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elucidate the content of the no-harm rule in this context, unlike in the context of transboundary 
harm between neighbouring states. The decisions of international courts and tribunals are only 
binding on the parties to the case, but nevertheless provide considerable guidance as to how 
other states should interpret obligations under the no-harm rule for activities that pose a risk of 
significant transboundary harm, including for determining whether a risk of transboundary 
harm is likely to qualify as ‘significant’. 16 However, this guidance is lacking for risks of 
significant harm to the atmosphere as a global commons area. It is therefore more challenging 
to identify when such risks would give rise to obligations and how obligations under the no-
harm rule like the duty to notify and consult with other states17 should apply.  
The no-harm rule satisfies the elements of interactional law theory to a lesser extent for harm 
to the global commons than for transboundary harm. A key difference here is the element of 
shared understandings, as prevention of harm to the global commons is not underpinned by 
existing understandings and practice concerning the rights of states.18 There is no widespread 
community of practice involving both state and non-state actors to promote the development 
of shared understandings. 19 Greater doctrinal ambiguity also means that the no-harm rule 
satisfies the criteria of legality to a lesser extent for harm to the global commons. In particular, 
the no-harm rule satisfies the criteria of clarity, constancy/predictability and impossibility to 
only a low degree.20 Finally, it is difficult to identify examples of practice of legality involving 
state actors. Unlike transboundary harm, there are no clear examples where states have 
attempted to enforce the no-harm rule for the global commons. It is also unclear how states 
would do this through existing rules of state responsibility.21 As explained in chapter eight, 
enforcement on its own does not account for a sense of legal obligation, but plays an important 
role in developing a practice of legality. 22 There is therefore little prospect that the no-harm 
rule will exert a sense of legal obligation and promote compliance from states in the context of 
risks of harm to the global commons from SAI.   
                                                 
16 Chapter 7.3.3. 
17 See chapter 7.4.1. 
18 See chapter 8.2.1. 
19 See chapter 8.2.2. 
20 Chapter 8.3.9, figure 8.1.  
21 For further discussion see 9.3.3 below. States may have a right of actio popularis. However, as noted by 
Sands and Peel, there is no state practice in support of such a right. See Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, 
Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2012), 148, 151. 
22 Chapter 8.4. See also Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account (Cambridge University Press 2010), 111-114.  
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These findings are concerning. By its very nature, SAI will affect the atmosphere and the global 
climate system.23 This is what SAI is intended to do. As outlined in chapter one, scientists 
suggest that SAI may also have serious side effects on precipitation patterns and the 
stratospheric ozone layer.24 As highlighted in chapter one, existing multilateral agreements do 
not adequately address the risks posed by SAI.25 Risks of harm to the global commons from 
SAI therefore appear to fall through the gaps of existing rules of international law.  
As with transboundary harm above, this project does not propose that the no-harm rule would 
provide a comprehensive and adequate means to govern risks of harm to the global commons 
posed by SAI. It may be the case that an international agreement is needed to adequately govern 
these risks.26 However, there is no indication that states plan to negotiate any such agreement 
in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, a growing number of scientists advocate that it is 
necessary to start field testing SAI, 27  so it is plausible that SAI will be deployed in the 
stratosphere before an international agreement can be negotiated. This project therefore 
considers how the no-harm rule might be developed in the meantime to bolster its capacity to 
respond to risks of harm to the global commons. These recommendations aim to bring this 
capacity on par with that for transboundary harm and provide international law with at least a 
basic prospect of preventing significant harm to the atmosphere from SAI.  
9.3 DEVELOPING THE NO-HARM FOR THE PREVENTION OF HARM TO THE 
ATMOSPHERE AS A GLOBAL COMMONS  
This projects makes four recommendations for the development of the no-harm rule for the 
global commons. The aims of these recommendations are: (a) to reduce doctrinal ambiguity; 
and (b) to enhance the sense of legal obligation the rule may exert over states should they 
                                                 
23 Chapter 1.2.2; Chapter 7.3.1, 7.4.2.  
24 Chapter 1.2.2.   
25 Chapter 1.2. 
26 The desirability, design and purpose of an international agreement for SRM and geoengineering more 
generally has been mooted in the literature. See, eg, Chiara Armeni and Catherine Redgwell, ‘International legal 
and regulatory issues of climate geoengineering governance: rethinking the approach’ (2016) Climate 
Geoengineering Governance Working Paper Series: 021 <http://geoengineering-governance-
research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper21armeniredgwelltheinternationalcontextrevise-.pdf> ; Ian D  Lloyd 
and Michael Oppenheimer, 'On the design of an international governance framwork for geoengineering ' (2014) 
14(2) Global Environmental Politics 45; John Virgoe, 'International governance of a possible geoengineering 
intervention to combat climate change' (2009) 95(1-2) Climatic Change 103; 
27 See, eg, Jane C S Long, Frank Loy and M. Granger Morgan, ‘Start research on climate engineering’ (2015) 
518 Nature 29; David W. Keith and Douglas G. MacMartin, 'A temporary, moderate and responsive scenario for 
solar geoengineering' (2015) 5(3) Nature Climate Change 201; David  Keith, A Case for Climate Engineering 
(The MIT Press, 2013); Douglas G. MacMynowski et al, 'Can we test geoengineering?' (2011) 4(12) Energy & 
Environmental Science 5044.  
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decide to attempt SAI in the future. States, international organisations and international law 
scholars should:   
(1) Build a widespread community of practice to promote mutual and sustained 
engagement between state and non-state actors regarding the no-harm rule for the 
global commons; 
(2) Develop a set of relevant criteria or factors to provide states with greater guidance 
on how to determine if an activity poses a risk of ‘significant’ harm to the global 
commons; 
(3) Clarify the means by which states can enforce the no-harm rule for the global 
commons against other states that breach their obligations under this rule;  
(4) Clarify how procedural obligations should be interpreted in the context of the global 
commons as opposed to transboundary harm.  
The first two of these four recommendations are the most important in the near-term. The 
development of a widespread community of practice involving both state and non-state actors 
is necessary to foster interactional lawmaking. This is a prerequisite for the progressive 
development of the no-harm rule. Without sustained interaction and a community of practice, 
interactional law theory suggests that it is unlikely that efforts to further develop the no-harm 
rule would have a practical impact on the understanding and practice of states. A clearer 
understanding of the threshold level of ‘significant’ harm is also a prerequisite to realising the 
effective operation of recommendations (3) and (4). It is necessary to determine when a 
proposed SAI activity will give rise to procedural obligations.28 The decision in the Certain 
Activities case also suggests that this threshold will play an important role in determining 
whether a state has breached its obligations (procedural and substantial) under the no-harm 
rule.29 For this reason, this research provides more detailed consideration of recommendations 
(1) and (2), and flags (3) and (4) for future consideration.  
9.3.1 A community of practice for the prevention of significant harm to the global commons  
Interactional law theory highlights the role of mutual engagement and interaction between state 
and non-state actors in building norms with a strong sense of legal obligation.30 As noted by 
                                                 
28 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction 
of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) (International Court of 
Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015) [104], [168]. See also Chapter 6.6.4; Chapter 7.4.1.  
29 See chapter 6.6.3-4.  
30 Brunnée and Toope, above n 22, 62-65. See also Chapter 3.4.1; Chapter 8.2.2.  
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Brunnée and Toope, ‘without the mutual engagement of social actors in a community of 
practice, the formal norm will not exert social influence.’31 In this view, it is imperative that 
state and non-state actors have opportunities to engage and interact with each other over 
application of the no-harm rule for the global commons. Communities of practice provide this 
opportunity.32 It is therefore important to create ‘space’ that enables communities of practice 
to develop around the no-harm rule for the global commons.33 
As noted in chapter eight, Brunnée and Toope privilege the role of international institutions in 
enabling communities of practice to develop around legal norms.34 A number of legal scholars 
have recognised that international institutions (especially intergovernmental organisations) 
play an important role in the contemporary development of customary international law.35 As 
noted by Wood:  
Through international organizations, states interact intensively and adopt positions, often 
jointly, on a continuing and collective basis that would have been unimaginable in the not too 
distant past. This inevitably has an important impact on the development of customary 
international law.36 
Wood explains the role of international organisations in developing customary international 
law based on the traditional doctrinal account of state practice and opinio juris.37 He suggests 
that the activities of states within international organisations (i.e. voting or debating) provide 
evidence of state practice and opinio juris. 38  He further suggests that international 
organisations may contribute to practice and opinio juris in their own right.39 However, this is 
a more controversial argument as it is difficult to reconcile with the traditional doctrinal view 
of states as primary actors in international law, and solely responsible for the development of 
customary international law.40 The concept of communities of practice and the role attributed 
to them in interactional law theory potentially offers a more nuanced account of the way in 
                                                 
31 Ibid, 351. 
32 Ibid, 352.  
33 See Ibid 63-65, 353.  
34 Chapter 8.2.2.  
35 See Michael Wood, 'International Organizations and Customary International Law, 2014 Johathan J. Charney 
Ristinguished Lecture in Public International Law, Presented at Vanderbilt University Law School on 
November 4, 2014 ' (2015) 48(3) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 609. See also Jonathan I. Charney, 
'Universal International Law' (1993) 87(4) The American Journal of International Law 529, 543-545; Roozbeh 
B. Baker, 'Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and New Debates' (2010) 21(1) 
(February 1, 2010) European Journal of International Law 173; Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: 
International Law, Politics and Organizations (Oxford University Press, 2011).    
36 Wood, above n 35, 614.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid, 614.  
40 See ibid, 616-619. 
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which international organisations can contribute to the development of customary international 
law.  
The first step towards developing the no-harm rule for the global commons is to understand 
how international organisations might be used and which may be the most suitable to facilitate 
the development of a widespread community of practice between state and non-state actors. It 
is beyond the scope of this project to fully undertake this analysis but this section provides a 
preliminary assessment of the suitability of four prominent institutions.  
The UN General Assembly  
The first international institution that could help develop a community of practice around the 
no-harm rule for the global commons is the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The UNGA is a 
well-established institution that provides states with a forum to deliberate matters of 
international law. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the UNGA has the capacity to 
promote the codification and progressive development of international law.41 Membership of 
the UNGA is restricted to states. Non-state actors can participate in the UN System through the 
Economic and Social Council, through the UN Department of Public Information, or through 
special events organised by the President of the UNGA. 42 However, there are no formal 
mechanisms to allow NGOs to participate in the UNGA.43 Owing to this limited membership, 
it is doubtful that the UNGA would be able to facilitate the development of a widespread 
community of practice between state and non-state actors for the no-harm rule for the global 
commons.  
The International Law Commission 
Another potential institution to consider is the International Law Commission (ILC). The ILC’s 
mandate is the ‘promotion of the progressive development of international law and its 
codification’.44 The ILC has the capacity to act as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ to seek to deliberately 
build new norms and promote new standards for appropriate behaviour in international law.45 
The membership of the ILC is comprised of experts in international law acting in their private 
                                                 
41 Charter of the United Nations art 13(1)(a).  
42 See Civil Society, United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/sections/resources/civil-society/index.html>. 
43 Jens Martens, ‘The Future of NGO Participate at the United Nations after the 2005 World Summit’, (2006) 
Dialogue on Globalization Briefing Papers < http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/50188.pdf> 2. 
44 Statute of the International Law Commission, GA Res 174(II), UN GAOR, 2nd sess, 123rd mtg, (21 November 
1947) art 1(1) (‘Statute of the International Law Commission’). 
45 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change' (1998) 52(4) 
International Organization 887, 896-897. See also Brunnée and Toope, above n 22, 57-58. See also chapter 
8.8.2. 
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capacity.46 The ILC also engages with the governments of states and the UN General Assembly 
at different stages throughout a project. In this sense, the structure of the ILC may facilitate the 
engagement of a broader range of state and non-state actors than the UNGA regarding the 
development of the no-harm rule for the global commons.  
However, the nature of this engagement requires further assessment. The ILC provides states 
with opportunities to supply information and comment on the ILC’s work,47 but it is unclear 
whether this level of engagement would be sufficiently prolonged and mutual to sustain a 
process of interactive lawmaking. The UNGA plays a more direct role in the work of the ILC, 
including referring topics for consideration, debating reports provided by the ILC, encouraging 
informal discussions between members of the sixth committee on the work of the ILC, and, in 
some instances, it has initiated diplomatic conferences to study an adopt the ILC’s draft 
conventions.48 However, as noted above, civil society is largely absent from this process. 
Further research is needed to consider the process of codification and progressive development 
of international law within the ILC and the extent to which it may be expected to promote 
interactive lawmaking and the development of widespread communities of practice for the no-
harm rule for the global commons.   
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
The IUCN is a union that pursues environmental protection, conservation and sustainable 
development. Its membership is comprised of 1300 member organisations from governments 
and civil society, as well as 16,000 experts.49 The IUCN therefore has a much broader and 
diverse membership than the ILC and the UNGA. It provides a forum for ‘governments, NGOs, 
scientists, businesses, local communities, indigenous peoples groups, faith-based organisations 
and others can work together to forge and implement solutions to environmental challenges.’50 
It has a dedicated environmental law program, which could provide a forum for a wide range 
of state and non-state actors to interact and discuss the development of the no-harm rule for the 
prevention of significant harm to the global commons. Further research is warranted to better 
                                                 
46 Membership: Qualifications and Nationality, International Law Commission, (16 August 2016) 
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml>.  
47 See About the Commission: Organization, programme and methods of work, International Law Commission, 
(22 July 2015) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/governments.shtml>. Under art 17(1) of the Statute of the International 
Law Commission the governments of states may ask the ILC to consider proposals and draft multilateral 
conventions, but this has never taken place.  
48 Ibid.  
49 The Union, IUCN, <https://www.iucn.org/secretariat/about/union>.  
50 About, IUCN, < https://www.iucn.org/about>. 
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understand the role of the IUCN in international lawmaking and how it might contribute to the 
development of a widespread community of practice around the no-harm rule for the prevention 
of harm to the global commons.  
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) & Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
The MDGs and SDGs are not ‘institutions’ in the formal sense, like the UNGA, the ILC or the 
IUCN. They are universally applicable goals to guide and shape law, policy and development 
at national, regional and global levels.51 The SDGs succeeded the earlier MDGs, and were 
adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1 on the 25th September 2015.52 The SDG 
aspire to end poverty as well as address related issues including climate change and 
environmental protection.53 The SDGs are non-binding on states, but they provide a framework 
within which governments, corporations, civil society and NGOs can discuss issues of global 
environmental concern.  
The prevention of harm to the global commons fits directly with the following SDGs:  
Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts;54 
Goals 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources.55 
It may also fit indirectly with other SDGs, such as goal 6 (clean water and sanitation), goal 7 
(affordable and clean energy), and goal 12 (responsible consumption and production). 56 
Further consideration should therefore be given to the suitability of the SDGs as a means to 
facilitate greater engagement between state and non-state actors concerning the no-harm rule 
for the prevention of significant transboundary harm to the global commons.    
9.3.2 Criteria for determining significant harm to the global commons  
A set of criteria to assist states in determining when a proposed activity posed a risk of 
significant harm to the global commons would greatly enhance the capacity no-harm rule to 
                                                 
51 See The Sustainable Development Agenda, Sustainable Development Goals, < 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/>. 
52 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, GA Res 70/1, UN GAOR, 70th sess, 
Agenda Items 15 and 116, UN Doc A/RES/70/1 (25 September 2015).  
53 See The Sustainable Development Agenda, Sustainable Development Goals, < 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/>. 
54 Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, Sustainable Development Goals, < 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-change-2/>. 
55 Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources, Sustainable Development Goals, < 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/oceans/>. 
56 Sustainable Development Goals, Sustainable Development Goals, < 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/>.  
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reduce the risks of harm to the atmosphere from SAI. Given the general nature of the no-harm 
rule as a principle of customary international law, a universal set of criteria may also have 
broader application to activities other than SAI and thereby bolster the capacity of the no-harm 
rule more generally to respond to other risks of significant harm to the global commons.  
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context57 (‘Espoo 
Convention’) and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty 58(‘Antarctic Environmental Protocol’) provide guidance on what a general set of 
criteria might include. Appendix III of the Espoo Convention provides a list of three general 
criteria that may indicate that an activity is likely to have a ‘significant adverse transboundary 
impact’ for the purpose of article 2(5) of the convention. These criteria are the size and location 
of a proposed activity, and the effects it is likely to have on the environment. Parties to the 
Espoo Convention must consider these criteria for proposed activities that are located close to 
an international border and those that might not be close, but nevertheless ‘give rise to 
significant transboundary effects far removed from the site of development.’59 The criteria 
under Appendix III of the Espoo Convention are therefore directed at establishing the same 
threshold level of harm as the no-harm rule.  
The major drawback of Appendix III of the Espoo Convention is that it specifically addresses 
transboundary harm between states, rather than harm to the global commons. Article 3(2)(c) of 
the Antarctic Environment Protocol, on the other hand, establishes rules for human activities 
in Antarctica to prevent harm to the environment. Article 3(2)(c) provides a list of features that 
must be taken into consideration when assessing the possible impact of scientific research on 
the Antarctic environment – a recognised global commons. The general aim under article 3 of 
the Protocol is to limit adverse impacts on the Antarctic environment, not limited to a threshold 
of ‘significant’ harm as is the case with the no-harm rule, but article 3(2)(c) nonetheless 
indicates what type of considerations may be relevant in the context of the global commons as 
opposed to transboundary harm.  
Based on Appendix III of the Espoo Convention and article 3(2)(c) of the Antarctic 
Environment Protocol, the following criteria provide a useful framework for assessing the 
severity of risks of harm to the global commons.  
                                                 
57 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, opened for signature 25 
February 1991, 1989 UNTS 309 (entered into force 10 September 1997) (‘Espoo Convention’). 
58 The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 4 October 1991, 
[1998] ATS 6 (entered into force 14 January 1998) (‘Antarctic Environmental Protocol’).   
59 Espoo Convention, Appendix III (2). 
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1. The scope of the activity, including its area, duration and intensity 
 The Espoo Convention lists a criterion of scale, which encourages Parties to consider whether 
a proposed activity is ‘large’ for its type.60 The physical size of a proposed SAI activity would 
be an important consideration. However, geographical size alone may not accurately reflect the 
potential impacts of SAI. Thinking back to the hypothetical scenarios in chapter seven, a key 
issue is more likely to be the volume of precursor to be used and the corresponding amount of 
particles to be created in the stratosphere. For this reason, it would also be important to take 
into account the magnitude or intensity of a proposed SAI activity. That is, the amount of 
particles to be created in the atmosphere and the amount of sunlight that they are likely to 
reflect (radiative forcing). 61  A further relevant consideration would be the duration of a 
proposed SAI activity – the timeframe over which it would be conducted may also be relevant 
in considering whether it poses a risk of significant harm to the global commons. 62  For 
example, continuous deployment of SAI as in scenario 3 may indicate greater severity of 
impacts than deployment lasting only three months, as in scenario 1. These considerations are 
better reflected in article 3(2)(c)(i) of the Antarctic Environmental Protocol. It requires parties 
to take into account ‘the scope of the activity, including its area, duration and intensity’. This 
approach would therefore be preferable for assessing the risks of harm to the global commons.  
2. The location of the activity, including whether it will be located or conducted within a 
global commons area, and/or the proximity of protected areas or sites of scientific or 
culturally significance;  
The location of an activity is a relevant consideration under Appendix III(1)(b) of the Espoo 
Convention. The proximity of a proposed activity to protected areas, such as Ramsar wetlands63 
and sites of cultural or historic significance64 may indicate that an activity carries a risk of 
causing significant adverse transboundary impacts65 or indeed impacts on global commons 
such as Antarctica.66  However, they do not readily translate to the atmosphere, as it does not 
                                                 
60 Espoo Convention, Appendix III, 1(a). 
61 For a discussion on radiative forcing and SAI see Keith and MacMartin, above n 27; Douglas G. MacMartin, 
Ken Caldeira and David W. Keith, 'Solar geoengineering to limit the rate of temperature change' (2014) 
372(2031) Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 1.  
62 See Reichwein et al, above n 1, 162.  
63 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, opened for signature 2 February 1971, 996 UNTS 246 
(entered into force 21 December 1975). 
64 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, opened for signature 16 
November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 17 December 1975).  
65 Espoo Convention, Appendix III 1(b) 
66 For example, proximity to historically significant sites. See Antarctic Environmental Protocol, art 3(2)(h). 
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contain any protected areas or sites of cultural or historical significance. This does not mean 
that the location of an activity will be irrelevant when determining if it poses a risk of harm to 
the atmosphere. A key consideration in the context of future SAI activities is the fact that they 
are conducted within the atmosphere as a global commons.  
3. The purpose of the activity, including whether it is intended to change or modify a 
global commons area 
Not only would SAI be conducted within the atmosphere, it would be done with the deliberate 
intention of modifying the atmosphere and global climate system. This characteristic of SAI 
(and geoengineering proposals more broadly) highlights the need to think beyond the mere 
location of a proposed activity to consider how its purpose might also indicate a risk of 
significant harm.  
4. The potential effects of the activity, including 
(i) Whether the activity will have complex and/or potentially adverse effects 
on humans, organisms or ecosystems; 
(ii) Whether the activity will detrimentally affect other activities or potential 
future activities conducted in or involving a global commons area; 
(iii) The cumulative impacts of the activity on the global commons, both by 
itself and in combination with other activities; 
(iv) Whether the activity is likely to contribute to or exacerbate an existing 
environmental problem within a global commons area 
Appendix III of the Espoo Convention lists the following effects: 
[P]roposed activities with particularly complex and potentially adverse effects, including those 
giving rise to serious effects on humans or on valued species or organisms, those which threaten 
the existing or potential use of an affected area and those causing additional loading which 
cannot be sustained by the carrying capacity of the environment. 
 
Harm to humans, species and organisms as highlighted within Appendix III of the Espoo 
Convention will be an important consideration when it comes to risks of transboundary harm 
from SAI. These risks were highlighted in all three hypothetical scenarios in chapter seven. 
Harm to humans, species and organisms may also be relevant for assessing risks of harm to the 
global commons areas of the high seas and Antarctica. 67   Harm to humans, species and 
                                                 
67 Article 3(2)(b) of the Antarctic Environmental Protocol lists specific impacts that Parties should avoid 
causing to the Antarctic environment, including: ‘significant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including 
aquatic), glacial or marine environments’; ‘detrimental changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of 
species or populations of species of fauna and flora’; further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or 
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organisms should therefore be included as part of a general list of criteria to consider for 
assessing whether an activity poses a risk of significant harm to a global commons area.68 
However, owing to the nature of the atmosphere, it would be of little use in assessing whether 
a future SAI activity poses a risk of significant harm to the atmosphere per se.   
A more relevant consideration would be the potential impact of SAI on other uses of the 
atmosphere. Robock, a leading atmospheric chemist, suggests that SAI may affect other ways 
in which humans utilise the atmosphere and solar energy. For example, it may ‘[d]egrade 
terrestrial optical astronomy’; have ‘[e]ffects on aeroplanes flying in the stratosphere’; result 
in ‘[l]ess solar energy generation’; and ‘[d]egrade passive solar heating’.69 Impacts upon the 
‘use of an area’ is included within article 3(2)(c)(iii) of the Antarctic Environmental Protocol. 
This project proposes that a similar provision be taken into account when determining if an 
activity poses a risk of significant harm to the global commons. 
It may also be relevant to consider whether an activity will have cumulative effects on a global 
commons area. Article 3(2)(c)(ii) of the Antarctic Environmental Protocol encourages Parties 
to take account of ‘the cumulative impacts of the activity, both by itself and in combination 
with other activities in the Antarctic Treaty area’. A similar provision would be prudent in the 
context of future attempts at SAI. It may encourage states and decision makers to take into 
account other SAI activities, such as in hypothetical scenario 3, where state ‘E’ decided to 
commence its own SAI program in addition to that of state ‘A’.70 Highlighting this as a relevant 
consideration for assessing severity of harm could also encourage states and policymakers to 
consider how SAI may interact with CDR geoengineering proposals, such as bioenergy with 
carbon capture and storage, or ocean fertilisation. Lastly, it would also encourage states and 
decision makers to consider how SAI is likely to interact with natural phenomena, such as large 
volcanic eruptions.71  
                                                 
populations of such species’; and ‘degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of biological scientific, historic, 
aesthetic or wilderness significance.’  
68 Article 3(2)(b) of the Antarctic Environmental Protocol lists specific impacts that Parties should avoid 
causing to the Antarctic environment, including: ‘significant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial (including 
aquatic), glacial or marine environments’; ‘detrimental changes in the distribution, abundance or productivity of 
species or populations of species of fauna and flora’; further jeopardy to endangered or threatened species or 
populations of such species’; and ‘degradation of, or substantial risk to, areas of biological scientific, historic, 
aesthetic or wilderness significance.’  
69 Alan Robock, 'Stratospheric Aerosol Geoengineering' in Roy  Harrison and Ron Hester (eds), Geoengineering 
of the Climate System (The Royal Society of Chemistry, 2014) 162, [181].  
70 Chapter 7.2. 
71 See A. Laakso et al, 'Radiative and climate impacts of a large volcanic eruption during stratospheric sulfur 
geoengineering' (2016) 16(1) Atmos. Chem. Phys. 305.  
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In the context of future attempts at SAI, it may also be relevant to consider the way in which a 
proposed activity may contribute to existing environmental problems within a global commons 
area. As noted in chapter seven, SAI may exacerbate existing problems, such as ozone 
depletion and atmospheric aerosol loading.72 One way to address this would be the approach 
taken under Appendix III of the Espoo Convention, which asks whether an activity may ‘cause 
additional loading which cannot be sustained by the carrying capacity of the environment.’73 
Such a provision could mean that SAI activities which are otherwise considered small in size, 
magnitude and/or duration (such as small scale field tests) may nevertheless be assessed as 
posing a risk of significant harm if they risk exceeding the critical limits on atmospheric 
pollution.74  
However, the way this issue is phrased under the Espoo Convention may not be appropriate for 
harm the global atmospheric commons. It assumes that carrying capacity of a system is 
established or easy to establish. As noted in chapter seven, scientists are as yet to define what 
the precise limits of the atmosphere are in relation to aerosol loading.75 The use of terms such 
as ‘loading’ and ‘carrying capacity’ would exclude situations where a problem involves the 
depletion of a resource rather than the addition of pollutants. Given the potential for SAI to 
deplete the stratospheric ozone layer it is important that the criterion of effects is worded in 
such a way as to also address resource depletion. This project therefore recommends taking a 
broader approach, considering instead whether an activity will contribute to or exacerbate an 
existing environmental problem.  
5. The capacity to monitor and safely conduct the activity, including 
(i) Whether technology and procedures are available to provide for 
environmentally safe operations; 
(ii) Whether there exists the capacity to monitor key environmental 
parameters and ecosystem components so as to identify and provide 
early warning of any adverse impacts of the activity and provide for such 
modification of operating procedures as may be necessary in light of the 
result of monitoring and increased knowledge of the environment and 
dependant and associated ecosystems of a global commons; 
                                                 
72 Chapter 7.3.2. See also chapter 1.2.2. 
73 Espoo Convention, Appendix III 1(c). 
74 See chapter 7.3.2. 
75 Ibid. 
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(iii) Whether there exists the capacity to respond properly and effectively to 
accidents, particularly those with potential effects on a global commons 
This criterion is adapted from article 3(2)(c)(iv)-(vi) of the Antarctic Environmental Protocol. 
The purpose of this criterion would be to encourage states and decision makers to take a broader 
view of what might constitute a risk of significant harm. It may be prudent to think beyond the 
location and nature of likely impacts from the activity on a global commons area, to also 
consider the capacity to detect and respond to such impacts.  
The capacity to detect and respond to impacts will be important considerations in assessing 
whether SAI poses a risk of significant harm to the atmosphere. The difficulties of detecting 
and responding to future SAI field tests and deployment are identified by Robock et al.76 
According to Robock et al, it may be impossible to distinguish the impact of small-scale SRM 
field tests from the existing ‘noise’ of weather and climate variations.77 In the case of large-
scale experiments and full-scale deployment, Robock et al further suggest that, no matter if 
negative side-effects are detected, it may be ‘difficult to stop such an experiment quickly.’78 
This is because stopping large-scale attempts at SAI may result in a rapid increase in global 
temperatures that could have more serious consequences than the current rate of global 
warming.79 Lastly, Robock et al note that there is currently no comprehensive system for 
monitoring the effects of any field testing.80 The limitations in monitoring and managing SAI 
arguably heighten the risk of significant harm to the atmosphere, and therefore should be taken 
into account when determining if a proposed SAI activity gives rise to obligations under the 
no-harm rule.  
These criteria should be developed as an illustrative, rather than an exclusive list, so that they 
can remain general and open to other relevant considerations. This would preserve the inherent 
flexibility in the no-harm rule, enabling it to apply to a wide ranges of scenarios. Moreover, 
the criteria need not be legally binding, instead playing a similar role to the ‘significant impact 
criteria’ establishing by the Australian Government Department of the Environment81 that 
                                                 
76 Alan Robock et al, 'A Test for Geoengineering?' (2010) 327(5965) Science 530, 531. For further discussion on 
the ‘termination problem’ see chapter 1.2.2. 
77 Ibid, 531. But see Keith and MacMartin, above n 27, 204.  
78 Robock et al, above n 76, 531.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid.  
81 Matters of National Environmental Significance: Significant impact guidelines 1.1, Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, (2013) Department  of the Environment, 
<https://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/42f84df4-720b-4dcf-b262-48679a3aba58/files/nes-
guidelines_1.pdf> 
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assist in determining whether a proposed activity is likely to have a ‘significant impact on a 
matter of national environmental significance’ such that it must be referred for approval under 
the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). 82  The criteria 
proposed for the no-harm rule could take the form of a non-binding set of guidelines to assist 
states and legal scholars interpret the no-harm rule, similar to the work produced by the ILC. 
The criteria proposed for the no-harm rule would similarly provide states, their scientists and 
decision-makers with guidance on how to assess whether a proposed activity meets the 
threshold level of ‘significant’ harm, triggering obligations under the no-harm rule. These 
criteria would also clarify if and when states should fulfil relevant procedural obligations. If 
developed through an interactive approach involving a community of practice as outlined 
above, these criteria could influence the decision-making of states, regardless of their non-
binding status.  
Scientific opinion and assessment will play a necessary role in determining if a proposed SAI 
activity will pose a risk of significant harm to the global commons - there is no ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach to assessing severity of harm. The criteria proposed above would not remove all 
discretion from the assessment and decision-making process, nor would they erase all 
ambiguity with regards to doctrinal analysis and the elements of interactional law theory. They 
would, however, reduce the discretion states currently have in determining whether the no-
harm rule applies to future attempts at SAI. Providing greater guidance on its application would 
give the no-harm rule better prospects of meeting the criteria of legality and promoting a 
stronger sense of legal obligation in the context of risks of harm to the global commons.  
9.3.3 State responsibility for harm to the global commons 
The third recommendation is to clarify how the no-harm rule for the protection of the global 
commons might be enforced against states that do not comply with their due diligence and 
procedural obligations. In the specific context of the atmosphere, this would require clarifying 
whether states owe a collective obligation to all other states to protect the atmosphere from 
significant harm. That is, whether states have an obligation erga omnes, in which significant 
harm to the atmosphere is deemed to injure the legal interests of all states.83 The concept that 
                                                 
82 Ibid, 1. 
83 See Jonathan I Charney, 'Third State Remedies for Environmental Damage to the World's Common Spaces ' 
in Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (eds), International Responsibility for Environmental Harm 
(Graham & Trotman, 1991) 149, 166. See also Kathy Leigh, 'Liability for Damage to the Global Commons' 
(1992) 14 Australian Year Book of International Law 129, 142-144; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 'Liability for 
Environmental Damage Caused to the Global Commons' (1996) 5(4) RECIEL 305, 305.  
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states may owe obligations erga omnes to the international community as a whole was raised 
by the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 
(Second Phase) (‘Barcelona Traction’). 84  According to Fitzmaurice, protection of the 
environment of the global commons falls within this category,85 but this view has not been 
affirmed by an international court or tribunal.86 
A further question is whether states have corresponding standing to bring an action against 
states that breach their obligations under the no-harm rule for the global commons.87 That is, 
whether they might invoke the rules of state responsibility to hold a state accountable for such 
a breach. Article 48(1)(b) of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility suggests that any 
state may invoke the responsibility of another if ‘the obligation breached is owed to the 
international community as a whole.’88 However, this right has not been successfully exercised 
by states in the context of harm to the global commons.89 According to Leigh, international 
courts and tribunals have typically taken a restrictive approach to the enforcement of such 
rights.90 For example, the ICJ did not recognise a corresponding right of actio popularis (‘the 
right to take legal action in vindication of a public interest’) in the South-West Africa Cases 
(Second Phase). 91  It therefore remains unclear whether states would have a right under 
customary international law to enforce the no-harm rule for the prevention of harm to the global 
commons against other states.  
It is important to clarify rules of standing and the process of enforcement to further reduce 
doctrinal uncertainty regarding the no-harm rule for the global commons. Additionally, as 
noted above, enforcement is an important part of a practice of legality under interactional law 
theory, although clarifying enforcement mechanisms would not necessarily lead to the 
development of such practice. Enforcing the no-harm rule for the global commons would face 
the same hurdles as outlined above in section 9.2 for transboundary harm, such as establishing 
causation and consent-based jurisdiction. However, providing states with at least a means to 
                                                 
84 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Second Phase) (Belgium v 
Spain) (Judgment) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, 32 (‘Barcelona Traction’).  
85 See Fitzmaurice, above n 83, 307. 
86 The ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case affirmed acts of aggression, genocide, protection from slavery and 
racial discrimination as egra omne. See Barcelona Traction, [1970] ICJ Rep 3, [34].  
87 Fitzmaurice, above n 83, 308.  
88 ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) II(2) 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 31, art 48(1)(b). 
89 Sands and Peel, above n 21, 148. Sands and Peel note that there is an absence of state practice in support of 
such a right in the context of environmental harm to the global commons.  
90 Leigh, above n 83, 150. 
91 South-West Africa Cases (Second Phase) (Ethiopia v South Africa); (Liberia v South Africa) (Judgment) 
[1966] ICJ Rep 6 [88]. See also ibid.  
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enforce the no-harm rule for the global commons is a necessary step towards enabling such 
practice. It would put the no-harm rule for the global commons on par with the no-harm rule 
for transboundary harm.  
9.3.4 Clarifying procedural obligations for the global commons  
The fourth and final recommendation is to develop a clearer understanding of how key 
procedural obligations of conducting an EIA and notifying and consulting with other states 
apply to activities that risk causing significant harm to the atmosphere.92 A set of criteria for 
identifying risks of ‘significant’ harm to the global commons as outlined above would assist in 
clarifying several procedural obligations. Firstly, since the content of an EIA is not prescribed 
under customary international law,93 so the criteria could be used to inform the terms of 
reference for EIA relating to activities affecting the global commons. They highlight issues that 
ought to be taken into account when assessing the nature and severity of risk posed by a 
proposed activity.  
However, further development of the no-harm rule is needed to clarify with whom the content 
of an EIA for the global commons should be shared in accordance with the duty to notify and 
consult.  Short of notifying and consulting with all 192 states, it is unclear how states should 
fulfil this procedural obligation when it comes to risks of harm to the atmosphere.94 This is not 
as big an issue for other global commons, such as Antarctica and the High Seas, as they are 
already governed by treaty bodies and have clear mechanisms for notification, consultation and 
cooperation.95 However, there is no treaty or international organisation for the protection of the 
atmosphere as a whole.  
The most appropriate course of action for resolving this issue may be to charge an existing 
international organisation (or create a new one) with decision-making authority over activities 
affecting the atmosphere.96 This would be difficult to achieve in practice because it would 
require negotiation of an international agreement, and would therefore be beyond the scope of 
customary international law. It would also be politically challenging to convince states to 
                                                 
92 This is not so much of a problem for risks of harm to Antarctica and the High Seas, for which procedural 
obligations are more clearly set out under respective treaty instruments. See United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) 
art 206 (‘UNCLOS’).  
93 See chapter 7.4.1.  
94 Ibid.  
95 See UNCLOS art 205, 206; Antarctic Environmental Protocol, art 6. 
96 Chapter 7.4.1. See also Neil Craik, 'International Law and Geoengineering: Do Emerging Technologies 
Require Special Rules?' (2015) 5(2-4) Climate Law 111, 128.  
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endow an international organisation with such decision-making authority. This is clearly an 
issue that demands further consideration and may be hard to resolve. Developing the no-harm 
rule for the global commons so that its capacity is equivalent to transboundary harm may 
therefore be unachievable when it comes to the duty to notify and consult. The duty to notify 
and consult for risks of harm to the global commons might be beyond the capacity of the no-
harm rule to contribute to the governance of SAI.  
9.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has synthesised the key findings from doctrinal legal analysis and application of 
interactional law theory to the no-harm rule. It is clear from this analysis that the no-harm rule 
does not provide a universal solution to the international governance of SRM/SAI. It is well 
recognised in geoengineering literature that liability mechanisms would be an important aspect 
of international governance.97 As noted in this chapter, there are many obstacles to the no-harm 
rule providing an adequate means to hold states responsible for harm that might result from an 
attempt at SAI. Furthermore, the no-harm rule would only provide a means to govern risks of 
harm. There are other governance challenges that the no-harm rule would not address. As 
summarised by Horton, Parker and Keith: 
Who decides when to use solar geoengineering? Who decides when to test it? How should these 
decisions be made? What climatic targets should guide an intervention? How should 
geoengineering be tied to mitigation and adaptation?98 
This project has taken a narrow focus to analysing the capacity of the no-harm rule to contribute 
to the governance of SRM/SAI. It has expressly focused on the no-harm rule’s capacity to 
contribute to the ex ante governance of risks of transboundary harm and harm to the global 
commons. In this respect, the findings of this project suggest that the no-harm rule would 
provide international law with a basic capacity to govern risks of significant transboundary 
harm posed by SAI. In light of the fact that risks of transboundary harm from SAI are not 
clearly governed by existing international agreements, and the prospect that scientists may field 
test SAI in the near future, the importance of this basic capacity should not be underestimated.  
                                                 
97 See, eg, Joshua B Horton, Andrew Parker and David Keith, 'Solar Geoengineering and the Problem of 
Liability ' (2013)  Geoengineering Our Climate? Working Papers and Opinion Articles  
<http://geoengineeringourclimate.com/tag/solar-radiation-management/>; Anna-Maria  Hubert and David 
Reichwein, 'An Exploration of a Code of Conduct for Responsible Scientific Research involving 
Geoengineering: Introduction, Draft Articles and Commentaries' (IASS, Potsdam 
Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, University of Oxford, 2015) 37-38; Saxler, Siegfried and Proelss, 
above n 1.  
98 Horton, Parker and Keith, above n 97, 2.  
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However, this basic capacity does not extend to risks of harm to the atmosphere per se. Given 
the nature of SAI and the way in which it is intended to interfere with the atmosphere and 
global climate system, the no-harm rule should be developed to apply to the global commons, 
so that its capacity in this context matches that for transboundary harm. Accordingly, this 
chapter has made four recommendations for the development of the no-harm rule for the global 
commons. These are (1) to encourage the development a community of practice for the no-
harm rule through existing international institutions; (2) establish a set of criteria to provide 
states, policymakers and scientists with greater guidance on how to determine when an activity 
poses a risk of significant harm to the global commons; (3) clarify enforcement mechanisms 
for the no-harm rule for the global commons; and (4) clarify the way in which procedural 
obligations (especially the duty to notify and consult) are to be interpreted to apply in the 
context of risks of harm to the global commons.  
These recommendations will not transform the no-harm rule into a comprehensive regime for 
the protection of the atmosphere, but would at least clarify the way in which the no-harm rule 
should be interpreted to apply to SAI and improve the extent to which it is likely to exert a 
sense of legal obligation over states to prevent significant harm to the atmosphere from 
activities under their jurisdiction and control. This is so that the no-harm rule might share the 
same, basic capacity to respond to risk of harm to the global commons from SAI as it currently 
has for risk of transboundary harm. This capacity is important until such a time as a 
comprehensive agreement for SRM/SAI might be negotiated. These recommendations would 
also serve to improve the capacity of international law more generally to protect the atmosphere 
as a global commons.   
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10 Conclusion 
When this project commenced in February 2013, geoengineering had just emerged from the 
fringes of climate science as a potential response to anthropogenic climate change. 1 
Geoengineering has continued to gain momentum over the duration of this project, with various 
events and publications bringing it within mainstream policy consideration. The first 
international academic conference specifically focusing on geoengineering was held in Berlin 
in 2014.2 The IPCC considered and commented upon possible future use of geoengineering for 
the first time in Working Group 1 Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis and the 
Summary for Policymakers of its Fifth Assessment Report.3 A number of reports have been 
released by key national and international scientific and research bodies considering the science 
and governance of geoengineering.4 Most recently, a report was released in October 2016 by 
the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, considering the feasibility and 
potential effectiveness of geoengineering as a response to climate change and its implications 
for biodiversity.5  
Consideration of geoengineering has intensified since the negotiation of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement.6 The Paris Agreement was hailed as a diplomatic success,7 setting an ambitious 
                                                 
1 K A Brent and J McGee, ‘The regulation of geoengineering: A gathering storm for international climate 
change policy?’ (2012) 46(4) Air Quality and Climate Change 22, 22.  
2 See Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies, Climate Engineering Conference 2014: Critical Global 
Discussions, Conference Report (2014) Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies <http://www.ce-
conference.org/>. 
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution 
of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/> 27, 98, 468, 546.   
4 See, eg, Kelsi Bracmort and Richard Lattanzio, ‘Geoengineering: Governance and Technology Policy’ (CRS 
Report, Congressoinal Research Service, 26 November 2013); S Schäfer et al, ‘The European Transdisciplinary 
Assessment of Climate Engineering (EuTRACE): Removing Greenhouse Gases from the Atmosphere and 
Reflecting Sunlight away from Earth’ <http://www.eutrace.org/>; National Research Council, Climate 
Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool the Earth (The National Academies Press, 2015) 
<http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18988/climate-intervention-reflecting-sunlight-to-cool-earth>; National Research 
Council, Climate Intervention: Carbon Dioxide Removal and Reliable Sequestration (The National Academies 
Press, 2015) <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/18805/climate-intervention-carbon-dioxide-removal-and-reliable-
sequestration>; Andrew R Bowie, Julia Jabour, Thomas W Trull, Karina McLachlan, Philip W  Boyd, Tony 
Press, Delphine Lannuzel, Kerryn Brent, Jeffrey McGee, Policy Analysis: Ocean Fertilisation, (2016) Antarctic 
Climate & Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre <http://acecrc.org.au/publication/ocean-fertilisation-2/>. 
5 P Williamson & R Bodle, ‘Update on Climate Geoengineering in Relation to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity: Potential Impacts and Regulatory Framework’, (2016) Technical Series No.84. Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, < https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-84-en.pdf>. 
6 Paris Agreement, opened for signature 12 December 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016) < 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php> art 4.  
7 See, eg, Fiona Harvey, ‘Paris climate change agreement: the world’s greatest diplomatic success’, The 
Guardian, 14 December 2015 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/paris-climate-deal-cop-
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target of ‘holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-
industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-
industrial levels’. 8 However, there are significant concerns that this target (especially the lower 
limit of 1.5 °C) is infeasible.9 The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions made by 
countries prior to the Paris Agreement are insufficient to limit global temperature rise to 2 °C 
— at best, they will limit warming to 2.7 °C.10 Following the election of Donald Trump as the 
45th President of the United States, there is a significant risk that the United States will 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement, or even the UNFCCC. 11 There are growing suggestions 
that some form of geoengineering will be necessary to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 °C.12 
The need to develop carbon dioxide removal (CDR) geoengineering or ‘negative emissions’ 
technology is arguably implicit in the 2015 Paris Agreement. 13  Shortly after the Paris 
Agreement was concluded, leading UK climate change scientist Kevin Anderson published an 
article in Nature, claiming that: 
[R]ather than requiring that nations reduce emissions in the short-to-medium term, the Paris 
agreement instead rests on the assumption that the world will successfully suck the carbon 
pollution it produces back from the atmosphere in the longer term.14 
                                                 
diplomacy-developing-united-nations>; John Vidal et al, ‘World Leaders hail Paris climate deal as ‘major leap 
for mankind’’, The Guardian, 13 December 2016 < 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/13/world-leaders-hail-paris-climate-deal>. 
8 Paris Agreement, opened for signature 12 December 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016) < 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php> art 2. 
9 See, eg, Agence France-Presse, ‘Paris climate goal will be ‘difficult if not impossible to hit’’ The Guardian, 22 
September 2016, < https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/22/paris-climate-goal-will-de-difficult-
if-not-impossible-to-hit>; Andrew King and Benjamin J Hanley, ‘We have almost certainly blown the 1.5-
degree global warming target’, The Conversation, 15 August 2016, <https://theconversation.com/we-have-
almost-certainly-blown-the-1-5-degree-global-warming-target-63720>.   
10 Simon Evans, ‘UN report: Climate pledges fall short of cheapest route to 2C limit’ CarbonBrief, 30 October 
2015 <https://www.carbonbrief.org/un-report-climate-pledges-fall-short-of-cheapest-route-to-2c-limit>. 
11 See, eg, Coral Davenport, ‘Donald Trump Could Put Climate Change on Course for ‘Danger Zone’’, New 
York Times (10 November 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/us/politics/donald-trump-climate-
change.html>; John Vidal, ‘‘There’s no plan B’: climate change scientists fear consequences of Trump victory’, 
The Guardian (13 November 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/12/climate-change-
marrakech-no-plan-b--trump-victory; Coral Davenport, ‘Diplomats Confront New Threat to Paris Climate Pact: 
Donald Trump’, New York Times, 18 November 2016, < http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/us/politics/trump-
climate-change.html?_r=0>; Luke Kemp, ‘President Trump could kill the Paris Agreement – but climate action 
will survive’, The Conversation, 11 November 2016 < https://theconversation.com/president-trump-could-kill-
the-paris-agreement-but-climate-action-will-survive-68596>; Valerie Volcovivi and Alister Doyle, ‘Trump 
looking at fast ways to quit global climate deal: source’, Reuters, 14 November 2016 < 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-climatechange-accord-idUSKBN1370JX>. 
12 See Robin McKie, ‘Scientists warn world will miss key climate target’, The Guardian, 7 August 2016 < 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/aug/06/global-warming-target-miss-scientists-warn>. 
13 Paris Agreement, opened for signature 12 December 2016 (entered into force 4 November 2016) < 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php> art 4.  
14 Kevin Anderson, ‘Talks in the city of light generate more heat’ 582 (7583) Nature 437, 437.  
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In other words, the Paris Agreement was concluded on the basis of the assumption that CDR 
geoengineering will be successfully developed and used in the coming decades.15 However, it 
is questionable whether CDR geoengineering could be feasibly developed and deployed on a 
large enough scale to avoid global temperature increase exceeding 1.5°C.16 Several scientists 
propose that SRM may be necessary to achieve this target, and there are calls for the IPCC to 
start factoring SRM into its modelling and scenarios.17 There is a growing chorus of proponents 
who advocate that, while rapid global decarbonisation is the preferred response to climate 
change, SRM/SAI must be researched and developed so that it is ready to play a role in reducing 
global temperatures if necessary.18   
In light of these developments, it is likely that proposals to develop geoengineering technology 
will gain increasing momentum as a potential means to respond to climate change. The question 
of how geoengineering attempts should be governed at an international level must therefore 
rise in prominence. International law needs to develop quickly if it is to play a role in governing 
the development and potential future deployment of SAI. In particular, it must be developed to 
ensure that any future field testing or full-scale deployment of SAI will not exacerbate an 
already bad situation. International law has already developed speedily in response to the risks 
of marine geoengineering, 19  for example through the 2013 amendments to the London 
                                                 
15 See also John Shepherd, ‘What does the Paris Agreement mean for geoengineering?’ on The Royal Society 
(17 Feb 2016) <http://blogs.royalsociety.org/in-verba/2016/02/17/what-does-the-paris-agreement-mean-for-
geoengineering/>; Joshua B Horton, David W Keith and Matthias Honegger ‘Implications of the Paris 
Agreement for Carbon Dioxide Removal and Solar Geoengineering’ Harvard Project on Climate Agreements 
(July 2016) <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/160700_horton-keith-honegger_vp2.pdf>. 
16 Andy Parker and Oliver Geden, ‘No fudging on geoengineering’, (2016) Nature Geoscience – Advanced 
Online Publication 
<http://www.nature.com/articles/ngeo2851.epdf?author_access_token=H_OWCpUIRzRjnbDCD7phRNRgN0j
AjWel9jnR3ZoTv0MkaXvEd3zZcdmn9cYxtHS6fy7t2z-
okX47A1QNqqe2rvcM4Ijc2vF1BP3rPpd1u8KxPtLUkOH7pCuwiREjG8mo>. 
17 Ibid. See also Joshua B Horton, David W Keith and Matthias Honegger ‘Implications of the Paris Agreement 
for Carbon Dioxide Removal and Solar Geoengineering’ Harvard Project on Climate Agreements (July 2016) 
<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/160700_horton-keith-honegger_vp2.pdf>. 
18 See, eg, Matthew Watson, ‘Time to stage trials of engineering the atmosphere to cool earth’ New Scientist, 23 
November 2016, < https://www.newscientist.com/article/2113880-time-to-stage-trials-of-engineering-the-
atmosphere-to-cool-earth/>; Jane C S Long, Frank Loy and M. Granger Morgan, ‘Start research on climate 
engineering’ (2015) 518 Nature 29; David W. Keith and Douglas G. MacMartin, 'A temporary, moderate and 
responsive scenario for solar geoengineering' (2015) 5(3) Nature Climate Change 201; David  Keith, A Case for 
Climate Engineering (The MIT Press, 2013); Douglas G. MacMynowski et al, 'Can we test geoengineering?' 
(2011) 4(12) Energy & Environmental Science 5044; John A Dykema et al, 'Stratospheric controlled 
perturbation experiment: a small-scale experiment to improve understanding of the risks of solar 
geoengineering' (2014) 372(2031) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, 
Physical and Engineering Sciences 1; Edward A Parson and David W Keith, 'End the Deadlock on Governance 
of Geoengineering Research' (2013) 339(6125) Science 1278, 1279.   
19 See Chapter 1.2.5. 
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Protocol.20 The question is whether international law can be similarly developed in time to 
govern the risks of SAI? At the present time, there is no indication that states will negotiate a 
similar agreement regarding SAI in the near future.    
The aim of this project has been to analyse how the no-harm rule, as an existing rule of 
customary international law, might encourage states to take action to prevent and/or minimise 
the risk of harm to other states and to the atmosphere if they wish to field test and/or deploy 
SAI in the future. In order to achieve this aim, this project posed the following research 
questions:  
1. What is the history, content and underlying purpose of the no-harm rule? 
2. To what extent does the no-harm rule, as currently formulated, respond to potential 
environmental harm from proposed SAI geoengineering activities?  
3. What changes to the no-harm rule might be required to enhance its capacity to respond 
to risks of transboundary harm and/or harm to the atmosphere should SAI be attempted 
in the future? 
This project uses two approaches to answer these questions. Doctrinal legal analysis establishes 
the content of the no-harm rule and how it would probably be interpreted to apply to future 
attempts at SAI. Interactional law theory analyses the capacity of the no-harm rule to influence 
the behaviour of states by exerting a sense of legal obligation that will encourage states to 
comply with the rule if they decide to attempt SAI in the future. By combining these 
approaches, this research contributes to geoengineering governance literature by presenting a 
multifaceted account of the role of the no-harm rule in international environmental governance. 
Not only does it offer a detailed account of the content of the no-harm rule, it also establishes 
the extent to which the no-harm rule is likely to ‘matter’ to the behaviour and decision-making 
of states.21 
In answering question one, this thesis contributes to international law scholarship by providing 
a comprehensive, cutting-edge analysis of the development – and hence the current 
interpretation - of the no-harm rule. It analyses key sources to demonstrate how the no-harm 
                                                 
20 Resolution LP.4(8): On the Amendment to the London Protocol to Regulate the Placement of Matter for 
Ocean Fertilization and other Marine Geoengineering Activities, LC 35/15 (adopted 18 October 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ms-amendment-to-1996-london-protocol-to-regulate-marine-
geoengineering> (‘Resolution LP.4(8)’). 
21 See Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie  Slaughter, 'International Law, International Relations and Compliance ' in 
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth  Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations (Sage 
Publications, 2002) 538, 538. See also Chapter 2.4.  
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rule has evolved over time and how its content is best interpreted at the present time. Many of 
the sources considered in this analysis, such as the records of UN General Assembly meetings, 
and the written submissions of states to international courts and tribunals, are often overlooked 
by legal scholars when assessing the content of the no-harm rule. By analysing these sources, 
this project provides a unique picture of how states have understood their obligations under the 
no-harm rule and how these understandings have changed over time. This is also one of the 
first pieces of research to analyse the implications for the no-harm rule of the seminal judgment 
of the ICJ in the 2015 Certain Activities case.22  
In answering question two, this project provides a new understanding of the potential of the 
no-harm rule to contribute to the governance of SAI, and international environmental 
governance more generally. The no-harm rule should not be relied upon as providing an 
adequate and comprehensive governance regime for risk of transboundary harm from SAI. 
Existing research indicates that it would be difficult to hold states responsible or liable for 
significant transboundary harm from SAI under the no-harm rule. 23  However, this work 
demonstrates that the no-harm rule as it currently stands has a basic capacity to contribute to 
the ex ante governance of risk of transboundary harm to the territory of other states from SAI. 
Given that there is currently no indication that states will negotiate a comprehensive 
international agreement for SAI in the near future, this basic capacity could therefore enable 
the no-harm rule to play an important role in geoengineering governance. For this reason, the 
potential of the no-harm rule to contribute to geoengineering governance should no longer be 
downplayed.24 
However, this project demonstrates that the no-harm rule has a poor capacity to respond to 
risks of harm to the atmosphere per se from SAI. It is unclear how the no-harm rule applies to 
these risks, and the no-harm rule is less likely to promote a sense of legal obligation and 
compliance from states in this context. This project therefore recommends how the no-harm 
rule might be developed to bolster its capacity to respond to risks of harm to the atmosphere.  
These recommendations are: (1) the development of a widespread community of practice 
between state and non-state actors; (2) the creation of a set of criteria to help determine when 
                                                 
22 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Boarder Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) & Construction 
of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) (Judgment) (International Court of 
Justice, General List No 150 & 152, 16 December 2015).  
23 See Barbara Saxler, Jule Siegfried and Alexander Proelss, 'International liability for transboundary damage 
arising from stratospheric aerosol injections' (2015) 7(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 112, 122-123; David 
Reichwein et al, 'State Responsibility for Environmental Harm from Climate Engineering' (2015) 5(2-4) Climate 
law 142.  
24 See Chapter 2.2  
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an activity poses a risk of significant harm; (3) the clarification of enforcement mechanisms; 
and (4) the clarification of procedural obligations. These recommendations are uniquely 
informed by Brunnée and Toope’s theory of interactional international law and are targeted at 
bolstering the likelihood of compliance with the no-harm rule, as well as enhancing doctrinal 
clarity. They provide states, policymakers, civil society and legal scholars with a practical 
strategy to enhance the capacity of the no-harm rule to respond to risks of harm to the 
atmosphere from SAI, to match its capacity to respond to risks of transboundary harm.  
In this respect, this project makes a fresh contribution to a broader issue in international law 
and governance scholarship: the protection of the atmosphere. The ILC has recently 
commenced a new project on this topic, emphasising that protection of the atmosphere as an 
issue of contemporary significance to international law scholarship and to the United Nations 
General Assembly.25 The special rapporteur, Shinya Murase, has published three reports on 
this topic, including early recommendations for a set of draft guidelines on the obligation of 
states to protect the atmosphere.26 Unlike the broad approach taken by the ILC, this research is 
tailored to the distinctive challenges raised by proposals to develop SAI and it recognises the 
important role of legal obligation through the lens of interactional law theory. This is not 
necessarily a better approach to the protection of the atmosphere than the ILC approach, but it 
does provide states, policy-makers, and international law and governance scholars with a fresh 
perspective from which they might reflect on the future development of international law for 
the protection of the atmosphere.  
Analysis of the no-harm rule using interactional law theory is both original and innovative. 
Aside from the work of Brunnée and Toope, interactional law theory has not been widely 
considered or applied by international law or international relations scholars. The examples 
that Brunnée and Toope use in their seminal book Legitimacy and Legality in International 
Law were primarily aimed to develop interactional law theory and demonstrate how its 
elements contribute to a distinct sense of legal legitimacy and legal obligation that can lead to 
effective lawmaking.27 In contrast, this project uses interactional law theory as a means to 
assess the capacity of an existing rule to generate a sense of legal obligation, and recommend 
                                                 
25 See Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission: Protection of the Atmosphere, 
International Law Commission (18 November 2016)  < http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/8_8.shtml#mandate>  
26 Shinya Murase, ‘Third report on the protection of the atmosphere’, Protection of the Atmosphere, 
International Law Commission, 68th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/692 (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016), 20, 
draft guideline 3.  
27 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 
(Cambridge University Press 2010), 17.  
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how it might be developed to improve this capacity. This project therefore ‘tests’ the utility of 
interactional law theory as an approach for analysing the potential of rules of customary 
international law to encourage states to comply. It provides international law and international 
relations scholars with a distinctive example of how interactional law theory can be used to 
predict compliance with international law.  
The initial focus of this project was the governance of SRM geoengineering, with customary 
international law and the no-harm rule providing one of many potential mechanisms to focus 
on. It quickly became apparent that a single chapter on customary international law would 
provide only a superficial understanding of the potential of the no-harm rule. Instead of being 
the primary focus of this research, therefore, the governance of SRM became a lens through 
which to examine and analyse the role of the no-harm rule in international environmental 
governance. This project has coincided with a wider reawakening of interest in and engagement 
with the no-harm rule among academics, the ILC and the ICJ. This reawakening of interest 
suggests that the no-harm rule has more to offer international environmental governance than 
has been recognised to date. The unique challenges posed by SRM demonstrate the continuing 
relevance of the no-harm rule and the urgency and importance of its refinement and further 
development.     
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